Mention the negotiated SSH-2 MAC algorithm(s) in the Event Log.

[PuTTY.git] / ssh.c

diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index dfcb8a46e84fb735edea61595aeb72d23d084d8c..5b5a6be7973575bb6e4c819929e33af014e9b7c2 100644 (file)
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -1828,7 +1828,7 @@ static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
         (!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
          !strcmp(imp, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.21") ||
          !strcmp(imp, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") ||
-         !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
+         !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
        /*
         * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
         * to use a different defence against password length
@@ -4502,6 +4502,10 @@ static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen, int ispkt)
              ssh->cscipher->text_name);
     logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
              ssh->sccipher->text_name);
+    logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
+             ssh->csmac->text_name);
+    logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
+             ssh->scmac->text_name);
     if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
        logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
                  ssh->cscomp->text_name);
@@ -6085,7 +6089,18 @@ static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen, int ispkt)
                    ssh2_pkt_send(ssh);
                }
            } else if (ssh->pktin.type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE) {
+                static const char *const reasons[] = {
+                    "<unknown reason code>",
+                    "Administratively prohibited",
+                    "Connect failed",
+                    "Unknown channel type",
+                    "Resource shortage",
+                };
                unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(ssh);
+                unsigned reason_code;
+                char *reason_string;
+                int reason_length;
+                char *message;
                struct ssh_channel *c;
                c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
                if (!c)
@@ -6093,7 +6108,15 @@ static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen, int ispkt)
                if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
                    continue;          /* dunno why they're failing this */
 
-               logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
+                reason_code = ssh_pkt_getuint32(ssh);
+                if (reason_code >= lenof(reasons))
+                    reason_code = 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
+                ssh_pkt_getstring(ssh, &reason_string, &reason_length);
+                message = dupprintf("Forwarded connection refused by"
+                                    " server: %s [%.*s]", reasons[reason_code],
+                                    reason_length, reason_string);
+               logevent(message);
+                sfree(message);
 
                pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);