+You should normally leave this at the default, \q{2 only}. The older
+SSH-1 protocol is no longer developed, has many known cryptographic
+weaknesses, and is generally not considered to be secure. If you
+permit use of SSH-1 by selecting \q{2} instead of \q{2 only}, an
+active attacker can force downgrade to SSH-1 even if the server
+you're connecting to supports SSH-2.
+
+PuTTY's protocol 1 implementation is provided mainly for
+compatibility, and is no longer being enhanced.
+
+\S{config-ssh-sharing} Sharing an SSH connection between PuTTY tools
+
+\cfg{winhelp-topic}{ssh.sharing}
+
+The controls in this box allow you to configure PuTTY to reuse an
+existing SSH connection, where possible.
+
+The SSH-2 protocol permits you to run multiple data channels over the
+same SSH connection, so that you can log in just once (and do the
+expensive encryption setup just once) and then have more than one
+terminal window open.
+
+Each instance of PuTTY can still run at most one terminal session, but
+using the controls in this box, you can configure PuTTY to check if
+another instance of itself has already connected to the target host,
+and if so, share that instance's SSH connection instead of starting a
+separate new one.
+
+To enable this feature, just tick the box \q{Share SSH connections if
+possible}. Then, whenever you start up a PuTTY session connecting to a
+particular host, it will try to reuse an existing SSH connection if
+one is available. For example, selecting \q{Duplicate Session} from
+the system menu will launch another session on the same host, and if
+sharing is enabled then it will reuse the existing SSH connection.
+
+When this mode is in use, the first PuTTY that connected to a given
+server becomes the \q{upstream}, which means that it is the one
+managing the real SSH connection. All subsequent PuTTYs which reuse
+the connection are referred to as \q{downstreams}: they do not connect
+to the real server at all, but instead connect to the upstream PuTTY
+via local inter-process communication methods.
+
+For this system to be activated, \e{both} the upstream and downstream
+instances of PuTTY must have the sharing option enabled.
+
+The upstream PuTTY can therefore not terminate until all its
+downstreams have closed. This is similar to the effect you get with
+port forwarding or X11 forwarding, in which a PuTTY whose terminal
+session has already finished will still remain open so as to keep
+serving forwarded connections.
+
+In case you need to configure this system in more detail, there are
+two additional checkboxes which allow you to specify whether a
+particular PuTTY can act as an upstream or a downstream or both.
+(These boxes only take effect if the main \q{Share SSH connections if
+possible} box is also ticked.) By default both of these boxes are
+ticked, so that multiple PuTTYs started from the same configuration
+will designate one of themselves as the upstream and share a single
+connection; but if for some reason you need a particular PuTTY
+configuration \e{not} to be an upstream (e.g. because you definitely
+need it to close promptly) or not to be a downstream (e.g. because it
+needs to do its own authentication using a special private key) then
+you can untick one or the other of these boxes.
+
+I have referred to \q{PuTTY} throughout the above discussion, but all
+the other PuTTY tools which make SSH connections can use this
+mechanism too. For example, if PSCP or PSFTP loads a configuration
+with sharing enabled, then it can act as a downstream and use an
+existing SSH connection set up by an instance of GUI PuTTY. The one
+special case is that PSCP and PSFTP will \e{never} act as upstreams.
+
+It is possible to test programmatically for the existence of a live
+upstream using Plink. See \k{plink-option-shareexists}.
+
+\H{config-ssh-kex} The Kex panel
+
+The Kex panel (short for \q{\i{key exchange}}) allows you to configure
+options related to SSH-2 key exchange.
+
+Key exchange occurs at the start of an SSH connection (and
+occasionally thereafter); it establishes a \i{shared secret} that is used
+as the basis for all of SSH's security features. It is therefore very
+important for the security of the connection that the key exchange is
+secure.
+
+Key exchange is a cryptographically intensive process; if either the
+client or the server is a relatively slow machine, the slower methods
+may take several tens of seconds to complete.
+
+If connection startup is too slow, or the connection hangs
+periodically, you may want to try changing these settings.
+
+If you don't understand what any of this means, it's safe to leave
+these settings alone.
+
+This entire panel is only relevant to SSH protocol version 2; none of
+these settings affect SSH-1 at all.
+
+\S{config-ssh-kex-order} \ii{Key exchange algorithm} selection
+
+\cfg{winhelp-topic}{ssh.kex.order}
+
+PuTTY supports a variety of SSH-2 key exchange methods, and allows you
+to choose which one you prefer to use; configuration is similar to
+cipher selection (see \k{config-ssh-encryption}).
+
+PuTTY currently supports the following key exchange methods:
+
+\b \q{ECDH}: \i{elliptic curve} \i{Diffie-Hellman key exchange}.
+
+\b \q{Group 14}: Diffie-Hellman key exchange with a well-known
+2048-bit group.
+
+\b \q{Group 1}: Diffie-Hellman key exchange with a well-known
+1024-bit group. This is less secure \#{FIXME better words} than
+group 14, but may be faster with slow client or server machines,
+and may be the only method supported by older server software.
+
+\b \q{\ii{Group exchange}}: with this method, instead of using a fixed
+group, PuTTY requests that the server suggest a group to use for key
+exchange; the server can avoid groups known to be weak, and possibly
+invent new ones over time, without any changes required to PuTTY's
+configuration. We recommend use of this method, if possible.
+
+\b \q{\i{RSA key exchange}}: this requires much less computational
+effort on the part of the client, and somewhat less on the part of
+the server, than Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
+
+If the first algorithm PuTTY finds is below the \q{warn below here}
+line, you will see a warning box when you make the connection, similar
+to that for cipher selection (see \k{config-ssh-encryption}).
+
+\S{config-ssh-kex-rekey} \ii{Repeat key exchange}
+
+\cfg{winhelp-topic}{ssh.kex.repeat}
+
+If the session key negotiated at connection startup is used too much
+or for too long, it may become feasible to mount attacks against the
+SSH connection. Therefore, the SSH-2 protocol specifies that a new key
+exchange should take place every so often; this can be initiated by
+either the client or the server.
+
+While this renegotiation is taking place, no data can pass through
+the SSH connection, so it may appear to \q{freeze}. (The occurrence of
+repeat key exchange is noted in the Event Log; see
+\k{using-eventlog}.) Usually the same algorithm is used as at the
+start of the connection, with a similar overhead.
+
+These options control how often PuTTY will initiate a repeat key
+exchange (\q{rekey}). You can also force a key exchange at any time
+from the Special Commands menu (see \k{using-specials}).
+
+\# FIXME: do we have any additions to the SSH-2 specs' advice on
+these values? Do we want to enforce any limits?
+
+\b \q{Max minutes before rekey} specifies the amount of time that is
+allowed to elapse before a rekey is initiated. If this is set to zero,
+PuTTY will not rekey due to elapsed time. The SSH-2 protocol
+specification recommends a timeout of at most 60 minutes.
+
+You might have a need to disable time-based rekeys completely for the same
+reasons that \i{keepalives} aren't always helpful. If you anticipate
+suffering a network dropout of several hours in the middle of an SSH
+connection, but were not actually planning to send \e{data} down
+that connection during those hours, then an attempted rekey in the
+middle of the dropout will probably cause the connection to be
+abandoned, whereas if rekeys are disabled then the connection should
+in principle survive (in the absence of interfering \i{firewalls}). See
+\k{config-keepalive} for more discussion of these issues; for these
+purposes, rekeys have much the same properties as keepalives.
+(Except that rekeys have cryptographic value in themselves, so you
+should bear that in mind when deciding whether to turn them off.)
+Note, however, the the SSH \e{server} can still initiate rekeys.
+
+\b \q{Max data before rekey} specifies the amount of data (in bytes)
+that is permitted to flow in either direction before a rekey is
+initiated. If this is set to zero, PuTTY will not rekey due to
+transferred data. The SSH-2 protocol specification recommends a limit
+of at most 1 gigabyte.
+
+\lcont{
+
+As well as specifying a value in bytes, the following shorthand can be
+used:
+
+\b \cq{1k} specifies 1 kilobyte (1024 bytes).
+
+\b \cq{1M} specifies 1 megabyte (1024 kilobytes).
+
+\b \cq{1G} specifies 1 gigabyte (1024 megabytes).
+
+}
+
+Disabling data-based rekeys entirely is a bad idea. The \i{integrity},
+and to a lesser extent, \i{confidentiality} of the SSH-2 protocol depend
+in part on rekeys occuring before a 32-bit packet sequence number
+wraps around. Unlike time-based rekeys, data-based rekeys won't occur
+when the SSH connection is idle, so they shouldn't cause the same
+problems. The SSH-1 protocol, incidentally, has even weaker integrity
+protection than SSH-2 without rekeys.
+
+\H{config-ssh-hostkey} The Host Keys panel
+
+The Host Keys panel allows you to configure options related to SSH-2
+host key management.
+
+Host keys are used to prove the server's identity, and assure you that
+the server is not being spoofed (either by a man-in-the-middle attack
+or by completely replacing it on the network).
+
+This entire panel is only relevant to SSH protocol version 2; none of
+these settings affect SSH-1 at all.
+
+\S{config-ssh-hostkey-order} \ii{Host key type} selection
+
+\cfg{winhelp-topic}{ssh.hostkey.order}
+
+PuTTY supports a variety of SSH-2 host key types, and allows you to
+choose which one you prefer to use to identify the server.
+Configuration is similar to cipher selection (see
+\k{config-ssh-encryption}).
+
+PuTTY currently supports the following host key types:
+
+\b \q{Ed25519}: \i{Edwards-curve} \i{DSA} using a twisted Edwards
+curve with modulus \cw{2^255-19}.
+
+\b \q{ECDSA}: \i{elliptic curve} \i{DSA} using one of the
+NIST-standardised elliptic curves.
+
+\b \q{DSA}: straightforward \i{DSA} using modular exponentiation.
+
+\b \q{RSA}: the ordinary \i{RSA} algorithm.
+
+If PuTTY already has a host key stored for the server, it will prefer
+to use the one it already has. If not, it will choose an algorithm
+based on the preference order you specify in the configuration.
+
+If the first algorithm PuTTY finds is below the \q{warn below here}
+line, you will see a warning box when you make the connection, similar
+to that for cipher selection (see \k{config-ssh-encryption}).
+
+\S{config-ssh-kex-manual-hostkeys} \ii{Manually configuring host keys}
+
+\cfg{winhelp-topic}{ssh.kex.manualhostkeys}
+
+In some situations, if PuTTY's automated host key management is not
+doing what you need, you might need to manually configure PuTTY to
+accept a specific host key, or one of a specific set of host keys.
+
+One reason why you might want to do this is because the host name
+PuTTY is connecting to is using round-robin DNS to return one of
+multiple actual servers, and they all have different host keys. In
+that situation, you might need to configure PuTTY to accept any of a
+list of host keys for the possible servers, while still rejecting any
+key not in that list.
+
+Another reason is if PuTTY's automated host key management is
+completely unavailable, e.g. because PuTTY (or Plink or PSFTP, etc) is
+running in a Windows environment without access to the Registry. In
+that situation, you will probably want to use the \cw{-hostkey}
+command-line option to configure the expected host key(s); see
+\k{using-cmdline-hostkey}.
+
+For situations where PuTTY's automated host key management simply
+picks the wrong host name to store a key under, you may want to
+consider setting a \q{logical host name} instead; see
+\k{config-loghost}.
+
+To configure manual host keys via the GUI, enter some text describing
+the host key into the edit box in the \q{Manually configure host keys
+for this connection} container, and press the \q{Add} button. The text
+will appear in the \q{Host keys or fingerprints to accept} list box.
+You can remove keys again with the \q{Remove} button.
+
+The text describing a host key can be in one of the following formats:
+
+\b An MD5-based host key fingerprint of the form displayed in PuTTY's
+Event Log and host key dialog boxes, i.e. sixteen 2-digit hex numbers
+separated by colons.
+
+\b A base64-encoded blob describing an SSH-2 public key in
+OpenSSH's one-line public key format. How you acquire a public key in
+this format is server-dependent; on an OpenSSH server it can typically
+be found in a location like \c{/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub}.
+
+If this box contains at least one host key or fingerprint when PuTTY
+makes an SSH connection, then PuTTY's automated host key management is
+completely bypassed: the connection will be permitted if and only if
+the host key presented by the server is one of the keys listed in this
+box, and the \I{host key cache}host key store in the Registry will be
+neither read \e{nor written}, unless you explicitly do so.
+
+If the box is empty (as it usually is), then PuTTY's automated host
+key management will work as normal.
+
+\H{config-ssh-encryption} The Cipher panel