17 #define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
18 #define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
19 #define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
20 #define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
21 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
22 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
23 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
24 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
25 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
26 #define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
27 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
28 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
29 #define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
30 #define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
31 #define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
32 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
33 #define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
34 #define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
35 #define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
36 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
37 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
38 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
39 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
40 #define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
41 #define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
42 #define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
43 #define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
44 #define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
45 #define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
46 #define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
47 #define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
48 #define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
49 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
50 #define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
51 #define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
52 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
53 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
54 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
55 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
56 #define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
57 #define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
59 #define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
60 #define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
62 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
63 /* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
64 #define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
66 #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
67 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
68 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
69 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
70 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
71 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
72 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
73 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
74 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
75 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
76 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
77 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
78 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
79 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
80 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
81 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
82 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
83 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
84 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
85 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
86 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
87 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
88 #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
89 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
90 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
91 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
92 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
93 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
94 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
95 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
96 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
97 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
98 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
99 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
100 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
101 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
104 * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
105 * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
107 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP 0x0001
108 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX 0x0002
109 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_KEX_MASK 0x000F
110 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY 0x0010
111 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD 0x0020
112 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER 0x0040
113 #define SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK 0x00F0
115 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
116 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
117 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
118 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
119 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
120 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
121 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
122 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
123 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
124 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
125 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
126 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
127 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
128 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
129 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
131 static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons[] = {
133 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT",
134 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR",
135 "SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED",
136 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED",
137 "SSH_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR",
138 "SSH_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR",
139 "SSH_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE",
140 "SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED",
141 "SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE",
142 "SSH_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST",
143 "SSH_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION",
144 "SSH_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS",
145 "SSH_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER",
146 "SSH_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE",
147 "SSH_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME",
150 #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
151 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
152 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
153 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
155 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
158 * Various remote-bug flags.
160 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
161 #define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
162 #define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
163 #define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
164 #define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
165 #define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
166 #define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
167 #define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
170 * Codes for terminal modes.
171 * Most of these are the same in SSH-1 and SSH-2.
172 * This list is derived from draft-ietf-secsh-connect-25 and
175 static const struct {
176 const char* const mode;
178 enum { TTY_OP_CHAR, TTY_OP_BOOL } type;
180 /* "V" prefix discarded for special characters relative to SSH specs */
181 { "INTR", 1, TTY_OP_CHAR },
182 { "QUIT", 2, TTY_OP_CHAR },
183 { "ERASE", 3, TTY_OP_CHAR },
184 { "KILL", 4, TTY_OP_CHAR },
185 { "EOF", 5, TTY_OP_CHAR },
186 { "EOL", 6, TTY_OP_CHAR },
187 { "EOL2", 7, TTY_OP_CHAR },
188 { "START", 8, TTY_OP_CHAR },
189 { "STOP", 9, TTY_OP_CHAR },
190 { "SUSP", 10, TTY_OP_CHAR },
191 { "DSUSP", 11, TTY_OP_CHAR },
192 { "REPRINT", 12, TTY_OP_CHAR },
193 { "WERASE", 13, TTY_OP_CHAR },
194 { "LNEXT", 14, TTY_OP_CHAR },
195 { "FLUSH", 15, TTY_OP_CHAR },
196 { "SWTCH", 16, TTY_OP_CHAR },
197 { "STATUS", 17, TTY_OP_CHAR },
198 { "DISCARD", 18, TTY_OP_CHAR },
199 { "IGNPAR", 30, TTY_OP_BOOL },
200 { "PARMRK", 31, TTY_OP_BOOL },
201 { "INPCK", 32, TTY_OP_BOOL },
202 { "ISTRIP", 33, TTY_OP_BOOL },
203 { "INLCR", 34, TTY_OP_BOOL },
204 { "IGNCR", 35, TTY_OP_BOOL },
205 { "ICRNL", 36, TTY_OP_BOOL },
206 { "IUCLC", 37, TTY_OP_BOOL },
207 { "IXON", 38, TTY_OP_BOOL },
208 { "IXANY", 39, TTY_OP_BOOL },
209 { "IXOFF", 40, TTY_OP_BOOL },
210 { "IMAXBEL", 41, TTY_OP_BOOL },
211 { "ISIG", 50, TTY_OP_BOOL },
212 { "ICANON", 51, TTY_OP_BOOL },
213 { "XCASE", 52, TTY_OP_BOOL },
214 { "ECHO", 53, TTY_OP_BOOL },
215 { "ECHOE", 54, TTY_OP_BOOL },
216 { "ECHOK", 55, TTY_OP_BOOL },
217 { "ECHONL", 56, TTY_OP_BOOL },
218 { "NOFLSH", 57, TTY_OP_BOOL },
219 { "TOSTOP", 58, TTY_OP_BOOL },
220 { "IEXTEN", 59, TTY_OP_BOOL },
221 { "ECHOCTL", 60, TTY_OP_BOOL },
222 { "ECHOKE", 61, TTY_OP_BOOL },
223 { "PENDIN", 62, TTY_OP_BOOL }, /* XXX is this a real mode? */
224 { "OPOST", 70, TTY_OP_BOOL },
225 { "OLCUC", 71, TTY_OP_BOOL },
226 { "ONLCR", 72, TTY_OP_BOOL },
227 { "OCRNL", 73, TTY_OP_BOOL },
228 { "ONOCR", 74, TTY_OP_BOOL },
229 { "ONLRET", 75, TTY_OP_BOOL },
230 { "CS7", 90, TTY_OP_BOOL },
231 { "CS8", 91, TTY_OP_BOOL },
232 { "PARENB", 92, TTY_OP_BOOL },
233 { "PARODD", 93, TTY_OP_BOOL }
236 /* Miscellaneous other tty-related constants. */
237 #define SSH_TTY_OP_END 0
238 /* The opcodes for ISPEED/OSPEED differ between SSH-1 and SSH-2. */
239 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED 192
240 #define SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED 193
241 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
242 #define SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
244 /* Helper functions for parsing tty-related config. */
245 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_specchar(char *s)
250 ret = ctrlparse(s, &next);
251 if (!next) ret = s[0];
253 ret = 255; /* special value meaning "don't set" */
257 static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_boolean(char *s)
259 if (stricmp(s, "yes") == 0 ||
260 stricmp(s, "on") == 0 ||
261 stricmp(s, "true") == 0 ||
262 stricmp(s, "+") == 0)
264 else if (stricmp(s, "no") == 0 ||
265 stricmp(s, "off") == 0 ||
266 stricmp(s, "false") == 0 ||
267 stricmp(s, "-") == 0)
268 return 0; /* false */
270 return (atoi(s) != 0);
273 #define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
274 #define translatec(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_ctx & ctx)) return #x
275 static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type)
277 translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT);
278 translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
279 translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
280 translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER);
281 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
282 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
283 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
284 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
285 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
286 translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
287 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
288 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
289 translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS);
290 translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE);
291 translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
292 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
293 translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
294 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF);
295 translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS);
296 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
297 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
298 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
299 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
300 translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
301 translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
302 translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
303 translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
304 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
305 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
306 translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE);
307 translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
308 translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
309 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
310 translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG);
311 translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
312 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
313 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
314 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
315 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD);
316 translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE);
317 translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE);
320 static char *ssh2_pkt_type(int pkt_ctx, int type)
322 translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
323 translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
324 translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
325 translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
326 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
327 translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
328 translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
329 translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
330 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
331 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
332 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
333 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
334 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
335 translatec(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
336 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
337 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
338 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
339 translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
340 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY);
341 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD);
342 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
343 translatec(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
344 translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
345 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS);
346 translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
347 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
348 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
349 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
350 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
351 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
352 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
353 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
354 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
355 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
356 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS);
357 translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
363 /* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
365 PKT_END, PKT_INT, PKT_CHAR, PKT_DATA, PKT_STR, PKT_BIGNUM,
366 /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
367 * fields to the packet logging code. */
368 PKTT_OTHER, PKTT_PASSWORD, PKTT_DATA
372 * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
373 * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
376 * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
378 * which explains the theory behind these macros.
380 * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
381 * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
382 * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
383 * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
385 * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
387 * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
388 * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
389 * Database for Edit and Continue'.
391 #define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
394 if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = snew(struct t); \
396 #define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
397 #define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
398 #define crReturn(z) \
400 *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
404 *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
406 #define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
407 #define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
408 #define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
409 #define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
411 typedef struct ssh_tag *Ssh;
414 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
415 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
416 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *, int length);
417 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *, void *data, int len);
418 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
419 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
420 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *, unsigned long value);
421 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *);
422 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *, char *data);
423 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *, char *data, int len);
424 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *, char *data);
425 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len);
426 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
427 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
428 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh, struct Packet *);
429 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh, struct Packet *);
430 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *);
431 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
432 struct Packet *pktin);
433 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
434 struct Packet *pktin);
437 * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
438 * various different purposes:
440 * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
441 * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
442 * connection (in SSH-1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
443 * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
446 * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
447 * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
448 * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
449 * thankfully unlikely in SSH-2 since the window mechanism should
450 * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
451 * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
453 * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH-2
457 #define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
458 #define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
459 #define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
460 #define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
462 const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = { &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss };
464 const static struct ssh_mac *macs[] = {
467 const static struct ssh_mac *buggymacs[] = {
468 &ssh_sha1_buggy, &ssh_md5
471 static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
475 static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle)
478 static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle, unsigned char *block, int len,
479 unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen)
483 static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle)
487 const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none = {
489 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
490 ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
491 ssh_comp_none_disable, NULL
493 extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib;
494 const static struct ssh_compress *compressions[] = {
495 &ssh_zlib, &ssh_comp_none
498 enum { /* channel types */
503 CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT /* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
507 * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
510 Ssh ssh; /* pointer back to main context */
511 unsigned remoteid, localid;
513 /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
516 * In SSH-1, this value contains four bits:
518 * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
519 * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
520 * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
521 * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
523 * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
527 struct ssh1_data_channel {
530 struct ssh2_data_channel {
532 unsigned remwindow, remmaxpkt;
537 struct ssh_agent_channel {
538 unsigned char *message;
539 unsigned char msglen[4];
540 unsigned lensofar, totallen;
542 struct ssh_x11_channel {
545 struct ssh_pfd_channel {
552 * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH-1 and SSH-2
553 * use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH-2's
554 * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
556 * In SSH-1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
557 * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
558 * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
559 * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
560 * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
561 * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
562 * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
563 * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
564 * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
565 * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
566 * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
568 * In SSH-2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
569 * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
570 * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
571 * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
572 * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
573 * local host:port pair went with that port number.
575 * Hence, in SSH-1 this structure is indexed by destination
576 * host:port pair, whereas in SSH-2 it is indexed by source port.
578 struct ssh_portfwd; /* forward declaration */
580 struct ssh_rportfwd {
581 unsigned sport, dport;
584 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec;
586 #define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
587 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
590 * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
591 * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
592 * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
593 * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
597 enum { DESTROY, KEEP, CREATE } status;
599 unsigned sport, dport;
602 struct ssh_rportfwd *remote;
606 #define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
607 ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
608 sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
611 long length; /* length of `data' actually used */
612 long forcepad; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
613 int type; /* only used for incoming packets */
614 unsigned long sequence; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
615 unsigned char *data; /* allocated storage */
616 unsigned char *body; /* offset of payload within `data' */
617 long savedpos; /* temporary index into `data' (for strings) */
618 long maxlen; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
619 long encrypted_len; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
622 * State associated with packet logging
626 struct logblank_t *blanks;
629 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
630 struct Packet *pktin);
631 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
632 struct Packet *pktin);
633 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
634 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
635 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
636 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special);
637 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c);
638 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len);
639 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize);
640 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, unsigned newwin);
641 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle);
642 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit);
643 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt);
644 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt);
645 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length);
646 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now);
647 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
648 struct Packet *pktin);
650 struct rdpkt1_state_tag {
651 long len, pad, biglen, to_read;
652 unsigned long realcrc, gotcrc;
656 struct Packet *pktin;
659 struct rdpkt2_state_tag {
660 long len, pad, payload, packetlen, maclen;
663 unsigned long incoming_sequence;
664 struct Packet *pktin;
667 typedef void (*handler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
668 typedef void (*chandler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx);
670 struct queued_handler;
671 struct queued_handler {
673 chandler_fn_t handler;
675 struct queued_handler *next;
679 const struct plug_function_table *fn;
680 /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
682 SHA_State exhash, exhashbase;
689 unsigned char session_key[32];
691 int v1_remote_protoflags;
692 int v1_local_protoflags;
693 int agentfwd_enabled;
696 const struct ssh_cipher *cipher;
699 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher, *sccipher;
700 void *cs_cipher_ctx, *sc_cipher_ctx;
701 const struct ssh_mac *csmac, *scmac;
702 void *cs_mac_ctx, *sc_mac_ctx;
703 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp, *sccomp;
704 void *cs_comp_ctx, *sc_comp_ctx;
705 const struct ssh_kex *kex;
706 const struct ssh_signkey *hostkey;
707 unsigned char v2_session_id[20];
713 int echoing, editing;
717 int ospeed, ispeed; /* temporaries */
718 int term_width, term_height;
720 tree234 *channels; /* indexed by local id */
721 struct ssh_channel *mainchan; /* primary session channel */
726 tree234 *rportfwds, *portfwds;
730 SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE,
736 int size_needed, eof_needed;
738 struct Packet **queue;
739 int queuelen, queuesize;
741 unsigned char *deferred_send_data;
742 int deferred_len, deferred_size;
745 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
746 * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
747 * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
752 bufchain banner; /* accumulates banners during do_ssh2_authconn */
754 * Used for username and password input.
756 char *userpass_input_buffer;
757 int userpass_input_buflen;
758 int userpass_input_bufpos;
759 int userpass_input_echo;
766 int v1_throttle_count;
769 int v1_stdout_throttling;
770 unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence;
772 int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate;
773 int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate;
774 int do_ssh_init_crstate;
775 int ssh_gotdata_crstate;
776 int do_ssh1_login_crstate;
777 int do_ssh1_connection_crstate;
778 int do_ssh2_transport_crstate;
779 int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate;
781 void *do_ssh_init_state;
782 void *do_ssh1_login_state;
783 void *do_ssh2_transport_state;
784 void *do_ssh2_authconn_state;
786 struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state;
787 struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state;
789 /* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
790 int protocol_initial_phase_done;
792 void (*protocol) (Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
794 struct Packet *(*s_rdpkt) (Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen);
797 * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
798 * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
799 * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
800 * potentially reconfigure port forwardings etc in mid-session.
805 * Used to transfer data back from async callbacks.
807 void *agent_response;
808 int agent_response_len;
812 * The SSH connection can be set as `frozen', meaning we are
813 * not currently accepting incoming data from the network. This
814 * is slightly more serious than setting the _socket_ as
815 * frozen, because we may already have had data passed to us
816 * from the network which we need to delay processing until
817 * after the freeze is lifted, so we also need a bufchain to
821 bufchain queued_incoming_data;
824 * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
827 handler_fn_t packet_dispatch[256];
830 * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
831 * indications from a request.
833 struct queued_handler *qhead, *qtail;
836 * This module deals with sending keepalives.
841 * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
844 unsigned long incoming_data_size, outgoing_data_size, deferred_data_size;
845 unsigned long max_data_size;
847 long next_rekey, last_rekey;
848 char *deferred_rekey_reason; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
851 #define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
853 /* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
854 static void logeventf(Ssh ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
860 buf = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
866 #define bombout(msg) \
868 char *text = dupprintf msg; \
869 ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE); \
871 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
875 /* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
877 static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
879 if (ssh->cfg.logomitpass)
880 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
883 static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
885 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata)
886 pkt->logmode = blanktype;
889 static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
891 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
894 /* Helper function for common bits of parsing cfg.ttymodes. */
895 static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh, char *modes,
896 void (*do_mode)(void *data, char *mode, char *val),
900 char *t = strchr(modes, '\t');
901 char *m = snewn(t-modes+1, char);
903 strncpy(m, modes, t-modes);
906 val = get_ttymode(ssh->frontend, m);
910 do_mode(data, m, val);
913 modes += strlen(modes) + 1;
917 static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av, void *bv)
919 struct ssh_channel *a = (struct ssh_channel *) av;
920 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
921 if (a->localid < b->localid)
923 if (a->localid > b->localid)
927 static int ssh_channelfind(void *av, void *bv)
929 unsigned *a = (unsigned *) av;
930 struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
938 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av, void *bv)
940 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
941 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
943 if ( (i = strcmp(a->dhost, b->dhost)) != 0)
944 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
945 if (a->dport > b->dport)
947 if (a->dport < b->dport)
952 static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av, void *bv)
954 struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
955 struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
957 if (a->sport > b->sport)
959 if (a->sport < b->sport)
965 * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
966 * defined to sort before even the empty string.
968 static int nullstrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
970 if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
979 static int ssh_portcmp(void *av, void *bv)
981 struct ssh_portfwd *a = (struct ssh_portfwd *) av;
982 struct ssh_portfwd *b = (struct ssh_portfwd *) bv;
984 if (a->type > b->type)
986 if (a->type < b->type)
988 if (a->addressfamily > b->addressfamily)
990 if (a->addressfamily < b->addressfamily)
992 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->saddr, b->saddr)) != 0)
993 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
994 if (a->sport > b->sport)
996 if (a->sport < b->sport)
998 if (a->type != 'D') {
999 if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->daddr, b->daddr)) != 0)
1000 return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
1001 if (a->dport > b->dport)
1003 if (a->dport < b->dport)
1009 static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh)
1011 const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET = 256;
1012 unsigned low, high, mid;
1014 struct ssh_channel *c;
1017 * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
1018 * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
1019 * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
1020 * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
1021 * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
1022 * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
1024 tsize = count234(ssh->channels);
1028 while (high - low > 1) {
1029 mid = (high + low) / 2;
1030 c = index234(ssh->channels, mid);
1031 if (c->localid == mid + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET)
1032 low = mid; /* this one is fine */
1034 high = mid; /* this one is past it */
1037 * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
1038 * largest ID in the initial sequence.
1041 unsigned i = low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1042 assert(NULL == find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind));
1044 return low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
1047 static void c_write(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1049 if ((flags & FLAG_STDERR)) {
1051 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
1053 fputc(buf[i], stderr);
1056 from_backend(ssh->frontend, 1, buf, len);
1059 static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
1062 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
1064 c_write(ssh, "\r\n", 2);
1065 else if ((buf[i] & 0x60) || (buf[i] == '\r'))
1066 c_write(ssh, buf + i, 1);
1070 static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh, const char *buf)
1072 c_write(ssh, buf, strlen(buf));
1075 static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet *pkt)
1080 static struct Packet *ssh_new_packet(void)
1082 struct Packet *pkt = snew(struct Packet);
1084 pkt->body = pkt->data = NULL;
1086 pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
1094 * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
1095 * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
1096 * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
1097 * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
1098 * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
1100 static struct Packet *ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1102 struct rdpkt1_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt1_state;
1104 crBegin(ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate);
1106 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1108 st->pktin->type = 0;
1109 st->pktin->length = 0;
1111 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
1112 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1114 st->len = (st->len << 8) + **data;
1115 (*data)++, (*datalen)--;
1118 st->pad = 8 - (st->len % 8);
1119 st->biglen = st->len + st->pad;
1120 st->pktin->length = st->len - 5;
1122 if (st->biglen < 0) {
1123 bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
1124 " data stream corruption"));
1125 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1129 st->pktin->maxlen = st->biglen;
1130 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->biglen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1132 st->to_read = st->biglen;
1133 st->p = st->pktin->data;
1134 while (st->to_read > 0) {
1135 st->chunk = st->to_read;
1136 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1138 if (st->chunk > (*datalen))
1139 st->chunk = (*datalen);
1140 memcpy(st->p, *data, st->chunk);
1142 *datalen -= st->chunk;
1144 st->to_read -= st->chunk;
1147 if (ssh->cipher && detect_attack(ssh->crcda_ctx, st->pktin->data,
1148 st->biglen, NULL)) {
1149 bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
1150 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1155 ssh->cipher->decrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->biglen);
1157 st->realcrc = crc32_compute(st->pktin->data, st->biglen - 4);
1158 st->gotcrc = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data + st->biglen - 4);
1159 if (st->gotcrc != st->realcrc) {
1160 bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
1161 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1165 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1166 st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
1168 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1169 unsigned char *decompblk;
1171 if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1172 st->pktin->body - 1, st->pktin->length + 1,
1173 &decompblk, &decomplen)) {
1174 bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
1175 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1179 if (st->pktin->maxlen < st->pad + decomplen) {
1180 st->pktin->maxlen = st->pad + decomplen;
1181 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1182 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1184 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
1187 memcpy(st->pktin->body - 1, decompblk, decomplen);
1189 st->pktin->length = decomplen - 1;
1192 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->body[-1];
1195 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1199 struct logblank_t blank;
1200 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
1201 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1202 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1203 if ((st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA) ||
1204 (st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA)) {
1205 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 0;
1206 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1207 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
1210 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1211 blank.len = st->pktin->length;
1212 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1216 log_packet(ssh->logctx,
1217 PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1218 ssh1_pkt_type(st->pktin->type),
1219 st->pktin->body, st->pktin->length,
1223 crFinish(st->pktin);
1226 static struct Packet *ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
1228 struct rdpkt2_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_state;
1230 crBegin(ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate);
1232 st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
1234 st->pktin->type = 0;
1235 st->pktin->length = 0;
1237 st->cipherblk = ssh->sccipher->blksize;
1240 if (st->cipherblk < 8)
1243 st->pktin->data = snewn(st->cipherblk + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1246 * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
1247 * contain the length and padding details.
1249 for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
1250 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1252 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1257 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1258 st->pktin->data, st->cipherblk);
1261 * Now get the length and padding figures.
1263 st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data);
1264 st->pad = st->pktin->data[4];
1267 * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
1268 * do us any more damage.
1270 if (st->len < 0 || st->len > 35000 || st->pad < 4 ||
1271 st->len - st->pad < 1 || (st->len + 4) % st->cipherblk != 0) {
1272 bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
1273 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1278 * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
1280 st->payload = st->len - st->pad - 1;
1282 st->pktin->length = st->payload + 5;
1285 * So now we can work out the total packet length.
1287 st->packetlen = st->len + 4;
1288 st->maclen = ssh->scmac ? ssh->scmac->len : 0;
1291 * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
1293 st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1294 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1295 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1299 * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
1301 for (st->i = st->cipherblk; st->i < st->packetlen + st->maclen;
1303 while ((*datalen) == 0)
1305 st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
1308 /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
1310 ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
1311 st->pktin->data + st->cipherblk,
1312 st->packetlen - st->cipherblk);
1314 st->pktin->encrypted_len = st->packetlen;
1320 && !ssh->scmac->verify(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->len + 4,
1321 st->incoming_sequence)) {
1322 bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
1323 ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
1327 st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
1330 * Decompress packet payload.
1333 unsigned char *newpayload;
1336 ssh->sccomp->decompress(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
1337 st->pktin->data + 5, st->pktin->length - 5,
1338 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1339 if (st->pktin->maxlen < newlen + 5) {
1340 st->pktin->maxlen = newlen + 5;
1341 st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
1342 st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
1345 st->pktin->length = 5 + newlen;
1346 memcpy(st->pktin->data + 5, newpayload, newlen);
1351 st->pktin->savedpos = 6;
1352 st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data;
1353 st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[5];
1356 * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
1360 struct logblank_t blank;
1361 if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
1362 int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
1363 /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
1364 if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
1365 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
1366 } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) {
1367 do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
1370 blank.offset = blank_prefix;
1371 blank.len = (st->pktin->length-6) - blank_prefix;
1372 blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
1376 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
1377 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_ctx, st->pktin->type),
1378 st->pktin->data+6, st->pktin->length-6,
1382 crFinish(st->pktin);
1385 static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int *offset_p)
1387 int pad, biglen, i, pktoffs;
1391 * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
1392 * register allocation in this function and use the same register
1393 * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
1394 * following sledgehammer prevents this.
1401 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[12],
1402 ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->data[12]),
1403 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1404 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks);
1405 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1408 if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
1409 unsigned char *compblk;
1411 zlib_compress_block(ssh->cs_comp_ctx,
1412 pkt->data + 12, pkt->length - 12,
1413 &compblk, &complen);
1414 memcpy(pkt->data + 12, compblk, complen);
1416 pkt->length = complen + 12;
1419 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + 4); /* space for CRC */
1421 len = pkt->length - 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
1422 pad = 8 - (len % 8);
1424 biglen = len + pad; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
1426 for (i = pktoffs; i < 4+8; i++)
1427 pkt->data[i] = random_byte();
1428 crc = crc32_compute(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen - 4); /* all ex len */
1429 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4 + biglen - 4, crc);
1430 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs, len);
1433 ssh->cipher->encrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx,
1434 pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen);
1436 if (offset_p) *offset_p = pktoffs;
1437 return biglen + 4; /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
1440 static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1442 int len, backlog, offset;
1443 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1444 backlog = sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)pkt->data + offset, len);
1445 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1446 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1447 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1450 static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1453 len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
1454 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
1455 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
1456 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
1460 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len,
1461 pkt->data + offset, len);
1462 ssh->deferred_len += len;
1463 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1467 * Construct a SSH-1 packet with the specified contents.
1468 * (This all-at-once interface used to be the only one, but now SSH-1
1469 * packets can also be constructed incrementally.)
1471 static struct Packet *construct_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, va_list ap)
1477 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(pkttype);
1479 while ((argtype = va_arg(ap, int)) != PKT_END) {
1480 unsigned char *argp, argchar;
1481 unsigned long argint;
1484 /* Actual fields in the packet */
1486 argint = va_arg(ap, int);
1487 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, argint);
1490 argchar = (unsigned char) va_arg(ap, int);
1491 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, argchar);
1494 argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
1495 arglen = va_arg(ap, int);
1496 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, argp, arglen);
1499 argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
1500 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, argp);
1503 bn = va_arg(ap, Bignum);
1504 ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt, bn);
1506 /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
1508 dont_log_password(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_BLANK);
1511 dont_log_data(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_OMIT);
1514 end_log_omission(ssh, pkt);
1522 static void send_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1526 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1527 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1532 static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
1536 va_start(ap, pkttype);
1537 pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
1539 s_wrpkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
1542 static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a, char *b)
1545 unsigned long av, bv;
1547 av = strtoul(a, &ae, 10);
1548 bv = strtoul(b, &be, 10);
1550 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1555 av = strtoul(ae, &ae, 10);
1556 bv = strtoul(be, &be, 10);
1558 return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
1563 * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
1564 * `uint32' into a SHA state.
1566 static void sha_string(SHA_State * s, void *str, int len)
1568 unsigned char lenblk[4];
1569 PUT_32BIT(lenblk, len);
1570 SHA_Bytes(s, lenblk, 4);
1571 SHA_Bytes(s, str, len);
1574 static void sha_uint32(SHA_State * s, unsigned i)
1576 unsigned char intblk[4];
1577 PUT_32BIT(intblk, i);
1578 SHA_Bytes(s, intblk, 4);
1582 * Packet construction functions. Mostly shared between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
1584 static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
1586 if (pkt->maxlen < length) {
1587 unsigned char *body = pkt->body;
1588 int offset = body ? pkt->data - body : 0;
1589 pkt->maxlen = length + 256;
1590 pkt->data = sresize(pkt->data, pkt->maxlen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
1591 if (body) pkt->body = pkt->data + offset;
1594 static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *pkt, void *data, int len)
1596 if (pkt->logmode != PKTLOG_EMIT) {
1598 pkt->blanks = sresize(pkt->blanks, pkt->nblanks, struct logblank_t);
1600 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].offset = pkt->length -
1601 (pkt->body - pkt->data);
1602 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].len = len;
1603 pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].type = pkt->logmode;
1606 ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length);
1607 memcpy(pkt->data + pkt->length - len, data, len);
1609 static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char byte)
1611 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &byte, 1);
1613 static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char value)
1615 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &value, 1);
1617 static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned long value)
1620 PUT_32BIT(x, value);
1621 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, x, 4);
1623 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *pkt)
1625 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0);
1626 pkt->savedpos = pkt->length;
1628 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1630 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, strlen(data));
1631 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1633 static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *pkt, char *data, int len)
1635 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1636 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
1638 static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
1640 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1641 ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data);
1643 static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1645 int len = ssh1_bignum_length(b);
1646 unsigned char *data = snewn(len, char);
1647 (void) ssh1_write_bignum(data, b);
1648 ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
1651 static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len)
1654 int i, n = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 7) / 8;
1655 p = snewn(n + 1, unsigned char);
1657 for (i = 1; i <= n; i++)
1658 p[i] = bignum_byte(b, n - i);
1660 while (i <= n && p[i] == 0 && (p[i + 1] & 0x80) == 0)
1662 memmove(p, p + i, n + 1 - i);
1666 static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
1670 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
1671 ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
1672 ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)p, len);
1676 static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1678 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1679 pkt->length = 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
1680 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, pkt_type);
1681 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
1685 /* For legacy code (SSH-1 and -2 packet construction used to be separate) */
1686 #define ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, length) ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, length)
1687 #define ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len)
1688 #define ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte) ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte)
1689 #define ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value) ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value)
1690 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt) ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt)
1691 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data)
1692 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len)
1693 #define ssh2_pkt_addstring(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, data)
1695 static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
1697 struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
1700 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, (unsigned char) pkt_type);
1701 pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
1706 * Construct an SSH-2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
1707 * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
1708 * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
1710 static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1712 int cipherblk, maclen, padding, i;
1715 log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[5],
1716 ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_ctx, pkt->data[5]),
1717 pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
1718 pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks);
1719 sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
1723 * Compress packet payload.
1726 unsigned char *newpayload;
1729 ssh->cscomp->compress(ssh->cs_comp_ctx, pkt->data + 5,
1731 &newpayload, &newlen)) {
1733 ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, newpayload, newlen);
1739 * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
1740 * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
1741 * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
1744 cipherblk = ssh->cscipher ? ssh->cscipher->blksize : 8; /* block size */
1745 cipherblk = cipherblk < 8 ? 8 : cipherblk; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
1747 if (pkt->length + padding < pkt->forcepad)
1748 padding = pkt->forcepad - pkt->length;
1750 (cipherblk - (pkt->length + padding) % cipherblk) % cipherblk;
1751 assert(padding <= 255);
1752 maclen = ssh->csmac ? ssh->csmac->len : 0;
1753 ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + padding + maclen);
1754 pkt->data[4] = padding;
1755 for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
1756 pkt->data[pkt->length + i] = random_byte();
1757 PUT_32BIT(pkt->data, pkt->length + padding - 4);
1759 ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
1760 pkt->length + padding,
1761 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
1762 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
1765 ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
1766 pkt->data, pkt->length + padding);
1768 pkt->encrypted_len = pkt->length + padding;
1770 /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
1771 return pkt->length + padding + maclen;
1775 * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
1776 * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
1777 * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
1779 * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
1780 * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
1781 * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
1782 * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
1783 * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
1784 * works after packet encryption.
1786 * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
1787 * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
1788 * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
1789 * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
1790 * then send them once we've finished.
1792 * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
1793 * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
1795 * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
1796 * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
1797 * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
1798 * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
1799 * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
1800 * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
1802 * When using a CBC-mode cipher, it's necessary to ensure that an
1803 * attacker can't provide data to be encrypted using an IV that they
1804 * know. We ensure this by prefixing each packet that might contain
1805 * user data with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE. This is done using the deferral
1806 * mechanism, so in this case send_noqueue() ends up redirecting to
1807 * defer_noqueue(). If you don't like this inefficiency, don't use
1811 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *, int);
1812 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh);
1815 * Send an SSH-2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
1817 static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1821 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC)) {
1822 /* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
1823 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
1824 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
1827 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
1828 backlog = sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)pkt->data, len);
1829 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1830 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1832 ssh->outgoing_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
1833 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
1834 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
1835 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
1836 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
1838 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1842 * Defer an SSH-2 packet.
1844 static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int noignore)
1847 if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
1848 ssh->deferred_len == 0 && !noignore) {
1850 * Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
1851 * get encrypted with a known IV.
1853 struct Packet *ipkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
1854 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ipkt, TRUE);
1856 len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
1857 if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
1858 ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
1859 ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
1863 memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->data, len);
1864 ssh->deferred_len += len;
1865 ssh->deferred_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
1866 ssh_free_packet(pkt);
1870 * Queue an SSH-2 packet.
1872 static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1874 assert(ssh->queueing);
1876 if (ssh->queuelen >= ssh->queuesize) {
1877 ssh->queuesize = ssh->queuelen + 32;
1878 ssh->queue = sresize(ssh->queue, ssh->queuesize, struct Packet *);
1881 ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen++] = pkt;
1885 * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
1888 static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1891 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
1893 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pkt);
1898 * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
1901 static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
1904 ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
1906 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
1911 * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
1912 * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH-1's defer_packet().
1914 * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
1915 * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
1916 * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
1917 * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
1918 * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
1919 * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
1920 * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
1923 static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh)
1926 backlog = sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)ssh->deferred_send_data,
1928 ssh->deferred_len = ssh->deferred_size = 0;
1929 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
1930 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
1931 if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
1932 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
1934 ssh->outgoing_data_size += ssh->deferred_data_size;
1935 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
1936 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
1937 ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
1938 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
1939 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0;
1943 * Send all queued SSH-2 packets. We send them by means of
1944 * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
1945 * packets that needed to be lumped together.
1947 static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh)
1951 assert(!ssh->queueing);
1953 for (i = 0; i < ssh->queuelen; i++)
1954 ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ssh->queue[i], FALSE);
1957 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
1961 void bndebug(char *string, Bignum b)
1965 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
1966 debug(("%s", string));
1967 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
1968 debug((" %02x", p[i]));
1974 static void sha_mpint(SHA_State * s, Bignum b)
1978 p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
1979 sha_string(s, p, len);
1984 * Packet decode functions for both SSH-1 and SSH-2.
1986 static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt)
1988 unsigned long value;
1989 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
1990 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
1991 value = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
1995 static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt)
1997 unsigned long value;
1998 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 1)
1999 return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
2000 value = pkt->body[pkt->savedpos] != 0;
2004 static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length)
2009 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
2011 len = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2016 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < *length)
2018 *p = (char *)(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
2019 pkt->savedpos += *length;
2021 static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
2023 if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < length)
2025 pkt->savedpos += length;
2026 return pkt->body + (pkt->savedpos - length);
2028 static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet *pkt, struct RSAKey *key,
2029 unsigned char **keystr)
2033 j = makekey(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2034 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos,
2041 assert(pkt->savedpos < pkt->length);
2045 static Bignum ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2050 j = ssh1_read_bignum(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
2051 pkt->length - pkt->savedpos, &b);
2059 static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
2065 ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
2070 b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
2075 * Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet.
2076 * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
2077 * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
2078 * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
2079 * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
2081 static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
2082 void *pkblob_v, int pkblob_len,
2083 void *sigblob_v, int sigblob_len)
2085 unsigned char *pkblob = (unsigned char *)pkblob_v;
2086 unsigned char *sigblob = (unsigned char *)sigblob_v;
2088 /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
2089 /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
2092 * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
2093 * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
2095 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING) &&
2096 (GET_32BIT(pkblob) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
2097 int pos, len, siglen;
2100 * Find the byte length of the modulus.
2103 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2104 pos += 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* skip over exponent */
2105 len = GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* find length of modulus */
2106 pos += 4; /* find modulus itself */
2107 while (len > 0 && pkblob[pos] == 0)
2109 /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
2112 * Now find the signature integer.
2114 pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
2115 siglen = GET_32BIT(sigblob+pos);
2116 /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
2118 if (len != siglen) {
2119 unsigned char newlen[4];
2120 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2121 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, pos);
2122 /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
2123 pos += 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
2124 PUT_32BIT(newlen, len);
2125 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 4);
2126 /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
2128 while (len-- > siglen) {
2129 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 1);
2130 /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
2132 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)(sigblob+pos), siglen);
2133 /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
2137 /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
2140 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
2141 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, sigblob_len);
2145 * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
2146 * a list of known buggy implementations.
2148 static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
2150 char *imp; /* pointer to implementation part */
2152 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2154 imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
2157 ssh->remote_bugs = 0;
2159 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == FORCE_ON ||
2160 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == AUTO &&
2161 (!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
2162 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.21") ||
2163 !strcmp(imp, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") ||
2164 !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
2166 * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
2167 * to use a different defence against password length
2170 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE;
2171 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-1 ignore bug");
2174 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == FORCE_ON ||
2175 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == AUTO &&
2176 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
2178 * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
2179 * handle having a null and a random length of data after
2182 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD;
2183 logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH-1 password");
2186 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == FORCE_ON ||
2187 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == AUTO &&
2188 (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
2190 * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
2191 * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
2192 * an AUTH_RSA message.
2194 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA;
2195 logevent("We believe remote version can't handle SSH-1 RSA authentication");
2198 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == FORCE_ON ||
2199 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == AUTO &&
2200 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2201 (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp) ||
2202 wc_match("2.2.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp) ||
2203 wc_match("2.1 *", imp)))) {
2205 * These versions have the HMAC bug.
2207 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_HMAC;
2208 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 HMAC bug");
2211 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
2212 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == AUTO &&
2213 !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
2214 (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp) ))) {
2216 * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
2217 * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
2218 * generate the keys).
2220 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY;
2221 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 key-derivation bug");
2224 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == FORCE_ON ||
2225 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == AUTO &&
2226 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp) ||
2227 wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp)))) {
2229 * These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
2231 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING;
2232 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 RSA padding bug");
2235 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == FORCE_ON ||
2236 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == AUTO &&
2237 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp))) {
2239 * These versions have the SSH-2 session-ID bug in
2240 * public-key authentication.
2242 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID;
2243 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 public-key-session-ID bug");
2246 if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
2247 (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == AUTO &&
2248 (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp) ||
2249 wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp) ||
2250 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp) ||
2251 wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp)))) {
2253 * These versions have the SSH-2 rekey bug.
2255 ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_REKEY;
2256 logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 rekey bug");
2261 * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
2262 * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
2264 static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str)
2266 /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
2267 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2268 assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
2269 assert(*str == 'H'); str++;
2270 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2271 while (*str && *str != '-') str++;
2272 assert(*str == '-'); str++;
2274 /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
2277 if (*str == '-' || *str == ' ')
2283 static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
2285 struct do_ssh_init_state {
2293 crState(do_ssh_init_state);
2295 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate);
2297 /* Search for the string "SSH-" in the input. */
2300 static const int transS[] = { 1, 2, 2, 1 };
2301 static const int transH[] = { 0, 0, 3, 0 };
2302 static const int transminus[] = { 0, 0, 0, -1 };
2304 s->i = transS[s->i];
2306 s->i = transH[s->i];
2308 s->i = transminus[s->i];
2313 crReturn(1); /* get another character */
2317 s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
2318 strcpy(s->vstring, "SSH-");
2322 crReturn(1); /* get another char */
2323 if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
2325 s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
2327 s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
2330 s->version[s->i] = '\0';
2332 } else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
2333 s->version[s->i++] = c;
2334 } else if (c == '\012')
2338 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
2339 ssh->rdpkt2_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
2341 s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
2342 s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
2343 logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
2344 ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
2347 * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
2350 /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
2351 s->proto1 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0;
2352 /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
2353 s->proto2 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.99") >= 0;
2355 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0 && !s->proto1) {
2356 bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
2359 if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3 && !s->proto2) {
2360 bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
2367 if (s->proto2 && (ssh->cfg.sshprot >= 2 || !s->proto1)) {
2369 * Construct a v2 version string.
2371 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver);
2375 * Construct a v1 version string.
2377 verstring = dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
2378 (ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.5") <= 0 ?
2379 s->version : "1.5"),
2384 ssh_fix_verstring(verstring);
2386 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2388 * Hash our version string and their version string.
2390 SHA_Init(&ssh->exhashbase);
2391 sha_string(&ssh->exhashbase, verstring,
2392 strcspn(verstring, "\015\012"));
2393 sha_string(&ssh->exhashbase, s->vstring,
2394 strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012"));
2397 * Initialise SSH-2 protocol.
2399 ssh->protocol = ssh2_protocol;
2400 ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh);
2401 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_rdpkt;
2404 * Initialise SSH-1 protocol.
2406 ssh->protocol = ssh1_protocol;
2407 ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh);
2408 ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh1_rdpkt;
2410 logeventf(ssh, "We claim version: %.*s",
2411 strcspn(verstring, "\015\012"), verstring);
2412 sk_write(ssh->s, verstring, strlen(verstring));
2414 if (ssh->version == 2)
2415 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2418 logeventf(ssh, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh->version);
2420 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
2421 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
2422 ssh->pinger = pinger_new(&ssh->cfg, &ssh_backend, ssh);
2429 static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2430 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2432 struct Packet *pktin = ssh->s_rdpkt(ssh, data, datalen);
2434 ssh->protocol(ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
2435 ssh_free_packet(pktin);
2439 static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
2440 unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
2442 bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
2447 static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh)
2450 unsigned char *data;
2453 while (!ssh->frozen && bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data)) {
2454 bufchain_prefix(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, &vdata, &len);
2458 while (!ssh->frozen && len > 0)
2459 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &len);
2462 bufchain_consume(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, origlen - len);
2466 static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh, int frozen)
2469 sk_set_frozen(ssh->s, frozen);
2470 ssh->frozen = frozen;
2473 static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *data, int datalen)
2475 crBegin(ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate);
2478 * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
2479 * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
2480 * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
2481 * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
2484 int ret; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
2486 crReturnV; /* more data please */
2487 ret = do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
2495 * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
2496 * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
2497 * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
2498 * to the proper protocol handler.
2504 * Process queued data if there is any.
2506 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
2509 while (datalen > 0) {
2511 ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2513 ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
2515 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
2523 static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit)
2526 struct ssh_channel *c;
2528 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED;
2529 expire_timer_context(ssh);
2534 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2539 * Now we must shut down any port- and X-forwarded channels going
2540 * through this connection.
2542 if (ssh->channels) {
2543 while (NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, 0))) {
2546 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
2549 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
2552 del234(ssh->channels, c); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2553 if (ssh->version == 2)
2554 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
2559 * Go through port-forwardings, and close any associated
2560 * listening sockets.
2562 if (ssh->portfwds) {
2563 struct ssh_portfwd *pf;
2564 while (NULL != (pf = index234(ssh->portfwds, 0))) {
2565 /* Dispose of any listening socket. */
2567 pfd_terminate(pf->local);
2568 del234(ssh->portfwds, pf); /* moving next one to index 0 */
2576 static void ssh_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
2577 const char *error_msg, int error_code)
2579 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2580 char addrbuf[256], *msg;
2582 sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
2585 msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
2587 msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
2593 static int ssh_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
2596 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2597 int need_notify = ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE);
2600 if (!ssh->close_expected)
2601 error_msg = "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
2603 error_msg = "Server closed network connection";
2607 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2610 logevent(error_msg);
2611 if (!ssh->close_expected || !ssh->clean_exit)
2612 connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
2616 static int ssh_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
2618 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2619 ssh_gotdata(ssh, (unsigned char *)data, len);
2620 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED) {
2621 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
2627 static void ssh_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
2629 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
2631 * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
2632 * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
2634 if (bufsize < SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
2635 ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 0, bufsize);
2639 * Connect to specified host and port.
2640 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
2641 * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
2642 * freed by the caller.
2644 static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, char *host, int port,
2645 char **realhost, int nodelay, int keepalive)
2647 static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
2658 ssh->savedhost = snewn(1 + strlen(host), char);
2659 strcpy(ssh->savedhost, host);
2662 port = 22; /* default ssh port */
2663 ssh->savedport = port;
2668 logeventf(ssh, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
2669 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
2670 (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" : "")));
2671 addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, &ssh->cfg,
2672 ssh->cfg.addressfamily);
2673 if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
2681 ssh->fn = &fn_table;
2682 ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
2683 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) ssh, &ssh->cfg);
2684 if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
2686 notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
2694 * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
2696 static void ssh1_throttle(Ssh ssh, int adjust)
2698 int old_count = ssh->v1_throttle_count;
2699 ssh->v1_throttle_count += adjust;
2700 assert(ssh->v1_throttle_count >= 0);
2701 if (ssh->v1_throttle_count && !old_count) {
2702 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
2703 } else if (!ssh->v1_throttle_count && old_count) {
2704 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
2709 * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
2710 * on the SSH connection itself back up).
2712 static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize)
2715 struct ssh_channel *c;
2717 if (enable == ssh->throttled_all)
2719 ssh->throttled_all = enable;
2720 ssh->overall_bufsize = bufsize;
2723 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++) {
2725 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
2727 * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
2731 x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, enable);
2734 /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
2737 pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, enable);
2744 * Username and password input, abstracted off into routines
2745 * reusable in several places - even between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
2748 /* Set up a username or password input loop on a given buffer. */
2749 static void setup_userpass_input(Ssh ssh, char *buffer, int buflen, int echo)
2751 ssh->userpass_input_buffer = buffer;
2752 ssh->userpass_input_buflen = buflen;
2753 ssh->userpass_input_bufpos = 0;
2754 ssh->userpass_input_echo = echo;
2758 * Process some terminal data in the course of username/password
2759 * input. Returns >0 for success (line of input returned in
2760 * buffer), <0 for failure (user hit ^C/^D, bomb out and exit), 0
2761 * for inconclusive (keep waiting for more input please).
2763 static int process_userpass_input(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen)
2768 switch (c = *in++) {
2771 ssh->userpass_input_buffer[ssh->userpass_input_bufpos] = 0;
2772 ssh->userpass_input_buffer[ssh->userpass_input_buflen-1] = 0;
2777 if (ssh->userpass_input_bufpos > 0) {
2778 if (ssh->userpass_input_echo)
2779 c_write_str(ssh, "\b \b");
2780 ssh->userpass_input_bufpos--;
2785 while (ssh->userpass_input_bufpos > 0) {
2786 if (ssh->userpass_input_echo)
2787 c_write_str(ssh, "\b \b");
2788 ssh->userpass_input_bufpos--;
2797 * This simplistic check for printability is disabled
2798 * when we're doing password input, because some people
2799 * have control characters in their passwords.o
2801 if ((!ssh->userpass_input_echo ||
2802 (c >= ' ' && c <= '~') ||
2803 ((unsigned char) c >= 160))
2804 && ssh->userpass_input_bufpos < ssh->userpass_input_buflen-1) {
2805 ssh->userpass_input_buffer[ssh->userpass_input_bufpos++] = c;
2806 if (ssh->userpass_input_echo)
2807 c_write(ssh, &c, 1);
2815 static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv, void *reply, int replylen)
2817 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
2819 ssh->agent_response = reply;
2820 ssh->agent_response_len = replylen;
2822 if (ssh->version == 1)
2823 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2825 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2828 static void ssh_dialog_callback(void *sshv, int ret)
2830 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
2832 ssh->user_response = ret;
2834 if (ssh->version == 1)
2835 do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2837 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
2840 * This may have unfrozen the SSH connection, so do a
2843 ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
2846 static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv, void *reply, int replylen)
2848 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)cv;
2850 void *sentreply = reply;
2853 /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
2854 sentreply = "\0\0\0\1\5";
2857 if (ssh->version == 2) {
2858 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, sentreply, replylen);
2861 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
2862 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
2865 PKT_DATA, sentreply, replylen,
2874 * Client-initiated disconnection. Send a DISCONNECT if `wire_reason'
2875 * non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
2876 * => log `wire_reason'.
2878 static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh, char *client_reason, char *wire_reason,
2879 int code, int clean_exit)
2883 client_reason = wire_reason;
2885 error = dupprintf("Disconnected: %s", client_reason);
2887 error = dupstr("Disconnected");
2889 if (ssh->version == 1) {
2890 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT, PKT_STR, wire_reason,
2892 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
2893 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
2894 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, code);
2895 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, wire_reason);
2896 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
2897 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
2900 ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
2901 ssh->clean_exit = clean_exit;
2902 ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, error, 0, 0);
2907 * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
2909 static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
2910 struct Packet *pktin)
2913 unsigned char cookie[8], *ptr;
2914 struct RSAKey servkey, hostkey;
2915 struct MD5Context md5c;
2916 struct do_ssh1_login_state {
2918 unsigned char *rsabuf, *keystr1, *keystr2;
2919 unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask, supported_auths_mask;
2920 int tried_publickey, tried_agent;
2921 int tis_auth_refused, ccard_auth_refused;
2922 unsigned char session_id[16];
2925 void *publickey_blob;
2926 int publickey_bloblen;
2932 unsigned char request[5], *response, *p;
2942 crState(do_ssh1_login_state);
2944 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate);
2949 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
2950 bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
2954 logevent("Received public keys");
2956 ptr = ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin, 8);
2958 bombout(("SSH-1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
2961 memcpy(cookie, ptr, 8);
2963 if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &servkey, &s->keystr1) ||
2964 !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &hostkey, &s->keystr2)) {
2965 bombout(("Failed to read SSH-1 public keys from public key packet"));
2970 * Log the host key fingerprint.
2974 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
2975 strcpy(logmsg, " ");
2976 hostkey.comment = NULL;
2977 rsa_fingerprint(logmsg + strlen(logmsg),
2978 sizeof(logmsg) - strlen(logmsg), &hostkey);
2982 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
2983 s->supported_ciphers_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
2984 s->supported_auths_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
2986 ssh->v1_local_protoflags =
2987 ssh->v1_remote_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED;
2988 ssh->v1_local_protoflags |= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
2991 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr2, hostkey.bytes);
2992 MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr1, servkey.bytes);
2993 MD5Update(&md5c, cookie, 8);
2994 MD5Final(s->session_id, &md5c);
2996 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
2997 ssh->session_key[i] = random_byte();
3000 * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
3002 if (hostkey.bits > hostkey.bytes * 8 ||
3003 servkey.bits > servkey.bytes * 8) {
3004 bombout(("SSH-1 public keys were badly formatted"));
3008 s->len = (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes ? hostkey.bytes : servkey.bytes);
3010 s->rsabuf = snewn(s->len, unsigned char);
3013 * Verify the host key.
3017 * First format the key into a string.
3019 int len = rsastr_len(&hostkey);
3020 char fingerprint[100];
3021 char *keystr = snewn(len, char);
3022 rsastr_fmt(keystr, &hostkey);
3023 rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint, sizeof(fingerprint), &hostkey);
3025 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3026 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
3027 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
3028 "rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
3029 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3031 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3035 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3036 " for user host key response"));
3039 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3040 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3042 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3044 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3045 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
3051 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3052 s->rsabuf[i] = ssh->session_key[i];
3054 s->rsabuf[i] ^= s->session_id[i];
3057 if (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes) {
3058 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &servkey);
3060 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, servkey.bytes, &hostkey);
3062 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &hostkey);
3064 ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, hostkey.bytes, &servkey);
3067 bombout(("SSH-1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
3071 logevent("Encrypted session key");
3074 int cipher_chosen = 0, warn = 0;
3075 char *cipher_string = NULL;
3077 for (i = 0; !cipher_chosen && i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
3078 int next_cipher = ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i];
3079 if (next_cipher == CIPHER_WARN) {
3080 /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
3082 } else if (next_cipher == CIPHER_AES) {
3083 /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
3084 logevent("AES not supported in SSH-1, skipping");
3086 switch (next_cipher) {
3087 case CIPHER_3DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
3088 cipher_string = "3DES"; break;
3089 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
3090 cipher_string = "Blowfish"; break;
3091 case CIPHER_DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_DES;
3092 cipher_string = "single-DES"; break;
3094 if (s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << s->cipher_type))
3098 if (!cipher_chosen) {
3099 if ((s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES)) == 0)
3100 bombout(("Server violates SSH-1 protocol by not "
3101 "supporting 3DES encryption"));
3103 /* shouldn't happen */
3104 bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
3108 /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
3110 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
3111 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "cipher", cipher_string,
3112 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
3113 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
3117 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3118 " for user response"));
3121 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3122 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
3124 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
3125 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
3126 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
3133 switch (s->cipher_type) {
3134 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
3135 logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
3137 case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
3138 logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
3140 case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
3141 logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
3145 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY,
3146 PKT_CHAR, s->cipher_type,
3147 PKT_DATA, cookie, 8,
3148 PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) & 0xFF,
3149 PKT_DATA, s->rsabuf, s->len,
3150 PKT_INT, ssh->v1_local_protoflags, PKT_END);
3152 logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
3156 ssh->cipher = (s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ? &ssh_blowfish_ssh1 :
3157 s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_DES ? &ssh_des :
3159 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = ssh->cipher->make_context();
3160 ssh->cipher->sesskey(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->session_key);
3161 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh->cipher->text_name);
3163 ssh->crcda_ctx = crcda_make_context();
3164 logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
3166 if (servkey.modulus) {
3167 sfree(servkey.modulus);
3168 servkey.modulus = NULL;
3170 if (servkey.exponent) {
3171 sfree(servkey.exponent);
3172 servkey.exponent = NULL;
3174 if (hostkey.modulus) {
3175 sfree(hostkey.modulus);
3176 hostkey.modulus = NULL;
3178 if (hostkey.exponent) {
3179 sfree(hostkey.exponent);
3180 hostkey.exponent = NULL;
3184 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3185 bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
3189 logevent("Successfully started encryption");
3193 if (!*ssh->cfg.username) {
3194 if (ssh_get_line && !ssh_getline_pw_only) {
3195 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
3196 s->username, sizeof(s->username), FALSE)) {
3198 * get_line failed to get a username.
3201 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
3205 int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
3206 c_write_str(ssh, "login as: ");
3209 setup_userpass_input(ssh, s->username, sizeof(s->username), 1);
3211 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3212 ret = process_userpass_input(ssh, in, inlen);
3216 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
3219 strncpy(s->username, ssh->cfg.username, sizeof(s->username));
3220 s->username[sizeof(s->username)-1] = '\0';
3223 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_USER, PKT_STR, s->username, PKT_END);
3225 char userlog[22 + sizeof(s->username)];
3226 sprintf(userlog, "Sent username \"%s\"", s->username);
3228 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE &&
3229 (!((flags & FLAG_STDERR) && (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)))) {
3230 strcat(userlog, "\r\n");
3231 c_write_str(ssh, userlog);
3238 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA)) {
3239 /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
3240 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 1;
3242 s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 0;
3244 s->tis_auth_refused = s->ccard_auth_refused = 0;
3245 /* Load the public half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
3246 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
3247 if (!rsakey_pubblob(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
3248 &s->publickey_blob, &s->publickey_bloblen, NULL))
3249 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3251 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
3253 while (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3254 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD;
3256 if (agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
3258 * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
3264 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
3266 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
3267 PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
3268 s->request[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
3269 if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
3270 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3274 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
3275 " for agent response"));
3278 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3279 r = ssh->agent_response;
3280 s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3282 s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
3283 if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
3284 s->response[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
3285 s->p = s->response + 5;
3286 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3288 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s->nkeys);
3289 for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
3290 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
3291 if (s->publickey_blob &&
3292 !memcmp(s->p, s->publickey_blob,
3293 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
3294 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
3295 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3300 do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
3301 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3302 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3307 n = ssh1_read_bignum
3308 (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
3313 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) < 4)
3315 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
3317 if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) <
3320 s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
3321 s->p += s->commentlen;
3325 logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
3329 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3330 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3332 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3333 logevent("Key refused");
3336 logevent("Received RSA challenge");
3337 if ((s->challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3338 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3343 char *agentreq, *q, *ret;
3346 len = 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
3347 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.exponent);
3348 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.modulus);
3349 len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->challenge);
3350 len += 16; /* session id */
3351 len += 4; /* response format */
3352 agentreq = snewn(4 + len, char);
3353 PUT_32BIT(agentreq, len);
3355 *q++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
3356 PUT_32BIT(q, bignum_bitcount(s->key.modulus));
3358 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.exponent);
3359 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.modulus);
3360 q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->challenge);
3361 memcpy(q, s->session_id, 16);
3363 PUT_32BIT(q, 1); /* response format */
3364 if (!agent_query(agentreq, len + 4, &vret, &retlen,
3365 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
3370 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
3371 " while waiting for agent"
3375 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
3376 vret = ssh->agent_response;
3377 retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
3382 if (ret[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
3383 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
3384 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3385 PKT_DATA, ret + 5, 16,
3389 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3391 ("Pageant's response accepted");
3392 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
3393 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticated using"
3395 c_write(ssh, s->commentp,
3397 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
3402 ("Pageant's response not accepted");
3405 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
3409 logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
3412 freebn(s->key.exponent);
3413 freebn(s->key.modulus);
3414 freebn(s->challenge);
3423 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile) && !s->tried_publickey)
3424 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA;
3426 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
3427 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS)) &&
3428 !s->tis_auth_refused) {
3429 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE;
3430 logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
3431 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, PKT_END);
3433 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
3434 logevent("TIS authentication declined");
3435 if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)
3436 c_write_str(ssh, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
3437 s->tis_auth_refused = 1;
3443 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3445 bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
3448 c_write_str(ssh, "Using TIS authentication.\r\n");
3449 logevent("Received TIS challenge");
3450 if (challengelen > sizeof(s->prompt) - 1)
3451 challengelen = sizeof(s->prompt) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
3452 memcpy(s->prompt, challenge, challengelen);
3453 /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
3454 strncpy(s->prompt + challengelen,
3455 memchr(s->prompt, '\n', challengelen) ?
3456 "": "\r\nResponse: ",
3457 (sizeof s->prompt) - challengelen);
3458 s->prompt[(sizeof s->prompt) - 1] = '\0';
3461 if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
3462 (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD)) &&
3463 !s->ccard_auth_refused) {
3464 s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE;
3465 logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
3466 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD, PKT_END);
3468 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE) {
3469 logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
3470 c_write_str(ssh, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
3471 s->ccard_auth_refused = 1;
3477 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
3479 bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
3482 c_write_str(ssh, "Using CryptoCard authentication.\r\n");
3483 logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
3484 if (challengelen > sizeof(s->prompt) - 1)
3485 challengelen = sizeof(s->prompt) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
3486 memcpy(s->prompt, challenge, challengelen);
3487 strncpy(s->prompt + challengelen,
3488 memchr(s->prompt, '\n', challengelen) ?
3489 "" : "\r\nResponse: ",
3490 sizeof(s->prompt) - challengelen);
3491 s->prompt[sizeof(s->prompt) - 1] = '\0';
3494 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
3495 sprintf(s->prompt, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
3496 s->username, ssh->savedhost);
3498 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA) {
3499 char *comment = NULL;
3501 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3502 c_write_str(ssh, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
3503 logeventf(ssh, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
3504 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3505 type = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
3506 if (type != SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1) {
3507 char *msg = dupprintf("Key is of wrong type (%s)",
3508 key_type_to_str(type));
3510 c_write_str(ssh, msg);
3511 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
3513 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3516 if (!rsakey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, &comment)) {
3517 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3518 c_write_str(ssh, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
3521 sprintf(s->prompt, "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ", comment);
3526 * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
3527 * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
3531 if (!ssh_get_line(s->prompt, s->password,
3532 sizeof(s->password), TRUE)) {
3534 * get_line failed to get a password (for example
3535 * because one was supplied on the command line
3536 * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
3538 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate", 0, FALSE);
3542 /* Prompt may have come from server. We've munged it a bit, so
3543 * we know it to be zero-terminated at least once. */
3544 int ret; /* need not be saved over crReturn */
3545 c_write_untrusted(ssh, s->prompt, strlen(s->prompt));
3548 setup_userpass_input(ssh, s->password, sizeof(s->password), 0);
3550 crWaitUntil(!pktin);
3551 ret = process_userpass_input(ssh, in, inlen);
3555 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
3559 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA) {
3561 * Try public key authentication with the specified
3564 s->tried_publickey = 1;
3567 const char *error = NULL;
3568 int ret = loadrsakey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, &s->key, s->password,
3571 c_write_str(ssh, "Couldn't load private key from ");
3572 c_write_str(ssh, filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
3573 c_write_str(ssh, " (");
3574 c_write_str(ssh, error);
3575 c_write_str(ssh, ").\r\n");
3576 continue; /* go and try password */
3579 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n");
3580 s->tried_publickey = 0;
3581 continue; /* try again */
3586 * Send a public key attempt.
3588 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
3589 PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
3592 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3593 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
3594 continue; /* go and try password */
3596 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
3597 bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
3603 unsigned char buffer[32];
3604 Bignum challenge, response;
3606 if ((challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
3607 bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
3610 response = rsadecrypt(challenge, &s->key);
3611 freebn(s->key.private_exponent);/* burn the evidence */
3613 for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
3614 buffer[i] = bignum_byte(response, 31 - i);
3618 MD5Update(&md5c, buffer, 32);
3619 MD5Update(&md5c, s->session_id, 16);
3620 MD5Final(buffer, &md5c);
3622 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
3623 PKT_DATA, buffer, 16, PKT_END);
3630 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3631 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3632 c_write_str(ssh, "Failed to authenticate with"
3633 " our public key.\r\n");
3634 continue; /* go and try password */
3635 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3636 bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
3640 break; /* we're through! */
3642 if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
3644 * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
3645 * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
3646 * different lengths. One of these strings is the
3647 * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
3648 * The others are all random data in
3649 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
3650 * listener can't tell which is the password, and
3651 * hence can't deduce the password length.
3653 * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
3654 * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
3655 * password that a listener won't find it _that_
3656 * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
3659 * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
3660 * containing string lengths 1 through 15
3662 * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
3663 * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
3664 * packets containing string lengths N through
3665 * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
3666 * magnitude of the password length, but it will
3667 * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
3669 * A few servers (the old 1.2.18 through 1.2.22)
3670 * can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE. For these
3671 * servers, we need an alternative defence. We make
3672 * use of the fact that the password is interpreted
3673 * as a C string: so we can append a NUL, then some
3676 * One server (a Cisco one) can deal with neither
3677 * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE _nor_ a padded password string.
3678 * For this server we are left with no defences
3679 * against password length sniffing.
3681 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE)) {
3683 * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
3684 * we can use the primary defence.
3686 int bottom, top, pwlen, i;
3689 pwlen = strlen(s->password);
3691 bottom = 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
3694 bottom = pwlen & ~7;
3698 assert(pwlen >= bottom && pwlen <= top);
3700 randomstr = snewn(top + 1, char);
3702 for (i = bottom; i <= top; i++) {
3704 defer_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
3705 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR, s->password,
3706 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
3708 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
3710 randomstr[j] = random_byte();
3711 } while (randomstr[j] == '\0');
3713 randomstr[i] = '\0';
3714 defer_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE,
3715 PKT_STR, randomstr, PKT_END);
3718 logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
3719 ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
3722 else if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
3724 * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
3725 * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
3726 * can use the secondary defence.
3732 len = strlen(s->password);
3733 if (len < sizeof(string)) {
3735 strcpy(string, s->password);
3736 len++; /* cover the zero byte */
3737 while (len < sizeof(string)) {
3738 string[len++] = (char) random_byte();
3743 logevent("Sending length-padded password");
3744 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
3745 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, ss, len,
3746 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
3749 * The server has _both_
3750 * BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE and
3751 * BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD. There is
3752 * therefore nothing we can do.
3755 len = strlen(s->password);
3756 logevent("Sending unpadded password");
3757 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
3758 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_INT, len,
3759 PKT_DATA, s->password, len,
3760 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
3763 send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
3764 PKT_STR, s->password, PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
3767 logevent("Sent password");
3768 memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
3770 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
3771 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
3772 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
3773 logevent("Authentication refused");
3774 } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
3775 bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin->type));
3780 logevent("Authentication successful");
3785 void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
3789 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
3792 if (c && !c->closes) {
3794 * If halfopen is true, we have sent
3795 * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
3796 * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
3797 * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
3798 * open, we can close it then.
3801 if (ssh->version == 1) {
3802 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
3805 struct Packet *pktout;
3806 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
3807 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
3808 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
3811 c->closes = 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
3812 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
3814 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
3815 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA ||
3816 c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
3818 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
3823 int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len)
3827 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
3830 if (ssh->version == 1) {
3831 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
3832 PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
3834 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
3835 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
3837 * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
3838 * connections are never individually throttled - because
3839 * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
3840 * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
3841 * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
3845 ssh2_add_channel_data(c, buf, len);
3846 return ssh2_try_send(c);
3850 void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c, int bufsize)
3854 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
3857 if (ssh->version == 1) {
3858 if (c->v.v1.throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
3859 c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
3860 ssh1_throttle(ssh, -1);
3863 ssh2_set_window(c, OUR_V2_WINSIZE - bufsize);
3867 static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
3869 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
3873 assert(pktin->type == qh->msg1 || pktin->type == qh->msg2);
3876 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == ssh_queueing_handler);
3877 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = NULL;
3880 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == ssh_queueing_handler);
3881 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = NULL;
3885 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
3887 if (ssh->qhead->msg1 > 0) {
3888 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] == NULL);
3889 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
3891 if (ssh->qhead->msg2 > 0) {
3892 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] == NULL);
3893 ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
3896 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
3897 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type] = NULL;
3900 qh->handler(ssh, pktin, qh->ctx);
3905 static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh, int msg1, int msg2,
3906 chandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
3908 struct queued_handler *qh;
3910 qh = snew(struct queued_handler);
3913 qh->handler = handler;
3917 if (ssh->qtail == NULL) {
3921 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == NULL);
3922 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
3925 assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == NULL);
3926 ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
3929 ssh->qtail->next = qh;
3934 static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx)
3936 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf, *pf = (struct ssh_rportfwd *)ctx;
3938 if (pktin->type == (ssh->version == 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS :
3939 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS)) {
3940 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
3943 logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
3946 rpf = del234(ssh->rportfwds, pf);
3952 static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh, const Config *cfg)
3954 const char *portfwd_strptr = cfg->portfwd;
3955 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
3958 if (!ssh->portfwds) {
3959 ssh->portfwds = newtree234(ssh_portcmp);
3962 * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
3963 * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
3964 * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
3965 * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
3968 struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
3970 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
3971 epf->status = DESTROY;
3974 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
3975 char address_family, type;
3976 int sport,dport,sserv,dserv;
3977 char sports[256], dports[256], saddr[256], host[256];
3980 address_family = 'A';
3982 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'A' ||
3983 *portfwd_strptr == '4' ||
3984 *portfwd_strptr == '6')
3985 address_family = *portfwd_strptr++;
3986 if (*portfwd_strptr == 'L' ||
3987 *portfwd_strptr == 'R' ||
3988 *portfwd_strptr == 'D')
3989 type = *portfwd_strptr++;
3994 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != '\t') {
3995 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':') {
3997 * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
3998 * source port number. This means that
3999 * everything we've seen until now is the
4000 * source _address_, so we'll move it into
4001 * saddr and start sports from the beginning
4006 if (ssh->version == 1 && type == 'R') {
4007 logeventf(ssh, "SSH-1 cannot handle remote source address "
4008 "spec \"%s\"; ignoring", sports);
4010 strcpy(saddr, sports);
4013 if (n < lenof(sports)-1) sports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4017 if (*portfwd_strptr == '\t')
4020 while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != ':') {
4021 if (n < lenof(host)-1) host[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4024 if (*portfwd_strptr == ':')
4027 while (*portfwd_strptr) {
4028 if (n < lenof(dports)-1) dports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
4032 dport = atoi(dports);
4036 dport = net_service_lookup(dports);
4038 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for destination"
4039 " port \"%s\"", dports);
4043 while (*portfwd_strptr) portfwd_strptr++;
4047 portfwd_strptr++; /* eat the NUL and move to next one */
4049 sport = atoi(sports);
4053 sport = net_service_lookup(sports);
4055 logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for source"
4056 " port \"%s\"", sports);
4059 if (sport && dport) {
4060 /* Set up a description of the source port. */
4061 struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec, *epfrec;
4063 pfrec = snew(struct ssh_portfwd);
4065 pfrec->saddr = *saddr ? dupstr(saddr) : NULL;
4066 pfrec->sserv = sserv ? dupstr(sports) : NULL;
4067 pfrec->sport = sport;
4068 pfrec->daddr = *host ? dupstr(host) : NULL;
4069 pfrec->dserv = dserv ? dupstr(dports) : NULL;
4070 pfrec->dport = dport;
4071 pfrec->local = NULL;
4072 pfrec->remote = NULL;
4073 pfrec->addressfamily = (address_family == '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4 :
4074 address_family == '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6 :
4077 epfrec = add234(ssh->portfwds, pfrec);
4078 if (epfrec != pfrec) {
4080 * We already have a port forwarding with precisely
4081 * these parameters. Hence, no need to do anything;
4082 * simply tag the existing one as KEEP.
4084 epfrec->status = KEEP;
4085 free_portfwd(pfrec);
4087 pfrec->status = CREATE;
4093 * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
4096 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4097 if (epf->status == DESTROY) {
4100 message = dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
4101 epf->type == 'L' ? "local" :
4102 epf->type == 'R' ? "remote" : "dynamic",
4103 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4104 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4107 if (epf->type != 'D') {
4108 char *msg2 = dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message,
4109 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4114 logeventf(ssh, "Cancelling %s", message);
4118 struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf = epf->remote;
4119 struct Packet *pktout;
4122 * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
4125 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4127 * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
4128 * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
4129 * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
4130 * the rportfwd record from the local end
4131 * so that any connections the server tries
4132 * to make on it are rejected.
4135 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4136 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
4137 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
4139 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4140 } else if (ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall) {
4141 /* XXX: ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall may not represent
4142 * what was used to open the original connection,
4143 * since it's reconfigurable. */
4144 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4146 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4148 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4149 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4152 del234(ssh->rportfwds, rpf);
4154 } else if (epf->local) {
4155 pfd_terminate(epf->local);
4158 delpos234(ssh->portfwds, i);
4160 i--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
4164 * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
4166 for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
4167 if (epf->status == CREATE) {
4168 char *sportdesc, *dportdesc;
4169 sportdesc = dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
4170 epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
4171 epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
4172 epf->sserv ? epf->sserv : "",
4173 epf->sserv ? "(" : "",
4175 epf->sserv ? ")" : "");
4176 if (epf->type == 'D') {
4179 dportdesc = dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
4181 epf->dserv ? epf->dserv : "",
4182 epf->dserv ? "(" : "",
4184 epf->dserv ? ")" : "");
4187 if (epf->type == 'L') {
4188 const char *err = pfd_addforward(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
4189 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4192 epf->addressfamily);
4194 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
4195 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4196 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4197 sportdesc, dportdesc,
4198 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4199 } else if (epf->type == 'D') {
4200 const char *err = pfd_addforward(NULL, -1,
4201 epf->saddr, epf->sport,
4204 epf->addressfamily);
4206 logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
4207 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
4208 epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
4210 err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
4212 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
4215 * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
4217 if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
4218 if (ssh->version == 1)
4219 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1);
4221 ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
4224 pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
4225 strncpy(pf->dhost, epf->daddr, lenof(pf->dhost)-1);
4226 pf->dhost[lenof(pf->dhost)-1] = '\0';
4227 pf->dport = epf->dport;
4228 pf->sport = epf->sport;
4229 if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
4230 logeventf(ssh, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
4231 epf->daddr, epf->dport);
4234 logeventf(ssh, "Requesting remote port %s"
4235 " forward to %s", sportdesc, dportdesc);
4237 pf->sportdesc = sportdesc;
4242 if (ssh->version == 1) {
4243 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST,
4244 PKT_INT, epf->sport,
4245 PKT_STR, epf->daddr,
4246 PKT_INT, epf->dport,
4248 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS,
4250 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4252 struct Packet *pktout;
4253 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
4254 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "tcpip-forward");
4255 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 1);/* want reply */
4257 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
4258 } else if (cfg->rport_acceptall) {
4259 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
4261 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
4263 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
4264 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
4266 ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS,
4267 SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
4268 ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
4277 static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4280 int stringlen, bufsize;
4282 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &string, &stringlen);
4283 if (string == NULL) {
4284 bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
4288 bufsize = from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA,
4290 if (!ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4291 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 1;
4292 ssh1_throttle(ssh, +1);
4296 static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4298 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4299 * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
4300 struct ssh_channel *c;
4301 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4303 logevent("Received X11 connect request");
4304 /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
4305 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled) {
4306 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4307 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4308 logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
4310 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4313 if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->cfg.x11_display, c,
4314 ssh->x11auth, NULL, -1, &ssh->cfg) != NULL) {
4315 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
4317 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4318 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4321 ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
4322 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4323 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4324 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4326 c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
4327 c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
4328 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4329 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4330 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4331 c->localid, PKT_END);
4332 logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
4337 static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4339 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
4340 * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
4341 struct ssh_channel *c;
4342 int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4344 /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
4345 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled) {
4346 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4347 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4349 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4351 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4352 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4353 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4355 c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
4356 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
4357 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4358 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4359 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4360 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT, c->localid,
4365 static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4367 /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
4368 * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
4369 struct ssh_channel *c;
4370 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *pfp;
4375 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
4378 remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4379 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &host, &hostsize);
4380 port = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4382 if (hostsize >= lenof(pf.dhost))
4383 hostsize = lenof(pf.dhost)-1;
4384 memcpy(pf.dhost, host, hostsize);
4385 pf.dhost[hostsize] = '\0';
4387 pfp = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
4390 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
4392 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4393 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4395 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
4397 e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s, pf.dhost, port,
4398 c, &ssh->cfg, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
4400 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
4402 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
4403 PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
4405 c->remoteid = remoteid;
4406 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4407 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
4409 c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
4410 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA; /* identify channel type */
4411 add234(ssh->channels, c);
4412 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
4413 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
4414 c->localid, PKT_END);
4415 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
4420 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4422 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4423 unsigned int localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4424 struct ssh_channel *c;
4426 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4427 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4428 c->remoteid = localid;
4429 c->halfopen = FALSE;
4430 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
4431 c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
4432 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
4435 if (c && c->closes) {
4437 * We have a pending close on this channel,
4438 * which we decided on before the server acked
4439 * the channel open. So now we know the
4440 * remoteid, we can close it again.
4442 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE,
4443 PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_END);
4447 static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4449 unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4450 struct ssh_channel *c;
4452 c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
4453 if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
4454 logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
4455 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4456 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4461 static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4463 /* Remote side closes a channel. */
4464 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4465 struct ssh_channel *c;
4466 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4467 if (c && !c->halfopen) {
4470 (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? 1 : 2);
4472 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_X11)) {
4473 logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
4474 assert(c->u.x11.s != NULL);
4475 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
4478 if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA)) {
4479 logevent("Forwarded port closed");
4480 assert(c->u.pfd.s != NULL);
4481 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
4485 c->closes |= (closetype << 2); /* seen this message */
4486 if (!(c->closes & closetype)) {
4487 send_packet(ssh, pktin->type, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
4489 c->closes |= closetype; /* sent it too */
4492 if (c->closes == 15) {
4493 del234(ssh->channels, c);
4497 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
4498 pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? "" :
4499 "_CONFIRMATION", c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent",
4504 static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4506 /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
4507 int i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4510 struct ssh_channel *c;
4512 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &p, &len);
4514 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
4519 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, p, len);
4522 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, p, len);
4525 /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
4527 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
4528 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, len);
4529 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
4533 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
4535 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
4537 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
4538 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
4540 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
4542 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && len > 0) {
4544 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
4546 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
4550 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
4552 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
4555 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
4558 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
4559 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
4560 sfree(c->u.a.message);
4561 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
4564 bufsize = 0; /* agent channels never back up */
4567 if (!c->v.v1.throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
4568 c->v.v1.throttling = 1;
4569 ssh1_throttle(ssh, +1);
4574 static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4576 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
4577 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh->exitcode);
4578 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
4580 * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
4581 * extra human-readable text on the end of the
4582 * session which we might mistake for another
4583 * encrypted packet, we close the session once
4584 * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
4586 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, NULL, 0, TRUE);
4589 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
4590 static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
4592 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
4594 unsigned int arg = 0;
4595 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
4596 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
4597 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
4599 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
4602 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
4605 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
4606 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, arg);
4610 static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
4611 struct Packet *pktin)
4613 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate);
4615 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA] =
4616 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA] =
4617 ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data;
4619 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
4620 ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
4621 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
4622 ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure;
4623 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] =
4624 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION] =
4625 ssh1_msg_channel_close;
4626 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh1_msg_channel_data;
4627 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status;
4629 if (ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
4630 logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
4631 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING, PKT_END);
4635 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4636 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4637 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4639 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4640 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
4642 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
4643 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
4644 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open;
4648 if (ssh->cfg.x11_forward) {
4649 char proto[20], data[64];
4650 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
4651 ssh->x11auth = x11_invent_auth(proto, sizeof(proto),
4652 data, sizeof(data), ssh->cfg.x11_auth);
4653 x11_get_real_auth(ssh->x11auth, ssh->cfg.x11_display);
4655 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
4656 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
4657 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
4658 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
4659 * cookie into the log.
4661 if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
4662 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
4664 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR, data, PKTT_OTHER,
4665 PKT_INT, x11_get_screen_number(ssh->cfg.x11_display),
4668 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
4670 PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR, data, PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4675 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4676 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4677 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4679 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4680 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
4682 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
4683 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
4684 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
4688 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
4689 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN] = ssh1_msg_port_open;
4691 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
4693 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
4694 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
4695 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
4696 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
4697 /* Send the pty request. */
4698 pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
4699 ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, ssh->cfg.termtype);
4700 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_height);
4701 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_width);
4702 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* width in pixels */
4703 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* height in pixels */
4704 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
4705 ssh1_send_ttymode, (void *)pkt);
4706 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
4707 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ispeed);
4708 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
4709 ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ospeed);
4710 ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH_TTY_OP_END);
4712 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
4716 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4717 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4718 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4720 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4721 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
4722 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
4724 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
4725 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
4727 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
4730 if (ssh->cfg.compression) {
4731 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION, PKT_INT, 6, PKT_END);
4735 if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
4736 && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4737 bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
4739 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4740 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
4742 logevent("Started compression");
4743 ssh->v1_compressing = TRUE;
4744 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = zlib_compress_init();
4745 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
4746 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = zlib_decompress_init();
4747 logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
4751 * Start the shell or command.
4753 * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
4754 * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
4755 * exists, we fall straight back to that.
4758 char *cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
4760 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
4762 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2) {
4763 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
4764 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
4767 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD, PKT_STR, cmd, PKT_END);
4769 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL, PKT_END);
4770 logevent("Started session");
4773 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
4774 if (ssh->size_needed)
4775 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
4776 if (ssh->eof_needed)
4777 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
4780 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
4782 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
4786 * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
4787 * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
4788 * attention to the unusual ones.
4793 if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
4794 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
4795 } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
4796 /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
4797 * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
4799 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
4804 int len = min(inlen, 512);
4805 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA, PKTT_DATA,
4806 PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, in, len,
4807 PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
4818 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
4820 static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4825 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
4826 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
4829 static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4831 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
4835 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
4836 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen, msg));
4839 static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
4841 /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
4844 static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
4849 * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
4851 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
4852 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = NULL;
4855 * These special message types we install handlers for.
4857 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh1_msg_disconnect;
4858 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
4859 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh1_msg_debug;
4862 static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
4863 struct Packet *pktin)
4865 unsigned char *in=(unsigned char*)vin;
4866 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
4869 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
4870 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
4874 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
4875 if (do_ssh1_login(ssh, in, inlen, pktin))
4876 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
4881 do_ssh1_connection(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
4885 * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
4887 static int in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
4890 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
4892 needlen = strlen(needle);
4895 * Is it at the start of the string?
4897 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
4898 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
4899 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
4900 /* either , or EOS follows */
4904 * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
4905 * If no comma found, terminate.
4907 while (haylen > 0 && *haystack != ',')
4908 haylen--, haystack++;
4911 haylen--, haystack++; /* skip over comma itself */
4916 * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
4918 static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
4921 if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
4923 needlen = strlen(needle);
4925 * Is it at the start of the string?
4927 if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
4928 !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
4929 (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
4930 /* either , or EOS follows */
4938 * SSH-2 key creation method.
4940 static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh, Bignum K, unsigned char *H,
4941 unsigned char *sessid, char chr,
4942 unsigned char *keyspace)
4945 /* First 20 bytes. */
4947 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
4949 SHA_Bytes(&s, H, 20);
4950 SHA_Bytes(&s, &chr, 1);
4951 SHA_Bytes(&s, sessid, 20);
4952 SHA_Final(&s, keyspace);
4953 /* Next 20 bytes. */
4955 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
4957 SHA_Bytes(&s, H, 20);
4958 SHA_Bytes(&s, keyspace, 20);
4959 SHA_Final(&s, keyspace + 20);
4963 * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
4965 static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
4966 struct Packet *pktin)
4968 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
4969 struct do_ssh2_transport_state {
4970 int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher;
4971 Bignum p, g, e, f, K;
4972 int kex_init_value, kex_reply_value;
4973 const struct ssh_mac **maclist;
4975 const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher_tobe;
4976 const struct ssh2_cipher *sccipher_tobe;
4977 const struct ssh_mac *csmac_tobe;
4978 const struct ssh_mac *scmac_tobe;
4979 const struct ssh_compress *cscomp_tobe;
4980 const struct ssh_compress *sccomp_tobe;
4981 char *hostkeydata, *sigdata, *keystr, *fingerprint;
4982 int hostkeylen, siglen;
4983 void *hkey; /* actual host key */
4984 unsigned char exchange_hash[20];
4985 int n_preferred_kex;
4986 const struct ssh_kex *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX];
4987 int n_preferred_ciphers;
4988 const struct ssh2_ciphers *preferred_ciphers[CIPHER_MAX];
4989 const struct ssh_compress *preferred_comp;
4990 int got_session_id, activated_authconn;
4991 struct Packet *pktout;
4996 crState(do_ssh2_transport_state);
4998 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate);
5000 s->cscipher_tobe = s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5001 s->csmac_tobe = s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5002 s->cscomp_tobe = s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5004 s->got_session_id = s->activated_authconn = FALSE;
5007 * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
5009 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_HMAC)
5010 s->maclist = buggymacs, s->nmacs = lenof(buggymacs);
5012 s->maclist = macs, s->nmacs = lenof(macs);
5015 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_KEX_MASK;
5017 int i, j, commalist_started;
5020 * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
5022 s->n_preferred_kex = 0;
5023 for (i = 0; i < KEX_MAX; i++) {
5024 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_kexlist[i]) {
5026 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5027 &ssh_diffiehellman_gex;
5030 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5031 &ssh_diffiehellman_group14;
5034 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
5035 &ssh_diffiehellman_group1;
5038 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5040 if (i < KEX_MAX - 1) {
5041 s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] = NULL;
5048 * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
5050 s->n_preferred_ciphers = 0;
5051 for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
5052 switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i]) {
5053 case CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
5054 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_blowfish;
5057 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc) {
5058 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_des;
5062 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_3des;
5065 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_aes;
5067 case CIPHER_ARCFOUR:
5068 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_arcfour;
5071 /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
5073 if (i < CIPHER_MAX - 1) {
5074 s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = NULL;
5081 * Set up preferred compression.
5083 if (ssh->cfg.compression)
5084 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_zlib;
5086 s->preferred_comp = &ssh_comp_none;
5089 * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
5090 * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
5092 ssh->queueing = TRUE;
5095 * Flag that KEX is in progress.
5097 ssh->kex_in_progress = TRUE;
5100 * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
5102 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
5103 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
5104 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) random_byte());
5105 /* List key exchange algorithms. */
5106 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5107 commalist_started = 0;
5108 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5109 const struct ssh_kex *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5110 if (!k) continue; /* warning flag */
5111 if (commalist_started)
5112 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5113 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_kex[i]->name);
5114 commalist_started = 1;
5116 /* List server host key algorithms. */
5117 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5118 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5119 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
5120 if (i < lenof(hostkey_algs) - 1)
5121 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5123 /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
5124 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5125 commalist_started = 0;
5126 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5127 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5128 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5129 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5130 if (commalist_started)
5131 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5132 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5133 commalist_started = 1;
5136 /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
5137 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5138 commalist_started = 0;
5139 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5140 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5141 if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
5142 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5143 if (commalist_started)
5144 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5145 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
5146 commalist_started = 1;
5149 /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
5150 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5151 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5152 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5153 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5154 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5156 /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
5157 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5158 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5159 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
5160 if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
5161 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5163 /* List client->server compression algorithms. */
5164 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5165 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5166 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5167 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5168 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5169 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5170 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5171 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5174 /* List server->client compression algorithms. */
5175 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5176 assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
5177 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
5178 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
5179 const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
5180 if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
5181 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
5182 ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
5185 /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
5186 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5187 /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
5188 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
5189 /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
5190 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
5192 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
5195 ssh->exhash = ssh->exhashbase;
5196 sha_string(&ssh->exhash, s->pktout->data + 5, s->pktout->length - 5);
5198 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5202 if (pktin->length > 5)
5203 sha_string(&ssh->exhash, pktin->data + 5, pktin->length - 5);
5206 * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
5210 char *str, *preferred;
5213 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
5214 bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
5218 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
5219 s->cscipher_tobe = NULL;
5220 s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
5221 s->csmac_tobe = NULL;
5222 s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
5223 s->cscomp_tobe = NULL;
5224 s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
5225 s->warn_kex = s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE;
5227 pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
5228 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* key exchange algorithms */
5231 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
5232 const struct ssh_kex *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
5236 if (!preferred) preferred = k->name;
5237 if (in_commasep_string(k->name, str, len))
5244 bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
5245 str ? str : "(null)"));
5249 * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
5250 * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
5253 s->guessok = first_in_commasep_string(preferred, str, len);
5254 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* host key algorithms */
5255 for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
5256 if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[i]->name, str, len)) {
5257 ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[i];
5261 s->guessok = s->guessok &&
5262 first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[0]->name, str, len);
5263 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server cipher */
5264 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5265 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5267 s->warn_cscipher = TRUE;
5269 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5270 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5271 s->cscipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5276 if (s->cscipher_tobe)
5279 if (!s->cscipher_tobe) {
5280 bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
5281 str ? str : "(null)"));
5285 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client cipher */
5286 for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
5287 const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
5289 s->warn_sccipher = TRUE;
5291 for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
5292 if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
5293 s->sccipher_tobe = c->list[j];
5298 if (s->sccipher_tobe)
5301 if (!s->sccipher_tobe) {
5302 bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
5303 str ? str : "(null)"));
5307 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server mac */
5308 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5309 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5310 s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5314 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client mac */
5315 for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
5316 if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
5317 s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
5321 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server compression */
5322 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5323 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5324 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5325 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5330 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client compression */
5331 for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
5332 const struct ssh_compress *c =
5333 i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
5334 if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
5339 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server language */
5340 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client language */
5341 s->ignorepkt = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin) && !s->guessok;
5344 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5345 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "key-exchange algorithm",
5347 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5348 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5352 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5353 " waiting for user response"));
5356 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5357 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5359 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5360 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5361 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL,
5367 if (s->warn_cscipher) {
5368 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5369 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5370 "client-to-server cipher",
5371 s->cscipher_tobe->name,
5372 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5373 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5377 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5378 " waiting for user response"));
5381 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5382 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5384 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5385 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5386 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5392 if (s->warn_sccipher) {
5393 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5394 s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
5395 "server-to-client cipher",
5396 s->sccipher_tobe->name,
5397 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5398 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5402 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
5403 " waiting for user response"));
5406 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5407 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5409 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5410 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5411 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
5417 if (s->ignorepkt) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
5418 crWaitUntil(pktin); /* Ignore packet */
5422 * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the key
5423 * exchange. We start with the maximum key length of either
5429 csbits = s->cscipher_tobe->keylen;
5430 scbits = s->sccipher_tobe->keylen;
5431 s->nbits = (csbits > scbits ? csbits : scbits);
5433 /* The keys only have 160-bit entropy, since they're based on
5434 * a SHA-1 hash. So cap the key size at 160 bits. */
5439 * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
5440 * requesting a group.
5442 if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
5443 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
5444 ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX;
5446 * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
5449 s->pbits = 512 << ((s->nbits - 1) / 64);
5450 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
5451 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
5452 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5455 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP) {
5456 bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
5459 s->p = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5460 s->g = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5461 if (!s->p || !s->g) {
5462 bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
5465 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_gex(s->p, s->g);
5466 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT;
5467 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY;
5469 ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP;
5470 ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_group(ssh->kex);
5471 s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT;
5472 s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY;
5473 logeventf(ssh, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
5474 ssh->kex->groupname);
5477 logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange");
5479 * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
5481 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* this can take a while */
5482 s->e = dh_create_e(ssh->kex_ctx, s->nbits * 2);
5483 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(s->kex_init_value);
5484 ssh2_pkt_addmp(s->pktout, s->e);
5485 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5487 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_WAITING); /* wait for server */
5489 if (pktin->type != s->kex_reply_value) {
5490 bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
5493 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* cogitate */
5494 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
5495 s->f = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
5497 bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
5500 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
5502 s->K = dh_find_K(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
5504 /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
5505 * involve user interaction. */
5506 set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_NOT);
5508 sha_string(&ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5509 if (ssh->kex == &ssh_diffiehellman_gex) {
5510 sha_uint32(&ssh->exhash, s->pbits);
5511 sha_mpint(&ssh->exhash, s->p);
5512 sha_mpint(&ssh->exhash, s->g);
5514 sha_mpint(&ssh->exhash, s->e);
5515 sha_mpint(&ssh->exhash, s->f);
5516 sha_mpint(&ssh->exhash, s->K);
5517 SHA_Final(&ssh->exhash, s->exchange_hash);
5519 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
5520 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
5523 debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
5524 dmemdump(s->exchange_hash, 20);
5527 s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
5529 !ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
5530 (char *)s->exchange_hash, 20)) {
5531 bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
5536 * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
5537 * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
5539 s->keystr = ssh->hostkey->fmtkey(s->hkey);
5540 s->fingerprint = ssh->hostkey->fingerprint(s->hkey);
5541 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
5542 s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
5543 ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
5544 ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
5546 ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
5547 if (s->dlgret < 0) {
5551 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
5552 " for user host key response"));
5555 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
5556 s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
5558 ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
5559 if (s->dlgret == 0) {
5560 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL,
5564 if (!s->got_session_id) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
5565 logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
5566 logevent(s->fingerprint);
5568 sfree(s->fingerprint);
5570 ssh->hostkey->freekey(s->hkey);
5573 * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
5574 * the session id, used in session key construction and
5577 if (!s->got_session_id) {
5578 memcpy(ssh->v2_session_id, s->exchange_hash,
5579 sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
5580 s->got_session_id = TRUE;
5584 * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
5586 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
5587 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
5588 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
5591 * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
5592 * client-to-server session keys.
5594 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
5595 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
5596 ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe;
5597 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
5599 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
5600 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
5601 ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
5602 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context();
5604 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
5605 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
5606 ssh->cscomp = s->cscomp_tobe;
5607 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = ssh->cscomp->compress_init();
5610 * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
5611 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
5614 unsigned char keyspace[40];
5615 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'C',keyspace);
5616 ssh->cscipher->setkey(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
5617 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'A',keyspace);
5618 ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
5619 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'E',keyspace);
5620 ssh->csmac->setkey(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, keyspace);
5623 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
5624 ssh->cscipher->text_name);
5625 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
5626 ssh->csmac->text_name);
5627 if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
5628 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
5629 ssh->cscomp->text_name);
5632 * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
5633 * our queued higher-layer packets.
5635 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
5636 ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh);
5639 * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
5642 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
5643 bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
5646 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
5649 * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
5650 * server-to-client session keys.
5652 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
5653 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
5654 ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
5655 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
5657 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
5658 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
5659 ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
5660 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context();
5662 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
5663 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
5664 ssh->sccomp = s->sccomp_tobe;
5665 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = ssh->sccomp->decompress_init();
5668 * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
5669 * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
5672 unsigned char keyspace[40];
5673 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'D',keyspace);
5674 ssh->sccipher->setkey(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
5675 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'B',keyspace);
5676 ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
5677 ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'F',keyspace);
5678 ssh->scmac->setkey(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, keyspace);
5680 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
5681 ssh->sccipher->text_name);
5682 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
5683 ssh->scmac->text_name);
5684 if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
5685 logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
5686 ssh->sccomp->text_name);
5689 * Free key exchange data.
5693 if (ssh->kex == &ssh_diffiehellman_gex) {
5699 * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
5700 * deferred rekey reason.
5702 if (ssh->deferred_rekey_reason) {
5703 logevent(ssh->deferred_rekey_reason);
5705 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
5706 goto begin_key_exchange;
5710 * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
5712 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
5713 ssh->last_rekey = GETTICKCOUNT();
5714 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0)
5715 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
5719 * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
5720 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
5721 * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
5722 * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
5723 * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
5724 * it would only confuse the layer above.
5726 if (s->activated_authconn) {
5729 s->activated_authconn = TRUE;
5732 * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
5733 * function so that other things can run on top of the
5734 * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
5737 * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
5738 * inlen==-1, because this is a special signal meaning
5739 * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
5740 * giving the reason for the rekey.
5742 while (!((pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) ||
5743 (!pktin && inlen == -1))) {
5748 logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
5751 * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
5752 * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
5753 * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
5754 * we process it anyway!)
5756 if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY)) {
5757 logeventf(ssh, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
5759 /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
5760 * hit the event log _too_ often. */
5761 ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0;
5762 ssh->incoming_data_size = 0;
5763 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
5765 schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
5768 goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is utterly horrid */
5770 logeventf(ssh, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in);
5773 goto begin_key_exchange;
5779 * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
5781 static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf,
5784 bufchain_add(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, buf, len);
5788 * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
5790 static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c)
5793 struct Packet *pktout;
5795 while (c->v.v2.remwindow > 0 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0) {
5798 bufchain_prefix(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, &data, &len);
5799 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remwindow)
5800 len = c->v.v2.remwindow;
5801 if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remmaxpkt)
5802 len = c->v.v2.remmaxpkt;
5803 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
5804 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
5805 dont_log_data(ssh, pktout, PKTLOG_OMIT);
5806 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
5807 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, data, len);
5808 end_log_omission(ssh, pktout);
5809 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
5810 bufchain_consume(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, len);
5811 c->v.v2.remwindow -= len;
5815 * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
5818 return bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
5821 static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c)
5825 return; /* don't send on closing channels */
5826 bufsize = ssh2_try_send(c);
5829 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
5830 /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
5831 * notification since it will be polled */
5834 x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.s);
5837 /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
5838 * buffer management */
5841 pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.s);
5848 * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
5850 static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, unsigned newwin)
5855 * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
5856 * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
5857 * be sending any more data anyway.
5863 * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
5864 * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
5865 * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
5867 * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
5869 if (newwin > c->v.v2.locwindow * 2) {
5870 struct Packet *pktout;
5872 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
5873 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
5874 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow);
5875 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
5876 c->v.v2.locwindow = newwin;
5880 static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5882 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
5883 struct ssh_channel *c;
5884 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
5885 if (c && !c->closes) {
5886 c->v.v2.remwindow += ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
5887 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c);
5891 static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5895 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
5896 struct ssh_channel *c;
5897 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
5899 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5900 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA &&
5901 ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)
5902 return; /* extended but not stderr */
5903 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &length);
5906 c->v.v2.locwindow -= length;
5908 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
5910 from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type ==
5911 SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA,
5915 bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, data, length);
5918 bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, data, length);
5921 while (length > 0) {
5922 if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
5923 unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, length);
5924 memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar,
5928 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
5930 if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
5932 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
5933 c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
5935 memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
5937 if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && length > 0) {
5939 min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
5941 memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar,
5945 c->u.a.lensofar += l;
5947 if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
5950 if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
5953 ssh_agentf_callback, c))
5954 ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
5955 sfree(c->u.a.message);
5956 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
5963 * If we are not buffering too much data,
5964 * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
5966 if (bufsize < OUR_V2_WINSIZE)
5967 ssh2_set_window(c, OUR_V2_WINSIZE - bufsize);
5971 static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5973 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
5974 struct ssh_channel *c;
5976 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
5978 return; /* nonexistent channel */
5980 if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
5982 * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
5983 * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
5985 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
5987 } else if (c->type == CHAN_AGENT) {
5989 } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA) {
5990 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
5995 static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
5997 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
5998 struct ssh_channel *c;
5999 struct Packet *pktout;
6001 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
6002 if (!c || c->halfopen) {
6003 bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE for %s channel %d\n",
6004 c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent", i));
6007 /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
6009 case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
6010 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
6011 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
6014 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
6015 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
6022 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
6023 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6027 if (c->closes == 0) {
6028 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6029 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6030 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6032 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6033 bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6037 * See if that was the last channel left open.
6038 * (This is only our termination condition if we're
6039 * not running in -N mode.)
6041 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell && count234(ssh->channels) == 0) {
6043 * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
6044 * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
6045 * SSH-2 connection had to end with a disconnect
6046 * being sent by at least one side; apparently
6047 * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
6048 * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
6049 * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
6050 * this is more polite than sending a
6051 * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
6053 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "All channels closed", NULL, 0, TRUE);
6057 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6059 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6060 struct ssh_channel *c;
6061 struct Packet *pktout;
6063 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
6065 return; /* nonexistent channel */
6066 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
6067 return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
6068 c->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6069 c->halfopen = FALSE;
6070 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
6071 c->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6072 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6074 pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
6077 * We have a pending close on this channel,
6078 * which we decided on before the server acked
6079 * the channel open. So now we know the
6080 * remoteid, we can close it again.
6082 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
6083 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6084 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6088 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6090 static const char *const reasons[] = {
6091 "<unknown reason code>",
6092 "Administratively prohibited",
6094 "Unknown channel type",
6095 "Resource shortage",
6097 unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6098 unsigned reason_code;
6099 char *reason_string;
6101 struct ssh_channel *c;
6102 c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
6104 return; /* nonexistent channel */
6105 if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
6106 return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
6108 reason_code = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6109 if (reason_code >= lenof(reasons))
6110 reason_code = 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
6111 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &reason_string, &reason_length);
6112 logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
6113 reasons[reason_code], reason_length, reason_string);
6115 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
6117 del234(ssh->channels, c);
6121 static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6125 int typelen, want_reply;
6126 int reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE; /* default */
6127 struct ssh_channel *c;
6128 struct Packet *pktout;
6130 localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6131 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
6132 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6135 * First, check that the channel exists. Otherwise,
6136 * we can instantly disconnect with a rude message.
6138 c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
6140 char *buf = dupprintf("Received channel request for nonexistent"
6141 " channel %d", localid);
6142 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, buf, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
6148 * Having got the channel number, we now look at
6149 * the request type string to see if it's something
6152 if (c == ssh->mainchan) {
6154 * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
6155 * the primary channel.
6157 if (typelen == 11 &&
6158 !memcmp(type, "exit-status", 11)) {
6160 ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6161 logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d",
6163 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
6165 } else if (typelen == 11 &&
6166 !memcmp(type, "exit-signal", 11)) {
6168 int is_plausible = TRUE, is_int = FALSE;
6169 char *fmt_sig = "", *fmt_msg = "";
6171 int msglen = 0, core = FALSE;
6172 /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
6173 * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
6174 * having been a `string' in the drafts since at
6175 * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
6176 * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
6178 unsigned char *p = pktin->body +
6180 long len = pktin->length - pktin->savedpos;
6181 unsigned long num = GET_32BIT(p); /* what is it? */
6182 /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
6186 int maybe_int = FALSE, maybe_str = FALSE;
6187 #define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
6190 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
6191 q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
6192 if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
6193 ((q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))!= 0) && q == len) \
6197 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int);
6198 CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num+1, maybe_str);
6199 #undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
6200 if (maybe_int && !maybe_str)
6202 else if (!maybe_int && maybe_str)
6205 /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
6206 is_plausible = FALSE;
6211 /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
6212 int signum = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6213 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" %d", signum);
6215 /* As per the drafts. */
6218 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &sig, &siglen);
6219 /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
6220 * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
6222 fmt_sig = dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
6226 core = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6227 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
6229 fmt_msg = dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen, msg);
6231 /* ignore lang tag */
6232 } /* else don't attempt to parse */
6233 logeventf(ssh, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
6234 fmt_sig, core ? " (core dumped)" : "",
6236 if (*fmt_sig) sfree(fmt_sig);
6237 if (*fmt_msg) sfree(fmt_msg);
6238 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
6243 * This is a channel request we don't know
6244 * about, so we now either ignore the request
6245 * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
6248 reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
6251 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(reply);
6252 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6253 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6257 static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6260 int typelen, want_reply;
6261 struct Packet *pktout;
6263 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
6264 want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
6267 * We currently don't support any global requests
6268 * at all, so we either ignore the request or
6269 * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
6273 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
6274 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6278 static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6286 struct ssh_channel *c;
6287 unsigned remid, winsize, pktsize;
6288 struct Packet *pktout;
6290 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
6291 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
6294 remid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6295 winsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6296 pktsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6298 if (typelen == 3 && !memcmp(type, "x11", 3)) {
6301 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
6302 addrstr = snewn(peeraddrlen+1, char);
6303 memcpy(addrstr, peeraddr, peeraddrlen);
6304 addrstr[peeraddrlen] = '\0';
6305 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6307 logeventf(ssh, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
6310 if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled)
6311 error = "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
6312 else if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->cfg.x11_display, c,
6313 ssh->x11auth, addrstr, peerport,
6314 &ssh->cfg) != NULL) {
6315 error = "Unable to open an X11 connection";
6317 logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
6322 } else if (typelen == 15 &&
6323 !memcmp(type, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
6324 struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *realpf;
6327 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &dummy, &dummylen);/* skip address */
6328 pf.sport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6329 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
6330 peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
6331 realpf = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
6332 logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port %d open request "
6333 "from %s:%d", pf.sport, peeraddr, peerport);
6334 if (realpf == NULL) {
6335 error = "Remote port is not recognised";
6337 const char *e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s,
6341 realpf->pfrec->addressfamily);
6342 logeventf(ssh, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
6343 "%s:%d", realpf->dhost, realpf->dport);
6345 logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
6346 error = "Port open failed";
6348 logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
6349 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
6352 } else if (typelen == 22 &&
6353 !memcmp(type, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 22)) {
6354 if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled)
6355 error = "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
6357 c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
6358 c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
6361 error = "Unsupported channel type requested";
6364 c->remoteid = remid;
6365 c->halfopen = FALSE;
6367 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
6368 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6369 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
6370 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, error);
6371 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
6372 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6373 logeventf(ssh, "Rejected channel open: %s", error);
6376 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
6378 c->v.v2.locwindow = OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
6379 c->v.v2.remwindow = winsize;
6380 c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = pktsize;
6381 bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
6382 add234(ssh->channels, c);
6383 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
6384 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
6385 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
6386 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);
6387 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
6388 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
6393 * Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point.
6395 static void ssh2_msg_userauth_banner(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
6397 /* Arbitrary limit to prevent unbounded inflation of buffer */
6398 if (bufchain_size(&ssh->banner) <= 131072) {
6399 char *banner = NULL;
6401 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &banner, &size);
6403 bufchain_add(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
6407 /* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for "pty-req" */
6408 static void ssh2_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
6410 struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
6412 unsigned int arg = 0;
6413 while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
6414 if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
6415 switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
6417 arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
6420 arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
6423 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
6424 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, arg);
6428 * Handle the SSH-2 userauth and connection layers.
6430 static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
6431 struct Packet *pktin)
6433 struct do_ssh2_authconn_state {
6435 AUTH_INVALID, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_AGENT, AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE,
6437 AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE
6441 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY,
6442 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD,
6443 AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET,
6445 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE,
6446 AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
6448 int done_service_req;
6449 int gotit, need_pw, can_pubkey, can_passwd, can_keyb_inter;
6450 int tried_pubkey_config, tried_agent;
6451 int kbd_inter_running, kbd_inter_refused;
6453 int num_prompts, curr_prompt, echo;
6458 void *publickey_blob;
6459 int publickey_bloblen;
6460 unsigned char request[5], *response, *p;
6464 char *pkblob, *alg, *commentp;
6465 int pklen, alglen, commentlen;
6466 int siglen, retlen, len;
6467 char *q, *agentreq, *ret;
6469 int num_env, env_left, env_ok;
6470 struct Packet *pktout;
6472 crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state);
6474 crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate);
6476 s->done_service_req = FALSE;
6477 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
6478 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_userauth) {
6480 * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
6482 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
6483 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-userauth");
6484 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
6485 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
6486 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
6487 s->done_service_req = TRUE;
6489 if (!s->done_service_req) {
6491 * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
6493 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
6494 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
6495 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
6496 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
6497 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
6498 s->we_are_in = TRUE; /* no auth required */
6500 bombout(("Server refused service request"));
6506 * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
6507 * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
6508 * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
6509 * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
6510 * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
6511 * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
6513 * I think this best serves the needs of
6515 * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
6516 * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
6517 * type both correctly
6519 * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
6520 * need to fall back to passwords
6522 * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
6523 * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
6524 * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
6525 * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
6526 * the username they will want to be able to get back and
6529 s->username[0] = '\0';
6530 s->got_username = FALSE;
6531 bufchain_init(&ssh->banner);
6532 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] =
6533 ssh2_msg_userauth_banner;
6534 while (!s->we_are_in) {
6538 if (s->got_username && !ssh->cfg.change_username) {
6540 * We got a username last time round this loop, and
6541 * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
6544 } else if (!*ssh->cfg.username) {
6545 if (ssh_get_line && !ssh_getline_pw_only) {
6546 if (!ssh_get_line("login as: ",
6547 s->username, sizeof(s->username), FALSE)) {
6549 * get_line failed to get a username.
6552 ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
6556 int ret; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
6557 c_write_str(ssh, "login as: ");
6559 setup_userpass_input(ssh, s->username, sizeof(s->username), 1);
6561 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
6562 ret = process_userpass_input(ssh, in, inlen);
6566 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
6568 s->username[strcspn(s->username, "\n\r")] = '\0';
6571 strncpy(s->username, ssh->cfg.username, sizeof(s->username));
6572 s->username[sizeof(s->username)-1] = '\0';
6573 if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
6574 stuff = dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s->username);
6575 c_write_str(ssh, stuff);
6579 s->got_username = TRUE;
6582 * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
6583 * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
6584 * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
6586 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK;
6588 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
6589 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
6590 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
6591 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
6592 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
6593 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
6595 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
6597 s->tried_pubkey_config = FALSE;
6598 s->tried_agent = FALSE;
6599 s->kbd_inter_running = FALSE;
6600 s->kbd_inter_refused = FALSE;
6601 /* Load the pub half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
6602 if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
6604 logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
6605 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
6606 keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
6607 if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2) {
6609 ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, NULL,
6610 &s->publickey_bloblen, NULL);
6613 logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
6614 key_type_to_str(keytype));
6615 msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
6617 filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
6618 key_type_to_str(keytype));
6619 c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
6621 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
6624 s->publickey_blob = NULL;
6628 * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
6631 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
6633 * Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
6634 * that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
6635 * we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
6639 int size = bufchain_size(&ssh->banner);
6641 * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
6642 * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
6643 * a script, which means nobody will read the
6644 * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
6645 * the banner will screw up processing on the
6646 * output of (say) plink.)
6648 if (size && (flags & (FLAG_VERBOSE | FLAG_INTERACTIVE))) {
6649 char *banner = snewn(size, char);
6650 bufchain_fetch(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
6651 c_write_untrusted(ssh, banner, size);
6654 bufchain_clear(&ssh->banner);
6656 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS) {
6657 logevent("Access granted");
6658 s->we_are_in = TRUE;
6662 if (s->kbd_inter_running &&
6663 pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
6665 * This is either a further set-of-prompts packet
6666 * in keyboard-interactive authentication, or it's
6667 * the same one and we came back here with `gotit'
6668 * set. In the former case, we must reset the
6669 * curr_prompt variable.
6673 } else if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ) {
6674 /* FIXME: perhaps we should support this? */
6675 bombout(("PASSWD_CHANGEREQ not yet supported"));
6677 } else if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
6678 bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: type %d",
6686 * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
6687 * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
6688 * helpfully try next.
6690 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
6693 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &methods, &methlen);
6694 s->kbd_inter_running = FALSE;
6695 if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin)) {
6697 * We have received an unequivocal Access
6698 * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
6701 * - if we'd just tried "none" authentication,
6702 * it's not worth printing anything at all
6704 * - if we'd just tried a public key _offer_,
6705 * the message should be "Server refused our
6706 * key" (or no message at all if the key
6707 * came from Pageant)
6709 * - if we'd just tried anything else, the
6710 * message really should be "Access denied".
6712 * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
6713 * authentication, we should break out of this
6714 * whole loop so as to go back to the username
6715 * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
6716 * username change attempts).
6718 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
6720 } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD ||
6721 s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET) {
6722 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD)
6723 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our key\r\n");
6724 logevent("Server refused public key");
6725 } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET) {
6726 /* server declined keyboard-interactive; ignore */
6728 c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
6729 logevent("Access denied");
6730 if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD &&
6731 ssh->cfg.change_username) {
6732 /* XXX perhaps we should allow
6733 * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
6734 s->we_are_in = FALSE;
6739 c_write_str(ssh, "Further authentication required\r\n");
6740 logevent("Further authentication required");
6744 in_commasep_string("publickey", methods, methlen);
6746 in_commasep_string("password", methods, methlen);
6747 s->can_keyb_inter = ssh->cfg.try_ki_auth &&
6748 in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods, methlen);
6752 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK;
6756 * Most password/passphrase prompts will be
6757 * non-echoing, so we set this to 0 by default.
6758 * Exception is that some keyboard-interactive prompts
6759 * can be echoing, in which case we'll set this to 1.
6763 if (!s->method && s->can_pubkey &&
6764 agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
6766 * Attempt public-key authentication using Pageant.
6771 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK;
6772 ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
6774 s->tried_agent = TRUE;
6776 logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
6778 /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
6779 PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
6780 s->request[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
6781 if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
6782 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
6786 bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
6787 " waiting for agent response"));
6790 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
6791 r = ssh->agent_response;
6792 s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
6794 s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
6795 if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
6796 s->response[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
6797 s->p = s->response + 5;
6798 s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(s->p);
6800 logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-2 keys", s->nkeys);
6801 for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
6804 logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
6805 s->pklen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
6807 if (s->publickey_blob &&
6808 s->pklen == s->publickey_bloblen &&
6809 !memcmp(s->p, s->publickey_blob,
6810 s->publickey_bloblen)) {
6811 logevent("This key matches configured key file");
6812 s->tried_pubkey_config = 1;
6814 s->pkblob = (char *)s->p;
6816 s->alglen = GET_32BIT(s->pkblob);
6817 s->alg = s->pkblob + 4;
6818 s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
6820 s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
6821 s->p += s->commentlen;
6822 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
6823 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
6824 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6825 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
6826 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE); /* no signature included */
6827 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
6828 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
6829 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
6830 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
6831 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
6833 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
6834 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
6835 logevent("Key refused");
6839 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
6840 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with "
6842 c_write(ssh, s->commentp, s->commentlen);
6843 c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
6847 * Server is willing to accept the key.
6848 * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
6850 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
6851 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
6852 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6853 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
6854 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
6855 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
6856 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
6857 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
6858 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
6860 s->siglen = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 + 20;
6861 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
6863 s->len = 1; /* message type */
6864 s->len += 4 + s->pklen; /* key blob */
6865 s->len += 4 + s->siglen; /* data to sign */
6866 s->len += 4; /* flags */
6867 s->agentreq = snewn(4 + s->len, char);
6868 PUT_32BIT(s->agentreq, s->len);
6869 s->q = s->agentreq + 4;
6870 *s->q++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST;
6871 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->pklen);
6873 memcpy(s->q, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
6875 PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->siglen);
6877 /* Now the data to be signed... */
6878 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
6879 PUT_32BIT(s->q, 20);
6882 memcpy(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id, 20);
6884 memcpy(s->q, s->pktout->data + 5,
6885 s->pktout->length - 5);
6886 s->q += s->pktout->length - 5;
6887 /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
6889 if (!agent_query(s->agentreq, s->len + 4,
6891 ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
6895 bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
6896 " while waiting for agent"
6900 } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
6901 vret = ssh->agent_response;
6902 s->retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
6907 if (s->ret[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
6908 logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
6909 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout,
6910 s->pkblob, s->pklen,
6912 GET_32BIT(s->ret + 5));
6913 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
6918 ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
6929 if (!s->method && s->can_pubkey && s->publickey_blob
6930 && !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
6931 unsigned char *pub_blob;
6932 char *algorithm, *comment;
6935 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
6937 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK;
6938 ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
6941 * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
6943 * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
6944 * willing to accept it.
6947 (unsigned char *)ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
6952 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
6953 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
6954 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
6955 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
6956 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE); /* no signature included */
6957 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, algorithm);
6958 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
6959 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)pub_blob,
6961 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
6962 logevent("Offered public key");
6964 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
6965 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
6967 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD;
6968 continue; /* key refused; give up on it */
6971 logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
6973 * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
6976 if (ssh2_userkey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, &comment)) {
6977 sprintf(s->pwprompt,
6978 "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
6984 if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
6985 c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with public key \"");
6986 c_write_str(ssh, comment);
6987 c_write_str(ssh, "\"\r\n");
6989 s->method = AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE;
6993 if (!s->method && s->can_keyb_inter && !s->kbd_inter_refused &&
6994 !s->kbd_inter_running) {
6995 s->method = AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
6996 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
6998 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK;
6999 ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
7001 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7002 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7003 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7004 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "keyboard-interactive"); /* method */
7005 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* lang */
7006 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "");
7007 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7009 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7010 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
7011 if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE)
7013 logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication refused");
7014 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET;
7015 s->kbd_inter_refused = TRUE; /* don't try it again */
7019 c_write_str(ssh, "Using keyboard-interactive authentication.\r\n");
7020 s->kbd_inter_running = TRUE;
7024 if (s->kbd_inter_running) {
7025 s->method = AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
7026 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
7028 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK;
7029 ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
7031 if (s->curr_prompt == 0) {
7033 * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
7034 * Display header data, and start going through
7037 char *name, *inst, *lang;
7038 int name_len, inst_len, lang_len;
7040 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &name, &name_len);
7041 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &inst, &inst_len);
7042 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &lang, &lang_len);
7044 c_write_untrusted(ssh, name, name_len);
7045 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
7048 c_write_untrusted(ssh, inst, inst_len);
7049 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
7051 s->num_prompts = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7055 * If there are prompts remaining in the packet,
7056 * display one and get a response.
7058 if (s->curr_prompt < s->num_prompts) {
7062 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
7063 if (prompt_len > 0) {
7064 static const char trunc[] = "<prompt truncated>: ";
7065 static const int prlen = sizeof(s->pwprompt) -
7067 if (prompt_len > prlen) {
7068 memcpy(s->pwprompt, prompt, prlen);
7069 strcpy(s->pwprompt + prlen, trunc);
7071 memcpy(s->pwprompt, prompt, prompt_len);
7072 s->pwprompt[prompt_len] = '\0';
7076 "<server failed to send prompt>: ");
7078 s->echo = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
7084 if (!s->method && s->can_passwd) {
7085 s->method = AUTH_PASSWORD;
7086 ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_AUTH_MASK;
7087 ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD;
7088 sprintf(s->pwprompt, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ", s->username,
7095 if (!ssh_get_line(s->pwprompt, s->password,
7096 sizeof(s->password), TRUE)) {
7098 * get_line failed to get a password (for
7099 * example because one was supplied on the
7100 * command line which has already failed to
7103 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
7104 SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
7109 int ret; /* need not be saved across crReturn */
7110 c_write_untrusted(ssh, s->pwprompt, strlen(s->pwprompt));
7113 setup_userpass_input(ssh, s->password,
7114 sizeof(s->password), s->echo);
7116 crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
7117 ret = process_userpass_input(ssh, in, inlen);
7121 c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
7125 if (s->method == AUTH_PUBLICKEY_FILE) {
7127 * We have our passphrase. Now try the actual authentication.
7129 struct ssh2_userkey *key;
7130 const char *error = NULL;
7132 key = ssh2_load_userkey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, s->password,
7134 if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE || key == NULL) {
7135 if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
7136 c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
7137 s->tried_pubkey_config = FALSE;
7139 c_write_str(ssh, "Unable to load private key (");
7140 c_write_str(ssh, error);
7141 c_write_str(ssh, ")\r\n");
7142 s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
7144 /* Send a spurious AUTH_NONE to return to the top. */
7145 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7146 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7147 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7148 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
7149 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7150 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
7152 unsigned char *pkblob, *sigblob, *sigdata;
7153 int pkblob_len, sigblob_len, sigdata_len;
7157 * We have loaded the private key and the server
7158 * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
7159 * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
7161 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7162 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7163 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7164 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
7165 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
7166 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key->alg->name);
7167 pkblob = key->alg->public_blob(key->data, &pkblob_len);
7168 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7169 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)pkblob, pkblob_len);
7172 * The data to be signed is:
7176 * followed by everything so far placed in the
7179 sigdata_len = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 + 20;
7180 if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
7182 sigdata = snewn(sigdata_len, unsigned char);
7184 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
7185 PUT_32BIT(sigdata+p, 20);
7188 memcpy(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id, 20); p += 20;
7189 memcpy(sigdata+p, s->pktout->data + 5,
7190 s->pktout->length - 5);
7191 p += s->pktout->length - 5;
7192 assert(p == sigdata_len);
7193 sigblob = key->alg->sign(key->data, (char *)sigdata,
7194 sigdata_len, &sigblob_len);
7195 ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout, pkblob, pkblob_len,
7196 sigblob, sigblob_len);
7201 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7202 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
7203 key->alg->freekey(key->data);
7205 } else if (s->method == AUTH_PASSWORD) {
7207 * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
7208 * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
7211 * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
7212 * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
7213 * people who find out how long their password is!
7215 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
7216 s->pktout->forcepad = 256;
7217 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
7218 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection"); /* service requested */
7219 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
7220 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
7221 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
7222 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
7223 memset(s->password, 0, sizeof(s->password));
7224 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
7225 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7226 logevent("Sent password");
7227 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
7228 } else if (s->method == AUTH_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE) {
7229 if (s->curr_prompt == 0) {
7230 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
7231 s->pktout->forcepad = 256;
7232 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->num_prompts);
7234 if (s->need_pw) { /* only add pw if we just got one! */
7235 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
7236 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
7237 memset(s->password, 0, sizeof(s->password));
7238 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
7241 if (s->curr_prompt >= s->num_prompts) {
7242 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7245 * If there are prompts remaining, we set
7246 * `gotit' so that we won't attempt to get
7247 * another packet. Then we go back round the
7248 * loop and will end up retrieving another
7249 * prompt out of the existing packet. Funky or
7254 s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
7256 ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
7257 "No supported authentication methods available",
7258 SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE,
7264 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
7267 * Now the connection protocol has started, one way or another.
7270 ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
7273 * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
7274 * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
7276 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] =
7277 ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust;
7278 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] =
7279 ssh2_msg_global_request;
7282 * Create the main session channel.
7284 if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell) {
7285 ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
7286 ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
7287 ssh->mainchan->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
7288 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
7289 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "session");
7290 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
7291 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow = OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
7292 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
7293 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
7294 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7295 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7296 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
7297 bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
7299 /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
7301 if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
7302 bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
7305 ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7306 ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
7307 ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
7308 ssh->mainchan->closes = 0;
7309 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7310 ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7311 bufchain_init(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer);
7312 add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
7313 update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
7314 logevent("Opened channel for session");
7316 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
7319 * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
7320 * general channel-based messages.
7322 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] =
7323 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] =
7324 ssh2_msg_channel_data;
7325 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof;
7326 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_channel_close;
7327 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
7328 ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
7329 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
7330 ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure;
7331 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] =
7332 ssh2_msg_channel_request;
7333 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] =
7334 ssh2_msg_channel_open;
7337 * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
7339 if (ssh->mainchan && ssh->cfg.x11_forward) {
7340 char proto[20], data[64];
7341 logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
7342 ssh->x11auth = x11_invent_auth(proto, sizeof(proto),
7343 data, sizeof(data), ssh->cfg.x11_auth);
7344 x11_get_real_auth(ssh->x11auth, ssh->cfg.x11_display);
7345 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
7346 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
7347 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "x11-req");
7348 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
7349 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* many connections */
7350 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, proto);
7352 * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
7353 * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
7354 * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
7355 * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
7356 * cookie into the log.
7358 dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
7359 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, data);
7360 end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
7361 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, x11_get_screen_number(ssh->cfg.x11_display));
7362 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7364 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7366 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
7367 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
7368 bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
7369 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
7372 logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
7374 logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
7375 ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
7380 * Enable port forwardings.
7382 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
7385 * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
7387 if (ssh->mainchan && ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
7388 logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
7389 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
7390 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
7391 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
7392 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
7393 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7395 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7397 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
7398 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
7399 bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
7400 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
7403 logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
7405 logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
7406 ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
7411 * Now allocate a pty for the session.
7413 if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->cfg.nopty) {
7414 /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
7415 /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
7416 ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
7417 sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
7418 /* Build the pty request. */
7419 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
7420 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
7421 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "pty-req");
7422 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
7423 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.termtype);
7424 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_width);
7425 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_height);
7426 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel width */
7427 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel height */
7428 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7429 parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
7430 ssh2_send_ttymode, (void *)s->pktout);
7431 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
7432 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ispeed);
7433 ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
7434 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ospeed);
7435 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
7436 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7437 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
7439 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7441 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
7442 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
7443 bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
7444 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
7447 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
7448 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
7450 logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
7451 ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
7454 ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
7458 * Send environment variables.
7460 * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
7461 * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
7463 if (ssh->mainchan && *ssh->cfg.environmt) {
7464 char *e = ssh->cfg.environmt;
7465 char *var, *varend, *val;
7471 while (*e && *e != '\t') e++;
7473 if (*e == '\t') e++;
7478 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
7479 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
7480 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "env");
7481 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
7482 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
7483 ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, var, varend-var);
7484 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, val);
7485 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7490 logeventf(ssh, "Sent %d environment variables", s->num_env);
7493 s->env_left = s->num_env;
7495 while (s->env_left > 0) {
7496 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7498 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
7499 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
7500 bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
7501 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
7511 if (s->env_ok == s->num_env) {
7512 logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
7513 } else if (s->env_ok == 0) {
7514 logevent("All environment variables refused");
7515 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
7517 logeventf(ssh, "%d environment variables refused",
7518 s->num_env - s->env_ok);
7519 c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
7524 * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
7525 * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
7528 if (ssh->mainchan) while (1) {
7532 if (ssh->fallback_cmd) {
7533 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys2;
7534 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
7536 subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys;
7537 cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
7538 if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
7541 s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
7542 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
7544 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "subsystem");
7545 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
7546 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
7548 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "exec");
7549 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
7550 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
7552 ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "shell");
7553 ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
7555 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
7557 crWaitUntilV(pktin);
7559 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
7560 if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
7561 bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
7562 " packet type %d", pktin->type));
7566 * We failed to start the command. If this is the
7567 * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
7568 * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
7569 * back to it before complaining.
7571 if (!ssh->fallback_cmd && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2 != NULL) {
7572 logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
7573 ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
7576 bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
7579 logevent("Started a shell/command");
7584 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
7585 if (ssh->size_needed)
7586 ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
7587 if (ssh->eof_needed)
7588 ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
7594 ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
7599 s->try_send = FALSE;
7603 * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
7604 * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
7605 * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
7608 bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
7610 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
7612 * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
7614 ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh->mainchan, (char *)in, inlen);
7619 struct ssh_channel *c;
7621 * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
7623 for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++)
7624 ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c);
7632 * Handlers for SSH-2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
7634 static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7636 /* log reason code in disconnect message */
7638 int nowlen, reason, msglen;
7640 reason = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
7641 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
7643 if (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) {
7644 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
7645 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason]);
7647 buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
7648 " type %d)", reason);
7652 buf = dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %n%.*s",
7653 &nowlen, msglen, msg);
7655 bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%s\"",
7657 (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) ?
7658 ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason] : "unknown",
7663 static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7665 /* log the debug message */
7670 /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of this */
7671 always_display = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
7672 ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
7674 logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
7677 static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
7679 struct Packet *pktout;
7680 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
7681 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, pktin->sequence);
7683 * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
7684 * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
7686 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
7690 * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
7692 static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
7697 * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
7699 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
7700 ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented;
7703 * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
7704 * the coroutines will get it.
7706 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED] = NULL;
7707 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST] = NULL;
7708 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT] = NULL;
7709 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT] = NULL;
7710 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS] = NULL;
7711 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT] = NULL;
7712 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY] = NULL;
7713 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7714 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7715 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT] = NULL;
7716 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY] = NULL;
7717 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST] = NULL;
7718 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE] = NULL;
7719 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS] = NULL;
7720 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
7721 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK] = NULL;
7722 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7723 /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
7724 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE] = NULL;
7725 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = NULL;
7726 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = NULL;
7727 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = NULL;
7728 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = NULL;
7729 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = NULL;
7730 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = NULL;
7731 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = NULL;
7732 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = NULL;
7733 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = NULL;
7734 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = NULL;
7735 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = NULL;
7736 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] = NULL;
7737 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = NULL;
7738 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = NULL;
7741 * These special message types we install handlers for.
7743 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh2_msg_disconnect;
7744 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore; /* shared with SSH-1 */
7745 ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
7748 static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now)
7752 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
7755 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0 &&
7756 now - ssh->next_rekey >= 0) {
7757 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "timeout", -1, NULL);
7761 static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
7762 struct Packet *pktin)
7764 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
7765 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
7769 ssh->incoming_data_size += pktin->encrypted_len;
7770 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
7771 ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
7772 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
7773 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data received", -1, NULL);
7776 if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
7777 ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
7781 if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done ||
7782 (pktin && pktin->type >= 20 && pktin->type < 50)) {
7783 if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh, in, inlen, pktin) &&
7784 !ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
7785 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
7787 * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
7789 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
7792 do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
7797 * Called to set up the connection.
7799 * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
7801 static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
7803 char *host, int port, char **realhost, int nodelay,
7809 ssh = snew(struct ssh_tag);
7810 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
7811 ssh->version = 0; /* when not ready yet */
7814 ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = NULL;
7815 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
7816 ssh->cscipher = NULL;
7817 ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = NULL;
7818 ssh->sccipher = NULL;
7819 ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = NULL;
7821 ssh->cs_mac_ctx = NULL;
7823 ssh->sc_mac_ctx = NULL;
7825 ssh->cs_comp_ctx = NULL;
7827 ssh->sc_comp_ctx = NULL;
7829 ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
7830 ssh->hostkey = NULL;
7832 ssh->close_expected = FALSE;
7833 ssh->clean_exit = FALSE;
7834 ssh->state = SSH_STATE_PREPACKET;
7835 ssh->size_needed = FALSE;
7836 ssh->eof_needed = FALSE;
7839 ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
7840 ssh->deferred_len = 0;
7841 ssh->deferred_size = 0;
7842 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
7844 ssh->x11auth = NULL;
7845 ssh->v1_compressing = FALSE;
7846 ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence = 0;
7847 ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
7848 ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
7849 ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate = 0;
7850 ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate = 0;
7851 ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate = 0;
7852 ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate = 0;
7853 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate = 0;
7854 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate = 0;
7855 ssh->do_ssh_init_state = NULL;
7856 ssh->do_ssh1_login_state = NULL;
7857 ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state = NULL;
7858 ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state = NULL;
7859 ssh->mainchan = NULL;
7860 ssh->throttled_all = 0;
7861 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
7863 ssh->queuelen = ssh->queuesize = 0;
7864 ssh->queueing = FALSE;
7865 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
7866 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
7867 bufchain_init(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
7868 ssh->frozen = FALSE;
7870 *backend_handle = ssh;
7873 if (crypto_startup() == 0)
7874 return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
7877 ssh->frontend = frontend_handle;
7878 ssh->term_width = ssh->cfg.width;
7879 ssh->term_height = ssh->cfg.height;
7881 ssh->channels = NULL;
7882 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
7883 ssh->portfwds = NULL;
7888 ssh->v1_throttle_count = 0;
7889 ssh->overall_bufsize = 0;
7890 ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
7892 ssh->protocol = NULL;
7894 ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = FALSE;
7898 ssh->incoming_data_size = ssh->outgoing_data_size =
7899 ssh->deferred_data_size = 0L;
7900 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_data);
7901 ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
7903 p = connect_to_host(ssh, host, port, realhost, nodelay, keepalive);
7912 static void ssh_free(void *handle)
7914 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
7915 struct ssh_channel *c;
7916 struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
7918 if (ssh->v1_cipher_ctx)
7919 ssh->cipher->free_context(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx);
7920 if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
7921 ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
7922 if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
7923 ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
7924 if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
7925 ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
7926 if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
7927 ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
7928 if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx) {
7930 ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
7932 zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
7934 if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx) {
7936 ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
7938 zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
7941 dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
7942 sfree(ssh->savedhost);
7944 while (ssh->queuelen-- > 0)
7945 ssh_free_packet(ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen]);
7948 while (ssh->qhead) {
7949 struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
7950 ssh->qhead = qh->next;
7953 ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
7955 if (ssh->channels) {
7956 while ((c = delpos234(ssh->channels, 0)) != NULL) {
7959 if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
7960 x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
7963 if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
7964 pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
7969 freetree234(ssh->channels);
7970 ssh->channels = NULL;
7973 if (ssh->rportfwds) {
7974 while ((pf = delpos234(ssh->rportfwds, 0)) != NULL)
7976 freetree234(ssh->rportfwds);
7977 ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
7979 sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
7981 x11_free_auth(ssh->x11auth);
7982 sfree(ssh->do_ssh_init_state);
7983 sfree(ssh->do_ssh1_login_state);
7984 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state);
7985 sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state);
7986 if (ssh->crcda_ctx) {
7987 crcda_free_context(ssh->crcda_ctx);
7988 ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
7991 ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
7992 expire_timer_context(ssh);
7994 pinger_free(ssh->pinger);
7995 bufchain_clear(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
8002 * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
8004 static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle, Config *cfg)
8006 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8007 char *rekeying = NULL, rekey_mandatory = FALSE;
8008 unsigned long old_max_data_size;
8010 pinger_reconfig(ssh->pinger, &ssh->cfg, cfg);
8012 ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, cfg);
8014 if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != cfg->ssh_rekey_time &&
8015 cfg->ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
8016 long new_next = ssh->last_rekey + cfg->ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC;
8017 long now = GETTICKCOUNT();
8019 if (new_next - now < 0) {
8020 rekeying = "timeout shortened";
8022 ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(new_next - now, ssh2_timer, ssh);
8026 old_max_data_size = ssh->max_data_size;
8027 ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(cfg->ssh_rekey_data);
8028 if (old_max_data_size != ssh->max_data_size &&
8029 ssh->max_data_size != 0) {
8030 if (ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size ||
8031 ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
8032 rekeying = "data limit lowered";
8035 if (ssh->cfg.compression != cfg->compression) {
8036 rekeying = "compression setting changed";
8037 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
8040 if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc != cfg->ssh2_des_cbc ||
8041 memcmp(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist, cfg->ssh_cipherlist,
8042 sizeof(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist))) {
8043 rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
8044 rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
8047 ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
8050 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress) {
8051 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, rekeying, -1, NULL);
8052 } else if (rekey_mandatory) {
8053 ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = rekeying;
8059 * Called to send data down the SSH connection.
8061 static int ssh_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
8063 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8065 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
8068 ssh->protocol(ssh, (unsigned char *)buf, len, 0);
8070 return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh);
8074 * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
8076 static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle)
8078 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8081 if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
8085 * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
8086 * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
8089 if (ssh->throttled_all)
8090 override_value = ssh->overall_bufsize;
8092 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8093 return override_value;
8094 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
8095 if (!ssh->mainchan || ssh->mainchan->closes > 0)
8096 return override_value;
8098 return (override_value +
8099 bufchain_size(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer));
8106 * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
8108 static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
8110 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8111 struct Packet *pktout;
8113 ssh->term_width = width;
8114 ssh->term_height = height;
8116 switch (ssh->state) {
8117 case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE:
8118 case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET:
8119 case SSH_STATE_CLOSED:
8120 break; /* do nothing */
8121 case SSH_STATE_INTERMED:
8122 ssh->size_needed = TRUE; /* buffer for later */
8124 case SSH_STATE_SESSION:
8125 if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
8126 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8127 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE,
8128 PKT_INT, ssh->term_height,
8129 PKT_INT, ssh->term_width,
8130 PKT_INT, 0, PKT_INT, 0, PKT_END);
8131 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
8132 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8133 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8134 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "window-change");
8135 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
8136 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_width);
8137 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_height);
8138 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
8139 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
8140 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
8148 * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
8151 static const struct telnet_special *ssh_get_specials(void *handle)
8153 static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special[] = {
8154 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP}
8156 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_transport_specials[] = {
8157 {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP},
8158 {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY},
8160 static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials[] = {
8163 /* These are the signal names defined by draft-ietf-secsh-connect-23.
8164 * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
8165 * required signals. */
8166 {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT},
8167 {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM},
8168 {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL},
8169 {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT},
8170 {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP},
8171 {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU},
8172 {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM},
8173 {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL},
8174 {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV},
8175 {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2},
8178 static const struct telnet_special specials_end[] = {
8181 /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
8182 static struct telnet_special ssh_specials[lenof(ssh2_transport_specials) +
8183 lenof(ssh2_session_specials) +
8184 lenof(specials_end)];
8185 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8187 #define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
8189 assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
8190 memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
8194 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8195 /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
8196 * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
8198 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
8199 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special);
8200 } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
8201 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_transport_specials);
8203 ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials);
8204 } /* else we're not ready yet */
8207 ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end);
8208 return ssh_specials;
8216 * Send special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
8217 * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
8220 static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
8222 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8223 struct Packet *pktout;
8225 if (code == TS_EOF) {
8226 if (ssh->state != SSH_STATE_SESSION) {
8228 * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
8229 * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
8232 ssh->eof_needed = TRUE;
8235 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8236 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EOF, PKT_END);
8237 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
8238 struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
8239 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8240 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
8241 ssh->send_ok = 0; /* now stop trying to read from stdin */
8243 logevent("Sent EOF message");
8244 } else if (code == TS_PING || code == TS_NOP) {
8245 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
8246 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
8247 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8248 if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
8249 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, PKT_STR, "", PKT_END);
8251 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
8252 ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
8253 ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
8255 } else if (code == TS_REKEY) {
8256 if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->version == 2) {
8257 do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL);
8259 } else if (code == TS_BRK) {
8260 if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
8261 || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
8262 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8263 logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH-1");
8264 } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
8265 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8266 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8267 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "break");
8268 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
8269 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0); /* default break length */
8270 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
8273 /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
8274 char *signame = NULL;
8275 if (code == TS_SIGABRT) signame = "ABRT";
8276 if (code == TS_SIGALRM) signame = "ALRM";
8277 if (code == TS_SIGFPE) signame = "FPE";
8278 if (code == TS_SIGHUP) signame = "HUP";
8279 if (code == TS_SIGILL) signame = "ILL";
8280 if (code == TS_SIGINT) signame = "INT";
8281 if (code == TS_SIGKILL) signame = "KILL";
8282 if (code == TS_SIGPIPE) signame = "PIPE";
8283 if (code == TS_SIGQUIT) signame = "QUIT";
8284 if (code == TS_SIGSEGV) signame = "SEGV";
8285 if (code == TS_SIGTERM) signame = "TERM";
8286 if (code == TS_SIGUSR1) signame = "USR1";
8287 if (code == TS_SIGUSR2) signame = "USR2";
8288 /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
8289 * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
8291 /* It's a signal. */
8292 if (ssh->version == 2 && ssh->mainchan) {
8293 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
8294 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
8295 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "signal");
8296 ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
8297 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, signame);
8298 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
8299 logeventf(ssh, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame);
8302 /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
8307 void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, Socket s)
8309 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8310 struct ssh_channel *c;
8311 c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
8316 c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
8318 c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT;/* identify channel type */
8320 bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
8321 add234(ssh->channels, c);
8327 * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
8328 * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
8330 static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle, int bufsize)
8332 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8333 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8334 if (ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
8335 ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
8336 ssh1_throttle(ssh, -1);
8339 if (ssh->mainchan && ssh->mainchan->closes == 0)
8340 ssh2_set_window(ssh->mainchan, OUR_V2_WINSIZE - bufsize);
8344 void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, char *hostname, int port, char *org)
8346 struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)channel;
8348 struct Packet *pktout;
8350 logeventf(ssh, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname, port);
8352 if (ssh->version == 1) {
8353 send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN,
8354 PKT_INT, c->localid,
8357 /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
8360 pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
8361 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "direct-tcpip");
8362 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
8363 c->v.v2.locwindow = OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
8364 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
8365 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
8366 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, hostname);
8367 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, port);
8369 * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
8370 * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
8371 * convinced the server should be told details like that
8372 * about my local network configuration.
8374 ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "client-side-connection");
8375 ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
8376 ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
8380 static Socket ssh_socket(void *handle)
8382 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8386 static int ssh_sendok(void *handle)
8388 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8389 return ssh->send_ok;
8392 static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
8394 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8395 if (option == LD_ECHO)
8396 return ssh->echoing;
8397 if (option == LD_EDIT)
8398 return ssh->editing;
8402 static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
8404 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8408 static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
8410 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8411 ssh->logctx = logctx;
8414 static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle)
8416 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8420 return (ssh->exitcode >= 0 ? ssh->exitcode : 0);
8424 * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
8425 * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
8427 static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle)
8429 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8430 return ssh->version;
8434 * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
8435 * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
8436 * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
8438 extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle)
8440 Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
8441 return ssh->fallback_cmd;
8444 Backend ssh_backend = {
8454 ssh_return_exitcode,