17 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
18 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
19 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
20 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
21 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
22 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
23 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
24 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
25 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
26 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
27 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
28 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
29 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
30 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
31 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
32 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
33 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
34 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
35 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
36 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
37 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
38 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
39 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
40 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
41 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
42 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
43 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
44 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
45 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
46 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
47 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
48 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
49 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
50 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
51 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
52 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
53 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
54 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
55 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
56 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
57 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
59 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
60 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
62 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
63 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
64 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
66 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
67 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
68 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
69 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
70 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
71 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
72 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
73 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
74 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
75 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
76 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
77 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
78 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
79 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
80 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
81 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
82 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
83 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
84 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
85 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
86 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
87 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
88 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
89 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
90 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
91 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
92 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
93 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
94 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
95 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
96 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
97 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
98 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
99 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
100 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
101 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
104 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
105 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
107 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP 0x0001
108 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX 0x0002
109 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_KEX_MASK 0x000F
110 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY 0x0010
111 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD 0x0020
112 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER 0x0040
113 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK 0x00F0
115 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
116 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
117 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
118 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
119 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
120 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
121 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
122 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
123 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
124 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
125 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
126 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
127 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
128 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
129 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
131 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons[] = {
133 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT",
134 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR",
135 "SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED",
136 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED",
137 "SSH_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR",
138 "SSH_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR",
139 "SSH_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE",
140 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED",
141 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE",
142 "SSH_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST",
143 "SSH_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION",
144 "SSH_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS",
145 "SSH_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER",
146 "SSH_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE",
147 "SSH_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME",
150 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
151 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
152 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
153 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
155 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
158 * Various remote-bug flags.
160 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
161 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
162 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
163 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
164 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
165 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
166 #define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
167 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
170 * Codes for terminal modes.
171 * Most of these are the same in SSH-1 and SSH-2.
172 * This list is derived from draft-ietf-secsh-connect-25 and
175 static const struct {
176 const char* const mode;
178 enum { TTY_OP_CHAR, TTY_OP_BOOL } type;
180 /* "V" prefix discarded for special characters relative to SSH specs */
181 { "INTR", 1, TTY_OP_CHAR },
182 { "QUIT", 2, TTY_OP_CHAR },
183 { "ERASE", 3, TTY_OP_CHAR },
184 { "KILL", 4, TTY_OP_CHAR },
185 { "EOF", 5, TTY_OP_CHAR },
186 { "EOL", 6, TTY_OP_CHAR },
187 { "EOL2", 7, TTY_OP_CHAR },
188 { "START", 8, TTY_OP_CHAR },
189 { "STOP", 9, TTY_OP_CHAR },
190 { "SUSP", 10, TTY_OP_CHAR },
191 { "DSUSP", 11, TTY_OP_CHAR },
192 { "REPRINT", 12, TTY_OP_CHAR },
193 { "WERASE", 13, TTY_OP_CHAR },
194 { "LNEXT", 14, TTY_OP_CHAR },
195 { "FLUSH", 15, TTY_OP_CHAR },
196 { "SWTCH", 16, TTY_OP_CHAR },
197 { "STATUS", 17, TTY_OP_CHAR },
198 { "DISCARD", 18, TTY_OP_CHAR },
199 { "IGNPAR", 30, TTY_OP_BOOL },
200 { "PARMRK", 31, TTY_OP_BOOL },
201 { "INPCK", 32, TTY_OP_BOOL },
202 { "ISTRIP", 33, TTY_OP_BOOL },
203 { "INLCR", 34, TTY_OP_BOOL },
204 { "IGNCR", 35, TTY_OP_BOOL },
205 { "ICRNL", 36, TTY_OP_BOOL },
206 { "IUCLC", 37, TTY_OP_BOOL },
207 { "IXON", 38, TTY_OP_BOOL },
208 { "IXANY", 39, TTY_OP_BOOL },
209 { "IXOFF", 40, TTY_OP_BOOL },
210 { "IMAXBEL", 41, TTY_OP_BOOL },
211 { "ISIG", 50, TTY_OP_BOOL },
212 { "ICANON", 51, TTY_OP_BOOL },
213 { "XCASE", 52, TTY_OP_BOOL },
214 { "ECHO", 53, TTY_OP_BOOL },
215 { "ECHOE", 54, TTY_OP_BOOL },
216 { "ECHOK", 55, TTY_OP_BOOL },
217 { "ECHONL", 56, TTY_OP_BOOL },
218 { "NOFLSH", 57, TTY_OP_BOOL },
219 { "TOSTOP", 58, TTY_OP_BOOL },
220 { "IEXTEN", 59, TTY_OP_BOOL },
221 { "ECHOCTL", 60, TTY_OP_BOOL },
222 { "ECHOKE", 61, TTY_OP_BOOL },
223 { "PENDIN", 62, TTY_OP_BOOL }, /* XXX is this a real mode? */
224 { "OPOST", 70, TTY_OP_BOOL },
225 { "OLCUC", 71, TTY_OP_BOOL },
226 { "ONLCR", 72, TTY_OP_BOOL },
227 { "OCRNL", 73, TTY_OP_BOOL },
228 { "ONOCR", 74, TTY_OP_BOOL },
229 { "ONLRET", 75, TTY_OP_BOOL },
230 { "CS7", 90, TTY_OP_BOOL },
231 { "CS8", 91, TTY_OP_BOOL },
232 { "PARENB", 92, TTY_OP_BOOL },
233 { "PARODD", 93, TTY_OP_BOOL }
236 /* Miscellaneous other tty-related constants. */
237 #define SSH_TTY_OP_END 0
238 /* The opcodes for ISPEED/OSPEED differ between SSH-1 and SSH-2. */
239 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED 192
240 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED 193
241 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
242 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
244 /* Helper functions for parsing tty-related config. */
245 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_specchar(char *s)
250 ret = ctrlparse(s, &next);
251 if (!next) ret = s[0];
253 ret = 255; /* special value meaning "don't set" */
257 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_boolean(char *s)
259 if (stricmp(s, "yes") == 0 ||
260 stricmp(s, "on") == 0 ||
261 stricmp(s, "true") == 0 ||
262 stricmp(s, "+") == 0)
264 else if (stricmp(s, "no") == 0 ||
265 stricmp(s, "off") == 0 ||
266 stricmp(s, "false") == 0 ||
267 stricmp(s, "-") == 0)
268 return 0; /* false */
270 return (atoi(s) != 0);
273 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
274 #define translatec(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_ctx & ctx)) return #x
275 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type)
277 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT);
278 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
279 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
280 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER);
281 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
282 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
283 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
284 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
285 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
286 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
287 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
288 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
289 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS);
290 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE);
291 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
292 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
293 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
294 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF);
295 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS);
296 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
297 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
298 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
299 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
300 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
301 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
302 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
303 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
304 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
305 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
306 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE);
307 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
308 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
309 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
310 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG);
311 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
312 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
313 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
314 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
315 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD);
316 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE);
317 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE);
320 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(int pkt_ctx, int type)
322 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
323 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
324 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
325 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
326 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
327 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
328 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
329 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
330 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
331 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
332 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
333 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
334 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
335 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
336 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
337 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
338 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
339 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
340 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY);
341 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD);
342 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
343 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
344 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
345 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS);
346 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
347 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
348 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
349 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
350 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
351 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
352 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
353 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
354 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
355 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
356 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS);
357 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
363 /* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
365 PKT_END, PKT_INT, PKT_CHAR, PKT_DATA, PKT_STR, PKT_BIGNUM,
366 /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
367 * fields to the packet logging code. */
368 PKTT_OTHER, PKTT_PASSWORD, PKTT_DATA
372 * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
373 * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
376 * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
378 * which explains the theory behind these macros.
380 * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
381 * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
382 * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
383 * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
385 * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
387 * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
388 * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
389 * Database for Edit and Continue'.
391 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
394 if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = snew(struct t); \
396 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
397 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
398 #define crReturn(z) \
400 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
404 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
406 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
407 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
408 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
409 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
411 typedef struct ssh_tag *Ssh;
414 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
415 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
416 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *, int length);
417 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *, void *data, int len);
418 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
419 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
420 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *, unsigned long value);
421 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *);
422 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *, char *data);
423 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *, char *data, int len);
424 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *, char *data);
425 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len);
426 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
427 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
428 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh, struct Packet *);
429 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh, struct Packet *);
430 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *);
431 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
432 struct Packet *pktin);
433 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
434 struct Packet *pktin);
437 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
438 * various different purposes:
440 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
441 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
442 * connection (in SSH-1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
443 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
446 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
447 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
448 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
449 * thankfully unlikely in SSH-2 since the window mechanism should
450 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
451 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
453 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH-2
457 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
458 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
459 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
460 #define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
462 const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = { &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss };
464 const static struct ssh_mac *macs[] = {
467 const static struct ssh_mac *buggymacs[] = {
468 &ssh_sha1_buggy, &ssh_md5
471 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
475 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle)
478 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle, unsigned char *block, int len,
479 unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen)
483 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle)
487 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none = {
489 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
490 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
491 ssh_comp_none_disable, NULL
493 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib;
494 const static struct ssh_compress *compressions[] = {
495 &ssh_zlib, &ssh_comp_none
498 enum { /* channel types */
503 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT /* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
507 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
510 Ssh ssh; /* pointer back to main context */
511 unsigned remoteid, localid;
513 /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
516 * In SSH-1, this value contains four bits:
518 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
519 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
520 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
521 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
523 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
527 struct ssh1_data_channel {
530 struct ssh2_data_channel {
532 unsigned remwindow, remmaxpkt;
537 struct ssh_agent_channel {
538 unsigned char *message;
539 unsigned char msglen[4];
540 unsigned lensofar, totallen;
542 struct ssh_x11_channel {
545 struct ssh_pfd_channel {
552 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH-1 and SSH-2
553 * use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH-2's
554 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
556 * In SSH-1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
557 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
558 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
559 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
560 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
561 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
562 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
563 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
564 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
565 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
566 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
568 * In SSH-2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
569 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
570 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
571 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
572 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
573 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
575 * Hence, in SSH-1 this structure is indexed by destination
576 * host:port pair, whereas in SSH-2 it is indexed by source port.
578 struct ssh_portfwd; /* forward declaration */
580 struct ssh_rportfwd {
581 unsigned sport, dport;
584 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec;
586 #define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
587 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
590 * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
591 * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
592 * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
593 * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
597 enum { DESTROY, KEEP, CREATE } status;
599 unsigned sport, dport;
602 struct ssh_rportfwd *remote;
606 #define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
607 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
608 sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
611 long length; /* length of `data' actually used */
612 long forcepad; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
613 int type; /* only used for incoming packets */
614 unsigned long sequence; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
615 unsigned char *data; /* allocated storage */
616 unsigned char *body; /* offset of payload within `data' */
617 long savedpos; /* temporary index into `data' (for strings) */
618 long maxlen; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
619 long encrypted_len; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
622 * State associated with packet logging
626 struct logblank_t *blanks;
629 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
630 struct Packet *pktin);
631 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
632 struct Packet *pktin);
633 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
634 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
635 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
636 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special);
637 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c);
638 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len);
639 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize);
640 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, unsigned newwin);
641 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle);
642 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit);
643 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt);
644 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt);
645 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length);
646 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now);
647 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
648 struct Packet *pktin);
650 struct rdpkt1_state_tag {
651 long len, pad, biglen, to_read;
652 unsigned long realcrc, gotcrc;
656 struct Packet *pktin;
659 struct rdpkt2_state_tag {
660 long len, pad, payload, packetlen, maclen;
663 unsigned long incoming_sequence;
664 struct Packet *pktin;
667 typedef void (*handler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
668 typedef void (*chandler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx);
670 struct queued_handler;
671 struct queued_handler {
673 chandler_fn_t handler;
675 struct queued_handler *next;
679 const struct plug_function_table *fn;
680 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
682 SHA_State exhash, exhashbase;
689 unsigned char session_key[32];
691 int v1_remote_protoflags;
692 int v1_local_protoflags;
693 int agentfwd_enabled;
696 const struct ssh_cipher *cipher;
699 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher, *sccipher;
700 void *cs_cipher_ctx, *sc_cipher_ctx;
701 const struct ssh_mac *csmac, *scmac;
702 void *cs_mac_ctx, *sc_mac_ctx;
703 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp, *sccomp;
704 void *cs_comp_ctx, *sc_comp_ctx;
705 const struct ssh_kex *kex;
706 const struct ssh_signkey *hostkey;
707 unsigned char v2_session_id[20];
713 int echoing, editing;
717 int ospeed, ispeed; /* temporaries */
718 int term_width, term_height;
720 tree234 *channels; /* indexed by local id */
721 struct ssh_channel *mainchan; /* primary session channel */
726 tree234 *rportfwds, *portfwds;
730 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE,
736 int size_needed, eof_needed;
738 struct Packet **queue;
739 int queuelen, queuesize;
741 unsigned char *deferred_send_data;
742 int deferred_len, deferred_size;
745 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
746 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
747 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
752 bufchain banner; /* accumulates banners during do_ssh2_authconn */
754 * Used for username and password input.
756 char *userpass_input_buffer;
757 int userpass_input_buflen;
758 int userpass_input_bufpos;
759 int userpass_input_echo;
766 int v1_throttle_count;
769 int v1_stdout_throttling;
770 unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence;
772 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate;
773 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate;
774 int do_ssh_init_crstate;
775 int ssh_gotdata_crstate;
776 int do_ssh1_login_crstate;
777 int do_ssh1_connection_crstate;
778 int do_ssh2_transport_crstate;
779 int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate;
781 void *do_ssh_init_state;
782 void *do_ssh1_login_state;
783 void *do_ssh2_transport_state;
784 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state;
786 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state;
787 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state;
789 /* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
790 int protocol_initial_phase_done;
792 void (*protocol) (Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
794 struct Packet *(*s_rdpkt) (Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen);
797 * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
798 * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
799 * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
800 * potentially reconfigure port forwardings etc in mid-session.
805 * Used to transfer data back from async callbacks.
807 void *agent_response;
808 int agent_response_len;
812 * The SSH connection can be set as `frozen', meaning we are
813 * not currently accepting incoming data from the network. This
814 * is slightly more serious than setting the _socket_ as
815 * frozen, because we may already have had data passed to us
816 * from the network which we need to delay processing until
817 * after the freeze is lifted, so we also need a bufchain to
821 bufchain queued_incoming_data;
824 * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
827 handler_fn_t packet_dispatch[256];
830 * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
831 * indications from a request.
833 struct queued_handler *qhead, *qtail;
836 * This module deals with sending keepalives.
841 * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
844 unsigned long incoming_data_size, outgoing_data_size, deferred_data_size;
845 unsigned long max_data_size;
847 long next_rekey, last_rekey;
848 char *deferred_rekey_reason; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
851 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
853 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
854 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
860 buf = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
866 #define bombout(msg) \
868 char *text = dupprintf msg; \
869 ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE); \
871 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
875 /* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
877 static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
879 if (ssh->cfg.logomitpass)
880 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
883 static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
885 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata)
886 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
889 static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
891 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
894 /* Helper function for common bits of parsing cfg.ttymodes. */
895 static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh, char *modes,
896 void (*do_mode)(void *data, char *mode, char *val),
900 char *t = strchr(modes, '\t');
901 char *m = snewn(t-modes+1, char);
903 strncpy(m, modes, t-modes);
906 val = get_ttymode(ssh->frontend, m);
910 do_mode(data, m, val);
913 modes += strlen(modes) + 1;
917 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av, void *bv)
919 struct ssh_channel *a = (struct ssh_channel *) av;
920 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
921 if (a->localid < b->localid)
923 if (a->localid > b->localid)
927 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av, void *bv)
929 unsigned *a = (unsigned *) av;
930 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
938 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av, void *bv)
940 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
941 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
943 if ( (i = strcmp(a->dhost, b->dhost)) != 0)
944 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
945 if (a->dport > b->dport)
947 if (a->dport < b->dport)
952 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av, void *bv)
954 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
955 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
957 if (a->sport > b->sport)
959 if (a->sport < b->sport)
965 * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
966 * defined to sort before even the empty string.
968 static int nullstrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
970 if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
979 static int ssh_portcmp(void *av, void *bv)
981 struct ssh_portfwd *a = (struct ssh_portfwd *) av;
982 struct ssh_portfwd *b = (struct ssh_portfwd *) bv;
984 if (a->type > b->type)
986 if (a->type < b->type)
988 if (a->addressfamily > b->addressfamily)
990 if (a->addressfamily < b->addressfamily)
992 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->saddr, b->saddr)) != 0)
993 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
994 if (a->sport > b->sport)
996 if (a->sport < b->sport)
998 if (a->type != 'D') {
999 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->daddr, b->daddr)) != 0)
1000 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1001 if (a->dport > b->dport)
1003 if (a->dport < b->dport)
1009 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh)
1011 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET = 256;
1012 unsigned low, high, mid;
1014 struct ssh_channel *c;
1017 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
1018 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
1019 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
1020 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
1021 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
1022 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
1024 tsize = count234(ssh->channels);
1028 while (high - low > 1) {
1029 mid = (high + low) / 2;
1030 c = index234(ssh->channels, mid);
1031 if (c->localid == mid + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET)
1032 low = mid; /* this one is fine */
1034 high = mid; /* this one is past it */
1037 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
1038 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
1041 unsigned i = low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1042 assert(NULL == find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind));
1044 return low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1047 static void c_write(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1049 if ((flags & FLAG_STDERR)) {
1051 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
1053 fputc(buf[i], stderr);
1056 from_backend(ssh->frontend, 1, buf, len);
1059 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1062 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
1064 c_write(ssh, "\r\n", 2);
1065 else if ((buf[i] & 0x60) || (buf[i] == '\r'))
1066 c_write(ssh, buf + i, 1);
1070 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh, const char *buf)
1072 c_write(ssh, buf, strlen(buf));
1075 static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet *pkt)
1080 static struct Packet *ssh_new_packet(void)
1082 struct Packet *pkt = snew(struct Packet);
1084 pkt->body = pkt->data = NULL;
1086 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
1094 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
1095 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
1096 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
1097 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
1098 * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
1100 static struct Packet *ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1102 struct rdpkt1_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt1_state;
1104 crBegin(ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate);
1106 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1108 st->pktin->type = 0;
1109 st->pktin->length = 0;
1111 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
1112 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1114 st->len = (st->len << 8) + **data;
1115 (*data)++, (*datalen)--;
1118 st->pad = 8 - (st->len % 8);
1119 st->biglen = st->len + st->pad;
1120 st->pktin->length = st->len - 5;
1122 if (st->biglen < 0) {
1123 bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
1124 " data stream corruption"));
1125 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1129 st->pktin->maxlen = st->biglen;
1130 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->biglen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1132 st->to_read = st->biglen;
1133 st->p = st->pktin->data;
1134 while (st->to_read > 0) {
1135 st->chunk = st->to_read;
1136 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1138 if (st->chunk > (*datalen))
1139 st->chunk = (*datalen);
1140 memcpy(st->p, *data, st->chunk);
1142 *datalen -= st->chunk;
1144 st->to_read -= st->chunk;
1147 if (ssh->cipher && detect_attack(ssh->crcda_ctx, st->pktin->data,
1148 st->biglen, NULL)) {
1149 bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
1150 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1155 ssh->cipher->decrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->biglen);
1157 st->realcrc = crc32_compute(st->pktin->data, st->biglen - 4);
1158 st->gotcrc = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data + st->biglen - 4);
1159 if (st->gotcrc != st->realcrc) {
1160 bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
1161 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1165 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1166 st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
1168 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1169 unsigned char *decompblk;
1171 if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1172 st->pktin->body - 1, st->pktin->length + 1,
1173 &decompblk, &decomplen)) {
1174 bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
1175 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1179 if (st->pktin->maxlen < st->pad + decomplen) {
1180 st->pktin->maxlen = st->pad + decomplen;
1181 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1182 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1184 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1187 memcpy(st->pktin->body - 1, decompblk, decomplen);
1189 st->pktin->length = decomplen - 1;
1192 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->body[-1];
1195 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1199 struct logblank_t blank;
1200 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
1201 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1202 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1203 if ((st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA) ||
1204 (st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA)) {
1205 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 0;
1206 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1207 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
1210 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1211 blank.len = st->pktin->length;
1212 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1216 log_packet(ssh->logctx,
1217 PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1218 ssh1_pkt_type(st->pktin->type),
1219 st->pktin->body, st->pktin->length,
1223 crFinish(st->pktin);
1226 static struct Packet *ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1228 struct rdpkt2_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_state;
1230 crBegin(ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate);
1232 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1234 st->pktin->type = 0;
1235 st->pktin->length = 0;
1237 st->cipherblk = ssh->sccipher->blksize;
1240 if (st->cipherblk < 8)
1243 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->cipherblk + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1246 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
1247 * contain the length and padding details.
1249 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
1250 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1252 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1257 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1258 st->pktin->data, st->cipherblk);
1261 * Now get the length and padding figures.
1263 st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data);
1264 st->pad = st->pktin->data[4];
1267 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
1268 * do us any more damage.
1270 if (st->len < 0 || st->pad < 0 || st->len + st->pad < 0) {
1271 bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
1272 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1277 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
1279 st->payload = st->len - st->pad - 1;
1281 st->pktin->length = st->payload + 5;
1284 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
1286 st->packetlen = st->len + 4;
1287 st->maclen = ssh->scmac ? ssh->scmac->len : 0;
1290 * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
1292 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1293 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1294 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1298 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
1300 for (st->i = st->cipherblk; st->i < st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1302 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1304 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1307 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
1309 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1310 st->pktin->data + st->cipherblk,
1311 st->packetlen - st->cipherblk);
1313 st->pktin->encrypted_len = st->packetlen;
1319 && !ssh->scmac->verify(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->len + 4,
1320 st->incoming_sequence)) {
1321 bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
1322 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1326 st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
1329 * Decompress packet payload.
1332 unsigned char *newpayload;
1335 ssh->sccomp->decompress(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1336 st->pktin->data + 5, st->pktin->length - 5,
1337 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1338 if (st->pktin->maxlen < newlen + 5) {
1339 st->pktin->maxlen = newlen + 5;
1340 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1341 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1344 st->pktin->length = 5 + newlen;
1345 memcpy(st->pktin->data + 5, newpayload, newlen);
1350 st->pktin->savedpos = 6;
1351 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data;
1352 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[5];
1355 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1359 struct logblank_t blank;
1360 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
1361 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1362 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1363 if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1364 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
1365 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) {
1366 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
1369 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1370 blank.len = (st->pktin->length-6) - blank_prefix;
1371 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1375 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1376 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_ctx, st->pktin->type),
1377 st->pktin->data+6, st->pktin->length-6,
1381 crFinish(st->pktin);
1384 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int *offset_p)
1386 int pad, biglen, i, pktoffs;
1390 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
1391 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
1392 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
1393 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
1400 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[12],
1401 ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->data[12]),
1402 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1403 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks);
1404 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1407 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1408 unsigned char *compblk;
1410 zlib_compress_block(ssh->cs_comp_ctx,
1411 pkt->data + 12, pkt->length - 12,
1412 &compblk, &complen);
1413 memcpy(pkt->data + 12, compblk, complen);
1415 pkt->length = complen + 12;
1418 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + 4); /* space for CRC */
1420 len = pkt->length - 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
1421 pad = 8 - (len % 8);
1423 biglen = len + pad; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
1425 for (i = pktoffs; i < 4+8; i++)
1426 pkt->data[i] = random_byte();
1427 crc = crc32_compute(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen - 4); /* all ex len */
1428 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4 + biglen - 4, crc);
1429 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs, len);
1432 ssh->cipher->encrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx,
1433 pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen);
1435 if (offset_p) *offset_p = pktoffs;
1436 return biglen + 4; /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
1439 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1441 int len, backlog, offset;
1442 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1443 backlog = sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)pkt->data + offset, len);
1444 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1445 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1446 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1449 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1452 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1453 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
1454 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
1455 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
1459 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len,
1460 pkt->data + offset, len);
1461 ssh->deferred_len += len;
1462 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1466 * Construct a SSH-1 packet with the specified contents.
1467 * (This all-at-once interface used to be the only one, but now SSH-1
1468 * packets can also be constructed incrementally.)
1470 static struct Packet *construct_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, va_list ap)
1476 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(pkttype);
1478 while ((argtype = va_arg(ap, int)) != PKT_END) {
1479 unsigned char *argp, argchar;
1480 unsigned long argint;
1483 /* Actual fields in the packet */
1485 argint = va_arg(ap, int);
1486 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, argint);
1489 argchar = (unsigned char) va_arg(ap, int);
1490 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, argchar);
1493 argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
1494 arglen = va_arg(ap, int);
1495 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, argp, arglen);
1498 argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
1499 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, argp);
1502 bn = va_arg(ap, Bignum);
1503 ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt, bn);
1505 /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
1507 dont_log_password(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_BLANK);
1510 dont_log_data(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_OMIT);
1513 end_log_omission(ssh, pkt);
1521 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1525 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1526 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1531 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1535 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1536 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1538 s_wrpkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
1541 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a, char *b)
1544 unsigned long av, bv;
1546 av = strtoul(a, &ae, 10);
1547 bv = strtoul(b, &be, 10);
1549 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1554 av = strtoul(ae, &ae, 10);
1555 bv = strtoul(be, &be, 10);
1557 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1562 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
1563 * `uint32' into a SHA state.
1565 static void sha_string(SHA_State * s, void *str, int len)
1567 unsigned char lenblk[4];
1568 PUT_32BIT(lenblk, len);
1569 SHA_Bytes(s, lenblk, 4);
1570 SHA_Bytes(s, str, len);
1573 static void sha_uint32(SHA_State * s, unsigned i)
1575 unsigned char intblk[4];
1576 PUT_32BIT(intblk, i);
1577 SHA_Bytes(s, intblk, 4);
1581 * Packet construction functions. Mostly shared between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
1583 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
1585 if (pkt->maxlen < length) {
1586 unsigned char *body = pkt->body;
1587 int offset = body ? pkt->data - body : 0;
1588 pkt->maxlen = length + 256;
1589 pkt->data = sresize(pkt->data, pkt->maxlen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1590 if (body) pkt->body = pkt->data + offset;
1593 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *pkt, void *data, int len)
1595 if (pkt->logmode != PKTLOG_EMIT) {
1597 pkt->blanks = sresize(pkt->blanks, pkt->nblanks, struct logblank_t);
1599 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].offset = pkt->length -
1600 (pkt->body - pkt->data);
1601 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].len = len;
1602 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].type = pkt->logmode;
1605 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length);
1606 memcpy(pkt->data + pkt->length - len, data, len);
1608 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char byte)
1610 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &byte, 1);
1612 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char value)
1614 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &value, 1);
1616 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned long value)
1619 PUT_32BIT(x, value);
1620 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, x, 4);
1622 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *pkt)
1624 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0);
1625 pkt->savedpos = pkt->length;
1627 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1629 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, strlen(data));
1630 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1632 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *pkt, char *data, int len)
1634 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1635 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1637 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1639 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1640 ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data);
1642 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1644 int len = ssh1_bignum_length(b);
1645 unsigned char *data = snewn(len, char);
1646 (void) ssh1_write_bignum(data, b);
1647 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1650 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len)
1653 int i, n = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 7) / 8;
1654 p = snewn(n + 1, unsigned char);
1656 fatalbox("out of memory");
1658 for (i = 1; i <= n; i++)
1659 p[i] = bignum_byte(b, n - i);
1661 while (i <= n && p[i] == 0 && (p[i + 1] & 0x80) == 0)
1663 memmove(p, p + i, n + 1 - i);
1667 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1671 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
1672 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1673 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)p, len);
1677 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1679 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1680 pkt->length = 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
1681 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, pkt_type);
1682 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
1686 /* For legacy code (SSH-1 and -2 packet construction used to be separate) */
1687 #define ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, length) ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, length)
1688 #define ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len)
1689 #define ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte) ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte)
1690 #define ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value) ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value)
1691 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt) ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt)
1692 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data)
1693 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len)
1694 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, data)
1696 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1698 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1701 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, (unsigned char) pkt_type);
1702 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
1707 * Construct an SSH-2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
1708 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
1709 * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
1711 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1713 int cipherblk, maclen, padding, i;
1716 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[5],
1717 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_ctx, pkt->data[5]),
1718 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1719 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks);
1720 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1724 * Compress packet payload.
1727 unsigned char *newpayload;
1730 ssh->cscomp->compress(ssh->cs_comp_ctx, pkt->data + 5,
1732 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1734 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, newpayload, newlen);
1740 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
1741 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
1742 * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
1745 cipherblk = ssh->cscipher ? ssh->cscipher->blksize : 8; /* block size */
1746 cipherblk = cipherblk < 8 ? 8 : cipherblk; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
1748 if (pkt->length + padding < pkt->forcepad)
1749 padding = pkt->forcepad - pkt->length;
1751 (cipherblk - (pkt->length + padding) % cipherblk) % cipherblk;
1752 assert(padding <= 255);
1753 maclen = ssh->csmac ? ssh->csmac->len : 0;
1754 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + padding + maclen);
1755 pkt->data[4] = padding;
1756 for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
1757 pkt->data[pkt->length + i] = random_byte();
1758 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data, pkt->length + padding - 4);
1760 ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
1761 pkt->length + padding,
1762 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
1763 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1766 ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
1767 pkt->data, pkt->length + padding);
1769 pkt->encrypted_len = pkt->length + padding;
1771 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
1772 return pkt->length + padding + maclen;
1776 * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
1777 * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
1778 * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
1780 * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
1781 * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
1782 * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
1783 * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
1784 * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
1785 * works after packet encryption.
1787 * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
1788 * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
1789 * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
1790 * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
1791 * then send them once we've finished.
1793 * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
1794 * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
1796 * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
1797 * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
1798 * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
1799 * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
1800 * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
1801 * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
1803 * When using a CBC-mode cipher, it's necessary to ensure that an
1804 * attacker can't provide data to be encrypted using an IV that they
1805 * know. We ensure this by prefixing each packet that might contain
1806 * user data with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE. This is done using the deferral
1807 * mechanism, so in this case send_noqueue() ends up redirecting to
1808 * defer_noqueue(). If you don't like this inefficiency, don't use
1812 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *, int);
1813 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh);
1816 * Send an SSH-2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
1818 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1822 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC)) {
1823 /* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
1824 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
1825 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
1828 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
1829 backlog = sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)pkt->data, len);
1830 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1831 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1833 ssh->outgoing_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
1834 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
1835 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
1836 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
1837 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
1839 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1843 * Defer an SSH-2 packet.
1845 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int noignore)
1848 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
1849 ssh->deferred_len == 0 && !noignore) {
1851 * Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
1852 * get encrypted with a known IV.
1854 struct Packet *ipkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
1855 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ipkt, TRUE);
1857 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
1858 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
1859 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
1860 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
1864 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->data, len);
1865 ssh->deferred_len += len;
1866 ssh->deferred_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
1867 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1871 * Queue an SSH-2 packet.
1873 static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1875 assert(ssh->queueing);
1877 if (ssh->queuelen >= ssh->queuesize) {
1878 ssh->queuesize = ssh->queuelen + 32;
1879 ssh->queue = sresize(ssh->queue, ssh->queuesize, struct Packet *);
1882 ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen++] = pkt;
1886 * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
1889 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1892 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
1894 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pkt);
1899 * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
1902 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1905 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
1907 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
1912 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
1913 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH-1's defer_packet().
1915 * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
1916 * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
1917 * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
1918 * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
1919 * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
1920 * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
1921 * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
1924 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh)
1927 backlog = sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)ssh->deferred_send_data,
1929 ssh->deferred_len = ssh->deferred_size = 0;
1930 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
1931 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
1932 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1933 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1935 ssh->outgoing_data_size += ssh->deferred_data_size;
1936 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
1937 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
1938 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
1939 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
1940 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0;
1944 * Send all queued SSH-2 packets. We send them by means of
1945 * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
1946 * packets that needed to be lumped together.
1948 static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh)
1952 assert(!ssh->queueing);
1954 for (i = 0; i < ssh->queuelen; i++)
1955 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ssh->queue[i], FALSE);
1958 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
1962 void bndebug(char *string, Bignum b)
1966 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
1967 debug(("%s", string));
1968 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
1969 debug((" %02x", p[i]));
1975 static void sha_mpint(SHA_State * s, Bignum b)
1979 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
1980 sha_string(s, p, len);
1985 * Packet decode functions for both SSH-1 and SSH-2.
1987 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt)
1989 unsigned long value;
1990 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
1991 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
1992 value = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
1996 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt)
1998 unsigned long value;
1999 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 1)
2000 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2001 value = pkt->body[pkt->savedpos] != 0;
2005 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length)
2010 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2012 len = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2017 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < *length)
2019 *p = (char *)(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2020 pkt->savedpos += *length;
2022 static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
2024 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < length)
2026 pkt->savedpos += length;
2027 return pkt->body + (pkt->savedpos - length);
2029 static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet *pkt, struct RSAKey *key,
2030 unsigned char **keystr)
2034 j = makekey(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2035 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos,
2042 assert(pkt->savedpos < pkt->length);
2046 static Bignum ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2051 j = ssh1_read_bignum(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2052 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos, &b);
2060 static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2066 ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
2071 b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
2076 * Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet.
2077 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
2078 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
2079 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
2080 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
2082 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
2083 void *pkblob_v, int pkblob_len,
2084 void *sigblob_v, int sigblob_len)
2086 unsigned char *pkblob = (unsigned char *)pkblob_v;
2087 unsigned char *sigblob = (unsigned char *)sigblob_v;
2089 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
2090 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
2093 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
2094 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
2096 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING) &&
2097 (GET_32BIT(pkblob) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
2098 int pos, len, siglen;
2101 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
2104 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2105 pos += 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* skip over exponent */
2106 len = GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* find length of modulus */
2107 pos += 4; /* find modulus itself */
2108 while (len > 0 && pkblob[pos] == 0)
2110 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
2113 * Now find the signature integer.
2115 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2116 siglen = GET_32BIT(sigblob+pos);
2117 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
2119 if (len != siglen) {
2120 unsigned char newlen[4];
2121 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2122 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, pos);
2123 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
2124 pos += 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
2125 PUT_32BIT(newlen, len);
2126 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 4);
2127 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
2129 while (len-- > siglen) {
2130 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 1);
2131 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
2133 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)(sigblob+pos), siglen);
2134 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
2138 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
2141 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2142 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, sigblob_len);
2146 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
2147 * a list of known buggy implementations.
2149 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
2151 char *imp; /* pointer to implementation part */
2153 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2155 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2158 ssh->remote_bugs = 0;
2160 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == FORCE_ON ||
2161 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == AUTO &&
2162 (!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
2163 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.21") ||
2164 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") ||
2165 !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
2167 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
2168 * to use a different defence against password length
2171 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE;
2172 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-1 ignore bug");
2175 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == FORCE_ON ||
2176 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == AUTO &&
2177 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
2179 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
2180 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
2183 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD;
2184 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH-1 password");
2187 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == FORCE_ON ||
2188 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == AUTO &&
2189 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
2191 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
2192 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
2193 * an AUTH_RSA message.
2195 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA;
2196 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle SSH-1 RSA authentication");
2199 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == FORCE_ON ||
2200 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == AUTO &&
2201 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2202 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp) ||
2203 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp) ||
2204 wc_match("2.1 *", imp)))) {
2206 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
2208 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_HMAC;
2209 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 HMAC bug");
2212 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
2213 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == AUTO &&
2214 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2215 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp) ))) {
2217 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
2218 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
2219 * generate the keys).
2221 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY;
2222 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 key-derivation bug");
2225 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == FORCE_ON ||
2226 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == AUTO &&
2227 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp) ||
2228 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp)))) {
2230 * These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
2232 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING;
2233 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 RSA padding bug");
2236 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == FORCE_ON ||
2237 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == AUTO &&
2238 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp))) {
2240 * These versions have the SSH-2 session-ID bug in
2241 * public-key authentication.
2243 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID;
2244 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 public-key-session-ID bug");
2247 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
2248 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == AUTO &&
2249 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp) ||
2250 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp) ||
2251 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp) ||
2252 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp)))) {
2254 * These versions have the SSH-2 rekey bug.
2256 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_REKEY;
2257 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 rekey bug");
2262 * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
2263 * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
2265 static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str)
2267 /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
2268 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2269 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2270 assert(*str == 'H'); str++;
2271 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2272 while (*str && *str != '-') str++;
2273 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2275 /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
2278 if (*str == '-' || *str == ' ')
2284 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
2286 struct do_ssh_init_state {
2294 crState(do_ssh_init_state);
2296 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate);
2298 /* Search for the string "SSH-" in the input. */
2301 static const int transS[] = { 1, 2, 2, 1 };
2302 static const int transH[] = { 0, 0, 3, 0 };
2303 static const int transminus[] = { 0, 0, 0, -1 };
2305 s->i = transS[s->i];
2307 s->i = transH[s->i];
2309 s->i = transminus[s->i];
2314 crReturn(1); /* get another character */
2318 s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
2319 strcpy(s->vstring, "SSH-");
2323 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
2324 if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
2326 s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
2328 s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
2331 s->version[s->i] = '\0';
2333 } else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
2334 s->version[s->i++] = c;
2335 } else if (c == '\012')
2339 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
2340 ssh->rdpkt2_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
2342 s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
2343 s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
2344 logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
2345 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
2348 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
2351 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
2352 s->proto1 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0;
2353 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
2354 s->proto2 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.99") >= 0;
2356 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0 && !s->proto1) {
2357 bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
2360 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3 && !s->proto2) {
2361 bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
2368 if (s->proto2 && (ssh->cfg.sshprot >= 2 || !s->proto1)) {
2370 * Construct a v2 version string.
2372 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver);
2376 * Construct a v1 version string.
2378 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
2379 (ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.5") <= 0 ?
2380 s->version : "1.5"),
2385 ssh_fix_verstring(verstring);
2387 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2389 * Hash our version string and their version string.
2391 SHA_Init(&ssh->exhashbase);
2392 sha_string(&ssh->exhashbase, verstring,
2393 strcspn(verstring, "\015\012"));
2394 sha_string(&ssh->exhashbase, s->vstring,
2395 strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012"));
2398 * Initialise SSH-2 protocol.
2400 ssh->protocol = ssh2_protocol;
2401 ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh);
2402 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_rdpkt;
2405 * Initialise SSH-1 protocol.
2407 ssh->protocol = ssh1_protocol;
2408 ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh);
2409 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh1_rdpkt;
2411 logeventf(ssh, "We claim version: %.*s",
2412 strcspn(verstring, "\015\012"), verstring);
2413 sk_write(ssh->s, verstring, strlen(verstring));
2415 if (ssh->version == 2)
2416 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2419 logeventf(ssh, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh->version);
2421 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
2422 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
2423 ssh->pinger = pinger_new(&ssh->cfg, &ssh_backend, ssh);
2430 static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2431 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2433 struct Packet *pktin = ssh->s_rdpkt(ssh, data, datalen);
2435 ssh->protocol(ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
2436 ssh_free_packet(pktin);
2440 static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2441 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2443 bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
2448 static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh)
2451 unsigned char *data;
2454 while (!ssh->frozen && bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data)) {
2455 bufchain_prefix(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, &vdata, &len);
2459 while (!ssh->frozen && len > 0)
2460 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &len);
2463 bufchain_consume(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, origlen - len);
2467 static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh, int frozen)
2470 sk_set_frozen(ssh->s, frozen);
2471 ssh->frozen = frozen;
2474 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *data, int datalen)
2476 crBegin(ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate);
2479 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
2480 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
2481 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
2482 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
2485 int ret; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
2487 crReturnV; /* more data please */
2488 ret = do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
2496 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
2497 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
2498 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
2499 * to the proper protocol handler.
2505 * Process queued data if there is any.
2507 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
2510 while (datalen > 0) {
2512 ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2514 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2516 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
2524 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit)
2527 struct ssh_channel *c;
2529 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED;
2530 expire_timer_context(ssh);
2535 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2540 * Now we must shut down any port- and X-forwarded channels going
2541 * through this connection.
2543 if (ssh->channels) {
2544 while (NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, 0))) {
2547 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
2550 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
2553 del234(ssh->channels, c); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2554 if (ssh->version == 2)
2555 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
2560 * Go through port-forwardings, and close any associated
2561 * listening sockets.
2563 if (ssh->portfwds) {
2564 struct ssh_portfwd *pf;
2565 while (NULL != (pf = index234(ssh->portfwds, 0))) {
2566 /* Dispose of any listening socket. */
2568 pfd_terminate(pf->local);
2569 del234(ssh->portfwds, pf); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2577 static void ssh_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
2578 const char *error_msg, int error_code)
2580 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2581 char addrbuf[256], *msg;
2583 sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
2586 msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
2588 msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
2594 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
2597 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2598 int need_notify = ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE);
2601 if (!ssh->close_expected)
2602 error_msg = "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
2604 error_msg = "Server closed network connection";
2608 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2611 logevent(error_msg);
2612 if (!ssh->close_expected || !ssh->clean_exit)
2613 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
2617 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
2619 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2620 ssh_gotdata(ssh, (unsigned char *)data, len);
2621 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED) {
2622 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
2628 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
2630 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2632 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
2633 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
2635 if (bufsize < SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2636 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 0, bufsize);
2640 * Connect to specified host and port.
2641 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
2642 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
2643 * freed by the caller.
2645 static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, char *host, int port,
2646 char **realhost, int nodelay, int keepalive)
2648 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
2659 ssh->savedhost = snewn(1 + strlen(host), char);
2660 if (!ssh->savedhost)
2661 fatalbox("Out of memory");
2662 strcpy(ssh->savedhost, host);
2665 port = 22; /* default ssh port */
2666 ssh->savedport = port;
2671 logeventf(ssh, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
2672 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
2673 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" : "")));
2674 addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, &ssh->cfg,
2675 ssh->cfg.addressfamily);
2676 if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
2684 ssh->fn = &fn_table;
2685 ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
2686 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) ssh, &ssh->cfg);
2687 if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
2689 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2697 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
2699 static void ssh1_throttle(Ssh ssh, int adjust)
2701 int old_count = ssh->v1_throttle_count;
2702 ssh->v1_throttle_count += adjust;
2703 assert(ssh->v1_throttle_count >= 0);
2704 if (ssh->v1_throttle_count && !old_count) {
2705 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
2706 } else if (!ssh->v1_throttle_count && old_count) {
2707 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
2712 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
2713 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
2715 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize)
2718 struct ssh_channel *c;
2720 if (enable == ssh->throttled_all)
2722 ssh->throttled_all = enable;
2723 ssh->overall_bufsize = bufsize;
2726 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++) {
2728 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
2730 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
2734 x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, enable);
2737 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
2740 pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, enable);
2747 * Username and password input, abstracted off into routines
2748 * reusable in several places - even between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
2751 /* Set up a username or password input loop on a given buffer. */
2752 static void setup_userpass_input(Ssh ssh, char *buffer, int buflen, int echo)
2754 ssh->userpass_input_buffer = buffer;
2755 ssh->userpass_input_buflen = buflen;
2756 ssh->userpass_input_bufpos = 0;
2757 ssh->userpass_input_echo = echo;
2761 * Process some terminal data in the course of username/password
2762 * input. Returns >0 for success (line of input returned in
2763 * buffer), <0 for failure (user hit ^C/^D, bomb out and exit), 0
2764 * for inconclusive (keep waiting for more input please).
2766 static int process_userpass_input(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen)
2771 switch (c = *in++) {
2774 ssh->userpass_input_buffer[ssh->userpass_input_bufpos] = 0;
2775 ssh->userpass_input_buffer[ssh->userpass_input_buflen-1] = 0;
2780 if (ssh->userpass_input_bufpos > 0) {
2781 if (ssh->userpass_input_echo)
2782 c_write_str(ssh, "\b \b");
2783 ssh->userpass_input_bufpos--;
2788 while (ssh->userpass_input_bufpos > 0) {
2789 if (ssh->userpass_input_echo)
2790 c_write_str(ssh, "\b \b");
2791 ssh->userpass_input_bufpos--;
2800 * This simplistic check for printability is disabled
2801 * when we're doing password input, because some people
2802 * have control characters in their passwords.o
2804 if ((!ssh->userpass_input_echo ||
2805 (c >= ' ' && c <= '~') ||
2806 ((unsigned char) c >= 160))
2807 && ssh->userpass_input_bufpos < ssh->userpass_input_buflen-1) {
2808 ssh->userpass_input_buffer[ssh->userpass_input_bufpos++] = c;
2809 if (ssh->userpass_input_echo)
2810 c_write(ssh, &c, 1);
2818 static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv, void *reply, int replylen)
2820 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
2822 ssh->agent_response = reply;
2823 ssh->agent_response_len = replylen;
2825 if (ssh->version == 1)
2826 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2828 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2831 static void ssh_dialog_callback(void *sshv, int ret)
2833 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
2835 ssh->user_response = ret;
2837 if (ssh->version == 1)
2838 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2840 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2843 * This may have unfrozen the SSH connection, so do a
2846 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
2849 static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv, void *reply, int replylen)
2851 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)cv;
2853 void *sentreply = reply;
2856 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
2857 sentreply = "\0\0\0\1\5";
2860 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2861 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, sentreply, replylen);
2864 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
2865 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
2868 PKT_DATA, sentreply, replylen,
2877 * Client-initiated disconnection. Send a DISCONNECT if `wire_reason'
2878 * non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
2879 * => log `wire_reason'.
2881 static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh, char *client_reason, char *wire_reason,
2882 int code, int clean_exit)
2886 client_reason = wire_reason;
2888 error = dupprintf("Disconnected: %s", client_reason);
2890 error = dupstr("Disconnected");
2892 if (ssh->version == 1) {
2893 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT, PKT_STR, wire_reason,
2895 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
2896 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
2897 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, code);
2898 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, wire_reason);
2899 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
2900 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
2903 ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
2904 ssh->clean_exit = clean_exit;
2905 ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, error, 0, 0);
2910 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
2912 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
2913 struct Packet *pktin)
2916 unsigned char cookie[8], *ptr;
2917 struct RSAKey servkey, hostkey;
2918 struct MD5Context md5c;
2919 struct do_ssh1_login_state {
2921 unsigned char *rsabuf, *keystr1, *keystr2;
2922 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask, supported_auths_mask;
2923 int tried_publickey, tried_agent;
2924 int tis_auth_refused, ccard_auth_refused;
2925 unsigned char session_id[16];
2928 void *publickey_blob;
2929 int publickey_bloblen;
2935 unsigned char request[5], *response, *p;
2945 crState(do_ssh1_login_state);
2947 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate);
2952 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
2953 bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
2957 logevent("Received public keys");
2959 ptr = ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin, 8);
2961 bombout(("SSH-1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
2964 memcpy(cookie, ptr, 8);
2966 if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &servkey, &s->keystr1) ||
2967 !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &hostkey, &s->keystr2)) {
2968 bombout(("Failed to read SSH-1 public keys from public key packet"));
2973 * Log the host key fingerprint.
2977 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
2978 strcpy(logmsg, " ");
2979 hostkey.comment = NULL;
2980 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg + strlen(logmsg),
2981 sizeof(logmsg) - strlen(logmsg), &hostkey);
2985 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
2986 s->supported_ciphers_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
2987 s->supported_auths_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
2989 ssh->v1_local_protoflags =
2990 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED;
2991 ssh->v1_local_protoflags |= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
2994 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr2, hostkey.bytes);
2995 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr1, servkey.bytes);
2996 MD5Update(&md5c, cookie, 8);
2997 MD5Final(s->session_id, &md5c);
2999 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
3000 ssh->session_key[i] = random_byte();
3003 * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
3005 if (hostkey.bits > hostkey.bytes * 8 ||
3006 servkey.bits > servkey.bytes * 8) {
3007 bombout(("SSH-1 public keys were badly formatted"));
3011 s->len = (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes ? hostkey.bytes : servkey.bytes);
3013 s->rsabuf = snewn(s->len, unsigned char);
3015 fatalbox("Out of memory");
3018 * Verify the host key.
3022 * First format the key into a string.
3024 int len = rsastr_len(&hostkey);
3025 char fingerprint[100];
3026 char *keystr = snewn(len, char);
3028 fatalbox("Out of memory");
3029 rsastr_fmt(keystr, &hostkey);
3030 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint, sizeof(fingerprint), &hostkey);
3032 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3033 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
3034 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
3035 "rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
3036 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3038 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3042 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3043 " for user host key response"));
3046 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3047 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3049 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3051 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3052 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
3058 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3059 s->rsabuf[i] = ssh->session_key[i];
3061 s->rsabuf[i] ^= s->session_id[i];
3064 if (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes) {
3065 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &servkey);
3067 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, servkey.bytes, &hostkey);
3069 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &hostkey);
3071 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, hostkey.bytes, &servkey);
3074 bombout(("SSH-1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
3078 logevent("Encrypted session key");
3081 int cipher_chosen = 0, warn = 0;
3082 char *cipher_string = NULL;
3084 for (i = 0; !cipher_chosen && i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
3085 int next_cipher = ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i];
3086 if (next_cipher == CIPHER_WARN) {
3087 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
3089 } else if (next_cipher == CIPHER_AES) {
3090 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
3091 logevent("AES not supported in SSH-1, skipping");
3093 switch (next_cipher) {
3094 case CIPHER_3DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
3095 cipher_string = "3DES"; break;
3096 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
3097 cipher_string = "Blowfish"; break;
3098 case CIPHER_DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_DES;
3099 cipher_string = "single-DES"; break;
3101 if (s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << s->cipher_type))
3105 if (!cipher_chosen) {
3106 if ((s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES)) == 0)
3107 bombout(("Server violates SSH-1 protocol by not "
3108 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
3110 /* shouldn't happen */
3111 bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
3115 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
3117 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3118 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "cipher", cipher_string,
3119 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3120 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3124 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3125 " for user response"));
3128 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3129 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3131 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3132 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3133 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
3140 switch (s->cipher_type) {
3141 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
3142 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
3144 case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
3145 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
3147 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
3148 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
3152 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY,
3153 PKT_CHAR, s->cipher_type,
3154 PKT_DATA, cookie, 8,
3155 PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) & 0xFF,
3156 PKT_DATA, s->rsabuf, s->len,
3157 PKT_INT, ssh->v1_local_protoflags, PKT_END);
3159 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
3163 ssh->cipher = (s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ? &ssh_blowfish_ssh1 :
3164 s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_DES ? &ssh_des :
3166 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = ssh->cipher->make_context();
3167 ssh->cipher->sesskey(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->session_key);
3168 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh->cipher->text_name);
3170 ssh->crcda_ctx = crcda_make_context();
3171 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
3173 if (servkey.modulus) {
3174 sfree(servkey.modulus);
3175 servkey.modulus = NULL;
3177 if (servkey.exponent) {
3178 sfree(servkey.exponent);
3179 servkey.exponent = NULL;
3181 if (hostkey.modulus) {
3182 sfree(hostkey.modulus);
3183 hostkey.modulus = NULL;
3185 if (hostkey.exponent) {
3186 sfree(hostkey.exponent);
3187 hostkey.exponent = NULL;
3191 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3192 bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
3196 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
3200 if (!*ssh->cfg.username) {
3201 if (ssh_get_line && !ssh_getline_pw_only) {
3202 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
3203 s->username, sizeof(s->username), FALSE)) {
3205 * get_line failed to get a username.
3208 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
3212 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3213 c_write_str(ssh, "login as: ");
3216 setup_userpass_input(ssh, s->username, sizeof(s->username), 1);
3218 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3219 ret = process_userpass_input(ssh, in, inlen);
3223 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
3226 strncpy(s->username, ssh->cfg.username, sizeof(s->username));
3227 s->username[sizeof(s->username)-1] = '\0';
3230 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_USER, PKT_STR, s->username, PKT_END);
3232 char userlog[22 + sizeof(s->username)];
3233 sprintf(userlog, "Sent username \"%s\"", s->username);
3235 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE &&
3236 (!((flags & FLAG_STDERR) && (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)))) {
3237 strcat(userlog, "\r\n");
3238 c_write_str(ssh, userlog);
3245 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA)) {
3246 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
3247 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 1;
3249 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 0;
3251 s->tis_auth_refused = s->ccard_auth_refused = 0;
3252 /* Load the public half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
3253 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
3254 if (!rsakey_pubblob(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
3255 &s->publickey_blob, &s->publickey_bloblen, NULL))
3256 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3258 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3260 while (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3261 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD;
3263 if (agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
3265 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
3271 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
3273 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
3274 PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
3275 s->request[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
3276 if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
3277 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3281 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3282 " for agent response"));
3285 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3286 r = ssh->agent_response;
3287 s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3289 s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
3290 if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
3291 s->response[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
3292 s->p = s->response + 5;
3293 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3295 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s->nkeys);
3296 for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
3297 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
3298 if (s->publickey_blob &&
3299 !memcmp(s->p, s->publickey_blob,
3300 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
3301 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
3302 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3307 do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
3308 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3309 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3314 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3315 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3320 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) < 4)
3322 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3324 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) <
3327 s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
3328 s->p += s->commentlen;
3332 logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
3336 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3337 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3339 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3340 logevent("Key refused");
3343 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
3344 if ((s->challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3345 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3350 char *agentreq, *q, *ret;
3353 len = 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
3354 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.exponent);
3355 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.modulus);
3356 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->challenge);
3357 len += 16; /* session id */
3358 len += 4; /* response format */
3359 agentreq = snewn(4 + len, char);
3360 PUT_32BIT(agentreq, len);
3362 *q++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
3363 PUT_32BIT(q, bignum_bitcount(s->key.modulus));
3365 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.exponent);
3366 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.modulus);
3367 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->challenge);
3368 memcpy(q, s->session_id, 16);
3370 PUT_32BIT(q, 1); /* response format */
3371 if (!agent_query(agentreq, len + 4, &vret, &retlen,
3372 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3377 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
3378 " while waiting for agent"
3382 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3383 vret = ssh->agent_response;
3384 retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3389 if (ret[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
3390 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
3391 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3392 PKT_DATA, ret + 5, 16,
3396 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3398 ("Pageant's response accepted");
3399 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
3400 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticated using"
3402 c_write(ssh, s->commentp,
3404 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
3409 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
3412 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
3416 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
3419 freebn(s->key.exponent);
3420 freebn(s->key.modulus);
3421 freebn(s->challenge);
3430 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile) && !s->tried_publickey)
3431 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA;
3433 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
3434 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS)) &&
3435 !s->tis_auth_refused) {
3436 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE;
3437 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
3438 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, PKT_END);
3440 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
3441 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
3442 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)
3443 c_write_str(ssh, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
3444 s->tis_auth_refused = 1;
3450 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3452 bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
3455 c_write_str(ssh, "Using TIS authentication.\r\n");
3456 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
3457 if (challengelen > sizeof(s->prompt) - 1)
3458 challengelen = sizeof(s->prompt) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
3459 memcpy(s->prompt, challenge, challengelen);
3460 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3461 strncpy(s->prompt + challengelen,
3462 memchr(s->prompt, '\n', challengelen) ?
3463 "": "\r\nResponse: ",
3464 (sizeof s->prompt) - challengelen);
3465 s->prompt[(sizeof s->prompt) - 1] = '\0';
3468 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
3469 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD)) &&
3470 !s->ccard_auth_refused) {
3471 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE;
3472 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
3473 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD, PKT_END);
3475 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE) {
3476 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
3477 c_write_str(ssh, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
3478 s->ccard_auth_refused = 1;
3484 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3486 bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
3489 c_write_str(ssh, "Using CryptoCard authentication.\r\n");
3490 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
3491 if (challengelen > sizeof(s->prompt) - 1)
3492 challengelen = sizeof(s->prompt) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
3493 memcpy(s->prompt, challenge, challengelen);
3494 strncpy(s->prompt + challengelen,
3495 memchr(s->prompt, '\n', challengelen) ?
3496 "" : "\r\nResponse: ",
3497 sizeof(s->prompt) - challengelen);
3498 s->prompt[sizeof(s->prompt) - 1] = '\0';
3501 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
3502 sprintf(s->prompt, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
3503 s->username, ssh->savedhost);
3505 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA) {
3506 char *comment = NULL;
3508 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3509 c_write_str(ssh, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
3510 logeventf(ssh, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
3511 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3512 type = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
3513 if (type != SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1) {
3514 char *msg = dupprintf("Key is of wrong type (%s)",
3515 key_type_to_str(type));
3517 c_write_str(ssh, msg);
3518 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
3520 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3523 if (!rsakey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, &comment)) {
3524 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3525 c_write_str(ssh, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
3528 sprintf(s->prompt, "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ", comment);
3533 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
3534 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
3538 if (!ssh_get_line(s->prompt, s->password,
3539 sizeof(s->password), TRUE)) {
3541 * get_line failed to get a password (for example
3542 * because one was supplied on the command line
3543 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
3545 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate", 0, FALSE);
3549 /* Prompt may have come from server. We've munged it a bit, so
3550 * we know it to be zero-terminated at least once. */
3551 int ret; /* need not be saved over crReturn */
3552 c_write_untrusted(ssh, s->prompt, strlen(s->prompt));
3555 setup_userpass_input(ssh, s->password, sizeof(s->password), 0);
3557 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3558 ret = process_userpass_input(ssh, in, inlen);
3562 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
3566 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA) {
3568 * Try public key authentication with the specified
3571 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3574 const char *error = NULL;
3575 int ret = loadrsakey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, &s->key, s->password,
3578 c_write_str(ssh, "Couldn't load private key from ");
3579 c_write_str(ssh, filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3580 c_write_str(ssh, " (");
3581 c_write_str(ssh, error);
3582 c_write_str(ssh, ").\r\n");
3583 continue; /* go and try password */
3586 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n");
3587 s->tried_publickey = 0;
3588 continue; /* try again */
3593 * Send a public key attempt.
3595 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3596 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3599 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3600 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
3601 continue; /* go and try password */
3603 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3604 bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
3610 unsigned char buffer[32];
3611 Bignum challenge, response;
3613 if ((challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3614 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3617 response = rsadecrypt(challenge, &s->key);
3618 freebn(s->key.private_exponent);/* burn the evidence */
3620 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3621 buffer[i] = bignum_byte(response, 31 - i);
3625 MD5Update(&md5c, buffer, 32);
3626 MD5Update(&md5c, s->session_id, 16);
3627 MD5Final(buffer, &md5c);
3629 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3630 PKT_DATA, buffer, 16, PKT_END);
3637 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3638 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3639 c_write_str(ssh, "Failed to authenticate with"
3640 " our public key.\r\n");
3641 continue; /* go and try password */
3642 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3643 bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
3647 break; /* we're through! */
3649 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
3651 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
3652 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
3653 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
3654 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
3655 * The others are all random data in
3656 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
3657 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
3658 * hence can't deduce the password length.
3660 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
3661 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
3662 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
3663 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
3666 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
3667 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
3669 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
3670 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
3671 * packets containing string lengths N through
3672 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
3673 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
3674 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
3676 * A few servers (the old 1.2.18 through 1.2.22)
3677 * can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE. For these
3678 * servers, we need an alternative defence. We make
3679 * use of the fact that the password is interpreted
3680 * as a C string: so we can append a NUL, then some
3683 * One server (a Cisco one) can deal with neither
3684 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE _nor_ a padded password string.
3685 * For this server we are left with no defences
3686 * against password length sniffing.
3688 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE)) {
3690 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
3691 * we can use the primary defence.
3693 int bottom, top, pwlen, i;
3696 pwlen = strlen(s->password);
3698 bottom = 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
3701 bottom = pwlen & ~7;
3705 assert(pwlen >= bottom && pwlen <= top);
3707 randomstr = snewn(top + 1, char);
3709 for (i = bottom; i <= top; i++) {
3711 defer_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
3712 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR, s->password,
3713 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
3715 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
3717 randomstr[j] = random_byte();
3718 } while (randomstr[j] == '\0');
3720 randomstr[i] = '\0';
3721 defer_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE,
3722 PKT_STR, randomstr, PKT_END);
3725 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
3726 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
3729 else if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
3731 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
3732 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
3733 * can use the secondary defence.
3739 len = strlen(s->password);
3740 if (len < sizeof(string)) {
3742 strcpy(string, s->password);
3743 len++; /* cover the zero byte */
3744 while (len < sizeof(string)) {
3745 string[len++] = (char) random_byte();
3750 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
3751 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
3752 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, ss, len,
3753 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
3756 * The server has _both_
3757 * BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE and
3758 * BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD. There is
3759 * therefore nothing we can do.
3762 len = strlen(s->password);
3763 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
3764 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
3765 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_INT, len,
3766 PKT_DATA, s->password, len,
3767 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
3770 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
3771 PKT_STR, s->password, PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
3774 logevent("Sent password");
3775 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
3777 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3778 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3779 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
3780 logevent("Authentication refused");
3781 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3782 bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin->type));
3787 logevent("Authentication successful");
3792 void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
3796 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
3799 if (c && !c->closes) {
3801 * If halfopen is true, we have sent
3802 * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
3803 * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
3804 * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
3805 * open, we can close it then.
3808 if (ssh->version == 1) {
3809 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
3812 struct Packet *pktout;
3813 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
3814 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
3815 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
3818 c->closes = 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
3819 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
3821 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
3822 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA ||
3823 c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
3825 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
3830 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len)
3834 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
3837 if (ssh->version == 1) {
3838 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
3839 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
3841 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
3842 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
3844 * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
3845 * connections are never individually throttled - because
3846 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
3847 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
3848 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
3852 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, buf, len);
3853 return ssh2_try_send(c);
3857 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c, int bufsize)
3861 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
3864 if (ssh->version == 1) {
3865 if (c->v.v1.throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
3866 c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
3867 ssh1_throttle(ssh, -1);
3870 ssh2_set_window(c, OUR_V2_WINSIZE - bufsize);
3874 static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
3876 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
3880 assert(pktin->type == qh->msg1 || pktin->type == qh->msg2);
3883 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == ssh_queueing_handler);
3884 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = NULL;
3887 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == ssh_queueing_handler);
3888 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = NULL;
3892 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
3894 if (ssh->qhead->msg1 > 0) {
3895 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] == NULL);
3896 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
3898 if (ssh->qhead->msg2 > 0) {
3899 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] == NULL);
3900 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
3903 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
3904 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type] = NULL;
3907 qh->handler(ssh, pktin, qh->ctx);
3912 static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh, int msg1, int msg2,
3913 chandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
3915 struct queued_handler *qh;
3917 qh = snew(struct queued_handler);
3920 qh->handler = handler;
3924 if (ssh->qtail == NULL) {
3928 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == NULL);
3929 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
3932 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == NULL);
3933 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
3936 ssh->qtail->next = qh;
3941 static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx)
3943 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf, *pf = (struct ssh_rportfwd *)ctx;
3945 if (pktin->type == (ssh->version == 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS :
3946 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS)) {
3947 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
3950 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
3953 rpf = del234(ssh->rportfwds, pf);
3959 static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh, const Config *cfg)
3961 const char *portfwd_strptr = cfg->portfwd;
3962 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
3965 if (!ssh->portfwds) {
3966 ssh->portfwds = newtree234(ssh_portcmp);
3969 * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
3970 * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
3971 * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
3972 * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
3975 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
3977 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
3978 epf->status = DESTROY;
3981 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
3982 char address_family, type;
3983 int sport,dport,sserv,dserv;
3984 char sports[256], dports[256], saddr[256], host[256];
3987 address_family = 'A';
3989 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'A' ||
3990 *portfwd_strptr == '4' ||
3991 *portfwd_strptr == '6')
3992 address_family = *portfwd_strptr++;
3993 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'L' ||
3994 *portfwd_strptr == 'R' ||
3995 *portfwd_strptr == 'D')
3996 type = *portfwd_strptr++;
4001 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != '\t') {
4002 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':') {
4004 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
4005 * source port number. This means that
4006 * everything we've seen until now is the
4007 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
4008 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
4013 if (ssh->version == 1 && type == 'R') {
4014 logeventf(ssh, "SSH-1 cannot handle remote source address "
4015 "spec \"%s\"; ignoring", sports);
4017 strcpy(saddr, sports);
4020 if (n < lenof(sports)-1) sports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4024 if (*portfwd_strptr == '\t')
4027 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != ':') {
4028 if (n < lenof(host)-1) host[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4031 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':')
4034 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
4035 if (n < lenof(dports)-1) dports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4039 dport = atoi(dports);
4043 dport = net_service_lookup(dports);
4045 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for destination"
4046 " port \"%s\"", dports);
4050 while (*portfwd_strptr) portfwd_strptr++;
4054 portfwd_strptr++; /* eat the NUL and move to next one */
4056 sport = atoi(sports);
4060 sport = net_service_lookup(sports);
4062 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for source"
4063 " port \"%s\"", sports);
4066 if (sport && dport) {
4067 /* Set up a description of the source port. */
4068 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec, *epfrec;
4070 pfrec = snew(struct ssh_portfwd);
4072 pfrec->saddr = *saddr ? dupstr(saddr) : NULL;
4073 pfrec->sserv = sserv ? dupstr(sports) : NULL;
4074 pfrec->sport = sport;
4075 pfrec->daddr = *host ? dupstr(host) : NULL;
4076 pfrec->dserv = dserv ? dupstr(dports) : NULL;
4077 pfrec->dport = dport;
4078 pfrec->local = NULL;
4079 pfrec->remote = NULL;
4080 pfrec->addressfamily = (address_family == '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4 :
4081 address_family == '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6 :
4084 epfrec = add234(ssh->portfwds, pfrec);
4085 if (epfrec != pfrec) {
4087 * We already have a port forwarding with precisely
4088 * these parameters. Hence, no need to do anything;
4089 * simply tag the existing one as KEEP.
4091 epfrec->status = KEEP;
4092 free_portfwd(pfrec);
4094 pfrec->status = CREATE;
4100 * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
4103 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4104 if (epf->status == DESTROY) {
4107 message = dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
4108 epf->type == 'L' ? "local" :
4109 epf->type == 'R' ? "remote" : "dynamic",
4110 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4111 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4114 if (epf->type != 'D') {
4115 char *msg2 = dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message,
4116 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4121 logeventf(ssh, "Cancelling %s", message);
4125 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf = epf->remote;
4126 struct Packet *pktout;
4129 * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
4132 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4134 * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
4135 * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
4136 * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
4137 * the rportfwd record from the local end
4138 * so that any connections the server tries
4139 * to make on it are rejected.
4142 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4143 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
4144 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
4146 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4147 } else if (ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall) {
4148 /* XXX: ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall may not represent
4149 * what was used to open the original connection,
4150 * since it's reconfigurable. */
4151 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4153 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4155 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4156 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4159 del234(ssh->rportfwds, rpf);
4161 } else if (epf->local) {
4162 pfd_terminate(epf->local);
4165 delpos234(ssh->portfwds, i);
4167 i--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
4171 * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
4173 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4174 if (epf->status == CREATE) {
4175 char *sportdesc, *dportdesc;
4176 sportdesc = dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
4177 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4178 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4179 epf->sserv ? epf->sserv : "",
4180 epf->sserv ? "(" : "",
4182 epf->sserv ? ")" : "");
4183 if (epf->type == 'D') {
4186 dportdesc = dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
4188 epf->dserv ? epf->dserv : "",
4189 epf->dserv ? "(" : "",
4191 epf->dserv ? ")" : "");
4194 if (epf->type == 'L') {
4195 const char *err = pfd_addforward(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
4196 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4199 epf->addressfamily);
4201 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
4202 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4203 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4204 sportdesc, dportdesc,
4205 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4206 } else if (epf->type == 'D') {
4207 const char *err = pfd_addforward(NULL, -1,
4208 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4211 epf->addressfamily);
4213 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
4214 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4215 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4217 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4219 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
4222 * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
4224 if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
4225 if (ssh->version == 1)
4226 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1);
4228 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
4231 pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
4232 strncpy(pf->dhost, epf->daddr, lenof(pf->dhost)-1);
4233 pf->dhost[lenof(pf->dhost)-1] = '\0';
4234 pf->dport = epf->dport;
4235 pf->sport = epf->sport;
4236 if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
4237 logeventf(ssh, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
4238 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4241 logeventf(ssh, "Requesting remote port %s"
4242 " forward to %s", sportdesc, dportdesc);
4244 pf->sportdesc = sportdesc;
4249 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4250 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST,
4251 PKT_INT, epf->sport,
4252 PKT_STR, epf->daddr,
4253 PKT_INT, epf->dport,
4255 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS,
4257 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4259 struct Packet *pktout;
4260 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4261 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "tcpip-forward");
4262 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 1);/* want reply */
4264 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4265 } else if (cfg->rport_acceptall) {
4266 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4268 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4270 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4271 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4273 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS,
4274 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
4275 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4284 static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4287 int stringlen, bufsize;
4289 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &string, &stringlen);
4290 if (string == NULL) {
4291 bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
4295 bufsize = from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA,
4297 if (!ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4298 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 1;
4299 ssh1_throttle(ssh, +1);
4303 static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4305 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4306 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
4307 struct ssh_channel *c;
4308 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4310 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
4311 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
4312 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled) {
4313 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4314 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4315 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
4317 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4320 if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->cfg.x11_display, c,
4321 ssh->x11auth, NULL, -1, &ssh->cfg) != NULL) {
4322 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
4324 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4325 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4328 ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
4329 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4330 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4331 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4333 c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
4334 c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
4335 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4336 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4337 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4338 c->localid, PKT_END);
4339 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
4344 static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4346 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4347 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
4348 struct ssh_channel *c;
4349 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4351 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
4352 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled) {
4353 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4354 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4356 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4358 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4359 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4360 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4362 c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
4363 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
4364 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4365 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4366 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4367 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT, c->localid,
4372 static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4374 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
4375 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
4376 struct ssh_channel *c;
4377 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *pfp;
4382 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4385 remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4386 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &host, &hostsize);
4387 port = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4389 if (hostsize >= lenof(pf.dhost))
4390 hostsize = lenof(pf.dhost)-1;
4391 memcpy(pf.dhost, host, hostsize);
4392 pf.dhost[hostsize] = '\0';
4394 pfp = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
4397 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
4399 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4400 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4402 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
4404 e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s, pf.dhost, port,
4405 c, &ssh->cfg, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
4407 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
4409 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4410 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4412 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4413 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4414 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4416 c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
4417 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA; /* identify channel type */
4418 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4419 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4420 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4421 c->localid, PKT_END);
4422 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
4427 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4429 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4430 unsigned int localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4431 struct ssh_channel *c;
4433 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4434 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4435 c->remoteid = localid;
4436 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4437 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
4438 c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
4439 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
4442 if (c && c->closes) {
4444 * We have a pending close on this channel,
4445 * which we decided on before the server acked
4446 * the channel open. So now we know the
4447 * remoteid, we can close it again.
4449 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE,
4450 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_END);
4454 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4456 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4457 struct ssh_channel *c;
4459 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4460 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4461 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
4462 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4463 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4468 static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4470 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
4471 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4472 struct ssh_channel *c;
4473 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4474 if (c && !c->halfopen) {
4477 (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? 1 : 2);
4479 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_X11)) {
4480 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
4481 assert(c->u.x11.s != NULL);
4482 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
4485 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA)) {
4486 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
4487 assert(c->u.pfd.s != NULL);
4488 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4492 c->closes |= (closetype << 2); /* seen this message */
4493 if (!(c->closes & closetype)) {
4494 send_packet(ssh, pktin->type, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4496 c->closes |= closetype; /* sent it too */
4499 if (c->closes == 15) {
4500 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4504 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
4505 pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? "" :
4506 "_CONFIRMATION", c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent",
4511 static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4513 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
4514 int i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4517 struct ssh_channel *c;
4519 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &p, &len);
4521 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4526 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, p, len);
4529 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, p, len);
4532 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
4534 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
4535 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, len);
4536 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
4540 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
4542 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
4544 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
4545 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
4547 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
4549 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && len > 0) {
4551 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
4553 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
4557 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
4559 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
4562 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
4565 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
4566 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
4567 sfree(c->u.a.message);
4568 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4571 bufsize = 0; /* agent channels never back up */
4574 if (!c->v.v1.throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4575 c->v.v1.throttling = 1;
4576 ssh1_throttle(ssh, +1);
4581 static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4583 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4584 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh->exitcode);
4585 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
4587 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
4588 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
4589 * session which we might mistake for another
4590 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
4591 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
4593 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, NULL, 0, TRUE);
4596 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
4597 static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
4599 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
4601 unsigned int arg = 0;
4602 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
4603 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
4604 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
4606 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
4609 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
4612 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
4613 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, arg);
4617 static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
4618 struct Packet *pktin)
4620 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate);
4622 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA] =
4623 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA] =
4624 ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data;
4626 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
4627 ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
4628 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
4629 ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure;
4630 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] =
4631 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION] =
4632 ssh1_msg_channel_close;
4633 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh1_msg_channel_data;
4634 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status;
4636 if (ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
4637 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
4638 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING, PKT_END);
4642 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4643 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4644 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4646 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4647 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
4649 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
4650 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
4651 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open;
4655 if (ssh->cfg.x11_forward) {
4656 char proto[20], data[64];
4657 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
4658 ssh->x11auth = x11_invent_auth(proto, sizeof(proto),
4659 data, sizeof(data), ssh->cfg.x11_auth);
4660 x11_get_real_auth(ssh->x11auth, ssh->cfg.x11_display);
4662 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
4663 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
4664 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
4665 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
4666 * cookie into the log.
4668 if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
4669 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
4671 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR, data, PKTT_OTHER,
4672 PKT_INT, x11_get_screen_number(ssh->cfg.x11_display),
4675 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
4677 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR, data, PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4682 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4683 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4684 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4686 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4687 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
4689 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
4690 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
4691 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
4695 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
4696 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN] = ssh1_msg_port_open;
4698 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
4700 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
4701 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
4702 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
4703 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
4704 /* Send the pty request. */
4705 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
4706 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, ssh->cfg.termtype);
4707 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_height);
4708 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_width);
4709 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* width in pixels */
4710 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* height in pixels */
4711 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
4712 ssh1_send_ttymode, (void *)pkt);
4713 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
4714 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ispeed);
4715 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
4716 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ospeed);
4717 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH_TTY_OP_END);
4719 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
4723 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4724 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4725 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4727 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4728 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
4729 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
4731 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
4732 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
4734 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
4737 if (ssh->cfg.compression) {
4738 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION, PKT_INT, 6, PKT_END);
4742 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4743 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4744 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4746 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4747 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
4749 logevent("Started compression");
4750 ssh->v1_compressing = TRUE;
4751 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = zlib_compress_init();
4752 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
4753 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = zlib_decompress_init();
4754 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
4758 * Start the shell or command.
4760 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
4761 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
4762 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
4765 char *cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
4767 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
4769 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2) {
4770 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
4771 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
4774 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD, PKT_STR, cmd, PKT_END);
4776 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL, PKT_END);
4777 logevent("Started session");
4780 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
4781 if (ssh->size_needed)
4782 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
4783 if (ssh->eof_needed)
4784 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
4787 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
4789 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
4793 * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
4794 * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
4795 * attention to the unusual ones.
4800 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
4801 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
4802 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4803 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
4804 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
4806 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
4811 int len = min(inlen, 512);
4812 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA, PKTT_DATA,
4813 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, in, len,
4814 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4825 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
4827 static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4832 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
4833 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
4836 static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4838 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
4842 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
4843 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen, msg));
4846 static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4848 /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
4851 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
4856 * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
4858 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
4859 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = NULL;
4862 * These special message types we install handlers for.
4864 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh1_msg_disconnect;
4865 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
4866 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh1_msg_debug;
4869 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
4870 struct Packet *pktin)
4872 unsigned char *in=(unsigned char*)vin;
4873 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4876 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
4877 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
4881 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
4882 if (do_ssh1_login(ssh, in, inlen, pktin))
4883 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
4888 do_ssh1_connection(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
4892 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
4894 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
4897 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
4899 needlen = strlen(needle);
4902 * Is it at the start of the string?
4904 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
4905 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
4906 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
4907 /* either , or EOS follows */
4911 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
4912 * If no comma found, terminate.
4914 while (haylen > 0 && *haystack != ',')
4915 haylen--, haystack++;
4918 haylen--, haystack++; /* skip over comma itself */
4923 * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
4925 static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
4928 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
4930 needlen = strlen(needle);
4932 * Is it at the start of the string?
4934 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
4935 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
4936 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
4937 /* either , or EOS follows */
4945 * SSH-2 key creation method.
4947 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh, Bignum K, unsigned char *H,
4948 unsigned char *sessid, char chr,
4949 unsigned char *keyspace)
4952 /* First 20 bytes. */
4954 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
4956 SHA_Bytes(&s, H, 20);
4957 SHA_Bytes(&s, &chr, 1);
4958 SHA_Bytes(&s, sessid, 20);
4959 SHA_Final(&s, keyspace);
4960 /* Next 20 bytes. */
4962 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
4964 SHA_Bytes(&s, H, 20);
4965 SHA_Bytes(&s, keyspace, 20);
4966 SHA_Final(&s, keyspace + 20);
4970 * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
4972 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
4973 struct Packet *pktin)
4975 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
4976 struct do_ssh2_transport_state {
4977 int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher;
4978 Bignum p, g, e, f, K;
4979 int kex_init_value, kex_reply_value;
4980 const struct ssh_mac **maclist;
4982 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher_tobe;
4983 const struct ssh2_cipher *sccipher_tobe;
4984 const struct ssh_mac *csmac_tobe;
4985 const struct ssh_mac *scmac_tobe;
4986 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp_tobe;
4987 const struct ssh_compress *sccomp_tobe;
4988 char *hostkeydata, *sigdata, *keystr, *fingerprint;
4989 int hostkeylen, siglen;
4990 void *hkey; /* actual host key */
4991 unsigned char exchange_hash[20];
4992 int n_preferred_kex;
4993 const struct ssh_kex *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX];
4994 int n_preferred_ciphers;
4995 const struct ssh2_ciphers *preferred_ciphers[CIPHER_MAX];
4996 const struct ssh_compress *preferred_comp;
4997 int got_session_id, activated_authconn;
4998 struct Packet *pktout;
5003 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state);
5005 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate);
5007 s->cscipher_tobe = s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5008 s->csmac_tobe = s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5009 s->cscomp_tobe = s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5011 s->got_session_id = s->activated_authconn = FALSE;
5014 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
5016 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_HMAC)
5017 s->maclist = buggymacs, s->nmacs = lenof(buggymacs);
5019 s->maclist = macs, s->nmacs = lenof(macs);
5022 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_KEX_MASK;
5024 int i, j, commalist_started;
5027 * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
5029 s->n_preferred_kex = 0;
5030 for (i = 0; i < KEX_MAX; i++) {
5031 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_kexlist[i]) {
5033 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5034 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex;
5037 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5038 &ssh_diffiehellman_group14;
5041 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5042 &ssh_diffiehellman_group1;
5045 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5047 if (i < KEX_MAX - 1) {
5048 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] = NULL;
5055 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
5057 s->n_preferred_ciphers = 0;
5058 for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
5059 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i]) {
5060 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
5061 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_blowfish;
5064 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc) {
5065 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_des;
5069 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_3des;
5072 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_aes;
5074 case CIPHER_ARCFOUR:
5075 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_arcfour;
5078 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5080 if (i < CIPHER_MAX - 1) {
5081 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = NULL;
5088 * Set up preferred compression.
5090 if (ssh->cfg.compression)
5091 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_zlib;
5093 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_comp_none;
5096 * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
5097 * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
5099 ssh->queueing = TRUE;
5102 * Flag that KEX is in progress.
5104 ssh->kex_in_progress = TRUE;
5107 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
5109 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
5110 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
5111 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) random_byte());
5112 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
5113 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5114 commalist_started = 0;
5115 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5116 const struct ssh_kex *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5117 if (!k) continue; /* warning flag */
5118 if (commalist_started)
5119 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5120 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_kex[i]->name);
5121 commalist_started = 1;
5123 /* List server host key algorithms. */
5124 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5125 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5126 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
5127 if (i < lenof(hostkey_algs) - 1)
5128 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5130 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
5131 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5132 commalist_started = 0;
5133 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5134 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5135 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5136 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5137 if (commalist_started)
5138 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5139 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5140 commalist_started = 1;
5143 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
5144 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5145 commalist_started = 0;
5146 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5147 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5148 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5149 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5150 if (commalist_started)
5151 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5152 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5153 commalist_started = 1;
5156 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
5157 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5158 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5159 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5160 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5161 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5163 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
5164 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5165 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5166 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5167 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5168 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5170 /* List client->server compression algorithms. */
5171 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5172 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5173 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5174 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5175 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5176 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5177 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5178 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5181 /* List server->client compression algorithms. */
5182 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5183 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5184 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5185 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5186 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5187 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5188 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5189 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5192 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
5193 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5194 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
5195 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5196 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
5197 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
5199 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
5202 ssh->exhash = ssh->exhashbase;
5203 sha_string(&ssh->exhash, s->pktout->data + 5, s->pktout->length - 5);
5205 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5209 if (pktin->length > 5)
5210 sha_string(&ssh->exhash, pktin->data + 5, pktin->length - 5);
5213 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
5217 char *str, *preferred;
5220 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
5221 bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
5225 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
5226 s->cscipher_tobe = NULL;
5227 s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5228 s->csmac_tobe = NULL;
5229 s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5230 s->cscomp_tobe = NULL;
5231 s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5232 s->warn_kex = s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE;
5234 pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
5235 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* key exchange algorithms */
5238 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5239 const struct ssh_kex *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5243 if (!preferred) preferred = k->name;
5244 if (in_commasep_string(k->name, str, len))
5251 bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
5252 str ? str : "(null)"));
5256 * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
5257 * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
5260 s->guessok = first_in_commasep_string(preferred, str, len);
5261 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* host key algorithms */
5262 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5263 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[i]->name, str, len)) {
5264 ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[i];
5268 s->guessok = s->guessok &&
5269 first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[0]->name, str, len);
5270 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server cipher */
5271 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5272 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5274 s->warn_cscipher = TRUE;
5276 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5277 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5278 s->cscipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5283 if (s->cscipher_tobe)
5286 if (!s->cscipher_tobe) {
5287 bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
5288 str ? str : "(null)"));
5292 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client cipher */
5293 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5294 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5296 s->warn_sccipher = TRUE;
5298 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5299 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5300 s->sccipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5305 if (s->sccipher_tobe)
5308 if (!s->sccipher_tobe) {
5309 bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
5310 str ? str : "(null)"));
5314 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server mac */
5315 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5316 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5317 s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5321 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client mac */
5322 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5323 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5324 s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5328 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server compression */
5329 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5330 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5331 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5332 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5337 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client compression */
5338 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5339 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5340 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5341 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5346 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server language */
5347 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client language */
5348 s->ignorepkt = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin) && !s->guessok;
5351 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5352 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "key-exchange algorithm",
5354 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5355 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5359 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5360 " waiting for user response"));
5363 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5364 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5366 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5367 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5368 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL,
5374 if (s->warn_cscipher) {
5375 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5376 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5377 "client-to-server cipher",
5378 s->cscipher_tobe->name,
5379 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5380 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5384 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5385 " waiting for user response"));
5388 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5389 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5391 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5392 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5393 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5399 if (s->warn_sccipher) {
5400 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5401 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5402 "server-to-client cipher",
5403 s->sccipher_tobe->name,
5404 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5405 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5409 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5410 " waiting for user response"));
5413 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5414 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5416 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5417 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5418 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5424 if (s->ignorepkt) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
5425 crWaitUntil(pktin); /* Ignore packet */
5429 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the key
5430 * exchange. We start with the maximum key length of either
5436 csbits = s->cscipher_tobe->keylen;
5437 scbits = s->sccipher_tobe->keylen;
5438 s->nbits = (csbits > scbits ? csbits : scbits);
5440 /* The keys only have 160-bit entropy, since they're based on
5441 * a SHA-1 hash. So cap the key size at 160 bits. */
5446 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
5447 * requesting a group.
5449 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5450 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
5451 ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX;
5453 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
5456 s->pbits = 512 << ((s->nbits - 1) / 64);
5457 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
5458 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
5459 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5462 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP) {
5463 bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
5466 s->p = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5467 s->g = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5468 if (!s->p || !s->g) {
5469 bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
5472 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_gex(s->p, s->g);
5473 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT;
5474 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY;
5476 ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP;
5477 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_group(ssh->kex);
5478 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT;
5479 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY;
5480 logeventf(ssh, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
5481 ssh->kex->groupname);
5484 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange");
5486 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
5488 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* this can take a while */
5489 s->e = dh_create_e(ssh->kex_ctx, s->nbits * 2);
5490 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(s->kex_init_value);
5491 ssh2_pkt_addmp(s->pktout, s->e);
5492 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5494 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_WAITING); /* wait for server */
5496 if (pktin->type != s->kex_reply_value) {
5497 bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
5500 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* cogitate */
5501 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
5502 s->f = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5504 bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
5507 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
5509 s->K = dh_find_K(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
5511 /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
5512 * involve user interaction. */
5513 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_NOT);
5515 sha_string(&ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5516 if (ssh->kex == &ssh_diffiehellman_gex) {
5517 sha_uint32(&ssh->exhash, s->pbits);
5518 sha_mpint(&ssh->exhash, s->p);
5519 sha_mpint(&ssh->exhash, s->g);
5521 sha_mpint(&ssh->exhash, s->e);
5522 sha_mpint(&ssh->exhash, s->f);
5523 sha_mpint(&ssh->exhash, s->K);
5524 SHA_Final(&ssh->exhash, s->exchange_hash);
5526 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
5527 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
5530 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
5531 dmemdump(s->exchange_hash, 20);
5534 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5536 !ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
5537 (char *)s->exchange_hash, 20)) {
5538 bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
5543 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
5544 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
5546 s->keystr = ssh->hostkey->fmtkey(s->hkey);
5547 s->fingerprint = ssh->hostkey->fingerprint(s->hkey);
5548 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5549 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
5550 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
5551 ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
5553 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5554 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5558 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
5559 " for user host key response"));
5562 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5563 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5565 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5566 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5567 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL,
5571 if (!s->got_session_id) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
5572 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
5573 logevent(s->fingerprint);
5575 sfree(s->fingerprint);
5577 ssh->hostkey->freekey(s->hkey);
5580 * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
5581 * the session id, used in session key construction and
5584 if (!s->got_session_id) {
5585 memcpy(ssh->v2_session_id, s->exchange_hash,
5586 sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
5587 s->got_session_id = TRUE;
5591 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
5593 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
5594 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5595 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
5598 * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
5599 * client-to-server session keys.
5601 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
5602 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
5603 ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe;
5604 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
5606 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
5607 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
5608 ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
5609 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context();
5611 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
5612 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
5613 ssh->cscomp = s->cscomp_tobe;
5614 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = ssh->cscomp->compress_init();
5617 * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
5618 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
5621 unsigned char keyspace[40];
5622 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'C',keyspace);
5623 ssh->cscipher->setkey(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
5624 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'A',keyspace);
5625 ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
5626 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'E',keyspace);
5627 ssh->csmac->setkey(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, keyspace);
5630 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
5631 ssh->cscipher->text_name);
5632 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
5633 ssh->csmac->text_name);
5634 if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
5635 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
5636 ssh->cscomp->text_name);
5639 * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
5640 * our queued higher-layer packets.
5642 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
5643 ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh);
5646 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
5649 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
5650 bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
5653 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
5656 * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
5657 * server-to-client session keys.
5659 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
5660 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
5661 ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
5662 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
5664 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
5665 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
5666 ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
5667 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context();
5669 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
5670 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
5671 ssh->sccomp = s->sccomp_tobe;
5672 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = ssh->sccomp->decompress_init();
5675 * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
5676 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
5679 unsigned char keyspace[40];
5680 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'D',keyspace);
5681 ssh->sccipher->setkey(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
5682 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'B',keyspace);
5683 ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
5684 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'F',keyspace);
5685 ssh->scmac->setkey(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, keyspace);
5687 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
5688 ssh->sccipher->text_name);
5689 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
5690 ssh->scmac->text_name);
5691 if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
5692 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
5693 ssh->sccomp->text_name);
5696 * Free key exchange data.
5700 if (ssh->kex == &ssh_diffiehellman_gex) {
5706 * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
5707 * deferred rekey reason.
5709 if (ssh->deferred_rekey_reason) {
5710 logevent(ssh->deferred_rekey_reason);
5712 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
5713 goto begin_key_exchange;
5717 * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
5719 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
5720 ssh->last_rekey = GETTICKCOUNT();
5721 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0)
5722 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
5726 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
5727 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
5728 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
5729 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
5730 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
5731 * it would only confuse the layer above.
5733 if (s->activated_authconn) {
5736 s->activated_authconn = TRUE;
5739 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
5740 * function so that other things can run on top of the
5741 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
5744 * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
5745 * inlen==-1, because this is a special signal meaning
5746 * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
5747 * giving the reason for the rekey.
5749 while (!((pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) ||
5750 (!pktin && inlen == -1))) {
5755 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
5758 * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
5759 * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
5760 * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
5761 * we process it anyway!)
5763 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY)) {
5764 logeventf(ssh, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
5766 /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
5767 * hit the event log _too_ often. */
5768 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0;
5769 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0;
5770 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
5772 schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
5775 goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is utterly horrid */
5777 logeventf(ssh, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in);
5780 goto begin_key_exchange;
5786 * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
5788 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf,
5791 bufchain_add(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, buf, len);
5795 * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
5797 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c)
5800 struct Packet *pktout;
5802 while (c->v.v2.remwindow > 0 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0) {
5805 bufchain_prefix(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, &data, &len);
5806 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remwindow)
5807 len = c->v.v2.remwindow;
5808 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remmaxpkt)
5809 len = c->v.v2.remmaxpkt;
5810 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
5811 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
5812 dont_log_data(ssh, pktout, PKTLOG_OMIT);
5813 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
5814 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, data, len);
5815 end_log_omission(ssh, pktout);
5816 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
5817 bufchain_consume(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, len);
5818 c->v.v2.remwindow -= len;
5822 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
5825 return bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
5828 static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c)
5832 return; /* don't send on closing channels */
5833 bufsize = ssh2_try_send(c);
5836 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
5837 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
5838 * notification since it will be polled */
5841 x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.s);
5844 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
5845 * buffer management */
5848 pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.s);
5855 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
5857 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, unsigned newwin)
5862 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
5863 * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
5864 * be sending any more data anyway.
5870 * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
5871 * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
5872 * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
5874 * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
5876 if (newwin > c->v.v2.locwindow * 2) {
5877 struct Packet *pktout;
5879 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
5880 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
5881 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow);
5882 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
5883 c->v.v2.locwindow = newwin;
5887 static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5889 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
5890 struct ssh_channel *c;
5891 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
5892 if (c && !c->closes) {
5893 c->v.v2.remwindow += ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
5894 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c);
5898 static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5902 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
5903 struct ssh_channel *c;
5904 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
5906 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5907 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA &&
5908 ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)
5909 return; /* extended but not stderr */
5910 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &length);
5913 c->v.v2.locwindow -= length;
5915 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
5917 from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type ==
5918 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA,
5922 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, data, length);
5925 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, data, length);
5928 while (length > 0) {
5929 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
5930 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, length);
5931 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar,
5935 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
5937 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
5939 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
5940 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
5942 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
5944 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && length > 0) {
5946 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
5948 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar,
5952 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
5954 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
5957 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
5960 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
5961 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
5962 sfree(c->u.a.message);
5963 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
5970 * If we are not buffering too much data,
5971 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
5973 if (bufsize < OUR_V2_WINSIZE)
5974 ssh2_set_window(c, OUR_V2_WINSIZE - bufsize);
5978 static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5980 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
5981 struct ssh_channel *c;
5983 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
5985 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5987 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
5989 * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
5990 * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
5992 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
5994 } else if (c->type == CHAN_AGENT) {
5996 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA) {
5997 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6002 static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6004 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6005 struct ssh_channel *c;
6006 struct Packet *pktout;
6008 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
6009 if (!c || c->halfopen) {
6010 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE for %s channel %d\n",
6011 c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent", i));
6014 /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
6016 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6017 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
6018 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
6021 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
6022 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
6029 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
6030 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6034 if (c->closes == 0) {
6035 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6036 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6037 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6039 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6040 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6044 * See if that was the last channel left open.
6045 * (This is only our termination condition if we're
6046 * not running in -N mode.)
6048 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell && count234(ssh->channels) == 0) {
6050 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
6051 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
6052 * SSH-2 connection had to end with a disconnect
6053 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
6054 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
6055 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
6056 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
6057 * this is more polite than sending a
6058 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
6060 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "All channels closed", NULL, 0, TRUE);
6064 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6066 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6067 struct ssh_channel *c;
6068 struct Packet *pktout;
6070 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
6072 return; /* nonexistent channel */
6073 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
6074 return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
6075 c->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6076 c->halfopen = FALSE;
6077 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
6078 c->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6079 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6081 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
6084 * We have a pending close on this channel,
6085 * which we decided on before the server acked
6086 * the channel open. So now we know the
6087 * remoteid, we can close it again.
6089 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6090 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6091 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6095 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6097 static const char *const reasons[] = {
6098 "<unknown reason code>",
6099 "Administratively prohibited",
6101 "Unknown channel type",
6102 "Resource shortage",
6104 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6105 unsigned reason_code;
6106 char *reason_string;
6108 struct ssh_channel *c;
6109 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
6111 return; /* nonexistent channel */
6112 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
6113 return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
6115 reason_code = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6116 if (reason_code >= lenof(reasons))
6117 reason_code = 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
6118 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &reason_string, &reason_length);
6119 logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
6120 reasons[reason_code], reason_length, reason_string);
6122 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6124 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6128 static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6132 int typelen, want_reply;
6133 int reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE; /* default */
6134 struct ssh_channel *c;
6135 struct Packet *pktout;
6137 localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6138 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
6139 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6142 * First, check that the channel exists. Otherwise,
6143 * we can instantly disconnect with a rude message.
6145 c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
6147 char *buf = dupprintf("Received channel request for nonexistent"
6148 " channel %d", localid);
6149 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, buf, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6155 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
6156 * the request type string to see if it's something
6159 if (c == ssh->mainchan) {
6161 * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
6162 * the primary channel.
6164 if (typelen == 11 &&
6165 !memcmp(type, "exit-status", 11)) {
6167 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6168 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d",
6170 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
6172 } else if (typelen == 11 &&
6173 !memcmp(type, "exit-signal", 11)) {
6175 int is_plausible = TRUE, is_int = FALSE;
6176 char *fmt_sig = "", *fmt_msg = "";
6178 int msglen = 0, core = FALSE;
6179 /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
6180 * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
6181 * having been a `string' in the drafts since at
6182 * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
6183 * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
6185 unsigned char *p = pktin->body +
6187 long len = pktin->length - pktin->savedpos;
6188 unsigned long num = GET_32BIT(p); /* what is it? */
6189 /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
6193 int maybe_int = FALSE, maybe_str = FALSE;
6194 #define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
6197 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
6198 q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
6199 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
6200 ((q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))!= 0) && q == len) \
6204 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int);
6205 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num+1, maybe_str);
6206 #undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
6207 if (maybe_int && !maybe_str)
6209 else if (!maybe_int && maybe_str)
6212 /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
6213 is_plausible = FALSE;
6218 /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
6219 int signum = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6220 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" %d", signum);
6222 /* As per the drafts. */
6225 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &sig, &siglen);
6226 /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
6227 * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
6229 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
6233 core = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6234 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
6236 fmt_msg = dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen, msg);
6238 /* ignore lang tag */
6239 } /* else don't attempt to parse */
6240 logeventf(ssh, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
6241 fmt_sig, core ? " (core dumped)" : "",
6243 if (*fmt_sig) sfree(fmt_sig);
6244 if (*fmt_msg) sfree(fmt_msg);
6245 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
6250 * This is a channel request we don't know
6251 * about, so we now either ignore the request
6252 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
6255 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
6258 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(reply);
6259 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6260 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6264 static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6267 int typelen, want_reply;
6268 struct Packet *pktout;
6270 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
6271 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6274 * We currently don't support any global requests
6275 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
6276 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
6280 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
6281 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6285 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6293 struct ssh_channel *c;
6294 unsigned remid, winsize, pktsize;
6295 struct Packet *pktout;
6297 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
6298 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
6301 remid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6302 winsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6303 pktsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6305 if (typelen == 3 && !memcmp(type, "x11", 3)) {
6308 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
6309 addrstr = snewn(peeraddrlen+1, char);
6310 memcpy(addrstr, peeraddr, peeraddrlen);
6311 addrstr[peeraddrlen] = '\0';
6312 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6314 logeventf(ssh, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
6317 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled)
6318 error = "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
6319 else if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->cfg.x11_display, c,
6320 ssh->x11auth, addrstr, peerport,
6321 &ssh->cfg) != NULL) {
6322 error = "Unable to open an X11 connection";
6324 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
6329 } else if (typelen == 15 &&
6330 !memcmp(type, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
6331 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *realpf;
6334 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &dummy, &dummylen);/* skip address */
6335 pf.sport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6336 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
6337 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6338 realpf = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
6339 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port %d open request "
6340 "from %s:%d", pf.sport, peeraddr, peerport);
6341 if (realpf == NULL) {
6342 error = "Remote port is not recognised";
6344 const char *e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s,
6348 realpf->pfrec->addressfamily);
6349 logeventf(ssh, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
6350 "%s:%d", realpf->dhost, realpf->dport);
6352 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
6353 error = "Port open failed";
6355 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
6356 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
6359 } else if (typelen == 22 &&
6360 !memcmp(type, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 3)) {
6361 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled)
6362 error = "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
6364 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
6365 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
6368 error = "Unsupported channel type requested";
6371 c->remoteid = remid;
6372 c->halfopen = FALSE;
6374 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
6375 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6376 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
6377 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, error);
6378 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
6379 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6380 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected channel open: %s", error);
6383 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
6385 c->v.v2.locwindow = OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
6386 c->v.v2.remwindow = winsize;
6387 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = pktsize;
6388 bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6389 add234(ssh->channels, c);
6390 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
6391 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6392 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
6393 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);
6394 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
6395 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6400 * Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point.
6402 static void ssh2_msg_userauth_banner(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6404 /* Arbitrary limit to prevent unbounded inflation of buffer */
6405 if (bufchain_size(&ssh->banner) <= 131072) {
6406 char *banner = NULL;
6408 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &banner, &size);
6410 bufchain_add(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
6414 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for "pty-req" */
6415 static void ssh2_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
6417 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
6419 unsigned int arg = 0;
6420 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
6421 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
6422 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
6424 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
6427 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
6430 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
6431 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, arg);
6435 * Handle the SSH-2 userauth and connection layers.
6437 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
6438 struct Packet *pktin)
6440 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state {
6442 AUTH_INVALID, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_AGENT, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE,
6444 AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
6448 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY,
6449 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD,
6450 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET,
6452 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE,
6453 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
6455 int done_service_req;
6456 int gotit, need_pw, can_pubkey, can_passwd, can_keyb_inter;
6457 int tried_pubkey_config, tried_agent;
6458 int kbd_inter_running, kbd_inter_refused;
6460 int num_prompts, curr_prompt, echo;
6465 void *publickey_blob;
6466 int publickey_bloblen;
6467 unsigned char request[5], *response, *p;
6471 char *pkblob, *alg, *commentp;
6472 int pklen, alglen, commentlen;
6473 int siglen, retlen, len;
6474 char *q, *agentreq, *ret;
6476 int num_env, env_left, env_ok;
6477 struct Packet *pktout;
6479 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state);
6481 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate);
6483 s->done_service_req = FALSE;
6484 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
6485 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_userauth) {
6487 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
6489 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
6490 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-userauth");
6491 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
6492 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
6493 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
6494 s->done_service_req = TRUE;
6496 if (!s->done_service_req) {
6498 * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
6500 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
6501 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
6502 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
6503 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
6504 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
6505 s->we_are_in = TRUE; /* no auth required */
6507 bombout(("Server refused service request"));
6513 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
6514 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
6515 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
6516 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
6517 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
6518 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
6520 * I think this best serves the needs of
6522 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
6523 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
6524 * type both correctly
6526 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
6527 * need to fall back to passwords
6529 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
6530 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
6531 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
6532 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
6533 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
6536 s->username[0] = '\0';
6537 s->got_username = FALSE;
6538 bufchain_init(&ssh->banner);
6539 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] =
6540 ssh2_msg_userauth_banner;
6541 while (!s->we_are_in) {
6545 if (s->got_username && !ssh->cfg.change_username) {
6547 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
6548 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
6551 } else if (!*ssh->cfg.username) {
6552 if (ssh_get_line && !ssh_getline_pw_only) {
6553 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
6554 s->username, sizeof(s->username), FALSE)) {
6556 * get_line failed to get a username.
6559 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
6563 int ret; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
6564 c_write_str(ssh, "login as: ");
6566 setup_userpass_input(ssh, s->username, sizeof(s->username), 1);
6568 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
6569 ret = process_userpass_input(ssh, in, inlen);
6573 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
6575 s->username[strcspn(s->username, "\n\r")] = '\0';
6578 strncpy(s->username, ssh->cfg.username, sizeof(s->username));
6579 s->username[sizeof(s->username)-1] = '\0';
6580 if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
6581 stuff = dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s->username);
6582 c_write_str(ssh, stuff);
6586 s->got_username = TRUE;
6589 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
6590 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
6591 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
6593 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK;
6595 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
6596 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
6597 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
6598 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
6599 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
6600 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
6602 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
6604 s->tried_pubkey_config = FALSE;
6605 s->tried_agent = FALSE;
6606 s->kbd_inter_running = FALSE;
6607 s->kbd_inter_refused = FALSE;
6608 /* Load the pub half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
6609 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
6611 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
6612 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
6613 keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
6614 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2) {
6616 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, NULL,
6617 &s->publickey_bloblen, NULL);
6620 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
6621 key_type_to_str(keytype));
6622 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
6624 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
6625 key_type_to_str(keytype));
6626 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
6628 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
6631 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
6635 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
6638 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
6640 * Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
6641 * that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
6642 * we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
6646 int size = bufchain_size(&ssh->banner);
6648 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
6649 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
6650 * a script, which means nobody will read the
6651 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
6652 * the banner will screw up processing on the
6653 * output of (say) plink.)
6655 if (size && (flags & (FLAG_VERBOSE | FLAG_INTERACTIVE))) {
6656 char *banner = snewn(size, char);
6657 bufchain_fetch(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
6658 c_write_untrusted(ssh, banner, size);
6661 bufchain_clear(&ssh->banner);
6663 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS) {
6664 logevent("Access granted");
6665 s->we_are_in = TRUE;
6669 if (s->kbd_inter_running &&
6670 pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
6672 * This is either a further set-of-prompts packet
6673 * in keyboard-interactive authentication, or it's
6674 * the same one and we came back here with `gotit'
6675 * set. In the former case, we must reset the
6676 * curr_prompt variable.
6680 } else if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ) {
6681 /* FIXME: perhaps we should support this? */
6682 bombout(("PASSWD_CHANGEREQ not yet supported"));
6684 } else if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
6685 bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: type %d",
6693 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
6694 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
6695 * helpfully try next.
6697 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
6700 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &methods, &methlen);
6701 s->kbd_inter_running = FALSE;
6702 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin)) {
6704 * We have received an unequivocal Access
6705 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
6708 * - if we'd just tried "none" authentication,
6709 * it's not worth printing anything at all
6711 * - if we'd just tried a public key _offer_,
6712 * the message should be "Server refused our
6713 * key" (or no message at all if the key
6714 * came from Pageant)
6716 * - if we'd just tried anything else, the
6717 * message really should be "Access denied".
6719 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
6720 * authentication, we should break out of this
6721 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
6722 * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
6723 * username change attempts).
6725 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
6727 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD ||
6728 s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET) {
6729 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD)
6730 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our key\r\n");
6731 logevent("Server refused public key");
6732 } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET) {
6733 /* server declined keyboard-interactive; ignore */
6735 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
6736 logevent("Access denied");
6737 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD &&
6738 ssh->cfg.change_username) {
6739 /* XXX perhaps we should allow
6740 * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
6741 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
6746 c_write_str(ssh, "Further authentication required\r\n");
6747 logevent("Further authentication required");
6751 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods, methlen);
6753 in_commasep_string("password", methods, methlen);
6754 s->can_keyb_inter = ssh->cfg.try_ki_auth &&
6755 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods, methlen);
6759 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK;
6763 * Most password/passphrase prompts will be
6764 * non-echoing, so we set this to 0 by default.
6765 * Exception is that some keyboard-interactive prompts
6766 * can be echoing, in which case we'll set this to 1.
6770 if (!s->method && s->can_pubkey &&
6771 agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
6773 * Attempt public-key authentication using Pageant.
6778 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK;
6779 ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
6781 s->tried_agent = TRUE;
6783 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
6785 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
6786 PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
6787 s->request[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
6788 if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
6789 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
6793 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
6794 " waiting for agent response"));
6797 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
6798 r = ssh->agent_response;
6799 s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
6801 s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
6802 if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
6803 s->response[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
6804 s->p = s->response + 5;
6805 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(s->p);
6807 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-2 keys", s->nkeys);
6808 for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
6811 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
6812 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
6814 if (s->publickey_blob &&
6815 s->pklen == s->publickey_bloblen &&
6816 !memcmp(s->p, s->publickey_blob,
6817 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
6818 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
6819 s->tried_pubkey_config = 1;
6821 s->pkblob = (char *)s->p;
6823 s->alglen = GET_32BIT(s->pkblob);
6824 s->alg = s->pkblob + 4;
6825 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
6827 s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
6828 s->p += s->commentlen;
6829 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
6830 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
6831 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6832 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
6833 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE); /* no signature included */
6834 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
6835 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
6836 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
6837 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
6838 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
6840 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
6841 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
6842 logevent("Key refused");
6846 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
6847 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with "
6849 c_write(ssh, s->commentp, s->commentlen);
6850 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
6854 * Server is willing to accept the key.
6855 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
6857 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
6858 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
6859 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6860 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
6861 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
6862 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
6863 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
6864 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
6865 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
6867 s->siglen = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 + 20;
6868 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
6870 s->len = 1; /* message type */
6871 s->len += 4 + s->pklen; /* key blob */
6872 s->len += 4 + s->siglen; /* data to sign */
6873 s->len += 4; /* flags */
6874 s->agentreq = snewn(4 + s->len, char);
6875 PUT_32BIT(s->agentreq, s->len);
6876 s->q = s->agentreq + 4;
6877 *s->q++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST;
6878 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->pklen);
6880 memcpy(s->q, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
6882 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->siglen);
6884 /* Now the data to be signed... */
6885 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
6886 PUT_32BIT(s->q, 20);
6889 memcpy(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id, 20);
6891 memcpy(s->q, s->pktout->data + 5,
6892 s->pktout->length - 5);
6893 s->q += s->pktout->length - 5;
6894 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
6896 if (!agent_query(s->agentreq, s->len + 4,
6898 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
6902 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
6903 " while waiting for agent"
6907 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
6908 vret = ssh->agent_response;
6909 s->retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
6914 if (s->ret[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
6915 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
6916 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout,
6917 s->pkblob, s->pklen,
6919 GET_32BIT(s->ret + 5));
6920 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
6925 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
6936 if (!s->method && s->can_pubkey && s->publickey_blob
6937 && !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
6938 unsigned char *pub_blob;
6939 char *algorithm, *comment;
6942 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
6944 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK;
6945 ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
6948 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
6950 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
6951 * willing to accept it.
6954 (unsigned char *)ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
6959 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
6960 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
6961 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6962 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
6963 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE); /* no signature included */
6964 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, algorithm);
6965 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
6966 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)pub_blob,
6968 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
6969 logevent("Offered public key");
6971 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
6972 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
6974 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD;
6975 continue; /* key refused; give up on it */
6978 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
6980 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
6983 if (ssh2_userkey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, &comment)) {
6984 sprintf(s->pwprompt,
6985 "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
6991 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
6992 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with public key \"");
6993 c_write_str(ssh, comment);
6994 c_write_str(ssh, "\"\r\n");
6996 s->method = AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE;
7000 if (!s->method && s->can_keyb_inter && !s->kbd_inter_refused &&
7001 !s->kbd_inter_running) {
7002 s->method = AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
7003 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
7005 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK;
7006 ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
7008 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7009 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7010 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7011 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "keyboard-interactive"); /* method */
7012 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* lang */
7013 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "");
7014 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7016 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7017 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
7018 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE)
7020 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication refused");
7021 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET;
7022 s->kbd_inter_refused = TRUE; /* don't try it again */
7026 c_write_str(ssh, "Using keyboard-interactive authentication.\r\n");
7027 s->kbd_inter_running = TRUE;
7031 if (s->kbd_inter_running) {
7032 s->method = AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
7033 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
7035 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK;
7036 ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
7038 if (s->curr_prompt == 0) {
7040 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
7041 * Display header data, and start going through
7044 char *name, *inst, *lang;
7045 int name_len, inst_len, lang_len;
7047 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &name, &name_len);
7048 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &inst, &inst_len);
7049 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &lang, &lang_len);
7051 c_write_untrusted(ssh, name, name_len);
7052 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
7055 c_write_untrusted(ssh, inst, inst_len);
7056 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
7058 s->num_prompts = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7062 * If there are prompts remaining in the packet,
7063 * display one and get a response.
7065 if (s->curr_prompt < s->num_prompts) {
7069 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
7070 if (prompt_len > 0) {
7071 static const char trunc[] = "<prompt truncated>: ";
7072 static const int prlen = sizeof(s->pwprompt) -
7074 if (prompt_len > prlen) {
7075 memcpy(s->pwprompt, prompt, prlen);
7076 strcpy(s->pwprompt + prlen, trunc);
7078 memcpy(s->pwprompt, prompt, prompt_len);
7079 s->pwprompt[prompt_len] = '\0';
7083 "<server failed to send prompt>: ");
7085 s->echo = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
7091 if (!s->method && s->can_passwd) {
7092 s->method = AUTH_PASSWORD;
7093 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK;
7094 ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD;
7095 sprintf(s->pwprompt, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ", s->username,
7102 if (!ssh_get_line(s->pwprompt, s->password,
7103 sizeof(s->password), TRUE)) {
7105 * get_line failed to get a password (for
7106 * example because one was supplied on the
7107 * command line which has already failed to
7110 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
7111 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
7116 int ret; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
7117 c_write_untrusted(ssh, s->pwprompt, strlen(s->pwprompt));
7120 setup_userpass_input(ssh, s->password,
7121 sizeof(s->password), s->echo);
7123 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7124 ret = process_userpass_input(ssh, in, inlen);
7128 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
7132 if (s->method == AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE) {
7134 * We have our passphrase. Now try the actual authentication.
7136 struct ssh2_userkey *key;
7137 const char *error = NULL;
7139 key = ssh2_load_userkey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, s->password,
7141 if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE || key == NULL) {
7142 if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
7143 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
7144 s->tried_pubkey_config = FALSE;
7146 c_write_str(ssh, "Unable to load private key (");
7147 c_write_str(ssh, error);
7148 c_write_str(ssh, ")\r\n");
7149 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
7151 /* Send a spurious AUTH_NONE to return to the top. */
7152 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7153 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7154 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7155 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
7156 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7157 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
7159 unsigned char *pkblob, *sigblob, *sigdata;
7160 int pkblob_len, sigblob_len, sigdata_len;
7164 * We have loaded the private key and the server
7165 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
7166 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
7168 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7169 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7170 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7171 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
7172 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
7173 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key->alg->name);
7174 pkblob = key->alg->public_blob(key->data, &pkblob_len);
7175 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7176 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)pkblob, pkblob_len);
7179 * The data to be signed is:
7183 * followed by everything so far placed in the
7186 sigdata_len = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 + 20;
7187 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
7189 sigdata = snewn(sigdata_len, unsigned char);
7191 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
7192 PUT_32BIT(sigdata+p, 20);
7195 memcpy(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id, 20); p += 20;
7196 memcpy(sigdata+p, s->pktout->data + 5,
7197 s->pktout->length - 5);
7198 p += s->pktout->length - 5;
7199 assert(p == sigdata_len);
7200 sigblob = key->alg->sign(key->data, (char *)sigdata,
7201 sigdata_len, &sigblob_len);
7202 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout, pkblob, pkblob_len,
7203 sigblob, sigblob_len);
7208 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7209 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
7210 key->alg->freekey(key->data);
7212 } else if (s->method == AUTH_PASSWORD) {
7214 * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
7215 * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
7218 * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
7219 * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
7220 * people who find out how long their password is!
7222 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7223 s->pktout->forcepad = 256;
7224 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7225 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7226 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
7227 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
7228 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
7229 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
7230 memset(s->password, 0, sizeof(s->password));
7231 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
7232 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7233 logevent("Sent password");
7234 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
7235 } else if (s->method == AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE) {
7236 if (s->curr_prompt == 0) {
7237 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
7238 s->pktout->forcepad = 256;
7239 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->num_prompts);
7241 if (s->need_pw) { /* only add pw if we just got one! */
7242 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
7243 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
7244 memset(s->password, 0, sizeof(s->password));
7245 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
7248 if (s->curr_prompt >= s->num_prompts) {
7249 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7252 * If there are prompts remaining, we set
7253 * `gotit' so that we won't attempt to get
7254 * another packet. Then we go back round the
7255 * loop and will end up retrieving another
7256 * prompt out of the existing packet. Funky or
7261 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
7263 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
7264 "No supported authentication methods available",
7265 SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE,
7271 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
7274 * Now the connection protocol has started, one way or another.
7277 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
7280 * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
7281 * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
7283 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] =
7284 ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust;
7285 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] =
7286 ssh2_msg_global_request;
7289 * Create the main session channel.
7291 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell) {
7292 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
7293 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
7294 ssh->mainchan->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
7295 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
7296 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "session");
7297 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
7298 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow = OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
7299 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
7300 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
7301 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7302 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7303 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
7304 bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
7306 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
7308 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
7309 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
7312 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7313 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
7314 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
7315 ssh->mainchan->closes = 0;
7316 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7317 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7318 bufchain_init(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer);
7319 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
7320 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
7321 logevent("Opened channel for session");
7323 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
7326 * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
7327 * general channel-based messages.
7329 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] =
7330 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] =
7331 ssh2_msg_channel_data;
7332 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof;
7333 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_channel_close;
7334 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
7335 ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
7336 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
7337 ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure;
7338 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] =
7339 ssh2_msg_channel_request;
7340 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] =
7341 ssh2_msg_channel_open;
7344 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
7346 if (ssh->mainchan && ssh->cfg.x11_forward) {
7347 char proto[20], data[64];
7348 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
7349 ssh->x11auth = x11_invent_auth(proto, sizeof(proto),
7350 data, sizeof(data), ssh->cfg.x11_auth);
7351 x11_get_real_auth(ssh->x11auth, ssh->cfg.x11_display);
7352 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
7353 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
7354 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "x11-req");
7355 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
7356 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* many connections */
7357 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, proto);
7359 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
7360 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
7361 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
7362 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
7363 * cookie into the log.
7365 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
7366 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, data);
7367 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
7368 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, x11_get_screen_number(ssh->cfg.x11_display));
7369 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7371 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7373 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
7374 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
7375 bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
7376 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
7379 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
7381 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
7382 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
7387 * Enable port forwardings.
7389 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
7392 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
7394 if (ssh->mainchan && ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
7395 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
7396 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
7397 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
7398 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
7399 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
7400 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7402 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7404 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
7405 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
7406 bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
7407 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
7410 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
7412 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
7413 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
7418 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
7420 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->cfg.nopty) {
7421 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
7422 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
7423 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
7424 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
7425 /* Build the pty request. */
7426 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
7427 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
7428 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "pty-req");
7429 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
7430 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.termtype);
7431 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_width);
7432 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_height);
7433 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel width */
7434 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel height */
7435 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7436 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
7437 ssh2_send_ttymode, (void *)s->pktout);
7438 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
7439 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ispeed);
7440 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
7441 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ospeed);
7442 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
7443 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7444 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
7446 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7448 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
7449 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
7450 bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
7451 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
7454 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
7455 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
7457 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
7458 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
7461 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
7465 * Send environment variables.
7467 * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
7468 * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
7470 if (ssh->mainchan && *ssh->cfg.environmt) {
7471 char *e = ssh->cfg.environmt;
7472 char *var, *varend, *val;
7478 while (*e && *e != '\t') e++;
7480 if (*e == '\t') e++;
7485 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
7486 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
7487 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "env");
7488 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
7489 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7490 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, var, varend-var);
7491 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, val);
7492 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7497 logeventf(ssh, "Sent %d environment variables", s->num_env);
7500 s->env_left = s->num_env;
7502 while (s->env_left > 0) {
7503 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7505 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
7506 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
7507 bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
7508 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
7518 if (s->env_ok == s->num_env) {
7519 logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
7520 } else if (s->env_ok == 0) {
7521 logevent("All environment variables refused");
7522 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
7524 logeventf(ssh, "%d environment variables refused",
7525 s->num_env - s->env_ok);
7526 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
7531 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
7532 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
7535 if (ssh->mainchan) while (1) {
7539 if (ssh->fallback_cmd) {
7540 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys2;
7541 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
7543 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys;
7544 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
7545 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
7548 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
7549 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
7551 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "subsystem");
7552 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
7553 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
7555 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "exec");
7556 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
7557 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
7559 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "shell");
7560 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
7562 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7564 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7566 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
7567 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
7568 bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
7569 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
7573 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
7574 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
7575 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
7576 * back to it before complaining.
7578 if (!ssh->fallback_cmd && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2 != NULL) {
7579 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
7580 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
7583 bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
7586 logevent("Started a shell/command");
7591 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
7592 if (ssh->size_needed)
7593 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
7594 if (ssh->eof_needed)
7595 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
7601 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
7606 s->try_send = FALSE;
7610 * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
7611 * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
7612 * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
7615 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
7617 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
7619 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
7621 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh->mainchan, (char *)in, inlen);
7626 struct ssh_channel *c;
7628 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
7630 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++)
7631 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c);
7639 * Handlers for SSH-2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
7641 static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7643 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
7645 int nowlen, reason, msglen;
7647 reason = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7648 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
7650 if (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) {
7651 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
7652 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason]);
7654 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
7655 " type %d)", reason);
7659 buf = dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %n%.*s",
7660 &nowlen, msglen, msg);
7662 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%s\"",
7664 (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) ?
7665 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason] : "unknown",
7670 static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7672 /* log the debug message */
7677 /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of this */
7678 always_display = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
7679 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
7681 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
7684 static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7686 struct Packet *pktout;
7687 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
7688 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, pktin->sequence);
7690 * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
7691 * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
7693 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
7697 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
7699 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
7704 * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
7706 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
7707 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented;
7710 * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
7711 * the coroutines will get it.
7713 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED] = NULL;
7714 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST] = NULL;
7715 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT] = NULL;
7716 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT] = NULL;
7717 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS] = NULL;
7718 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT] = NULL;
7719 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY] = NULL;
7720 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7721 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7722 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT] = NULL;
7723 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY] = NULL;
7724 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST] = NULL;
7725 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE] = NULL;
7726 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS] = NULL;
7727 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
7728 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK] = NULL;
7729 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7730 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7731 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE] = NULL;
7732 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = NULL;
7733 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = NULL;
7734 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = NULL;
7735 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = NULL;
7736 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = NULL;
7737 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = NULL;
7738 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = NULL;
7739 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = NULL;
7740 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = NULL;
7741 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = NULL;
7742 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = NULL;
7743 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] = NULL;
7744 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = NULL;
7745 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = NULL;
7748 * These special message types we install handlers for.
7750 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh2_msg_disconnect;
7751 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore; /* shared with SSH-1 */
7752 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
7755 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now)
7759 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
7762 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0 &&
7763 now - ssh->next_rekey >= 0) {
7764 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "timeout", -1, NULL);
7768 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
7769 struct Packet *pktin)
7771 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
7772 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
7776 ssh->incoming_data_size += pktin->encrypted_len;
7777 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
7778 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
7779 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
7780 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data received", -1, NULL);
7783 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
7784 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
7788 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done ||
7789 (pktin && pktin->type >= 20 && pktin->type < 50)) {
7790 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh, in, inlen, pktin) &&
7791 !ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
7792 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
7794 * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
7796 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
7799 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
7804 * Called to set up the connection.
7806 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
7808 static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
7810 char *host, int port, char **realhost, int nodelay,
7816 ssh = snew(struct ssh_tag);
7817 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
7818 ssh->version = 0; /* when not ready yet */
7821 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = NULL;
7822 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
7823 ssh->cscipher = NULL;
7824 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = NULL;
7825 ssh->sccipher = NULL;
7826 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = NULL;
7828 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = NULL;
7830 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = NULL;
7832 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = NULL;
7834 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = NULL;
7836 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
7837 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
7839 ssh->close_expected = FALSE;
7840 ssh->clean_exit = FALSE;
7841 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_PREPACKET;
7842 ssh->size_needed = FALSE;
7843 ssh->eof_needed = FALSE;
7846 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
7847 ssh->deferred_len = 0;
7848 ssh->deferred_size = 0;
7849 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
7851 ssh->x11auth = NULL;
7852 ssh->v1_compressing = FALSE;
7853 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence = 0;
7854 ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
7855 ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
7856 ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate = 0;
7857 ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate = 0;
7858 ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate = 0;
7859 ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate = 0;
7860 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate = 0;
7861 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate = 0;
7862 ssh->do_ssh_init_state = NULL;
7863 ssh->do_ssh1_login_state = NULL;
7864 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state = NULL;
7865 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state = NULL;
7866 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
7867 ssh->throttled_all = 0;
7868 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
7870 ssh->queuelen = ssh->queuesize = 0;
7871 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
7872 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
7873 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
7874 bufchain_init(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
7875 ssh->frozen = FALSE;
7877 *backend_handle = ssh;
7880 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
7881 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
7884 ssh->frontend = frontend_handle;
7885 ssh->term_width = ssh->cfg.width;
7886 ssh->term_height = ssh->cfg.height;
7888 ssh->channels = NULL;
7889 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
7890 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
7895 ssh->v1_throttle_count = 0;
7896 ssh->overall_bufsize = 0;
7897 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
7899 ssh->protocol = NULL;
7901 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = FALSE;
7905 ssh->incoming_data_size = ssh->outgoing_data_size =
7906 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0L;
7907 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_data);
7908 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
7910 p = connect_to_host(ssh, host, port, realhost, nodelay, keepalive);
7919 static void ssh_free(void *handle)
7921 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
7922 struct ssh_channel *c;
7923 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
7925 if (ssh->v1_cipher_ctx)
7926 ssh->cipher->free_context(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx);
7927 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
7928 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
7929 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
7930 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
7931 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
7932 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
7933 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
7934 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
7935 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx) {
7937 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
7939 zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
7941 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx) {
7943 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
7945 zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
7948 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
7949 sfree(ssh->savedhost);
7951 while (ssh->queuelen-- > 0)
7952 ssh_free_packet(ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen]);
7955 while (ssh->qhead) {
7956 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
7957 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
7960 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
7962 if (ssh->channels) {
7963 while ((c = delpos234(ssh->channels, 0)) != NULL) {
7966 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
7967 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
7970 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
7971 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
7976 freetree234(ssh->channels);
7977 ssh->channels = NULL;
7980 if (ssh->rportfwds) {
7981 while ((pf = delpos234(ssh->rportfwds, 0)) != NULL)
7983 freetree234(ssh->rportfwds);
7984 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
7986 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
7988 x11_free_auth(ssh->x11auth);
7989 sfree(ssh->do_ssh_init_state);
7990 sfree(ssh->do_ssh1_login_state);
7991 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state);
7992 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state);
7993 if (ssh->crcda_ctx) {
7994 crcda_free_context(ssh->crcda_ctx);
7995 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
7998 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
7999 expire_timer_context(ssh);
8001 pinger_free(ssh->pinger);
8002 bufchain_clear(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
8009 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
8011 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle, Config *cfg)
8013 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8014 char *rekeying = NULL, rekey_mandatory = FALSE;
8015 unsigned long old_max_data_size;
8017 pinger_reconfig(ssh->pinger, &ssh->cfg, cfg);
8019 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, cfg);
8021 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != cfg->ssh_rekey_time &&
8022 cfg->ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
8023 long new_next = ssh->last_rekey + cfg->ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC;
8024 long now = GETTICKCOUNT();
8026 if (new_next - now < 0) {
8027 rekeying = "timeout shortened";
8029 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(new_next - now, ssh2_timer, ssh);
8033 old_max_data_size = ssh->max_data_size;
8034 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(cfg->ssh_rekey_data);
8035 if (old_max_data_size != ssh->max_data_size &&
8036 ssh->max_data_size != 0) {
8037 if (ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size ||
8038 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
8039 rekeying = "data limit lowered";
8042 if (ssh->cfg.compression != cfg->compression) {
8043 rekeying = "compression setting changed";
8044 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
8047 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc != cfg->ssh2_des_cbc ||
8048 memcmp(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist, cfg->ssh_cipherlist,
8049 sizeof(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist))) {
8050 rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
8051 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
8054 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
8057 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress) {
8058 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, rekeying, -1, NULL);
8059 } else if (rekey_mandatory) {
8060 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = rekeying;
8066 * Called to send data down the Telnet connection.
8068 static int ssh_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
8070 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8072 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
8075 ssh->protocol(ssh, (unsigned char *)buf, len, 0);
8077 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh);
8081 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
8083 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle)
8085 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8088 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
8092 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
8093 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
8096 if (ssh->throttled_all)
8097 override_value = ssh->overall_bufsize;
8099 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8100 return override_value;
8101 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
8102 if (!ssh->mainchan || ssh->mainchan->closes > 0)
8103 return override_value;
8105 return (override_value +
8106 bufchain_size(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer));
8113 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
8115 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
8117 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8118 struct Packet *pktout;
8120 ssh->term_width = width;
8121 ssh->term_height = height;
8123 switch (ssh->state) {
8124 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE:
8125 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET:
8126 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED:
8127 break; /* do nothing */
8128 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED:
8129 ssh->size_needed = TRUE; /* buffer for later */
8131 case SSH_STATE_SESSION:
8132 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
8133 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8134 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE,
8135 PKT_INT, ssh->term_height,
8136 PKT_INT, ssh->term_width,
8137 PKT_INT, 0, PKT_INT, 0, PKT_END);
8138 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
8139 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8140 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8141 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "window-change");
8142 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
8143 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_width);
8144 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_height);
8145 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
8146 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
8147 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
8155 * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
8158 static const struct telnet_special *ssh_get_specials(void *handle)
8160 static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special[] = {
8161 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP}
8163 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_transport_specials[] = {
8164 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP},
8165 {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY},
8167 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials[] = {
8170 /* These are the signal names defined by draft-ietf-secsh-connect-23.
8171 * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
8172 * required signals. */
8173 {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT},
8174 {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM},
8175 {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL},
8176 {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT},
8177 {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP},
8178 {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU},
8179 {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM},
8180 {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL},
8181 {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV},
8182 {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2},
8185 static const struct telnet_special specials_end[] = {
8188 /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
8189 static struct telnet_special ssh_specials[lenof(ssh2_transport_specials) +
8190 lenof(ssh2_session_specials) +
8191 lenof(specials_end)];
8192 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8194 #define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
8196 assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
8197 memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
8201 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8202 /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
8203 * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
8205 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
8206 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special);
8207 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
8208 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_transport_specials);
8210 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials);
8211 } /* else we're not ready yet */
8214 ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end);
8215 return ssh_specials;
8223 * Send Telnet special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
8224 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
8227 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
8229 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8230 struct Packet *pktout;
8232 if (code == TS_EOF) {
8233 if (ssh->state != SSH_STATE_SESSION) {
8235 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
8236 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
8239 ssh->eof_needed = TRUE;
8242 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8243 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EOF, PKT_END);
8244 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
8245 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
8246 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8247 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
8248 ssh->send_ok = 0; /* now stop trying to read from stdin */
8250 logevent("Sent EOF message");
8251 } else if (code == TS_PING || code == TS_NOP) {
8252 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
8253 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
8254 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8255 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
8256 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, PKT_STR, "", PKT_END);
8258 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
8259 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
8260 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
8262 } else if (code == TS_REKEY) {
8263 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->version == 2) {
8264 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL);
8266 } else if (code == TS_BRK) {
8267 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
8268 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
8269 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8270 logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH-1");
8271 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
8272 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8273 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8274 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "break");
8275 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
8276 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0); /* default break length */
8277 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
8280 /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
8281 char *signame = NULL;
8282 if (code == TS_SIGABRT) signame = "ABRT";
8283 if (code == TS_SIGALRM) signame = "ALRM";
8284 if (code == TS_SIGFPE) signame = "FPE";
8285 if (code == TS_SIGHUP) signame = "HUP";
8286 if (code == TS_SIGILL) signame = "ILL";
8287 if (code == TS_SIGINT) signame = "INT";
8288 if (code == TS_SIGKILL) signame = "KILL";
8289 if (code == TS_SIGPIPE) signame = "PIPE";
8290 if (code == TS_SIGQUIT) signame = "QUIT";
8291 if (code == TS_SIGSEGV) signame = "SEGV";
8292 if (code == TS_SIGTERM) signame = "TERM";
8293 if (code == TS_SIGUSR1) signame = "USR1";
8294 if (code == TS_SIGUSR2) signame = "USR2";
8295 /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
8296 * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
8298 /* It's a signal. */
8299 if (ssh->version == 2 && ssh->mainchan) {
8300 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8301 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8302 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "signal");
8303 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
8304 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, signame);
8305 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
8306 logeventf(ssh, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame);
8309 /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
8314 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, Socket s)
8316 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8317 struct ssh_channel *c;
8318 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
8323 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
8325 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT;/* identify channel type */
8327 bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
8328 add234(ssh->channels, c);
8334 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
8335 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
8337 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle, int bufsize)
8339 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8340 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8341 if (ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
8342 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
8343 ssh1_throttle(ssh, -1);
8346 if (ssh->mainchan && ssh->mainchan->closes == 0)
8347 ssh2_set_window(ssh->mainchan, OUR_V2_WINSIZE - bufsize);
8351 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, char *hostname, int port, char *org)
8353 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)channel;
8355 struct Packet *pktout;
8357 logeventf(ssh, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname, port);
8359 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8360 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN,
8361 PKT_INT, c->localid,
8364 /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
8367 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
8368 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "direct-tcpip");
8369 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
8370 c->v.v2.locwindow = OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
8371 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
8372 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
8373 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, hostname);
8374 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, port);
8376 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
8377 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
8378 * convinced the server should be told details like that
8379 * about my local network configuration.
8381 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "client-side-connection");
8382 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
8383 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
8387 static Socket ssh_socket(void *handle)
8389 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8393 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle)
8395 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8396 return ssh->send_ok;
8399 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
8401 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8402 if (option == LD_ECHO)
8403 return ssh->echoing;
8404 if (option == LD_EDIT)
8405 return ssh->editing;
8409 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
8411 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8415 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
8417 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8418 ssh->logctx = logctx;
8421 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle)
8423 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8427 return (ssh->exitcode >= 0 ? ssh->exitcode : 0);
8431 * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
8432 * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
8434 static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle)
8436 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8437 return ssh->version;
8441 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
8442 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
8443 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
8445 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle)
8447 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8448 return ssh->fallback_cmd;
8451 Backend ssh_backend = {
8461 ssh_return_exitcode,