2 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Mellanox Technologies. All rights reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>. All rights reserved.
4 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Lance Chao <lancerchao@fb.com>. All rights reserved.
5 * Copyright (c) 2016, Fridolin Pokorny <fridolin.pokorny@gmail.com>. All rights reserved.
6 * Copyright (c) 2016, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>. All rights reserved.
7 * Copyright (c) 2018, Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io
9 * This software is available to you under a choice of one of two
10 * licenses. You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU
11 * General Public License (GPL) Version 2, available from the file
12 * COPYING in the main directory of this source tree, or the
13 * OpenIB.org BSD license below:
15 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
16 * without modification, are permitted provided that the following
19 * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above
20 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
23 * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
24 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
25 * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
26 * provided with the distribution.
28 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
29 * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
30 * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
31 * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
32 * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
33 * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
34 * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
38 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
39 #include <linux/module.h>
40 #include <crypto/aead.h>
42 #include <net/strparser.h>
45 static int __skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len,
46 unsigned int recursion_level)
48 int start = skb_headlen(skb);
49 int i, chunk = start - offset;
50 struct sk_buff *frag_iter;
53 if (unlikely(recursion_level >= 24))
66 for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
69 WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
71 end = start + skb_frag_size(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]);
85 if (unlikely(skb_has_frag_list(skb))) {
86 skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) {
89 WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
91 end = start + frag_iter->len;
96 ret = __skb_nsg(frag_iter, offset - start, chunk,
98 if (unlikely(ret < 0))
113 /* Return the number of scatterlist elements required to completely map the
114 * skb, or -EMSGSIZE if the recursion depth is exceeded.
116 static int skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len)
118 return __skb_nsg(skb, offset, len, 0);
121 static int padding_length(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx,
122 struct tls_prot_info *prot, struct sk_buff *skb)
124 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
127 /* Determine zero-padding length */
128 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
129 char content_type = 0;
133 while (content_type == 0) {
134 if (back > rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size)
136 err = skb_copy_bits(skb,
137 rxm->offset + rxm->full_len - back,
146 ctx->control = content_type;
151 static void tls_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
153 struct aead_request *aead_req = (struct aead_request *)req;
154 struct scatterlist *sgout = aead_req->dst;
155 struct scatterlist *sgin = aead_req->src;
156 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx;
157 struct tls_context *tls_ctx;
158 struct tls_prot_info *prot;
159 struct scatterlist *sg;
164 skb = (struct sk_buff *)req->data;
165 tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(skb->sk);
166 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
167 prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
169 /* Propagate if there was an err */
172 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(skb->sk),
173 LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR);
174 ctx->async_wait.err = err;
175 tls_err_abort(skb->sk, err);
177 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
180 pad = padding_length(ctx, prot, skb);
182 ctx->async_wait.err = pad;
183 tls_err_abort(skb->sk, pad);
185 rxm->full_len -= pad;
186 rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size;
187 rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
191 /* After using skb->sk to propagate sk through crypto async callback
192 * we need to NULL it again.
197 /* Free the destination pages if skb was not decrypted inplace */
199 /* Skip the first S/G entry as it points to AAD */
200 for_each_sg(sg_next(sgout), sg, UINT_MAX, pages) {
203 put_page(sg_page(sg));
209 pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
211 if (!pending && READ_ONCE(ctx->async_notify))
212 complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
215 static int tls_do_decryption(struct sock *sk,
217 struct scatterlist *sgin,
218 struct scatterlist *sgout,
221 struct aead_request *aead_req,
224 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
225 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
226 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
229 aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_recv);
230 aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size);
231 aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sgin, sgout,
232 data_len + prot->tag_size,
236 /* Using skb->sk to push sk through to crypto async callback
237 * handler. This allows propagating errors up to the socket
238 * if needed. It _must_ be cleared in the async handler
239 * before consume_skb is called. We _know_ skb->sk is NULL
240 * because it is a clone from strparser.
243 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req,
244 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
245 tls_decrypt_done, skb);
246 atomic_inc(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
248 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req,
249 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
250 crypto_req_done, &ctx->async_wait);
253 ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
254 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
258 ret = crypto_wait_req(ret, &ctx->async_wait);
259 } else if (ret == -EBADMSG) {
260 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR);
264 atomic_dec(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
269 static void tls_trim_both_msgs(struct sock *sk, int target_size)
271 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
272 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
273 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
274 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
276 sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext, target_size);
278 target_size += prot->overhead_size;
279 sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted, target_size);
282 static int tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(struct sock *sk, int len)
284 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
285 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
286 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
287 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
289 return sk_msg_alloc(sk, msg_en, len, 0);
292 static int tls_clone_plaintext_msg(struct sock *sk, int required)
294 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
295 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
296 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
297 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
298 struct sk_msg *msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
299 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
302 /* We add page references worth len bytes from encrypted sg
303 * at the end of plaintext sg. It is guaranteed that msg_en
304 * has enough required room (ensured by caller).
306 len = required - msg_pl->sg.size;
308 /* Skip initial bytes in msg_en's data to be able to use
309 * same offset of both plain and encrypted data.
311 skip = prot->prepend_size + msg_pl->sg.size;
313 return sk_msg_clone(sk, msg_pl, msg_en, skip, len);
316 static struct tls_rec *tls_get_rec(struct sock *sk)
318 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
319 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
320 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
321 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
325 mem_size = sizeof(struct tls_rec) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_send);
327 rec = kzalloc(mem_size, sk->sk_allocation);
331 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
332 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
337 sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_in, 2);
338 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_in[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size);
339 sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_in[1]);
341 sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_out, 2);
342 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_out[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size);
343 sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_out[1]);
348 static void tls_free_rec(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *rec)
350 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted);
351 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
355 static void tls_free_open_rec(struct sock *sk)
357 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
358 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
359 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
362 tls_free_rec(sk, rec);
363 ctx->open_rec = NULL;
367 int tls_tx_records(struct sock *sk, int flags)
369 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
370 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
371 struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp;
372 struct sk_msg *msg_en;
373 int tx_flags, rc = 0;
375 if (tls_is_partially_sent_record(tls_ctx)) {
376 rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
377 struct tls_rec, list);
380 tx_flags = rec->tx_flags;
384 rc = tls_push_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx, tx_flags);
388 /* Full record has been transmitted.
389 * Remove the head of tx_list
391 list_del(&rec->list);
392 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
396 /* Tx all ready records */
397 list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) {
398 if (READ_ONCE(rec->tx_ready)) {
400 tx_flags = rec->tx_flags;
404 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
405 rc = tls_push_sg(sk, tls_ctx,
406 &msg_en->sg.data[msg_en->sg.curr],
411 list_del(&rec->list);
412 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
420 if (rc < 0 && rc != -EAGAIN)
421 tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
426 static void tls_encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
428 struct aead_request *aead_req = (struct aead_request *)req;
429 struct sock *sk = req->data;
430 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
431 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
432 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
433 struct scatterlist *sge;
434 struct sk_msg *msg_en;
439 rec = container_of(aead_req, struct tls_rec, aead_req);
440 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
442 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, msg_en->sg.curr);
443 sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
444 sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
446 /* Check if error is previously set on socket */
447 if (err || sk->sk_err) {
450 /* If err is already set on socket, return the same code */
452 ctx->async_wait.err = sk->sk_err;
454 ctx->async_wait.err = err;
455 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
460 struct tls_rec *first_rec;
462 /* Mark the record as ready for transmission */
463 smp_store_mb(rec->tx_ready, true);
465 /* If received record is at head of tx_list, schedule tx */
466 first_rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
467 struct tls_rec, list);
468 if (rec == first_rec)
472 pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
474 if (!pending && READ_ONCE(ctx->async_notify))
475 complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
480 /* Schedule the transmission */
481 if (!test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
482 schedule_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work, 1);
485 static int tls_do_encryption(struct sock *sk,
486 struct tls_context *tls_ctx,
487 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx,
488 struct aead_request *aead_req,
489 size_t data_len, u32 start)
491 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
492 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
493 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
494 struct scatterlist *sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, start);
495 int rc, iv_offset = 0;
497 /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of IV is a constant */
498 if (prot->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128) {
499 rec->iv_data[0] = TLS_AES_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE;
503 memcpy(&rec->iv_data[iv_offset], tls_ctx->tx.iv,
504 prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size);
506 xor_iv_with_seq(prot->version, rec->iv_data, tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq);
508 sge->offset += prot->prepend_size;
509 sge->length -= prot->prepend_size;
511 msg_en->sg.curr = start;
513 aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_send);
514 aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size);
515 aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, rec->sg_aead_in,
517 data_len, rec->iv_data);
519 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
520 tls_encrypt_done, sk);
522 /* Add the record in tx_list */
523 list_add_tail((struct list_head *)&rec->list, &ctx->tx_list);
524 atomic_inc(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
526 rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
527 if (!rc || rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
528 atomic_dec(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
529 sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
530 sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
534 WRITE_ONCE(rec->tx_ready, true);
535 } else if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
536 list_del(&rec->list);
540 /* Unhook the record from context if encryption is not failure */
541 ctx->open_rec = NULL;
542 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->tx);
546 static int tls_split_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *from,
547 struct tls_rec **to, struct sk_msg *msg_opl,
548 struct sk_msg *msg_oen, u32 split_point,
549 u32 tx_overhead_size, u32 *orig_end)
551 u32 i, j, bytes = 0, apply = msg_opl->apply_bytes;
552 struct scatterlist *sge, *osge, *nsge;
553 u32 orig_size = msg_opl->sg.size;
554 struct scatterlist tmp = { };
555 struct sk_msg *msg_npl;
559 new = tls_get_rec(sk);
562 ret = sk_msg_alloc(sk, &new->msg_encrypted, msg_opl->sg.size +
563 tx_overhead_size, 0);
565 tls_free_rec(sk, new);
569 *orig_end = msg_opl->sg.end;
570 i = msg_opl->sg.start;
571 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
572 while (apply && sge->length) {
573 if (sge->length > apply) {
574 u32 len = sge->length - apply;
576 get_page(sg_page(sge));
577 sg_set_page(&tmp, sg_page(sge), len,
578 sge->offset + apply);
583 apply -= sge->length;
584 bytes += sge->length;
587 sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
588 if (i == msg_opl->sg.end)
590 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
594 msg_opl->sg.curr = i;
595 msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0;
596 msg_opl->apply_bytes = 0;
597 msg_opl->sg.size = bytes;
599 msg_npl = &new->msg_plaintext;
600 msg_npl->apply_bytes = apply;
601 msg_npl->sg.size = orig_size - bytes;
603 j = msg_npl->sg.start;
604 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
606 memcpy(nsge, &tmp, sizeof(*nsge));
607 sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
608 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
611 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
612 while (osge->length) {
613 memcpy(nsge, osge, sizeof(*nsge));
615 sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
616 sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
619 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
620 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
624 msg_npl->sg.curr = j;
625 msg_npl->sg.copybreak = 0;
631 static void tls_merge_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *to,
632 struct tls_rec *from, u32 orig_end)
634 struct sk_msg *msg_npl = &from->msg_plaintext;
635 struct sk_msg *msg_opl = &to->msg_plaintext;
636 struct scatterlist *osge, *nsge;
640 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
641 j = msg_npl->sg.start;
643 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
644 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
646 if (sg_page(osge) == sg_page(nsge) &&
647 osge->offset + osge->length == nsge->offset) {
648 osge->length += nsge->length;
649 put_page(sg_page(nsge));
652 msg_opl->sg.end = orig_end;
653 msg_opl->sg.curr = orig_end;
654 msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0;
655 msg_opl->apply_bytes = msg_opl->sg.size + msg_npl->sg.size;
656 msg_opl->sg.size += msg_npl->sg.size;
658 sk_msg_free(sk, &to->msg_encrypted);
659 sk_msg_xfer_full(&to->msg_encrypted, &from->msg_encrypted);
664 static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags,
665 unsigned char record_type)
667 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
668 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
669 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
670 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec, *tmp = NULL;
671 u32 i, split_point, uninitialized_var(orig_end);
672 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
673 struct aead_request *req;
680 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
681 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
683 split_point = msg_pl->apply_bytes;
684 split = split_point && split_point < msg_pl->sg.size;
686 rc = tls_split_open_record(sk, rec, &tmp, msg_pl, msg_en,
687 split_point, prot->overhead_size,
691 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size +
692 prot->overhead_size);
695 rec->tx_flags = flags;
696 req = &rec->aead_req;
699 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
701 rec->content_type = record_type;
702 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
703 /* Add content type to end of message. No padding added */
704 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_content_type, &rec->content_type, 1);
705 sg_mark_end(&rec->sg_content_type);
706 sg_chain(msg_pl->sg.data, msg_pl->sg.end + 1,
707 &rec->sg_content_type);
709 sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_pl, i));
712 i = msg_pl->sg.start;
713 sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_in, 2, rec->inplace_crypto ?
714 &msg_en->sg.data[i] : &msg_pl->sg.data[i]);
717 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
718 sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_en, i));
720 i = msg_en->sg.start;
721 sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_out, 2, &msg_en->sg.data[i]);
723 tls_make_aad(rec->aad_space, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size,
724 tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq, prot->rec_seq_size,
725 record_type, prot->version);
727 tls_fill_prepend(tls_ctx,
728 page_address(sg_page(&msg_en->sg.data[i])) +
729 msg_en->sg.data[i].offset,
730 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size,
731 record_type, prot->version);
733 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = false;
735 rc = tls_do_encryption(sk, tls_ctx, ctx, req,
736 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size, i);
738 if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
739 tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
741 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
742 tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end);
745 ctx->async_capable = 1;
748 msg_pl = &tmp->msg_plaintext;
749 msg_en = &tmp->msg_encrypted;
750 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size);
751 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
755 return tls_tx_records(sk, flags);
758 static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,
759 bool full_record, u8 record_type,
760 size_t *copied, int flags)
762 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
763 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
764 struct sk_msg msg_redir = { };
765 struct sk_psock *psock;
766 struct sock *sk_redir;
772 policy = !(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY);
773 psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
774 if (!psock || !policy)
775 return tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
777 enospc = sk_msg_full(msg);
778 if (psock->eval == __SK_NONE) {
779 delta = msg->sg.size;
780 psock->eval = sk_psock_msg_verdict(sk, psock, msg);
781 if (delta < msg->sg.size)
782 delta -= msg->sg.size;
786 if (msg->cork_bytes && msg->cork_bytes > msg->sg.size &&
787 !enospc && !full_record) {
793 if (msg->apply_bytes && msg->apply_bytes < send)
794 send = msg->apply_bytes;
796 switch (psock->eval) {
798 err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
800 *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
801 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
806 sk_redir = psock->sk_redir;
807 memcpy(&msg_redir, msg, sizeof(*msg));
808 if (msg->apply_bytes < send)
809 msg->apply_bytes = 0;
811 msg->apply_bytes -= send;
812 sk_msg_return_zero(sk, msg, send);
813 msg->sg.size -= send;
815 err = tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(sk_redir, &msg_redir, send, flags);
818 *copied -= sk_msg_free_nocharge(sk, &msg_redir);
821 if (msg->sg.size == 0)
822 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
826 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, send);
827 if (msg->apply_bytes < send)
828 msg->apply_bytes = 0;
830 msg->apply_bytes -= send;
831 if (msg->sg.size == 0)
832 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
833 *copied -= (send + delta);
838 bool reset_eval = !ctx->open_rec;
842 msg = &rec->msg_plaintext;
843 if (!msg->apply_bytes)
847 psock->eval = __SK_NONE;
848 if (psock->sk_redir) {
849 sock_put(psock->sk_redir);
850 psock->sk_redir = NULL;
857 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
861 static int tls_sw_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags)
863 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
864 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
865 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
866 struct sk_msg *msg_pl;
872 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
873 copied = msg_pl->sg.size;
877 return bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, true, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA,
881 int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
883 long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
884 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
885 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
886 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
887 bool async_capable = ctx->async_capable;
888 unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
889 bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter);
890 bool eor = !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE);
891 size_t try_to_copy, copied = 0;
892 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
902 if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL))
905 mutex_lock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
908 if (unlikely(msg->msg_controllen)) {
909 ret = tls_proccess_cmsg(sk, msg, &record_type);
911 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
913 else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
918 while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
927 rec = ctx->open_rec = tls_get_rec(sk);
933 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
934 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
936 orig_size = msg_pl->sg.size;
938 try_to_copy = msg_data_left(msg);
939 record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - msg_pl->sg.size;
940 if (try_to_copy >= record_room) {
941 try_to_copy = record_room;
945 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy +
948 if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
949 goto wait_for_sndbuf;
952 ret = tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(sk, required_size);
955 goto wait_for_memory;
957 /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
958 * actually allocated. The difference is due
959 * to max sg elements limit
961 try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_en->sg.size;
965 if (!is_kvec && (full_record || eor) && !async_capable) {
966 u32 first = msg_pl->sg.end;
968 ret = sk_msg_zerocopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter,
969 msg_pl, try_to_copy);
971 goto fallback_to_reg_send;
973 rec->inplace_crypto = 0;
976 copied += try_to_copy;
978 sk_msg_sg_copy_set(msg_pl, first);
979 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
980 record_type, &copied,
983 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
985 else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
986 goto wait_for_memory;
987 else if (ctx->open_rec && ret == -ENOSPC)
989 else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
994 copied -= try_to_copy;
995 sk_msg_sg_copy_clear(msg_pl, first);
996 iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter,
997 msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size);
998 fallback_to_reg_send:
999 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_pl, orig_size);
1002 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy;
1004 ret = tls_clone_plaintext_msg(sk, required_size);
1009 /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
1010 * actually allocated. The difference is due
1011 * to max sg elements limit
1013 try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_pl->sg.size;
1015 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en,
1016 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size);
1020 ret = sk_msg_memcopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter,
1021 msg_pl, try_to_copy);
1026 /* Open records defined only if successfully copied, otherwise
1027 * we would trim the sg but not reset the open record frags.
1029 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
1030 copied += try_to_copy;
1031 if (full_record || eor) {
1032 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
1033 record_type, &copied,
1036 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
1038 else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
1039 goto wait_for_memory;
1040 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
1051 set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
1053 ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
1057 tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, orig_size);
1061 if (ctx->open_rec && msg_en->sg.size < required_size)
1062 goto alloc_encrypted;
1067 } else if (num_zc) {
1068 /* Wait for pending encryptions to get completed */
1069 smp_store_mb(ctx->async_notify, true);
1071 if (atomic_read(&ctx->encrypt_pending))
1072 crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
1074 reinit_completion(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
1076 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->async_notify, false);
1078 if (ctx->async_wait.err) {
1079 ret = ctx->async_wait.err;
1084 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */
1085 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) {
1086 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work);
1087 tls_tx_records(sk, msg->msg_flags);
1091 ret = sk_stream_error(sk, msg->msg_flags, ret);
1094 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
1095 return copied ? copied : ret;
1098 static int tls_sw_do_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
1099 int offset, size_t size, int flags)
1101 long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
1102 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1103 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
1104 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1105 unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
1106 struct sk_msg *msg_pl;
1107 struct tls_rec *rec;
1115 eor = !(flags & (MSG_MORE | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST));
1116 sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk);
1118 /* Call the sk_stream functions to manage the sndbuf mem. */
1120 size_t copy, required_size;
1128 rec = ctx->open_rec;
1130 rec = ctx->open_rec = tls_get_rec(sk);
1136 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
1138 full_record = false;
1139 record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - msg_pl->sg.size;
1141 if (copy >= record_room) {
1146 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + copy + prot->overhead_size;
1148 if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
1149 goto wait_for_sndbuf;
1151 ret = tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(sk, required_size);
1154 goto wait_for_memory;
1156 /* Adjust copy according to the amount that was
1157 * actually allocated. The difference is due
1158 * to max sg elements limit
1160 copy -= required_size - msg_pl->sg.size;
1164 sk_msg_page_add(msg_pl, page, copy, offset);
1165 sk_mem_charge(sk, copy);
1171 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
1172 if (full_record || eor || sk_msg_full(msg_pl)) {
1173 rec->inplace_crypto = 0;
1174 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
1175 record_type, &copied, flags);
1177 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
1179 else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
1180 goto wait_for_memory;
1181 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
1190 set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
1192 ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
1195 tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, msg_pl->sg.size);
1204 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */
1205 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) {
1206 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work);
1207 tls_tx_records(sk, flags);
1211 ret = sk_stream_error(sk, flags, ret);
1212 return copied ? copied : ret;
1215 int tls_sw_sendpage_locked(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
1216 int offset, size_t size, int flags)
1218 if (flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
1219 MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY |
1220 MSG_NO_SHARED_FRAGS))
1223 return tls_sw_do_sendpage(sk, page, offset, size, flags);
1226 int tls_sw_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
1227 int offset, size_t size, int flags)
1229 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1232 if (flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
1233 MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY))
1236 mutex_lock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
1238 ret = tls_sw_do_sendpage(sk, page, offset, size, flags);
1240 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
1244 static struct sk_buff *tls_wait_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock,
1245 int flags, long timeo, int *err)
1247 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1248 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1249 struct sk_buff *skb;
1250 DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function);
1252 while (!(skb = ctx->recv_pkt) && sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) {
1254 *err = sock_error(sk);
1258 if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
1261 if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
1264 if ((flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) || !timeo) {
1269 add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
1270 sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
1271 sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo,
1272 ctx->recv_pkt != skb ||
1273 !sk_psock_queue_empty(psock),
1275 sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
1276 remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
1278 /* Handle signals */
1279 if (signal_pending(current)) {
1280 *err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
1288 static int tls_setup_from_iter(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *from,
1289 int length, int *pages_used,
1290 unsigned int *size_used,
1291 struct scatterlist *to,
1294 int rc = 0, i = 0, num_elem = *pages_used, maxpages;
1295 struct page *pages[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
1296 unsigned int size = *size_used;
1297 ssize_t copied, use;
1300 while (length > 0) {
1302 maxpages = to_max_pages - num_elem;
1303 if (maxpages == 0) {
1307 copied = iov_iter_get_pages(from, pages,
1315 iov_iter_advance(from, copied);
1320 use = min_t(int, copied, PAGE_SIZE - offset);
1322 sg_set_page(&to[num_elem],
1323 pages[i], use, offset);
1324 sg_unmark_end(&to[num_elem]);
1325 /* We do not uncharge memory from this API */
1334 /* Mark the end in the last sg entry if newly added */
1335 if (num_elem > *pages_used)
1336 sg_mark_end(&to[num_elem - 1]);
1339 iov_iter_revert(from, size - *size_used);
1341 *pages_used = num_elem;
1346 /* This function decrypts the input skb into either out_iov or in out_sg
1347 * or in skb buffers itself. The input parameter 'zc' indicates if
1348 * zero-copy mode needs to be tried or not. With zero-copy mode, either
1349 * out_iov or out_sg must be non-NULL. In case both out_iov and out_sg are
1350 * NULL, then the decryption happens inside skb buffers itself, i.e.
1351 * zero-copy gets disabled and 'zc' is updated.
1354 static int decrypt_internal(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1355 struct iov_iter *out_iov,
1356 struct scatterlist *out_sg,
1357 int *chunk, bool *zc, bool async)
1359 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1360 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1361 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1362 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1363 int n_sgin, n_sgout, nsg, mem_size, aead_size, err, pages = 0;
1364 struct aead_request *aead_req;
1365 struct sk_buff *unused;
1366 u8 *aad, *iv, *mem = NULL;
1367 struct scatterlist *sgin = NULL;
1368 struct scatterlist *sgout = NULL;
1369 const int data_len = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size +
1373 if (*zc && (out_iov || out_sg)) {
1375 n_sgout = iov_iter_npages(out_iov, INT_MAX) + 1;
1377 n_sgout = sg_nents(out_sg);
1378 n_sgin = skb_nsg(skb, rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size,
1379 rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size);
1383 n_sgin = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &unused);
1389 /* Increment to accommodate AAD */
1390 n_sgin = n_sgin + 1;
1392 nsg = n_sgin + n_sgout;
1394 aead_size = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_recv);
1395 mem_size = aead_size + (nsg * sizeof(struct scatterlist));
1396 mem_size = mem_size + prot->aad_size;
1397 mem_size = mem_size + crypto_aead_ivsize(ctx->aead_recv);
1399 /* Allocate a single block of memory which contains
1400 * aead_req || sgin[] || sgout[] || aad || iv.
1401 * This order achieves correct alignment for aead_req, sgin, sgout.
1403 mem = kmalloc(mem_size, sk->sk_allocation);
1407 /* Segment the allocated memory */
1408 aead_req = (struct aead_request *)mem;
1409 sgin = (struct scatterlist *)(mem + aead_size);
1410 sgout = sgin + n_sgin;
1411 aad = (u8 *)(sgout + n_sgout);
1412 iv = aad + prot->aad_size;
1414 /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of nonce+iv is always '2' */
1415 if (prot->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128) {
1421 err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
1422 iv + iv_offset + prot->salt_size,
1428 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION)
1429 memcpy(iv + iv_offset, tls_ctx->rx.iv,
1430 crypto_aead_ivsize(ctx->aead_recv));
1432 memcpy(iv + iv_offset, tls_ctx->rx.iv, prot->salt_size);
1434 xor_iv_with_seq(prot->version, iv, tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq);
1437 tls_make_aad(aad, rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size +
1439 tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq, prot->rec_seq_size,
1440 ctx->control, prot->version);
1443 sg_init_table(sgin, n_sgin);
1444 sg_set_buf(&sgin[0], aad, prot->aad_size);
1445 err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, &sgin[1],
1446 rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size,
1447 rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size);
1455 sg_init_table(sgout, n_sgout);
1456 sg_set_buf(&sgout[0], aad, prot->aad_size);
1459 err = tls_setup_from_iter(sk, out_iov, data_len,
1460 &pages, chunk, &sgout[1],
1463 goto fallback_to_reg_recv;
1464 } else if (out_sg) {
1465 memcpy(sgout, out_sg, n_sgout * sizeof(*sgout));
1467 goto fallback_to_reg_recv;
1470 fallback_to_reg_recv:
1477 /* Prepare and submit AEAD request */
1478 err = tls_do_decryption(sk, skb, sgin, sgout, iv,
1479 data_len, aead_req, async);
1480 if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
1483 /* Release the pages in case iov was mapped to pages */
1484 for (; pages > 0; pages--)
1485 put_page(sg_page(&sgout[pages]));
1491 static int decrypt_skb_update(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1492 struct iov_iter *dest, int *chunk, bool *zc,
1495 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1496 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1497 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1498 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1501 if (!ctx->decrypted) {
1502 if (tls_ctx->rx_conf == TLS_HW) {
1503 err = tls_device_decrypted(sk, tls_ctx, skb, rxm);
1508 /* Still not decrypted after tls_device */
1509 if (!ctx->decrypted) {
1510 err = decrypt_internal(sk, skb, dest, NULL, chunk, zc,
1513 if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
1514 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot,
1523 pad = padding_length(ctx, prot, skb);
1527 rxm->full_len -= pad;
1528 rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size;
1529 rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
1530 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->rx);
1532 ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
1540 int decrypt_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1541 struct scatterlist *sgout)
1546 return decrypt_internal(sk, skb, NULL, sgout, &chunk, &zc, false);
1549 static bool tls_sw_advance_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1552 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1553 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1556 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1558 if (len < rxm->full_len) {
1560 rxm->full_len -= len;
1566 /* Finished with message */
1567 ctx->recv_pkt = NULL;
1568 __strp_unpause(&ctx->strp);
1573 /* This function traverses the rx_list in tls receive context to copies the
1574 * decrypted records into the buffer provided by caller zero copy is not
1575 * true. Further, the records are removed from the rx_list if it is not a peek
1576 * case and the record has been consumed completely.
1578 static int process_rx_list(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx,
1587 struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(&ctx->rx_list);
1590 struct tls_msg *tlm;
1593 /* Set the record type in 'control' if caller didn't pass it */
1596 ctrl = tlm->control;
1599 while (skip && skb) {
1600 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1603 /* Cannot process a record of different type */
1604 if (ctrl != tlm->control)
1607 if (skip < rxm->full_len)
1610 skip = skip - rxm->full_len;
1611 skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
1614 while (len && skb) {
1615 struct sk_buff *next_skb;
1616 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1617 int chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len - skip, len);
1621 /* Cannot process a record of different type */
1622 if (ctrl != tlm->control)
1625 /* Set record type if not already done. For a non-data record,
1626 * do not proceed if record type could not be copied.
1629 int cerr = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_TLS, TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE,
1630 sizeof(ctrl), &ctrl);
1632 if (ctrl != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
1633 if (cerr || msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC)
1640 if (!zc || (rxm->full_len - skip) > len) {
1641 int err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset + skip,
1648 copied = copied + chunk;
1650 /* Consume the data from record if it is non-peek case*/
1652 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk;
1653 rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk;
1655 /* Return if there is unconsumed data in the record */
1656 if (rxm->full_len - skip)
1660 /* The remaining skip-bytes must lie in 1st record in rx_list.
1661 * So from the 2nd record, 'skip' should be 0.
1666 msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
1668 next_skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
1671 skb_unlink(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
1682 int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
1689 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1690 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1691 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1692 struct sk_psock *psock;
1693 unsigned char control = 0;
1694 ssize_t decrypted = 0;
1695 struct strp_msg *rxm;
1696 struct tls_msg *tlm;
1697 struct sk_buff *skb;
1700 int target, err = 0;
1702 bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter);
1703 bool is_peek = flags & MSG_PEEK;
1708 if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE))
1709 return sock_recv_errqueue(sk, msg, len, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR);
1711 psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
1714 /* Process pending decrypted records. It must be non-zero-copy */
1715 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, &cmsg, 0, len, false,
1718 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
1727 target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len);
1729 timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
1731 while (len && (decrypted + copied < target || ctx->recv_pkt)) {
1732 bool retain_skb = false;
1739 skb = tls_wait_data(sk, psock, flags, timeo, &err);
1742 int ret = __tcp_bpf_recvmsg(sk, psock,
1754 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION)
1757 tlm->control = ctx->control;
1760 rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1762 to_decrypt = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size;
1764 if (to_decrypt <= len && !is_kvec && !is_peek &&
1765 ctx->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA &&
1766 prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
1769 /* Do not use async mode if record is non-data */
1770 if (ctx->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
1771 async_capable = ctx->async_capable;
1773 async_capable = false;
1775 err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, &msg->msg_iter,
1776 &chunk, &zc, async_capable);
1777 if (err < 0 && err != -EINPROGRESS) {
1778 tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
1782 if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
1785 } else if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
1786 tlm->control = ctx->control;
1789 /* If the type of records being processed is not known yet,
1790 * set it to record type just dequeued. If it is already known,
1791 * but does not match the record type just dequeued, go to end.
1792 * We always get record type here since for tls1.2, record type
1793 * is known just after record is dequeued from stream parser.
1794 * For tls1.3, we disable async.
1798 control = tlm->control;
1799 else if (control != tlm->control)
1805 cerr = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_TLS, TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE,
1806 sizeof(control), &control);
1808 if (control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
1809 if (cerr || msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) {
1817 goto pick_next_record;
1820 if (rxm->full_len > len) {
1824 chunk = rxm->full_len;
1827 err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset,
1833 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk;
1834 rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk;
1845 /* For async or peek case, queue the current skb */
1846 if (async || is_peek || retain_skb) {
1847 skb_queue_tail(&ctx->rx_list, skb);
1851 if (tls_sw_advance_skb(sk, skb, chunk)) {
1852 /* Return full control message to
1853 * userspace before trying to parse
1854 * another message type
1856 msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
1857 if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
1866 /* Wait for all previously submitted records to be decrypted */
1867 smp_store_mb(ctx->async_notify, true);
1868 if (atomic_read(&ctx->decrypt_pending)) {
1869 err = crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
1871 /* one of async decrypt failed */
1872 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
1878 reinit_completion(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
1880 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->async_notify, false);
1882 /* Drain records from the rx_list & copy if required */
1883 if (is_peek || is_kvec)
1884 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, &cmsg, copied,
1885 decrypted, false, is_peek);
1887 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, &cmsg, 0,
1888 decrypted, true, is_peek);
1890 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
1896 copied += decrypted;
1901 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
1902 return copied ? : err;
1905 ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
1906 struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
1907 size_t len, unsigned int flags)
1909 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sock->sk);
1910 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1911 struct strp_msg *rxm = NULL;
1912 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
1913 struct sk_buff *skb;
1922 timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
1924 skb = tls_wait_data(sk, NULL, flags, timeo, &err);
1926 goto splice_read_end;
1928 if (!ctx->decrypted) {
1929 err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, NULL, &chunk, &zc, false);
1931 /* splice does not support reading control messages */
1932 if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
1934 goto splice_read_end;
1938 tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
1939 goto splice_read_end;
1943 rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1945 chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len);
1946 copied = skb_splice_bits(skb, sk, rxm->offset, pipe, chunk, flags);
1948 goto splice_read_end;
1950 if (likely(!(flags & MSG_PEEK)))
1951 tls_sw_advance_skb(sk, skb, copied);
1955 return copied ? : err;
1958 bool tls_sw_stream_read(const struct sock *sk)
1960 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1961 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1962 bool ingress_empty = true;
1963 struct sk_psock *psock;
1966 psock = sk_psock(sk);
1968 ingress_empty = list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg);
1971 return !ingress_empty || ctx->recv_pkt ||
1972 !skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list);
1975 static int tls_read_size(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
1977 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk);
1978 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1979 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1980 char header[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + MAX_IV_SIZE];
1981 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1982 size_t cipher_overhead;
1983 size_t data_len = 0;
1986 /* Verify that we have a full TLS header, or wait for more data */
1987 if (rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size > skb->len)
1990 /* Sanity-check size of on-stack buffer. */
1991 if (WARN_ON(prot->prepend_size > sizeof(header))) {
1996 /* Linearize header to local buffer */
1997 ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset, header, prot->prepend_size);
2002 ctx->control = header[0];
2004 data_len = ((header[4] & 0xFF) | (header[3] << 8));
2006 cipher_overhead = prot->tag_size;
2007 if (prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
2008 cipher_overhead += prot->iv_size;
2010 if (data_len > TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE + cipher_overhead +
2015 if (data_len < cipher_overhead) {
2020 /* Note that both TLS1.3 and TLS1.2 use TLS_1_2 version here */
2021 if (header[1] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MINOR ||
2022 header[2] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MAJOR) {
2027 tls_device_rx_resync_new_rec(strp->sk, data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
2028 TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + rxm->offset);
2029 return data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE;
2032 tls_err_abort(strp->sk, ret);
2037 static void tls_queue(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
2039 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk);
2040 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2044 ctx->recv_pkt = skb;
2047 ctx->saved_data_ready(strp->sk);
2050 static void tls_data_ready(struct sock *sk)
2052 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2053 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2054 struct sk_psock *psock;
2056 strp_data_ready(&ctx->strp);
2058 psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
2059 if (psock && !list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg)) {
2060 ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
2061 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
2065 void tls_sw_cancel_work_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2067 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2069 set_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask);
2070 set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask);
2071 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ctx->tx_work.work);
2074 void tls_sw_release_resources_tx(struct sock *sk)
2076 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2077 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2078 struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp;
2080 /* Wait for any pending async encryptions to complete */
2081 smp_store_mb(ctx->async_notify, true);
2082 if (atomic_read(&ctx->encrypt_pending))
2083 crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
2085 tls_tx_records(sk, -1);
2087 /* Free up un-sent records in tx_list. First, free
2088 * the partially sent record if any at head of tx_list.
2090 if (tls_free_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx)) {
2091 rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
2092 struct tls_rec, list);
2093 list_del(&rec->list);
2094 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
2098 list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) {
2099 list_del(&rec->list);
2100 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted);
2101 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
2105 crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_send);
2106 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
2109 void tls_sw_free_ctx_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2111 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2116 void tls_sw_release_resources_rx(struct sock *sk)
2118 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2119 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2121 kfree(tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq);
2122 kfree(tls_ctx->rx.iv);
2124 if (ctx->aead_recv) {
2125 kfree_skb(ctx->recv_pkt);
2126 ctx->recv_pkt = NULL;
2127 skb_queue_purge(&ctx->rx_list);
2128 crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_recv);
2129 strp_stop(&ctx->strp);
2130 /* If tls_sw_strparser_arm() was not called (cleanup paths)
2131 * we still want to strp_stop(), but sk->sk_data_ready was
2134 if (ctx->saved_data_ready) {
2135 write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2136 sk->sk_data_ready = ctx->saved_data_ready;
2137 write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2142 void tls_sw_strparser_done(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2144 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2146 strp_done(&ctx->strp);
2149 void tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2151 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2156 void tls_sw_free_resources_rx(struct sock *sk)
2158 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2160 tls_sw_release_resources_rx(sk);
2161 tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2164 /* The work handler to transmitt the encrypted records in tx_list */
2165 static void tx_work_handler(struct work_struct *work)
2167 struct delayed_work *delayed_work = to_delayed_work(work);
2168 struct tx_work *tx_work = container_of(delayed_work,
2169 struct tx_work, work);
2170 struct sock *sk = tx_work->sk;
2171 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2172 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx;
2174 if (unlikely(!tls_ctx))
2177 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2178 if (test_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
2181 if (!test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
2183 mutex_lock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
2185 tls_tx_records(sk, -1);
2187 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
2190 void tls_sw_write_space(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
2192 struct tls_sw_context_tx *tx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(ctx);
2194 /* Schedule the transmission if tx list is ready */
2195 if (is_tx_ready(tx_ctx) &&
2196 !test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &tx_ctx->tx_bitmask))
2197 schedule_delayed_work(&tx_ctx->tx_work.work, 0);
2200 void tls_sw_strparser_arm(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2202 struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2204 write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2205 rx_ctx->saved_data_ready = sk->sk_data_ready;
2206 sk->sk_data_ready = tls_data_ready;
2207 write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2209 strp_check_rcv(&rx_ctx->strp);
2212 int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx, int tx)
2214 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2215 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
2216 struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info;
2217 struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *gcm_128_info;
2218 struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *gcm_256_info;
2219 struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *ccm_128_info;
2220 struct tls_sw_context_tx *sw_ctx_tx = NULL;
2221 struct tls_sw_context_rx *sw_ctx_rx = NULL;
2222 struct cipher_context *cctx;
2223 struct crypto_aead **aead;
2224 struct strp_callbacks cb;
2225 u16 nonce_size, tag_size, iv_size, rec_seq_size, salt_size;
2226 struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
2227 char *iv, *rec_seq, *key, *salt, *cipher_name;
2237 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_tx) {
2238 sw_ctx_tx = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_ctx_tx), GFP_KERNEL);
2243 ctx->priv_ctx_tx = sw_ctx_tx;
2246 (struct tls_sw_context_tx *)ctx->priv_ctx_tx;
2249 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_rx) {
2250 sw_ctx_rx = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_ctx_rx), GFP_KERNEL);
2255 ctx->priv_ctx_rx = sw_ctx_rx;
2258 (struct tls_sw_context_rx *)ctx->priv_ctx_rx;
2263 crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_tx->async_wait);
2264 crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send.info;
2266 aead = &sw_ctx_tx->aead_send;
2267 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_list);
2268 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.work, tx_work_handler);
2269 sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.sk = sk;
2271 crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_rx->async_wait);
2272 crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_recv.info;
2274 skb_queue_head_init(&sw_ctx_rx->rx_list);
2275 aead = &sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv;
2278 switch (crypto_info->cipher_type) {
2279 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128: {
2280 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2281 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
2282 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2283 iv = ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info)->iv;
2284 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2286 ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
2288 (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info;
2289 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE;
2290 key = gcm_128_info->key;
2291 salt = gcm_128_info->salt;
2292 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE;
2293 cipher_name = "gcm(aes)";
2296 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256: {
2297 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
2298 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_TAG_SIZE;
2299 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
2300 iv = ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *)crypto_info)->iv;
2301 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2303 ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
2305 (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *)crypto_info;
2306 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_KEY_SIZE;
2307 key = gcm_256_info->key;
2308 salt = gcm_256_info->salt;
2309 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_SALT_SIZE;
2310 cipher_name = "gcm(aes)";
2313 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128: {
2314 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2315 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
2316 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2317 iv = ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *)crypto_info)->iv;
2318 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2320 ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
2322 (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *)crypto_info;
2323 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_KEY_SIZE;
2324 key = ccm_128_info->key;
2325 salt = ccm_128_info->salt;
2326 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_SALT_SIZE;
2327 cipher_name = "ccm(aes)";
2335 /* Sanity-check the sizes for stack allocations. */
2336 if (iv_size > MAX_IV_SIZE || nonce_size > MAX_IV_SIZE ||
2337 rec_seq_size > TLS_MAX_REC_SEQ_SIZE) {
2342 if (crypto_info->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
2344 prot->aad_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE;
2345 prot->tail_size = 1;
2347 prot->aad_size = TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE;
2348 prot->tail_size = 0;
2351 prot->version = crypto_info->version;
2352 prot->cipher_type = crypto_info->cipher_type;
2353 prot->prepend_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE + nonce_size;
2354 prot->tag_size = tag_size;
2355 prot->overhead_size = prot->prepend_size +
2356 prot->tag_size + prot->tail_size;
2357 prot->iv_size = iv_size;
2358 prot->salt_size = salt_size;
2359 cctx->iv = kmalloc(iv_size + salt_size, GFP_KERNEL);
2364 /* Note: 128 & 256 bit salt are the same size */
2365 prot->rec_seq_size = rec_seq_size;
2366 memcpy(cctx->iv, salt, salt_size);
2367 memcpy(cctx->iv + salt_size, iv, iv_size);
2368 cctx->rec_seq = kmemdup(rec_seq, rec_seq_size, GFP_KERNEL);
2369 if (!cctx->rec_seq) {
2375 *aead = crypto_alloc_aead(cipher_name, 0, 0);
2376 if (IS_ERR(*aead)) {
2377 rc = PTR_ERR(*aead);
2383 ctx->push_pending_record = tls_sw_push_pending_record;
2385 rc = crypto_aead_setkey(*aead, key, keysize);
2390 rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(*aead, prot->tag_size);
2395 tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv);
2397 if (crypto_info->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION)
2398 sw_ctx_rx->async_capable = 0;
2400 sw_ctx_rx->async_capable =
2401 !!(tfm->__crt_alg->cra_flags &
2404 /* Set up strparser */
2405 memset(&cb, 0, sizeof(cb));
2406 cb.rcv_msg = tls_queue;
2407 cb.parse_msg = tls_read_size;
2409 strp_init(&sw_ctx_rx->strp, sk, &cb);
2415 crypto_free_aead(*aead);
2418 kfree(cctx->rec_seq);
2419 cctx->rec_seq = NULL;
2425 kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_tx);
2426 ctx->priv_ctx_tx = NULL;
2428 kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_rx);
2429 ctx->priv_ctx_rx = NULL;