-\define{versionidpageant} \versionid $Id$
-
\C{pageant} Using \i{Pageant} for authentication
\cfg{winhelp-topic}{pageant.general}
that are currently loaded into Pageant. The list might look
something like this:
-\c ssh1 1024 22:c3:68:3b:09:41:36:c3:39:83:91:ae:71:b2:0f:04 k1
-\c ssh-rsa 1023 74:63:08:82:95:75:e1:7c:33:31:bb:cb:00:c0:89:8b k2
+\c ssh-rsa 2048 22:d6:69:c9:22:51:ac:cb:b9:15:67:47:f7:65:6d:d7 k1
+\c ssh-dss 2048 e4:6c:69:f3:4f:fc:cf:fc:96:c0:88:34:a7:1e:59:d7 k2
For each key, the list box will tell you:
\b The type of the key. Currently, this can be \c{ssh1} (an RSA key
for use with the SSH-1 protocol), \c{ssh-rsa} (an RSA key for use
-with the SSH-2 protocol), or \c{ssh-dss} (a DSA key for use with
+with the SSH-2 protocol), \c{ssh-dss} (a DSA key for use with
+the SSH-2 protocol), \c{ecdsa-sha2-*} (an ECDSA key for use with
+the SSH-2 protocol), or \c{ssh-ed25519} (an Ed25519 key for use with
the SSH-2 protocol).
\b The size (in bits) of the key.
However, the sysadmin of the server machine can always pretend to be
you \e{on that machine}. So if you forward your agent to a server
machine, then the sysadmin of that machine can access the forwarded
-agent connection and request signatures from your private keys, and
-can therefore log in to other machines as you. They can only do this
-to a limited extent - when the agent forwarding disappears they lose
-the ability - but using Pageant doesn't actually \e{prevent} the
+agent connection and request signatures from any of your private keys,
+and can therefore log in to other machines as you. They can only do
+this to a limited extent - when the agent forwarding disappears they
+lose the ability - but using Pageant doesn't actually \e{prevent} the
sysadmin (or hackers) on the server from doing this.
Therefore, if you don't trust the sysadmin of a server machine, you