+ s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 0;
+ }
+ s->tis_auth_refused = s->ccard_auth_refused = 0;
+ /* Load the public half of ssh->cfg.keyfile so we notice if it's in Pageant */
+ if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
+ if (!rsakey_pubblob(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
+ &s->publickey_blob, &s->publickey_bloblen, NULL))
+ s->publickey_blob = NULL;
+ } else
+ s->publickey_blob = NULL;
+
+ while (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD;
+
+ if (agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
+ /*
+ * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
+ */
+ void *r;
+
+ s->authed = FALSE;
+ s->tried_agent = 1;
+ logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
+
+ /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
+ PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
+ s->request[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
+ if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
+ ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
+ " for agent response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ r = ssh->agent_response;
+ s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
+ }
+ s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
+ if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
+ s->response[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
+ s->p = s->response + 5;
+ s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(s->p);
+ s->p += 4;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s->nkeys);
+ for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
+ if (s->publickey_blob &&
+ !memcmp(s->p, s->publickey_blob,
+ s->publickey_bloblen)) {
+ logevent("This key matches configured key file");
+ s->tried_publickey = 1;
+ }
+ s->p += 4;
+ {
+ int n, ok = FALSE;
+ do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
+ n = ssh1_read_bignum
+ (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
+ &s->key.exponent);
+ if (n < 0)
+ break;
+ s->p += n;
+ n = ssh1_read_bignum
+ (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
+ &s->key.modulus);
+ if (n < 0)
+ break;
+ s->p += n;
+ if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) < 4)
+ break;
+ s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
+ s->p += 4;
+ if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) <
+ s->commentlen)
+ break;
+ s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
+ s->p += s->commentlen;
+ ok = TRUE;
+ } while (0);
+ if (!ok) {
+ logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
+ PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
+ logevent("Key refused");
+ continue;
+ }
+ logevent("Received RSA challenge");
+ if ((s->challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
+ bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ {
+ char *agentreq, *q, *ret;
+ void *vret;
+ int len, retlen;
+ len = 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
+ len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.exponent);
+ len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.modulus);
+ len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->challenge);
+ len += 16; /* session id */
+ len += 4; /* response format */
+ agentreq = snewn(4 + len, char);
+ PUT_32BIT(agentreq, len);
+ q = agentreq + 4;
+ *q++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
+ PUT_32BIT(q, bignum_bitcount(s->key.modulus));
+ q += 4;
+ q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.exponent);
+ q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.modulus);
+ q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->challenge);
+ memcpy(q, s->session_id, 16);
+ q += 16;
+ PUT_32BIT(q, 1); /* response format */
+ if (!agent_query(agentreq, len + 4, &vret, &retlen,
+ ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
+ sfree(agentreq);
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
+ " while waiting for agent"
+ " response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ vret = ssh->agent_response;
+ retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
+ } else
+ sfree(agentreq);
+ ret = vret;
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
+ logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
+ PKT_DATA, ret + 5, 16,
+ PKT_END);
+ sfree(ret);
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ logevent
+ ("Pageant's response accepted");
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticated using"
+ " RSA key \"");
+ c_write(ssh, s->commentp,
+ s->commentlen);
+ c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
+ }
+ s->authed = TRUE;
+ } else
+ logevent
+ ("Pageant's response not accepted");
+ } else {
+ logevent
+ ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
+ sfree(ret);
+ }
+ } else {
+ logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
+ }
+ }
+ freebn(s->key.exponent);
+ freebn(s->key.modulus);
+ freebn(s->challenge);
+ if (s->authed)
+ break;
+ }
+ sfree(s->response);
+ }
+ if (s->authed)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile) && !s->tried_publickey)
+ s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA;
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
+ (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS)) &&
+ !s->tis_auth_refused) {
+ s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE;
+ logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, PKT_END);
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
+ logevent("TIS authentication declined");
+ if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
+ s->tis_auth_refused = 1;
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ char *challenge;
+ int challengelen;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
+ if (!challenge) {
+ bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Using TIS authentication.\r\n");
+ logevent("Received TIS challenge");
+ if (challengelen > sizeof(s->prompt) - 1)
+ challengelen = sizeof(s->prompt) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
+ memcpy(s->prompt, challenge, challengelen);
+ /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
+ strncpy(s->prompt + challengelen,
+ memchr(s->prompt, '\n', challengelen) ?
+ "": "\r\nResponse: ",
+ (sizeof s->prompt) - challengelen);
+ s->prompt[(sizeof s->prompt) - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+ if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
+ (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD)) &&
+ !s->ccard_auth_refused) {
+ s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE;
+ logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD, PKT_END);
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE) {
+ logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
+ c_write_str(ssh, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
+ s->ccard_auth_refused = 1;
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ char *challenge;
+ int challengelen;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
+ if (!challenge) {
+ bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Using CryptoCard authentication.\r\n");
+ logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
+ if (challengelen > sizeof(s->prompt) - 1)
+ challengelen = sizeof(s->prompt) - 1;/* prevent overrun */
+ memcpy(s->prompt, challenge, challengelen);
+ strncpy(s->prompt + challengelen,
+ memchr(s->prompt, '\n', challengelen) ?
+ "" : "\r\nResponse: ",
+ sizeof(s->prompt) - challengelen);
+ s->prompt[sizeof(s->prompt) - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
+ sprintf(s->prompt, "%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
+ s->username, ssh->savedhost);
+ }
+ if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA) {
+ char *comment = NULL;
+ int type;
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
+ logeventf(ssh, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
+ filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
+ type = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
+ if (type != SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1) {
+ char *msg = dupprintf("Key is of wrong type (%s)",
+ key_type_to_str(type));
+ logevent(msg);
+ c_write_str(ssh, msg);
+ c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
+ sfree(msg);
+ s->tried_publickey = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!rsakey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, &comment)) {
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
+ goto tryauth;
+ }
+ sprintf(s->prompt, "Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ", comment);
+ sfree(comment);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
+ * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ if (ssh_get_line) {
+ if (!ssh_get_line(s->prompt, s->password,
+ sizeof(s->password), TRUE)) {
+ /*
+ * get_line failed to get a password (for example
+ * because one was supplied on the command line
+ * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
+ */
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT,
+ PKT_STR, "No more passwords available to try",
+ PKT_END);
+ logevent("Unable to authenticate");
+ connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "Unable to authenticate");
+ ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
+ ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, NULL, 0, 0);
+ crStop(1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Prompt may have come from server. We've munged it a bit, so
+ * we know it to be zero-terminated at least once. */
+ int ret; /* need not be saved over crReturn */
+ c_write_untrusted(ssh, s->prompt, strlen(s->prompt));
+ s->pos = 0;
+
+ setup_userpass_input(ssh, s->password, sizeof(s->password), 0);
+ do {
+ crWaitUntil(!pktin);
+ ret = process_userpass_input(ssh, in, inlen);
+ } while (ret == 0);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ cleanup_exit(0);
+ c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
+ }
+
+ tryauth:
+ if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA) {
+ /*
+ * Try public key authentication with the specified
+ * key file.
+ */
+ s->tried_publickey = 1;
+
+ {
+ const char *error = NULL;
+ int ret = loadrsakey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, &s->key, s->password,
+ &error);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Couldn't load private key from ");
+ c_write_str(ssh, filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
+ c_write_str(ssh, " (");
+ c_write_str(ssh, error);
+ c_write_str(ssh, ").\r\n");
+ continue; /* go and try password */
+ }
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n");
+ s->tried_publickey = 0;
+ continue; /* try again */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Send a public key attempt.
+ */
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
+ PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
+
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
+ continue; /* go and try password */
+ }
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
+ bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ {
+ int i;
+ unsigned char buffer[32];
+ Bignum challenge, response;
+
+ if ((challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
+ bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ response = rsadecrypt(challenge, &s->key);
+ freebn(s->key.private_exponent);/* burn the evidence */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ buffer[i] = bignum_byte(response, 31 - i);
+ }
+
+ MD5Init(&md5c);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, buffer, 32);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, s->session_id, 16);
+ MD5Final(buffer, &md5c);
+
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
+ PKT_DATA, buffer, 16, PKT_END);
+
+ freebn(challenge);
+ freebn(response);
+ }
+
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Failed to authenticate with"
+ " our public key.\r\n");
+ continue; /* go and try password */
+ } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ break; /* we're through! */
+ } else {
+ if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
+ /*
+ * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
+ * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
+ * different lengths. One of these strings is the
+ * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
+ * The others are all random data in
+ * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
+ * listener can't tell which is the password, and
+ * hence can't deduce the password length.
+ *
+ * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
+ * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
+ * password that a listener won't find it _that_
+ * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
+ * do is:
+ *
+ * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
+ * containing string lengths 1 through 15
+ *
+ * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
+ * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
+ * packets containing string lengths N through
+ * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
+ * magnitude of the password length, but it will
+ * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
+ *
+ * A few servers (the old 1.2.18 through 1.2.22)
+ * can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE. For these
+ * servers, we need an alternative defence. We make
+ * use of the fact that the password is interpreted
+ * as a C string: so we can append a NUL, then some
+ * random data.
+ *
+ * One server (a Cisco one) can deal with neither
+ * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE _nor_ a padded password string.
+ * For this server we are left with no defences
+ * against password length sniffing.
+ */
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE)) {
+ /*
+ * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
+ * we can use the primary defence.
+ */
+ int bottom, top, pwlen, i;
+ char *randomstr;
+
+ pwlen = strlen(s->password);
+ if (pwlen < 16) {
+ bottom = 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
+ top = 15;
+ } else {
+ bottom = pwlen & ~7;
+ top = bottom + 7;
+ }
+
+ assert(pwlen >= bottom && pwlen <= top);
+
+ randomstr = snewn(top + 1, char);
+
+ for (i = bottom; i <= top; i++) {
+ if (i == pwlen) {
+ defer_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
+ PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR, s->password,
+ PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+ do {
+ randomstr[j] = random_byte();
+ } while (randomstr[j] == '\0');
+ }
+ randomstr[i] = '\0';
+ defer_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE,
+ PKT_STR, randomstr, PKT_END);
+ }
+ }
+ logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
+ ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
+ sfree(randomstr);
+ }
+ else if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
+ /*
+ * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
+ * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
+ * can use the secondary defence.
+ */
+ char string[64];
+ char *ss;
+ int len;
+
+ len = strlen(s->password);
+ if (len < sizeof(string)) {
+ ss = string;
+ strcpy(string, s->password);
+ len++; /* cover the zero byte */
+ while (len < sizeof(string)) {
+ string[len++] = (char) random_byte();
+ }
+ } else {
+ ss = s->password;
+ }
+ logevent("Sending length-padded password");
+ send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
+ PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, ss, len,
+ PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The server has _both_
+ * BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE and
+ * BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD. There is
+ * therefore nothing we can do.
+ */
+ int len;
+ len = strlen(s->password);
+ logevent("Sending unpadded password");
+ send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
+ PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_INT, len,
+ PKT_DATA, s->password, len,
+ PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ }
+ } else {
+ send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
+ PKT_STR, s->password, PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ }
+ }
+ logevent("Sent password");
+ memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
+ logevent("Authentication refused");
+ } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ logevent("Authentication successful");
+
+ crFinish(1);
+}
+
+void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (c && !c->closes) {
+ /*
+ * If halfopen is true, we have sent
+ * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
+ * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
+ * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
+ * open, we can close it then.
+ */
+ if (!c->halfopen) {
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
+ PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+ }
+ c->closes = 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
+ if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
+ c->u.x11.s = NULL;
+ logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
+ } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA ||
+ c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
+ c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
+ logevent("Forwarded port closed");
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
+ PKTT_DATA,
+ PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
+ PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ /*
+ * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
+ * connections are never individually throttled - because
+ * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
+ * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
+ * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ ssh2_add_channel_data(c, buf, len);
+ return ssh2_try_send(c);
+ }
+}
+
+void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c, int bufsize)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ if (c->v.v1.throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
+ c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
+ ssh1_throttle(ssh, -1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssh2_set_window(c, OUR_V2_WINSIZE - bufsize);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
+
+ assert(qh != NULL);
+
+ assert(pktin->type == qh->msg1 || pktin->type == qh->msg2);
+
+ if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
+ assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == ssh_queueing_handler);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = NULL;
+ }
+ if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
+ assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == ssh_queueing_handler);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (qh->next) {
+ ssh->qhead = qh->next;
+
+ if (ssh->qhead->msg1 > 0) {
+ assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] == NULL);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
+ }
+ if (ssh->qhead->msg2 > 0) {
+ assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] == NULL);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ qh->handler(ssh, pktin, qh->ctx);
+
+ sfree(qh);
+}
+
+static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh, int msg1, int msg2,
+ chandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
+{
+ struct queued_handler *qh;
+
+ qh = snew(struct queued_handler);
+ qh->msg1 = msg1;
+ qh->msg2 = msg2;
+ qh->handler = handler;
+ qh->ctx = ctx;
+ qh->next = NULL;
+
+ if (ssh->qtail == NULL) {
+ ssh->qhead = qh;
+
+ if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
+ assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == NULL);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
+ }
+ if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
+ assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == NULL);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssh->qtail->next = qh;
+ }
+ ssh->qtail = qh;
+}
+
+static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx)
+{
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf, *pf = (struct ssh_rportfwd *)ctx;
+
+ if (pktin->type == (ssh->version == 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS :
+ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS)) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
+ pf->sportdesc);
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
+ pf->sportdesc);
+
+ rpf = del234(ssh->rportfwds, pf);
+ assert(rpf == pf);
+ free_rportfwd(pf);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh, const Config *cfg)
+{
+ const char *portfwd_strptr = cfg->portfwd;
+ struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!ssh->portfwds) {
+ ssh->portfwds = newtree234(ssh_portcmp);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
+ * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
+ * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
+ * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
+ * they were before.
+ */
+ struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
+ epf->status = DESTROY;
+ }
+
+ while (*portfwd_strptr) {
+ char address_family, type;
+ int sport,dport,sserv,dserv;
+ char sports[256], dports[256], saddr[256], host[256];
+ int n;
+
+ address_family = 'A';
+ type = 'L';
+ if (*portfwd_strptr == 'A' ||
+ *portfwd_strptr == '4' ||
+ *portfwd_strptr == '6')
+ address_family = *portfwd_strptr++;
+ if (*portfwd_strptr == 'L' ||
+ *portfwd_strptr == 'R' ||
+ *portfwd_strptr == 'D')
+ type = *portfwd_strptr++;
+
+ saddr[0] = '\0';
+
+ n = 0;
+ while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != '\t') {
+ if (*portfwd_strptr == ':') {
+ /*
+ * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
+ * source port number. This means that
+ * everything we've seen until now is the
+ * source _address_, so we'll move it into
+ * saddr and start sports from the beginning
+ * again.
+ */
+ portfwd_strptr++;
+ sports[n] = '\0';
+ if (ssh->version == 1 && type == 'R') {
+ logeventf(ssh, "SSH-1 cannot handle remote source address "
+ "spec \"%s\"; ignoring", sports);
+ } else
+ strcpy(saddr, sports);
+ n = 0;
+ }
+ if (n < lenof(sports)-1) sports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
+ }
+ sports[n] = 0;
+ if (type != 'D') {
+ if (*portfwd_strptr == '\t')
+ portfwd_strptr++;
+ n = 0;
+ while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != ':') {
+ if (n < lenof(host)-1) host[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
+ }
+ host[n] = 0;
+ if (*portfwd_strptr == ':')
+ portfwd_strptr++;
+ n = 0;
+ while (*portfwd_strptr) {
+ if (n < lenof(dports)-1) dports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
+ }
+ dports[n] = 0;
+ portfwd_strptr++;
+ dport = atoi(dports);
+ dserv = 0;
+ if (dport == 0) {
+ dserv = 1;
+ dport = net_service_lookup(dports);
+ if (!dport) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for destination"
+ " port \"%s\"", dports);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ while (*portfwd_strptr) portfwd_strptr++;
+ host[0] = 0;
+ dports[0] = 0;
+ dport = dserv = -1;
+ portfwd_strptr++; /* eat the NUL and move to next one */
+ }
+ sport = atoi(sports);
+ sserv = 0;
+ if (sport == 0) {
+ sserv = 1;
+ sport = net_service_lookup(sports);
+ if (!sport) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for source"
+ " port \"%s\"", sports);
+ }
+ }
+ if (sport && dport) {
+ /* Set up a description of the source port. */
+ struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec, *epfrec;
+
+ pfrec = snew(struct ssh_portfwd);
+ pfrec->type = type;
+ pfrec->saddr = *saddr ? dupstr(saddr) : NULL;
+ pfrec->sserv = sserv ? dupstr(sports) : NULL;
+ pfrec->sport = sport;
+ pfrec->daddr = *host ? dupstr(host) : NULL;
+ pfrec->dserv = dserv ? dupstr(dports) : NULL;
+ pfrec->dport = dport;
+ pfrec->local = NULL;
+ pfrec->remote = NULL;
+ pfrec->addressfamily = (address_family == '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4 :
+ address_family == '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6 :
+ ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC);
+
+ epfrec = add234(ssh->portfwds, pfrec);
+ if (epfrec != pfrec) {
+ /*
+ * We already have a port forwarding with precisely
+ * these parameters. Hence, no need to do anything;
+ * simply tag the existing one as KEEP.
+ */
+ epfrec->status = KEEP;
+ free_portfwd(pfrec);
+ } else {
+ pfrec->status = CREATE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
+ * not re-enabled.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
+ if (epf->status == DESTROY) {
+ char *message;
+
+ message = dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
+ epf->type == 'L' ? "local" :
+ epf->type == 'R' ? "remote" : "dynamic",
+ epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
+ epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
+ epf->sport);
+
+ if (epf->type != 'D') {
+ char *msg2 = dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message,
+ epf->daddr, epf->dport);
+ sfree(message);
+ message = msg2;
+ }
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Cancelling %s", message);
+ sfree(message);
+
+ if (epf->remote) {
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf = epf->remote;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ /*
+ * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
+ * end.
+ */
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ /*
+ * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
+ * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
+ * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
+ * the rportfwd record from the local end
+ * so that any connections the server tries
+ * to make on it are rejected.
+ */
+ } else {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
+ if (epf->saddr) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
+ } else if (ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall) {
+ /* XXX: ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall may not represent
+ * what was used to open the original connection,
+ * since it's reconfigurable. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
+ } else {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+
+ del234(ssh->rportfwds, rpf);
+ free_rportfwd(rpf);
+ } else if (epf->local) {
+ pfd_terminate(epf->local);
+ }
+
+ delpos234(ssh->portfwds, i);
+ free_portfwd(epf);
+ i--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
+ */
+ for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
+ if (epf->status == CREATE) {
+ char *sportdesc, *dportdesc;
+ sportdesc = dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
+ epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
+ epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
+ epf->sserv ? epf->sserv : "",
+ epf->sserv ? "(" : "",
+ epf->sport,
+ epf->sserv ? ")" : "");
+ if (epf->type == 'D') {
+ dportdesc = NULL;
+ } else {
+ dportdesc = dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
+ epf->daddr,
+ epf->dserv ? epf->dserv : "",
+ epf->dserv ? "(" : "",
+ epf->dport,
+ epf->dserv ? ")" : "");
+ }
+
+ if (epf->type == 'L') {
+ const char *err = pfd_addforward(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
+ epf->saddr, epf->sport,
+ ssh, cfg,
+ &epf->local,
+ epf->addressfamily);
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
+ epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
+ epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
+ sportdesc, dportdesc,
+ err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
+ } else if (epf->type == 'D') {
+ const char *err = pfd_addforward(NULL, -1,
+ epf->saddr, epf->sport,
+ ssh, cfg,
+ &epf->local,
+ epf->addressfamily);
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
+ epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
+ epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
+ sportdesc,
+ err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
+ } else {
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
+ */
+ if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
+ if (ssh->version == 1)
+ ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1);
+ else
+ ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
+ }
+
+ pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
+ strncpy(pf->dhost, epf->daddr, lenof(pf->dhost)-1);
+ pf->dhost[lenof(pf->dhost)-1] = '\0';
+ pf->dport = epf->dport;
+ pf->sport = epf->sport;
+ if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
+ epf->daddr, epf->dport);
+ sfree(pf);
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Requesting remote port %s"
+ " forward to %s", sportdesc, dportdesc);
+
+ pf->sportdesc = sportdesc;
+ sportdesc = NULL;
+ epf->remote = pf;
+ pf->pfrec = epf;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST,
+ PKT_INT, epf->sport,
+ PKT_STR, epf->daddr,
+ PKT_INT, epf->dport,
+ PKT_END);
+ ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS,
+ SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE,
+ ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
+ } else {
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "tcpip-forward");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 1);/* want reply */
+ if (epf->saddr) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
+ } else if (cfg->rport_acceptall) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
+ } else {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+
+ ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS,
+ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
+ ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ sfree(sportdesc);
+ sfree(dportdesc);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *string;
+ int stringlen, bufsize;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &string, &stringlen);
+ if (string == NULL) {
+ bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ bufsize = from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA,
+ string, stringlen);
+ if (!ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
+ ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 1;
+ ssh1_throttle(ssh, +1);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
+ * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+
+ logevent("Received X11 connect request");
+ /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
+ if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
+ PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
+ logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
+ } else {
+ c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+ c->ssh = ssh;
+
+ if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->cfg.x11_display, c,
+ ssh->x11auth, NULL, -1, &ssh->cfg) != NULL) {
+ logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
+ sfree(c);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
+ PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ logevent
+ ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
+ c->remoteid = remoteid;
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
+ c->closes = 0;
+ c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
+ c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
+ c->localid, PKT_END);
+ logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
+ * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+
+ /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
+ if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
+ PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+ c->ssh = ssh;
+ c->remoteid = remoteid;
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
+ c->closes = 0;
+ c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
+ c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
+ c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT, c->localid,
+ PKT_END);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
+ * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *pfp;
+ int remoteid;
+ int hostsize, port;
+ char *host;
+ const char *e;
+ c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+ c->ssh = ssh;
+
+ remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &host, &hostsize);
+ port = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+
+ if (hostsize >= lenof(pf.dhost))
+ hostsize = lenof(pf.dhost)-1;
+ memcpy(pf.dhost, host, hostsize);
+ pf.dhost[hostsize] = '\0';
+ pf.dport = port;
+ pfp = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
+
+ if (pfp == NULL) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
+ pf.dhost, port);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
+ PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
+ pf.dhost, port);
+ e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s, pf.dhost, port,
+ c, &ssh->cfg, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
+ if (e != NULL) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
+ sfree(c);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
+ PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ c->remoteid = remoteid;
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
+ c->closes = 0;
+ c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
+ c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA; /* identify channel type */
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
+ c->localid, PKT_END);
+ logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ unsigned int localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
+ c->remoteid = localid;
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
+ c->v.v1.throttling = 0;
+ pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
+ }
+
+ if (c && c->closes) {
+ /*
+ * We have a pending close on this channel,
+ * which we decided on before the server acked
+ * the channel open. So now we know the
+ * remoteid, we can close it again.
+ */
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_END);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
+ logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ del234(ssh->channels, c);
+ sfree(c);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Remote side closes a channel. */
+ unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (c && !c->halfopen) {
+ int closetype;
+ closetype =
+ (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? 1 : 2);
+
+ if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_X11)) {
+ logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
+ assert(c->u.x11.s != NULL);
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
+ c->u.x11.s = NULL;
+ }
+ if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA)) {
+ logevent("Forwarded port closed");
+ assert(c->u.pfd.s != NULL);
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
+ }
+
+ c->closes |= (closetype << 2); /* seen this message */
+ if (!(c->closes & closetype)) {
+ send_packet(ssh, pktin->type, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
+ PKT_END);
+ c->closes |= closetype; /* sent it too */
+ }
+
+ if (c->closes == 15) {
+ del234(ssh->channels, c);
+ sfree(c);
+ }
+ } else {
+ bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
+ pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? "" :
+ "_CONFIRMATION", c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent",
+ i));
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
+ int i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ char *p;
+ int len;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &p, &len);
+
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (c) {
+ int bufsize = 0;
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, p, len);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, p, len);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_AGENT:
+ /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
+ while (len > 0) {
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
+ unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, len);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
+ l);
+ p += l;
+ len -= l;
+ c->u.a.lensofar += l;
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
+ c->u.a.totallen =
+ 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
+ c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
+ unsigned char);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && len > 0) {
+ unsigned int l =
+ min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
+ len);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
+ l);
+ p += l;
+ len -= l;
+ c->u.a.lensofar += l;
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
+ void *reply;
+ int replylen;
+ if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
+ c->u.a.totallen,
+ &reply, &replylen,
+ ssh_agentf_callback, c))
+ ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
+ sfree(c->u.a.message);
+ c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ bufsize = 0; /* agent channels never back up */
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!c->v.v1.throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
+ c->v.v1.throttling = 1;
+ ssh1_throttle(ssh, +1);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh->exitcode);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
+ /*
+ * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
+ * extra human-readable text on the end of the
+ * session which we might mistake for another
+ * encrypted packet, we close the session once
+ * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
+ */
+ ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
+ ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, NULL, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
+static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
+{
+ struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
+ int i = 0;
+ unsigned int arg = 0;
+ while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
+ if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
+ switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
+ case TTY_OP_CHAR:
+ arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
+ break;
+ case TTY_OP_BOOL:
+ arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
+ break;
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, arg);
+}
+
+
+static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate);
+
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA] =
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA] =
+ ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data;
+
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
+ ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
+ ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] =
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION] =
+ ssh1_msg_channel_close;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh1_msg_channel_data;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status;
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
+ logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING, PKT_END);
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ } while (!pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
+ && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
+ } else {
+ logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
+ ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.x11_forward) {
+ char proto[20], data[64];
+ logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
+ ssh->x11auth = x11_invent_auth(proto, sizeof(proto),
+ data, sizeof(data), ssh->cfg.x11_auth);
+ x11_get_real_auth(ssh->x11auth, ssh->cfg.x11_display);
+ if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
+ PKT_STR, proto, PKT_STR, data,
+ PKT_INT, x11_get_screen_number(ssh->cfg.x11_display),
+ PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
+ PKT_STR, proto, PKT_STR, data, PKT_END);
+ }
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ } while (!pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
+ && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
+ } else {
+ logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
+ ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN] = ssh1_msg_port_open;
+
+ if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
+ struct Packet *pkt;
+ /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
+ /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
+ ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
+ sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
+ /* Send the pty request. */
+ pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, ssh->cfg.termtype);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_height);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_width);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* width in pixels */
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* height in pixels */
+ parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
+ ssh1_send_ttymode, (void *)pkt);
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ispeed);
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ospeed);
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH_TTY_OP_END);
+ s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ } while (!pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
+ && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
+ ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
+ }
+ logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
+ ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
+ } else {
+ ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.compression) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION, PKT_INT, 6, PKT_END);
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ } while (!pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
+ && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
+ }
+ logevent("Started compression");
+ ssh->v1_compressing = TRUE;
+ ssh->cs_comp_ctx = zlib_compress_init();
+ logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
+ ssh->sc_comp_ctx = zlib_decompress_init();
+ logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Start the shell or command.
+ *
+ * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
+ * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
+ * exists, we fall straight back to that.
+ */
+ {
+ char *cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
+
+ if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2) {
+ cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
+ ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
+ }
+ if (*cmd)
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD, PKT_STR, cmd, PKT_END);
+ else
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL, PKT_END);
+ logevent("Started session");
+ }
+
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
+ if (ssh->size_needed)
+ ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
+ if (ssh->eof_needed)
+ ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
+
+ if (ssh->ldisc)
+ ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
+ while (1) {
+
+ /*
+ * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
+ * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
+ * attention to the unusual ones.
+ */
+
+ crReturnV;
+ if (pktin) {
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
+ * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
+ } else {
+ bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ } else {
+ while (inlen > 0) {
+ int len = min(inlen, 512);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA, PKTT_DATA,
+ PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, in, len,
+ PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ in += len;
+ inlen -= len;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ crFinishV;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
+ */
+static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *msg;
+ int msglen;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* log reason code in disconnect message */
+ char *msg;
+ int msglen;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
+ bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen, msg));
+}
+
+static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
+}
+
+static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * These special message types we install handlers for.
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh1_msg_disconnect;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh1_msg_debug;
+}
+
+static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned char *in=(unsigned char*)vin;
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
+ if (do_ssh1_login(ssh, in, inlen, pktin))
+ ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
+ else
+ return;
+ }
+
+ do_ssh1_connection(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
+ */
+static int in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
+{
+ int needlen;
+ if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
+ return 0;
+ needlen = strlen(needle);
+ while (1) {
+ /*
+ * Is it at the start of the string?
+ */
+ if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
+ !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
+ (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
+ /* either , or EOS follows */
+ )
+ return 1;
+ /*
+ * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
+ * If no comma found, terminate.
+ */
+ while (haylen > 0 && *haystack != ',')
+ haylen--, haystack++;
+ if (haylen == 0)
+ return 0;
+ haylen--, haystack++; /* skip over comma itself */
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
+ */
+static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
+{
+ int needlen;
+ if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
+ return 0;
+ needlen = strlen(needle);
+ /*
+ * Is it at the start of the string?
+ */
+ if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
+ !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
+ (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
+ /* either , or EOS follows */
+ )
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * SSH-2 key creation method.
+ */
+static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh, Bignum K, unsigned char *H,
+ unsigned char *sessid, char chr,
+ unsigned char *keyspace)
+{
+ SHA_State s;
+ /* First 20 bytes. */
+ SHA_Init(&s);
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
+ sha_mpint(&s, K);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, H, 20);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, &chr, 1);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, sessid, 20);
+ SHA_Final(&s, keyspace);
+ /* Next 20 bytes. */
+ SHA_Init(&s);
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
+ sha_mpint(&s, K);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, H, 20);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, keyspace, 20);
+ SHA_Final(&s, keyspace + 20);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
+ */
+static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
+ struct do_ssh2_transport_state {
+ int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher;
+ Bignum p, g, e, f, K;
+ int kex_init_value, kex_reply_value;
+ const struct ssh_mac **maclist;
+ int nmacs;
+ const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher_tobe;
+ const struct ssh2_cipher *sccipher_tobe;
+ const struct ssh_mac *csmac_tobe;
+ const struct ssh_mac *scmac_tobe;
+ const struct ssh_compress *cscomp_tobe;
+ const struct ssh_compress *sccomp_tobe;
+ char *hostkeydata, *sigdata, *keystr, *fingerprint;
+ int hostkeylen, siglen;
+ void *hkey; /* actual host key */
+ unsigned char exchange_hash[20];
+ int n_preferred_kex;
+ const struct ssh_kex *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX];
+ int n_preferred_ciphers;
+ const struct ssh2_ciphers *preferred_ciphers[CIPHER_MAX];
+ const struct ssh_compress *preferred_comp;
+ int got_session_id, activated_authconn;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ int dlgret;
+ int guessok;
+ int ignorepkt;
+ };
+ crState(do_ssh2_transport_state);
+
+ crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate);
+
+ s->cscipher_tobe = s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
+ s->csmac_tobe = s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
+ s->cscomp_tobe = s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
+
+ s->got_session_id = s->activated_authconn = FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
+ */
+ if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_HMAC)
+ s->maclist = buggymacs, s->nmacs = lenof(buggymacs);
+ else
+ s->maclist = macs, s->nmacs = lenof(macs);
+
+ begin_key_exchange:
+ ssh->pkt_ctx &= ~SSH2_PKTCTX_KEX_MASK;
+ {
+ int i, j, commalist_started;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
+ */
+ s->n_preferred_kex = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < KEX_MAX; i++) {
+ switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_kexlist[i]) {
+ case KEX_DHGEX:
+ s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
+ &ssh_diffiehellman_gex;
+ break;
+ case KEX_DHGROUP14:
+ s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
+ &ssh_diffiehellman_group14;
+ break;
+ case KEX_DHGROUP1:
+ s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
+ &ssh_diffiehellman_group1;
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_WARN:
+ /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
+ * the list. */
+ if (i < KEX_MAX - 1) {
+ s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
+ */
+ s->n_preferred_ciphers = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
+ switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i]) {
+ case CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_blowfish;
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_DES:
+ if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc) {
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_des;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_3DES:
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_3des;
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_AES:
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_aes;
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_ARCFOUR:
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_arcfour;
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_WARN:
+ /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
+ * the list. */
+ if (i < CIPHER_MAX - 1) {
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up preferred compression.
+ */
+ if (ssh->cfg.compression)
+ s->preferred_comp = &ssh_zlib;
+ else
+ s->preferred_comp = &ssh_comp_none;
+
+ /*
+ * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
+ * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
+ */
+ ssh->queueing = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Flag that KEX is in progress.
+ */
+ ssh->kex_in_progress = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) random_byte());
+ /* List key exchange algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ commalist_started = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
+ const struct ssh_kex *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
+ if (!k) continue; /* warning flag */
+ if (commalist_started)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_kex[i]->name);
+ commalist_started = 1;
+ }
+ /* List server host key algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
+ if (i < lenof(hostkey_algs) - 1)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ }
+ /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ commalist_started = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
+ const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
+ if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
+ for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
+ if (commalist_started)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
+ commalist_started = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ commalist_started = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
+ const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
+ if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
+ for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
+ if (commalist_started)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
+ commalist_started = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
+ if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ }
+ /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
+ if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ }
+ /* List client->server compression algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
+ const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
+ if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
+ }
+ }
+ /* List server->client compression algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
+ const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
+ if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
+ }
+ }
+ /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
+ /* Reserved. */
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
+ }
+
+ ssh->exhash = ssh->exhashbase;
+ sha_string(&ssh->exhash, s->pktout->data + 5, s->pktout->length - 5);
+
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ if (!pktin)
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->length > 5)
+ sha_string(&ssh->exhash, pktin->data + 5, pktin->length - 5);
+
+ /*
+ * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
+ * to.
+ */
+ {
+ char *str, *preferred;
+ int i, j, len;
+
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
+ bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ ssh->kex = NULL;
+ ssh->hostkey = NULL;
+ s->cscipher_tobe = NULL;
+ s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
+ s->csmac_tobe = NULL;
+ s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
+ s->cscomp_tobe = NULL;
+ s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
+ s->warn_kex = s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE;
+
+ pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* key exchange algorithms */
+
+ preferred = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
+ const struct ssh_kex *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
+ if (!k) {
+ s->warn_kex = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ if (!preferred) preferred = k->name;
+ if (in_commasep_string(k->name, str, len))
+ ssh->kex = k;
+ }
+ if (ssh->kex)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ssh->kex) {
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
+ str ? str : "(null)"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
+ * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
+ * we end up using.
+ */
+ s->guessok = first_in_commasep_string(preferred, str, len);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* host key algorithms */
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
+ if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[i]->name, str, len)) {
+ ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ s->guessok = s->guessok &&
+ first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[0]->name, str, len);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server cipher */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
+ const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
+ if (!c) {
+ s->warn_cscipher = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
+ if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
+ s->cscipher_tobe = c->list[j];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->cscipher_tobe)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!s->cscipher_tobe) {
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
+ str ? str : "(null)"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client cipher */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
+ const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
+ if (!c) {
+ s->warn_sccipher = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
+ if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
+ s->sccipher_tobe = c->list[j];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->sccipher_tobe)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!s->sccipher_tobe) {
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
+ str ? str : "(null)"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server mac */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
+ if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
+ s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client mac */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
+ if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
+ s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server compression */
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
+ const struct ssh_compress *c =
+ i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
+ if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
+ s->cscomp_tobe = c;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client compression */
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
+ const struct ssh_compress *c =
+ i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
+ if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
+ s->sccomp_tobe = c;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server language */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client language */
+ s->ignorepkt = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin) && !s->guessok;
+
+ if (s->warn_kex) {
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "key-exchange algorithm",
+ ssh->kex->name,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
+ " waiting for user response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
+ ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, NULL, 0, 0);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->warn_cscipher) {
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
+ "client-to-server cipher",
+ s->cscipher_tobe->name,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
+ " waiting for user response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
+ ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, NULL, 0, 0);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->warn_sccipher) {
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
+ "server-to-client cipher",
+ s->sccipher_tobe->name,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
+ " waiting for user response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
+ ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, NULL, 0, 0);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->ignorepkt) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
+ crWaitUntil(pktin); /* Ignore packet */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the key
+ * exchange. We start with the maximum key length of either
+ * cipher...
+ */
+ {
+ int csbits, scbits;
+
+ csbits = s->cscipher_tobe->keylen;
+ scbits = s->sccipher_tobe->keylen;
+ s->nbits = (csbits > scbits ? csbits : scbits);
+ }
+ /* The keys only have 160-bit entropy, since they're based on
+ * a SHA-1 hash. So cap the key size at 160 bits. */
+ if (s->nbits > 160)
+ s->nbits = 160;
+
+ /*
+ * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
+ * requesting a group.
+ */
+ if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
+ logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
+ ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX;
+ /*
+ * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
+ * much data.
+ */
+ s->pbits = 512 << ((s->nbits - 1) / 64);
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP) {
+ bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ s->p = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
+ s->g = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
+ if (!s->p || !s->g) {
+ bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_gex(s->p, s->g);
+ s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT;
+ s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY;
+ } else {
+ ssh->pkt_ctx |= SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP;
+ ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_group(ssh->kex);
+ s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT;
+ s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
+ ssh->kex->groupname);
+ }
+
+ logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange");
+ /*
+ * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
+ */
+ set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* this can take a while */
+ s->e = dh_create_e(ssh->kex_ctx, s->nbits * 2);
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(s->kex_init_value);
+ ssh2_pkt_addmp(s->pktout, s->e);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_WAITING); /* wait for server */
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != s->kex_reply_value) {
+ bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* cogitate */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
+ s->f = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
+ if (!s->f) {
+ bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
+
+ s->K = dh_find_K(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
+
+ /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
+ * involve user interaction. */
+ set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_NOT);
+
+ sha_string(&ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
+ if (ssh->kex == &ssh_diffiehellman_gex) {
+ sha_uint32(&ssh->exhash, s->pbits);
+ sha_mpint(&ssh->exhash, s->p);
+ sha_mpint(&ssh->exhash, s->g);
+ }
+ sha_mpint(&ssh->exhash, s->e);
+ sha_mpint(&ssh->exhash, s->f);
+ sha_mpint(&ssh->exhash, s->K);
+ SHA_Final(&ssh->exhash, s->exchange_hash);
+
+ dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
+ ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
+
+#if 0
+ debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
+ dmemdump(s->exchange_hash, 20);
+#endif
+
+ s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
+ if (!s->hkey ||
+ !ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
+ (char *)s->exchange_hash, 20)) {
+ bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
+ * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
+ */
+ s->keystr = ssh->hostkey->fmtkey(s->hkey);
+ s->fingerprint = ssh->hostkey->fingerprint(s->hkey);
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
+ ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
+ ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
+ s->fingerprint,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
+ " for user host key response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
+ ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, NULL, 0, 0);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ if (!s->got_session_id) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
+ logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
+ logevent(s->fingerprint);
+ }
+ sfree(s->fingerprint);
+ sfree(s->keystr);
+ ssh->hostkey->freekey(s->hkey);
+
+ /*
+ * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
+ * the session id, used in session key construction and
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ if (!s->got_session_id) {
+ memcpy(ssh->v2_session_id, s->exchange_hash,
+ sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
+ s->got_session_id = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
+ ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
+
+ /*
+ * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
+ * client-to-server session keys.
+ */
+ if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
+ ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
+ ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe;
+ ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
+
+ if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
+ ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
+ ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
+ ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context();
+
+ if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
+ ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
+ ssh->cscomp = s->cscomp_tobe;
+ ssh->cs_comp_ctx = ssh->cscomp->compress_init();
+
+ /*
+ * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
+ * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned char keyspace[40];
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'C',keyspace);
+ ssh->cscipher->setkey(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'A',keyspace);
+ ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'E',keyspace);
+ ssh->csmac->setkey(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, keyspace);
+ }
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
+ ssh->cscipher->text_name);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
+ ssh->csmac->text_name);
+ if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
+ ssh->cscomp->text_name);
+
+ /*
+ * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
+ * our queued higher-layer packets.
+ */
+ ssh->queueing = FALSE;
+ ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh);
+
+ /*
+ * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
+ */
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
+ bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ ssh->incoming_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
+
+ /*
+ * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
+ * server-to-client session keys.
+ */
+ if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
+ ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
+ ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
+ ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
+
+ if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
+ ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
+ ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
+ ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context();
+
+ if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
+ ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
+ ssh->sccomp = s->sccomp_tobe;
+ ssh->sc_comp_ctx = ssh->sccomp->decompress_init();
+
+ /*
+ * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
+ * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned char keyspace[40];
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'D',keyspace);
+ ssh->sccipher->setkey(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'B',keyspace);
+ ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'F',keyspace);
+ ssh->scmac->setkey(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, keyspace);
+ }
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
+ ssh->sccipher->text_name);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
+ ssh->scmac->text_name);
+ if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
+ ssh->sccomp->text_name);
+
+ /*
+ * Free key exchange data.
+ */
+ freebn(s->f);
+ freebn(s->K);
+ if (ssh->kex == &ssh_diffiehellman_gex) {
+ freebn(s->g);
+ freebn(s->p);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
+ * deferred rekey reason.
+ */
+ if (ssh->deferred_rekey_reason) {
+ logevent(ssh->deferred_rekey_reason);
+ pktin = NULL;
+ ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
+ goto begin_key_exchange;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
+ */
+ ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
+ ssh->last_rekey = GETTICKCOUNT();
+ if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0)
+ ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
+ ssh2_timer, ssh);
+
+ /*
+ * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
+ * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
+ * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
+ * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
+ * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
+ * it would only confuse the layer above.
+ */
+ if (s->activated_authconn) {
+ crReturn(1);
+ }
+ s->activated_authconn = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
+ * function so that other things can run on top of the
+ * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
+ * start.
+ *
+ * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
+ * inlen==-1, because this is a special signal meaning
+ * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
+ * giving the reason for the rekey.
+ */
+ while (!((pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) ||
+ (!pktin && inlen == -1))) {
+ wait_for_rekey:
+ crReturn(1);
+ }
+ if (pktin) {
+ logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
+ * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
+ * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
+ * we process it anyway!)
+ */
+ if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY)) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
+ (char *)in);
+ /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
+ * hit the event log _too_ often. */
+ ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0;
+ ssh->incoming_data_size = 0;
+ if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
+ ssh->next_rekey =
+ schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
+ ssh2_timer, ssh);
+ }
+ goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is utterly horrid */
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in);
+ }
+ }
+ goto begin_key_exchange;
+
+ crFinish(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
+ */
+static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf,
+ int len)
+{
+ bufchain_add(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, buf, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
+ */
+static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ while (c->v.v2.remwindow > 0 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0) {
+ int len;
+ void *data;
+ bufchain_prefix(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, &data, &len);
+ if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remwindow)
+ len = c->v.v2.remwindow;
+ if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remmaxpkt)
+ len = c->v.v2.remmaxpkt;
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ dont_log_data(ssh, pktout, PKTLOG_OMIT);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, data, len);
+ end_log_omission(ssh, pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ bufchain_consume(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, len);
+ c->v.v2.remwindow -= len;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
+ * still buffered.
+ */
+ return bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ int bufsize;
+ if (c->closes)
+ return; /* don't send on closing channels */
+ bufsize = ssh2_try_send(c);
+ if (bufsize == 0) {
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
+ /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
+ * notification since it will be polled */
+ break;
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.s);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_AGENT:
+ /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
+ * buffer management */
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.s);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
+ */
+static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, unsigned newwin)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+
+ /*
+ * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
+ * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
+ * be sending any more data anyway.
+ */
+ if (c->closes != 0)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
+ * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
+ * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
+ *
+ * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
+ */
+ if (newwin > c->v.v2.locwindow * 2) {
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ c->v.v2.locwindow = newwin;
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (c && !c->closes) {
+ c->v.v2.remwindow += ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *data;
+ int length;
+ unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (!c)
+ return; /* nonexistent channel */
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA &&
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)
+ return; /* extended but not stderr */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &length);
+ if (data) {
+ int bufsize = 0;
+ c->v.v2.locwindow -= length;
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
+ bufsize =
+ from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type ==
+ SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA,
+ data, length);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, data, length);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, data, length);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_AGENT:
+ while (length > 0) {
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
+ unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, length);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar,
+ data, l);
+ data += l;
+ length -= l;
+ c->u.a.lensofar += l;
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
+ c->u.a.totallen =
+ 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
+ c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
+ unsigned char);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && length > 0) {
+ unsigned int l =
+ min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
+ length);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar,
+ data, l);
+ data += l;
+ length -= l;
+ c->u.a.lensofar += l;
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
+ void *reply;
+ int replylen;
+ if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
+ c->u.a.totallen,
+ &reply, &replylen,
+ ssh_agentf_callback, c))
+ ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
+ sfree(c->u.a.message);
+ c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ bufsize = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we are not buffering too much data,
+ * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
+ */
+ if (bufsize < OUR_V2_WINSIZE)
+ ssh2_set_window(c, OUR_V2_WINSIZE - bufsize);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (!c)
+ return; /* nonexistent channel */
+
+ if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
+ /*
+ * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
+ * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
+ */
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
+ sshfwd_close(c);
+ } else if (c->type == CHAN_AGENT) {
+ sshfwd_close(c);
+ } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA) {
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ sshfwd_close(c);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (!c || c->halfopen) {
+ bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE for %s channel %d\n",
+ c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent", i));
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
+ ssh->mainchan = NULL;
+ update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
+ sshfwd_close(c);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_AGENT:
+ sshfwd_close(c);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ sshfwd_close(c);
+ break;