#define TRUE 1
#endif
-#define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
-#define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
-#define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
-#define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
-#define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
-#define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
-#define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
-#define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
-#define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
-
-#define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS 1 /* 0x1 */
-#define SSH1_AUTH_RSA 2 /* 0x2 */
-#define SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD 3 /* 0x3 */
-#define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4 /* 0x4 */
-#define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
-#define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
-
-#define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
-/* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
-#define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
-
-#define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY 30 /* 0x1e */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET 31 /* 0x1f */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE 32 /* 0x20 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
-#define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE 60
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN 61
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE 63
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR 64
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK 65
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC 66
-
/*
* Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
* the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX,
SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP,
SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX,
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_ECDHKEX,
SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX
} Pkt_KCtx;
typedef enum {
SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
} Pkt_ACtx;
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
-
static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons[] = {
NULL,
"host not allowed to connect",
"illegal user name",
};
-#define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
-#define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
-#define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
-#define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
-
-#define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
-
/*
* Various remote-bug flags.
*/
#define BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT 256
#define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE 512
#define BUG_CHOKES_ON_WINADJ 1024
+#define BUG_SENDS_LATE_REQUEST_REPLY 2048
+#define BUG_SSH2_OLDGEX 4096
+
+#define DH_MIN_SIZE 1024
+#define DH_MAX_SIZE 8192
/*
* Codes for terminal modes.
#define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
#define translatek(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_kctx == ctx)) return #x
#define translatea(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_actx == ctx)) return #x
-static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type)
+static const char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type)
{
translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT);
translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE);
return "unknown";
}
-static char *ssh2_pkt_type(Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx, Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx, int type)
+static const char *ssh2_pkt_type(Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx, Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx,
+ int type)
{
translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_ECDHKEX);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_ECDHKEX);
translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
/* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
enum {
PKT_END, PKT_INT, PKT_CHAR, PKT_DATA, PKT_STR, PKT_BIGNUM,
- /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
- * fields to the packet logging code. */
- PKTT_OTHER, PKTT_PASSWORD, PKTT_DATA
};
/*
#define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
#define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
-typedef struct ssh_tag *Ssh;
struct Packet;
static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh, struct Packet *);
static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh, struct Packet *);
static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *);
-static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
struct Packet *pktin);
-static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
struct Packet *pktin);
static void ssh2_channel_check_close(struct ssh_channel *c);
static void ssh_channel_destroy(struct ssh_channel *c);
#define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
#define OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT 0x9000UL
-const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = { &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss };
+const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = {
+ &ssh_ecdsa_ed25519,
+ &ssh_ecdsa_nistp256, &ssh_ecdsa_nistp384, &ssh_ecdsa_nistp521,
+ &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss
+};
const static struct ssh_mac *macs[] = {
&ssh_hmac_sha256, &ssh_hmac_sha1, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96, &ssh_hmac_md5
CHAN_AGENT,
CHAN_SOCKDATA,
CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT, /* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
+ /*
+ * CHAN_SHARING indicates a channel which is tracked here on
+ * behalf of a connection-sharing downstream. We do almost nothing
+ * with these channels ourselves: all messages relating to them
+ * get thrown straight to sshshare.c and passed on almost
+ * unmodified to downstream.
+ */
+ CHAN_SHARING,
/*
* CHAN_ZOMBIE is used to indicate a channel for which we've
* already destroyed the local data source: for instance, if a
int outstanding_requests;
} a;
struct ssh_x11_channel {
- Socket s;
+ struct X11Connection *xconn;
+ int initial;
} x11;
struct ssh_pfd_channel {
- Socket s;
+ struct PortForwarding *pf;
} pfd;
+ struct ssh_sharing_channel {
+ void *ctx;
+ } sharing;
} u;
};
struct ssh_rportfwd {
unsigned sport, dport;
- char dhost[256];
+ char *shost, *dhost;
char *sportdesc;
+ void *share_ctx;
struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec;
};
-#define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
- ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
+
+static void free_rportfwd(struct ssh_rportfwd *pf)
+{
+ if (pf) {
+ sfree(pf->sportdesc);
+ sfree(pf->shost);
+ sfree(pf->dhost);
+ sfree(pf);
+ }
+}
/*
* Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
char *sserv, *dserv;
struct ssh_rportfwd *remote;
int addressfamily;
- void *local;
+ struct PortListener *local;
};
#define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
struct Packet {
- long length; /* length of `data' actually used */
+ long length; /* length of packet: see below */
long forcepad; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
int type; /* only used for incoming packets */
unsigned long sequence; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
unsigned char *data; /* allocated storage */
unsigned char *body; /* offset of payload within `data' */
- long savedpos; /* temporary index into `data' (for strings) */
+ long savedpos; /* dual-purpose saved packet position: see below */
long maxlen; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
long encrypted_len; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
/*
- * State associated with packet logging
+ * A note on the 'length' and 'savedpos' fields above.
+ *
+ * Incoming packets are set up so that pkt->length is measured
+ * relative to pkt->body, which itself points to a few bytes after
+ * pkt->data (skipping some uninteresting header fields including
+ * the packet type code). The ssh_pkt_get* functions all expect
+ * this setup, and they also use pkt->savedpos to indicate how far
+ * through the packet being decoded they've got - and that, too,
+ * is an offset from pkt->body rather than pkt->data.
+ *
+ * During construction of an outgoing packet, however, pkt->length
+ * is measured relative to the base pointer pkt->data, and
+ * pkt->body is not really used for anything until the packet is
+ * ready for sending. In this mode, pkt->savedpos is reused as a
+ * temporary variable by the addstring functions, which write out
+ * a string length field and then keep going back and updating it
+ * as more data is appended to the subsequent string data field;
+ * pkt->savedpos stores the offset (again relative to pkt->data)
+ * of the start of the string data field.
*/
- int logmode;
- int nblanks;
- struct logblank_t *blanks;
+
+ /* Extra metadata used in SSH packet logging mode, allowing us to
+ * log in the packet header line that the packet came from a
+ * connection-sharing downstream and what if anything unusual was
+ * done to it. The additional_log_text field is expected to be a
+ * static string - it will not be freed. */
+ unsigned downstream_id;
+ const char *additional_log_text;
};
-static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen,
struct Packet *pktin);
-static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen,
struct Packet *pktin);
+static void ssh2_bare_connection_protocol(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin);
static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
+static void ssh2_bare_connection_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special);
static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c);
-static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len);
+static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c,
+ const char *buf, int len);
static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize);
static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin);
static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle);
static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt);
static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length);
static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, unsigned long now);
-static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen,
struct Packet *pktin);
static void ssh2_msg_unexpected(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
struct Packet *pktin;
};
+struct rdpkt2_bare_state_tag {
+ char length[4];
+ long packetlen;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long incoming_sequence;
+ struct Packet *pktin;
+};
+
struct queued_handler;
struct queued_handler {
int msg1, msg2;
const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher, *sccipher;
void *cs_cipher_ctx, *sc_cipher_ctx;
const struct ssh_mac *csmac, *scmac;
+ int csmac_etm, scmac_etm;
void *cs_mac_ctx, *sc_mac_ctx;
const struct ssh_compress *cscomp, *sccomp;
void *cs_comp_ctx, *sc_comp_ctx;
int v2_session_id_len;
void *kex_ctx;
+ int bare_connection;
+ int attempting_connshare;
+ void *connshare;
+
char *savedhost;
int savedport;
int send_ok;
Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx;
struct X11Display *x11disp;
+ struct X11FakeAuth *x11auth;
+ tree234 *x11authtree;
int version;
int conn_throttle_count;
int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate;
int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate;
+ int ssh2_bare_rdpkt_crstate;
int ssh_gotdata_crstate;
int do_ssh1_connection_crstate;
void *do_ssh1_login_state;
void *do_ssh2_transport_state;
void *do_ssh2_authconn_state;
+ void *do_ssh_connection_init_state;
struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state;
struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state;
+ struct rdpkt2_bare_state_tag rdpkt2_bare_state;
/* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
int protocol_initial_phase_done;
- void (*protocol) (Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ void (*protocol) (Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen,
struct Packet *pkt);
- struct Packet *(*s_rdpkt) (Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen);
+ struct Packet *(*s_rdpkt) (Ssh ssh, const unsigned char **data,
+ int *datalen);
+ int (*do_ssh_init)(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c);
/*
* We maintain our own copy of a Conf structure here. That way,
unsigned long max_data_size;
int kex_in_progress;
unsigned long next_rekey, last_rekey;
- char *deferred_rekey_reason; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
+ const char *deferred_rekey_reason;
/*
* Fully qualified host name, which we need if doing GSSAPI.
#define bombout(msg) bomb_out(ssh, dupprintf msg)
-/* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
-
-static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
-{
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitpass))
- pkt->logmode = blanktype;
-}
-
-static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
-{
- if (ssh->logomitdata)
- pkt->logmode = blanktype;
-}
-
-static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
-{
- pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
-}
-
/* Helper function for common bits of parsing ttymodes. */
static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh,
void (*do_mode)(void *data, char *mode, char *val),
{
struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
-
+ int i;
+ if ( (i = strcmp(a->shost, b->shost)) != 0)
+ return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
if (a->sport > b->sport)
return +1;
if (a->sport < b->sport)
pkt->body = pkt->data = NULL;
pkt->maxlen = 0;
- pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
- pkt->nblanks = 0;
- pkt->blanks = NULL;
return pkt;
}
+static void ssh1_log_incoming_packet(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int nblanks = 0;
+ struct logblank_t blanks[4];
+ char *str;
+ int slen;
+
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+
+ if (ssh->logomitdata &&
+ (pkt->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA ||
+ pkt->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA ||
+ pkt->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) {
+ /* "Session data" packets - omit the data string. */
+ if (pkt->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt); /* skip channel id */
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos + 4;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str) {
+ blanks[nblanks].len = slen;
+ nblanks++;
+ }
+ }
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, pkt->type,
+ ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->type),
+ pkt->body, pkt->length, nblanks, blanks, NULL,
+ 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static void ssh1_log_outgoing_packet(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int nblanks = 0;
+ struct logblank_t blanks[4];
+ char *str;
+ int slen;
+
+ /*
+ * For outgoing packets, pkt->length represents the length of the
+ * whole packet starting at pkt->data (including some header), and
+ * pkt->body refers to the point within that where the log-worthy
+ * payload begins. However, incoming packets expect pkt->length to
+ * represent only the payload length (that is, it's measured from
+ * pkt->body not from pkt->data). Temporarily adjust our outgoing
+ * packet to conform to the incoming-packet semantics, so that we
+ * can analyse it with the ssh_pkt_get functions.
+ */
+ pkt->length -= (pkt->body - pkt->data);
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+
+ if (ssh->logomitdata &&
+ (pkt->type == SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA ||
+ pkt->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) {
+ /* "Session data" packets - omit the data string. */
+ if (pkt->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt); /* skip channel id */
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos + 4;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str) {
+ blanks[nblanks].len = slen;
+ nblanks++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((pkt->type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD ||
+ pkt->type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE ||
+ pkt->type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE) &&
+ conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitpass)) {
+ /* If this is a password or similar packet, blank the password(s). */
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = 0;
+ blanks[nblanks].len = pkt->length;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_BLANK;
+ nblanks++;
+ } else if (pkt->type == SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING &&
+ conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitpass)) {
+ /*
+ * If this is an X forwarding request packet, blank the fake
+ * auth data.
+ *
+ * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we
+ * don't take any special action to blank the start of an X11
+ * channel, so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening
+ * an X connection without having session blanking enabled is
+ * likely to leak your cookie into the log.
+ */
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_BLANK;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str) {
+ blanks[nblanks].len = pkt->savedpos - blanks[nblanks].offset;
+ nblanks++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[12],
+ ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->data[12]),
+ pkt->body, pkt->length,
+ nblanks, blanks, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * Undo the above adjustment of pkt->length, to put the packet
+ * back in the state we found it.
+ */
+ pkt->length += (pkt->body - pkt->data);
+}
+
/*
* Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
* Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
* Update the *data and *datalen variables.
* Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
*/
-static struct Packet *ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
+static struct Packet *ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, const unsigned char **data,
+ int *datalen)
{
struct rdpkt1_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt1_state;
}
st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
- st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
unsigned char *decompblk;
st->pktin->type = st->pktin->body[-1];
/*
- * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
+ * Now pktin->body and pktin->length identify the semantic content
+ * of the packet, excluding the initial type byte.
*/
- if (ssh->logctx) {
- int nblanks = 0;
- struct logblank_t blank;
- if (ssh->logomitdata) {
- int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
- /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
- if ((st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA) ||
- (st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA)) {
- do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
- } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
- do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
- }
- if (do_blank) {
- blank.offset = blank_prefix;
- blank.len = st->pktin->length;
- blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
- nblanks = 1;
- }
- }
- log_packet(ssh->logctx,
- PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
- ssh1_pkt_type(st->pktin->type),
- st->pktin->body, st->pktin->length,
- nblanks, &blank, NULL);
- }
+
+ if (ssh->logctx)
+ ssh1_log_incoming_packet(ssh, st->pktin);
+
+ st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
crFinish(st->pktin);
}
-static struct Packet *ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
+static void ssh2_log_incoming_packet(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int nblanks = 0;
+ struct logblank_t blanks[4];
+ char *str;
+ int slen;
+
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+
+ if (ssh->logomitdata &&
+ (pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA ||
+ pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)) {
+ /* "Session data" packets - omit the data string. */
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt); /* skip channel id */
+ if (pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt); /* skip extended data type */
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos + 4;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str) {
+ blanks[nblanks].len = slen;
+ nblanks++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, pkt->type,
+ ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx, pkt->type),
+ pkt->body, pkt->length, nblanks, blanks, &pkt->sequence,
+ 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_log_outgoing_packet(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int nblanks = 0;
+ struct logblank_t blanks[4];
+ char *str;
+ int slen;
+
+ /*
+ * For outgoing packets, pkt->length represents the length of the
+ * whole packet starting at pkt->data (including some header), and
+ * pkt->body refers to the point within that where the log-worthy
+ * payload begins. However, incoming packets expect pkt->length to
+ * represent only the payload length (that is, it's measured from
+ * pkt->body not from pkt->data). Temporarily adjust our outgoing
+ * packet to conform to the incoming-packet semantics, so that we
+ * can analyse it with the ssh_pkt_get functions.
+ */
+ pkt->length -= (pkt->body - pkt->data);
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+
+ if (ssh->logomitdata &&
+ (pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA ||
+ pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)) {
+ /* "Session data" packets - omit the data string. */
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt); /* skip channel id */
+ if (pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt); /* skip extended data type */
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos + 4;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str) {
+ blanks[nblanks].len = slen;
+ nblanks++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST &&
+ conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitpass)) {
+ /* If this is a password packet, blank the password(s). */
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (slen == 8 && !memcmp(str, "password", 8)) {
+ ssh2_pkt_getbool(pkt);
+ /* Blank the password field. */
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_BLANK;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str) {
+ blanks[nblanks].len = pkt->savedpos - blanks[nblanks].offset;
+ nblanks++;
+ /* If there's another password field beyond it (change of
+ * password), blank that too. */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str)
+ blanks[nblanks-1].len =
+ pkt->savedpos - blanks[nblanks].offset;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (ssh->pkt_actx == SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER &&
+ pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE &&
+ conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitpass)) {
+ /* If this is a keyboard-interactive response packet, blank
+ * the responses. */
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt);
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_BLANK;
+ while (1) {
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (!str)
+ break;
+ }
+ blanks[nblanks].len = pkt->savedpos - blanks[nblanks].offset;
+ nblanks++;
+ } else if (pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST &&
+ conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitpass)) {
+ /*
+ * If this is an X forwarding request packet, blank the fake
+ * auth data.
+ *
+ * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we
+ * don't take any special action to blank the start of an X11
+ * channel, so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening
+ * an X connection without having session blanking enabled is
+ * likely to leak your cookie into the log.
+ */
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (slen == 7 && !memcmp(str, "x11-req", 0)) {
+ ssh2_pkt_getbool(pkt);
+ ssh2_pkt_getbool(pkt);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_BLANK;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str) {
+ blanks[nblanks].len = pkt->savedpos - blanks[nblanks].offset;
+ nblanks++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[5],
+ ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx, pkt->data[5]),
+ pkt->body, pkt->length, nblanks, blanks,
+ &ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence,
+ pkt->downstream_id, pkt->additional_log_text);
+
+ /*
+ * Undo the above adjustment of pkt->length, to put the packet
+ * back in the state we found it.
+ */
+ pkt->length += (pkt->body - pkt->data);
+}
+
+static struct Packet *ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, const unsigned char **data,
+ int *datalen)
{
struct rdpkt2_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_state;
st->maclen = ssh->scmac ? ssh->scmac->len : 0;
if (ssh->sccipher && (ssh->sccipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
- ssh->scmac) {
+ ssh->scmac && !ssh->scmac_etm) {
/*
* When dealing with a CBC-mode cipher, we want to avoid the
* possibility of an attacker's tweaking the ciphertext stream
* length, so we just read data and check the MAC repeatedly,
* and when the MAC passes, see if the length we've got is
* plausible.
+ *
+ * This defence is unnecessary in OpenSSH ETM mode, because
+ * the whole point of ETM mode is that the attacker can't
+ * tweak the ciphertext stream at all without the MAC
+ * detecting it before we decrypt anything.
*/
/* May as well allocate the whole lot now. */
st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
unsigned char);
+ } else if (ssh->scmac && ssh->scmac_etm) {
+ st->pktin->data = snewn(4 + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
+
+ /*
+ * OpenSSH encrypt-then-MAC mode: the packet length is
+ * unencrypted.
+ */
+ for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
+ (*datalen)--;
+ }
+ st->len = toint(GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data));
+
+ /*
+ * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
+ * do us any more damage.
+ */
+ if (st->len < 0 || st->len > OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT ||
+ st->len % st->cipherblk != 0) {
+ bombout(("Incoming packet length field was garbled"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * So now we can work out the total packet length.
+ */
+ st->packetlen = st->len + 4;
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
+ */
+ st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
+ st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
+ st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
+ unsigned char);
+
+ /*
+ * Read the remainder of the packet.
+ */
+ for (st->i = 4; st->i < st->packetlen + st->maclen; st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
+ (*datalen)--;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check the MAC.
+ */
+ if (ssh->scmac
+ && !ssh->scmac->verify(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, st->pktin->data,
+ st->len + 4, st->incoming_sequence)) {
+ bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+
+ /* Decrypt everything between the length field and the MAC. */
+ if (ssh->sccipher)
+ ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
+ st->pktin->data + 4,
+ st->packetlen - 4);
} else {
st->pktin->data = snewn(st->cipherblk + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
+ st->pktin->length = st->packetlen - st->pad;
+ assert(st->pktin->length >= 0);
+
/*
* Decompress packet payload.
*/
}
}
- st->pktin->savedpos = 6;
- st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data;
+ /*
+ * pktin->body and pktin->length should identify the semantic
+ * content of the packet, excluding the initial type byte.
+ */
st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[5];
+ st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + 6;
+ st->pktin->length -= 6;
+ assert(st->pktin->length >= 0); /* one last double-check */
+
+ if (ssh->logctx)
+ ssh2_log_incoming_packet(ssh, st->pktin);
+
+ st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
+
+ crFinish(st->pktin);
+}
+
+static struct Packet *ssh2_bare_connection_rdpkt(Ssh ssh,
+ const unsigned char **data,
+ int *datalen)
+{
+ struct rdpkt2_bare_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_bare_state;
+
+ crBegin(ssh->ssh2_bare_rdpkt_crstate);
/*
- * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
+ * Read the packet length field.
*/
- if (ssh->logctx) {
- int nblanks = 0;
- struct logblank_t blank;
- if (ssh->logomitdata) {
- int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
- /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
- if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
- do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
- } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) {
- do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 12;
- }
- if (do_blank) {
- blank.offset = blank_prefix;
- blank.len = (st->pktin->length-6) - blank_prefix;
- blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
- nblanks = 1;
- }
- }
- log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
- ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
- st->pktin->type),
- st->pktin->data+6, st->pktin->length-6,
- nblanks, &blank, &st->pktin->sequence);
+ for (st->i = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->length[st->i] = *(*data)++;
+ (*datalen)--;
+ }
+
+ st->packetlen = toint(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(st->length));
+ if (st->packetlen <= 0 || st->packetlen >= OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT) {
+ bombout(("Invalid packet length received"));
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+
+ st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
+ st->pktin->data = snewn(st->packetlen, unsigned char);
+
+ st->pktin->encrypted_len = st->packetlen;
+
+ st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
+
+ /*
+ * Read the remainder of the packet.
+ */
+ for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->packetlen; st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
+ (*datalen)--;
}
+ /*
+ * pktin->body and pktin->length should identify the semantic
+ * content of the packet, excluding the initial type byte.
+ */
+ st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[0];
+ st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + 1;
+ st->pktin->length = st->packetlen - 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
+ */
+ if (ssh->logctx)
+ ssh2_log_incoming_packet(ssh, st->pktin);
+
+ st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
+
crFinish(st->pktin);
}
int len;
if (ssh->logctx)
- log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[12],
- ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->data[12]),
- pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
- pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, NULL);
- sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
- pkt->nblanks = 0;
+ ssh1_log_outgoing_packet(ssh, pkt);
if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
unsigned char *compblk;
{
if (ssh->logctx)
log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, -1, NULL, data, len,
- 0, NULL, NULL);
+ 0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ if (!ssh->s)
+ return 0;
return sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)data, len);
}
bn = va_arg(ap, Bignum);
ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt, bn);
break;
- /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
- case PKTT_PASSWORD:
- dont_log_password(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_BLANK);
- break;
- case PKTT_DATA:
- dont_log_data(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_OMIT);
- break;
- case PKTT_OTHER:
- end_log_omission(ssh, pkt);
- break;
}
}
s_wrpkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
}
-static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a, char *b)
+static int ssh_versioncmp(const char *a, const char *b)
{
char *ae, *be;
unsigned long av, bv;
}
static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *pkt, const void *data, int len)
{
- if (pkt->logmode != PKTLOG_EMIT) {
- pkt->nblanks++;
- pkt->blanks = sresize(pkt->blanks, pkt->nblanks, struct logblank_t);
- assert(pkt->body);
- pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].offset = pkt->length -
- (pkt->body - pkt->data);
- pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].len = len;
- pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].type = pkt->logmode;
- }
pkt->length += len;
ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length);
memcpy(pkt->data + pkt->length - len, data, len);
ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0);
pkt->savedpos = pkt->length;
}
-static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *pkt, const char *data)
-{
- ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, strlen(data));
- PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
-}
static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *pkt, const char *data,
int len)
{
ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
}
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *pkt, const char *data)
+{
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, strlen(data));
+}
static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *pkt, const char *data)
{
ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
pkt->length = 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, pkt_type);
pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
+ pkt->type = pkt_type;
+ pkt->downstream_id = 0;
+ pkt->additional_log_text = NULL;
return pkt;
}
struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
pkt->length = 5; /* space for packet length + padding length */
pkt->forcepad = 0;
+ pkt->type = pkt_type;
ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, (unsigned char) pkt_type);
pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length; /* after packet type */
+ pkt->downstream_id = 0;
+ pkt->additional_log_text = NULL;
return pkt;
}
*/
static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
{
- int cipherblk, maclen, padding, i;
+ int cipherblk, maclen, padding, unencrypted_prefix, i;
if (ssh->logctx)
- log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[5],
- ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx, pkt->data[5]),
- pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
- pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, &ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
- sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
- pkt->nblanks = 0;
+ ssh2_log_outgoing_packet(ssh, pkt);
+
+ if (ssh->bare_connection) {
+ /*
+ * Trivial packet construction for the bare connection
+ * protocol.
+ */
+ PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + 1, pkt->length - 5);
+ pkt->body = pkt->data + 1;
+ ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* only for diagnostics, really */
+ return pkt->length - 1;
+ }
/*
* Compress packet payload.
cipherblk = ssh->cscipher ? ssh->cscipher->blksize : 8; /* block size */
cipherblk = cipherblk < 8 ? 8 : cipherblk; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
padding = 4;
+ unencrypted_prefix = (ssh->csmac && ssh->csmac_etm) ? 4 : 0;
if (pkt->length + padding < pkt->forcepad)
padding = pkt->forcepad - pkt->length;
padding +=
- (cipherblk - (pkt->length + padding) % cipherblk) % cipherblk;
+ (cipherblk - (pkt->length - unencrypted_prefix + padding) % cipherblk)
+ % cipherblk;
assert(padding <= 255);
maclen = ssh->csmac ? ssh->csmac->len : 0;
ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + padding + maclen);
for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
pkt->data[pkt->length + i] = random_byte();
PUT_32BIT(pkt->data, pkt->length + padding - 4);
- if (ssh->csmac)
- ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
- pkt->length + padding,
- ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
- ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
-
- if (ssh->cscipher)
- ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
- pkt->data, pkt->length + padding);
+ if (ssh->csmac && ssh->csmac_etm) {
+ /*
+ * OpenSSH-defined encrypt-then-MAC protocol.
+ */
+ if (ssh->cscipher)
+ ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
+ pkt->data + 4, pkt->length + padding - 4);
+ ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
+ pkt->length + padding,
+ ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * SSH-2 standard protocol.
+ */
+ if (ssh->csmac)
+ ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
+ pkt->length + padding,
+ ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
+ if (ssh->cscipher)
+ ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
+ pkt->data, pkt->length + padding);
+ }
+ ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
pkt->encrypted_len = pkt->length + padding;
/* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
+ pkt->body = pkt->data;
return pkt->length + padding + maclen;
}
return;
}
len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
- backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data, len);
+ backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->body, len);
if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
ssh->outgoing_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
+ !ssh->bare_connection &&
ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
ssh->deferred_size,
unsigned char);
}
- memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->data, len);
+ memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->body, len);
ssh->deferred_len += len;
ssh->deferred_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
ssh_free_packet(pkt);
ssh->outgoing_data_size += ssh->deferred_data_size;
if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
+ !ssh->bare_connection &&
ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
return pkt->body + (pkt->savedpos - length);
}
static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet *pkt, struct RSAKey *key,
- unsigned char **keystr)
+ const unsigned char **keystr)
{
int j;
if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsapad2) == FORCE_ON ||
(conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsapad2) == AUTO &&
(wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp) ||
- wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp)))) {
+ wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("mod_sftp/0.[0-8]*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("mod_sftp/0.9.[0-8]", imp)))) {
/*
* These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
*/
logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 ignore bug");
}
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_oldgex2) == FORCE_ON ||
+ (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_oldgex2) == AUTO &&
+ (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[235]*", imp)))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions only support the original (pre-RFC4419)
+ * SSH-2 GEX request, and disconnect with a protocol error if
+ * we use the newer version.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_OLDGEX;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has outdated SSH-2 GEX");
+ }
+
if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_winadj) == FORCE_ON) {
/*
* Servers that don't support our winadj request for one
ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_WINADJ;
logevent("We believe remote version has winadj bug");
}
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_chanreq) == FORCE_ON ||
+ (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_chanreq) == AUTO &&
+ (wc_match("OpenSSH_[2-5].*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("OpenSSH_6.[0-6]*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("dropbear_0.[2-4][0-9]*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("dropbear_0.5[01]*", imp)))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions have the SSH-2 channel request bug.
+ * OpenSSH 6.7 and above do not:
+ * https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1818
+ * dropbear_0.52 and above do not:
+ * https://secure.ucc.asn.au/hg/dropbear/rev/cd02449b709c
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SENDS_LATE_REQUEST_REPLY;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 channel request bug");
+ }
}
/*
*/
static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str)
{
- /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
- assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
- assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
- assert(*str == 'H'); str++;
- assert(*str == '-'); str++;
+ /* Eat "<protoversion>-". */
while (*str && *str != '-') str++;
assert(*str == '-'); str++;
/*
* Send an appropriate SSH version string.
*/
-static void ssh_send_verstring(Ssh ssh, char *svers)
+static void ssh_send_verstring(Ssh ssh, const char *protoname, char *svers)
{
char *verstring;
/*
* Construct a v2 version string.
*/
- verstring = dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver);
+ verstring = dupprintf("%s2.0-%s\015\012", protoname, sshver);
} else {
/*
* Construct a v1 version string.
*/
+ assert(!strcmp(protoname, "SSH-")); /* no v1 bare connection protocol */
verstring = dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
(ssh_versioncmp(svers, "1.5") <= 0 ?
svers : "1.5"),
sshver);
}
- ssh_fix_verstring(verstring);
+ ssh_fix_verstring(verstring + strlen(protoname));
if (ssh->version == 2) {
size_t len;
static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
{
+ static const char protoname[] = "SSH-";
+
struct do_ssh_init_state {
int crLine;
int vslen;
crBeginState;
- /* Search for a line beginning with the string "SSH-" in the input. */
+ /* Search for a line beginning with the protocol name prefix in
+ * the input. */
for (;;) {
- if (c != 'S') goto no;
- crReturn(1);
- if (c != 'S') goto no;
- crReturn(1);
- if (c != 'H') goto no;
- crReturn(1);
- if (c != '-') goto no;
+ for (s->i = 0; protoname[s->i]; s->i++) {
+ if ((char)c != protoname[s->i]) goto no;
+ crReturn(1);
+ }
break;
no:
while (c != '\012')
crReturn(1);
}
- s->vstrsize = 16;
+ s->vstrsize = sizeof(protoname) + 16;
s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
- strcpy(s->vstring, "SSH-");
- s->vslen = 4;
+ strcpy(s->vstring, protoname);
+ s->vslen = strlen(protoname);
s->i = 0;
while (1) {
- crReturn(1); /* get another char */
if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
s->vstrsize += 16;
s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
s->version[s->i++] = c;
} else if (c == '\012')
break;
+ crReturn(1); /* get another char */
}
ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
s->proto2 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.99") >= 0;
if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) == 0 && !s->proto1) {
- bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
+ bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by configuration but "
+ "not provided by server"));
crStop(0);
}
if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) == 3 && !s->proto2) {
- bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
+ bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by configuration but "
+ "not provided by server"));
crStop(0);
}
/* Send the version string, if we haven't already */
if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) != 3)
- ssh_send_verstring(ssh, s->version);
+ ssh_send_verstring(ssh, protoname, s->version);
if (ssh->version == 2) {
size_t len;
crFinish(0);
}
+static int do_ssh_connection_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
+{
+ /*
+ * Ordinary SSH begins with the banner "SSH-x.y-...". This is just
+ * the ssh-connection part, extracted and given a trivial binary
+ * packet protocol, so we replace 'SSH-' at the start with a new
+ * name. In proper SSH style (though of course this part of the
+ * proper SSH protocol _isn't_ subject to this kind of
+ * DNS-domain-based extension), we define the new name in our
+ * extension space.
+ */
+ static const char protoname[] =
+ "SSHCONNECTION@putty.projects.tartarus.org-";
+
+ struct do_ssh_connection_init_state {
+ int crLine;
+ int vslen;
+ char version[10];
+ char *vstring;
+ int vstrsize;
+ int i;
+ };
+ crState(do_ssh_connection_init_state);
+
+ crBeginState;
+
+ /* Search for a line beginning with the protocol name prefix in
+ * the input. */
+ for (;;) {
+ for (s->i = 0; protoname[s->i]; s->i++) {
+ if ((char)c != protoname[s->i]) goto no;
+ crReturn(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ no:
+ while (c != '\012')
+ crReturn(1);
+ crReturn(1);
+ }
+
+ s->vstrsize = sizeof(protoname) + 16;
+ s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
+ strcpy(s->vstring, protoname);
+ s->vslen = strlen(protoname);
+ s->i = 0;
+ while (1) {
+ if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
+ s->vstrsize += 16;
+ s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
+ }
+ s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
+ if (s->i >= 0) {
+ if (c == '-') {
+ s->version[s->i] = '\0';
+ s->i = -1;
+ } else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
+ s->version[s->i++] = c;
+ } else if (c == '\012')
+ break;
+ crReturn(1); /* get another char */
+ }
+
+ ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
+ ssh->rdpkt2_bare_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
+
+ s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
+ s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
+ logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
+ ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
+
+ /*
+ * Decide which SSH protocol version to support. This is easy in
+ * bare ssh-connection mode: only 2.0 is legal.
+ */
+ if (ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0) {
+ bombout(("Server announces compatibility with SSH-1 in bare ssh-connection protocol"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) == 0) {
+ bombout(("Bare ssh-connection protocol cannot be run in SSH-1-only mode"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ ssh->version = 2;
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Using bare ssh-connection protocol");
+
+ /* Send the version string, if we haven't already */
+ ssh_send_verstring(ssh, protoname, s->version);
+
+ /*
+ * Initialise bare connection protocol.
+ */
+ ssh->protocol = ssh2_bare_connection_protocol;
+ ssh2_bare_connection_protocol_setup(ssh);
+ ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_bare_connection_rdpkt;
+
+ update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
+ ssh->pinger = pinger_new(ssh->conf, &ssh_backend, ssh);
+
+ /*
+ * Get authconn (really just conn) under way.
+ */
+ do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ sfree(s->vstring);
+
+ crFinish(0);
+}
+
static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
- unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
+ const unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
{
struct Packet *pktin;
}
static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
- unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
+ const unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
{
bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
*data += *datalen;
static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh)
{
void *vdata;
- unsigned char *data;
+ const unsigned char *data;
int len, origlen;
while (!ssh->frozen && bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data)) {
ssh->frozen = frozen;
}
-static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *data, int datalen)
+static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, const unsigned char *data, int datalen)
{
/* Log raw data, if we're in that mode. */
if (ssh->logctx)
log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, -1, NULL, data, datalen,
- 0, NULL, NULL);
+ 0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
crBegin(ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate);
int ret; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
if (datalen == 0)
crReturnV; /* more data please */
- ret = do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
+ ret = ssh->do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
data++;
datalen--;
if (ret == 0)
while (NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, 0))) {
switch (c->type) {
case CHAN_X11:
- x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.xconn);
break;
case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
- pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.pf);
break;
}
del234(ssh->channels, c); /* moving next one to index 0 */
while (NULL != (pf = index234(ssh->portfwds, 0))) {
/* Dispose of any listening socket. */
if (pf->local)
- pfd_terminate(pf->local);
+ pfl_terminate(pf->local);
del234(ssh->portfwds, pf); /* moving next one to index 0 */
free_portfwd(pf);
}
ssh->portfwds = NULL;
}
+ /*
+ * Also stop attempting to connection-share.
+ */
+ if (ssh->connshare) {
+ sharestate_free(ssh->connshare);
+ ssh->connshare = NULL;
+ }
+
return ret;
}
-static void ssh_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
- const char *error_msg, int error_code)
+static void ssh_socket_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
+ const char *error_msg, int error_code)
{
Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
char addrbuf[256], *msg;
- sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
+ if (ssh->attempting_connshare) {
+ /*
+ * While we're attempting connection sharing, don't loudly log
+ * everything that happens. Real TCP connections need to be
+ * logged when we _start_ trying to connect, because it might
+ * be ages before they respond if something goes wrong; but
+ * connection sharing is local and quick to respond, and it's
+ * sufficient to simply wait and see whether it worked
+ * afterwards.
+ */
+ } else {
+ sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
- if (type == 0)
- msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
- else
- msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
+ if (type == 0) {
+ if (sk_addr_needs_port(addr)) {
+ msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
+ } else {
+ msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s", addrbuf);
+ }
+ } else {
+ msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
+ }
- logevent(msg);
- sfree(msg);
+ logevent(msg);
+ sfree(msg);
+ }
+}
+
+void ssh_connshare_log(Ssh ssh, int event, const char *logtext,
+ const char *ds_err, const char *us_err)
+{
+ if (event == SHARE_NONE) {
+ /* In this case, 'logtext' is an error message indicating a
+ * reason why connection sharing couldn't be set up _at all_.
+ * Failing that, ds_err and us_err indicate why we couldn't be
+ * a downstream and an upstream respectively. */
+ if (logtext) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Could not set up connection sharing: %s", logtext);
+ } else {
+ if (ds_err)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Could not set up connection sharing"
+ " as downstream: %s", ds_err);
+ if (us_err)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Could not set up connection sharing"
+ " as upstream: %s", us_err);
+ }
+ } else if (event == SHARE_DOWNSTREAM) {
+ /* In this case, 'logtext' is a local endpoint address */
+ logeventf(ssh, "Using existing shared connection at %s", logtext);
+ /* Also we should mention this in the console window to avoid
+ * confusing users as to why this window doesn't behave the
+ * usual way. */
+ if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
+ c_write_str(ssh,"Reusing a shared connection to this server.\r\n");
+ }
+ } else if (event == SHARE_UPSTREAM) {
+ /* In this case, 'logtext' is a local endpoint address too */
+ logeventf(ssh, "Sharing this connection at %s", logtext);
+ }
}
static int ssh_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
* Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
* freed by the caller.
*/
-static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, char *host, int port,
+static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, const char *host, int port,
char **realhost, int nodelay, int keepalive)
{
static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
- ssh_log,
+ ssh_socket_log,
ssh_closing,
ssh_receive,
ssh_sent,
loghost = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_loghost);
if (*loghost) {
- char *colon;
+ char *tmphost;
+ char *colon;
- ssh->savedhost = dupstr(loghost);
+ tmphost = dupstr(loghost);
ssh->savedport = 22; /* default ssh port */
/*
- * A colon suffix on savedhost also lets us affect
- * savedport.
- *
- * (FIXME: do something about IPv6 address literals here.)
+ * A colon suffix on the hostname string also lets us affect
+ * savedport. (Unless there are multiple colons, in which case
+ * we assume this is an unbracketed IPv6 literal.)
*/
- colon = strrchr(ssh->savedhost, ':');
- if (colon) {
+ colon = host_strrchr(tmphost, ':');
+ if (colon && colon == host_strchr(tmphost, ':')) {
*colon++ = '\0';
if (*colon)
ssh->savedport = atoi(colon);
}
+
+ ssh->savedhost = host_strduptrim(tmphost);
+ sfree(tmphost);
} else {
- ssh->savedhost = dupstr(host);
+ ssh->savedhost = host_strduptrim(host);
if (port < 0)
port = 22; /* default ssh port */
ssh->savedport = port;
}
- /*
- * Try to find host.
- */
- addressfamily = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_addressfamily);
- logeventf(ssh, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
- (addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
- (addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" : "")));
- addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, ssh->conf, addressfamily);
- if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
- sk_addr_free(addr);
- return err;
- }
- ssh->fullhostname = dupstr(*realhost); /* save in case of GSSAPI */
+ ssh->fn = &fn_table; /* make 'ssh' usable as a Plug */
/*
- * Open socket.
+ * Try connection-sharing, in case that means we don't open a
+ * socket after all. ssh_connection_sharing_init will connect to a
+ * previously established upstream if it can, and failing that,
+ * establish a listening socket for _us_ to be the upstream. In
+ * the latter case it will return NULL just as if it had done
+ * nothing, because here we only need to care if we're a
+ * downstream and need to do our connection setup differently.
*/
- ssh->fn = &fn_table;
- ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
- 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) ssh, ssh->conf);
- if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
- ssh->s = NULL;
- notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
- return err;
+ ssh->connshare = NULL;
+ ssh->attempting_connshare = TRUE; /* affects socket logging behaviour */
+ ssh->s = ssh_connection_sharing_init(ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
+ ssh->conf, ssh, &ssh->connshare);
+ ssh->attempting_connshare = FALSE;
+ if (ssh->s != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We are a downstream.
+ */
+ ssh->bare_connection = TRUE;
+ ssh->do_ssh_init = do_ssh_connection_init;
+ ssh->fullhostname = NULL;
+ *realhost = dupstr(host); /* best we can do */
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We're not a downstream, so open a normal socket.
+ */
+ ssh->do_ssh_init = do_ssh_init;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to find host.
+ */
+ addressfamily = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_addressfamily);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
+ (addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
+ (addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" : "")));
+ addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, ssh->conf, addressfamily);
+ if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
+ sk_addr_free(addr);
+ return err;
+ }
+ ssh->fullhostname = dupstr(*realhost); /* save in case of GSSAPI */
+
+ ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
+ 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive,
+ (Plug) ssh, ssh->conf);
+ if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
+ ssh->s = NULL;
+ notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
+ return err;
+ }
}
/*
sshprot = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot);
if (sshprot == 0)
ssh->version = 1;
- if (sshprot == 3) {
+ if (sshprot == 3 && !ssh->bare_connection) {
ssh->version = 2;
- ssh_send_verstring(ssh, NULL);
+ ssh_send_verstring(ssh, "SSH-", NULL);
}
/*
*/
break;
case CHAN_X11:
- x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, enable);
+ x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.xconn, enable);
break;
case CHAN_AGENT:
/* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
break;
case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, enable);
+ pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.pf, enable);
break;
}
}
{
struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)cv;
Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
- void *sentreply = reply;
+ const void *sentreply = reply;
c->u.a.outstanding_requests--;
if (!sentreply) {
send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
PKT_INT, replylen,
- PKTT_DATA,
PKT_DATA, sentreply, replylen,
- PKTT_OTHER,
PKT_END);
}
if (reply)
* non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
* => log `wire_reason'.
*/
-static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh, char *client_reason, char *wire_reason,
+static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh, const char *client_reason,
+ const char *wire_reason,
int code, int clean_exit)
{
char *error;
sfree(error);
}
+int verify_ssh_manual_host_key(Ssh ssh, const char *fingerprint,
+ const struct ssh_signkey *ssh2keytype,
+ void *ssh2keydata)
+{
+ if (!conf_get_str_nthstrkey(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_manual_hostkeys, 0)) {
+ return -1; /* no manual keys configured */
+ }
+
+ if (fingerprint) {
+ /*
+ * The fingerprint string we've been given will have things
+ * like 'ssh-rsa 2048' at the front of it. Strip those off and
+ * narrow down to just the colon-separated hex block at the
+ * end of the string.
+ */
+ const char *p = strrchr(fingerprint, ' ');
+ fingerprint = p ? p+1 : fingerprint;
+ /* Quick sanity checks, including making sure it's in lowercase */
+ assert(strlen(fingerprint) == 16*3 - 1);
+ assert(fingerprint[2] == ':');
+ assert(fingerprint[strspn(fingerprint, "0123456789abcdef:")] == 0);
+
+ if (conf_get_str_str_opt(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_manual_hostkeys,
+ fingerprint))
+ return 1; /* success */
+ }
+
+ if (ssh2keydata) {
+ /*
+ * Construct the base64-encoded public key blob and see if
+ * that's listed.
+ */
+ unsigned char *binblob;
+ char *base64blob;
+ int binlen, atoms, i;
+ binblob = ssh2keytype->public_blob(ssh2keydata, &binlen);
+ atoms = (binlen + 2) / 3;
+ base64blob = snewn(atoms * 4 + 1, char);
+ for (i = 0; i < atoms; i++)
+ base64_encode_atom(binblob + 3*i, binlen - 3*i, base64blob + 4*i);
+ base64blob[atoms * 4] = '\0';
+ sfree(binblob);
+ if (conf_get_str_str_opt(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_manual_hostkeys,
+ base64blob)) {
+ sfree(base64blob);
+ return 1; /* success */
+ }
+ sfree(base64blob);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
*/
-static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
struct Packet *pktin)
{
int i, j, ret;
struct do_ssh1_login_state {
int crLine;
int len;
- unsigned char *rsabuf, *keystr1, *keystr2;
+ unsigned char *rsabuf;
+ const unsigned char *keystr1, *keystr2;
unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask, supported_auths_mask;
int tried_publickey, tried_agent;
int tis_auth_refused, ccard_auth_refused;
void *publickey_blob;
int publickey_bloblen;
char *publickey_comment;
- int publickey_encrypted;
+ int privatekey_available, privatekey_encrypted;
prompts_t *cur_prompt;
char c;
int pwpkt_type;
rsastr_fmt(keystr, &s->hostkey);
rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint, sizeof(fingerprint), &s->hostkey);
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
- s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
- ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
- "rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
- ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
- sfree(keystr);
- if (s->dlgret < 0) {
- do {
- crReturn(0);
- if (pktin) {
- bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
- " for user host key response"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
- s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
- }
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ /* First check against manually configured host keys. */
+ s->dlgret = verify_ssh_manual_host_key(ssh, fingerprint, NULL, NULL);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) { /* did not match */
+ bombout(("Host key did not appear in manually configured list"));
+ sfree(keystr);
+ crStop(0);
+ } else if (s->dlgret < 0) { /* none configured; use standard handling */
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
+ ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
+ "rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ sfree(keystr);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
+ " for user host key response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
- if (s->dlgret == 0) {
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
- NULL, 0, TRUE);
- crStop(0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
+ NULL, 0, TRUE);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } else {
+ sfree(keystr);
}
}
{
int cipher_chosen = 0, warn = 0;
- char *cipher_string = NULL;
+ const char *cipher_string = NULL;
int i;
for (i = 0; !cipher_chosen && i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
int next_cipher = conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf,
s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
if (!filename_is_null(s->keyfile)) {
int keytype;
- logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
+ logeventf(ssh, "Reading key file \"%.150s\"",
filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
keytype = key_type(s->keyfile);
- if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1) {
+ if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1 ||
+ keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1_PUBLIC) {
const char *error;
if (rsakey_pubblob(s->keyfile,
&s->publickey_blob, &s->publickey_bloblen,
&s->publickey_comment, &error)) {
- s->publickey_encrypted = rsakey_encrypted(s->keyfile,
- NULL);
+ s->privatekey_available = (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1);
+ if (!s->privatekey_available)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Key file contains public key only");
+ s->privatekey_encrypted = rsakey_encrypted(s->keyfile,
+ NULL);
} else {
char *msgbuf;
- logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)", error);
- msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
+ logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load key (%s)", error);
+ msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load key file "
"\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
error);
if (s->authed)
break;
}
- if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey) {
+ if (s->publickey_blob && s->privatekey_available &&
+ !s->tried_publickey) {
/*
* Try public key authentication with the specified
* key file.
*/
char *passphrase = NULL; /* only written after crReturn */
const char *error;
- if (!s->publickey_encrypted) {
+ if (!s->privatekey_encrypted) {
if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
c_write_str(ssh, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
passphrase = NULL;
for (i = bottom; i <= top; i++) {
if (i == pwlen) {
defer_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
- PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR,
- s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
- PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ PKT_STR,s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
+ PKT_END);
} else {
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
do {
ss = s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result;
}
logevent("Sending length-padded password");
- send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
+ send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, ss, len,
- PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ PKT_END);
} else {
/*
* The server is believed unable to cope with
len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
logevent("Sending unpadded password");
send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
- PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_INT, len,
+ PKT_INT, len,
PKT_DATA, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result, len,
- PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ PKT_END);
}
} else {
- send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
+ send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
PKT_STR, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
- PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ PKT_END);
}
logevent("Sent password");
free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
}
}
+Conf *sshfwd_get_conf(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ return ssh->conf;
+}
+
void sshfwd_write_eof(struct ssh_channel *c)
{
Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
switch (c->type) {
case CHAN_X11:
- x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.xconn);
logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded X11 connection terminated due to local "
"error: %s", err);
break;
case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
- pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.pf);
logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded port closed due to local error: %s", err);
break;
}
if (ssh->version == 1) {
send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
- PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
- PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
+ PKT_END);
/*
* In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
* connections are never individually throttled - because
}
}
+int ssh_alloc_sharing_rportfwd(Ssh ssh, const char *shost, int sport,
+ void *share_ctx)
+{
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
+ pf->dhost = NULL;
+ pf->dport = 0;
+ pf->share_ctx = share_ctx;
+ pf->shost = dupstr(shost);
+ pf->sport = sport;
+ pf->sportdesc = NULL;
+ if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
+ assert(ssh->version == 2);
+ ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
+ }
+ if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
+ sfree(pf->shost);
+ sfree(pf);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+static void ssh_sharing_global_request_response(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin,
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+}
+
+void ssh_sharing_queue_global_request(Ssh ssh, void *share_ctx)
+{
+ ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
+ ssh_sharing_global_request_response, share_ctx);
+}
+
static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh, Conf *conf)
{
struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
if (*kp == 'L' || *kp == 'R')
type = *kp++;
- if ((kp2 = strchr(kp, ':')) != NULL) {
+ if ((kp2 = host_strchr(kp, ':')) != NULL) {
/*
* There's a colon in the middle of the source port
* string, which means that the part before it is
* actually a source address.
*/
- saddr = dupprintf("%.*s", (int)(kp2 - kp), kp);
+ char *saddr_tmp = dupprintf("%.*s", (int)(kp2 - kp), kp);
+ saddr = host_strduptrim(saddr_tmp);
+ sfree(saddr_tmp);
sports = kp2+1;
} else {
saddr = NULL;
} else {
/* ordinary forwarding */
vp = val;
- vp2 = vp + strcspn(vp, ":");
+ vp2 = vp + host_strcspn(vp, ":");
host = dupprintf("%.*s", (int)(vp2 - vp), vp);
- if (vp2)
+ if (*vp2)
vp2++;
dports = vp2;
dport = atoi(dports);
del234(ssh->rportfwds, rpf);
free_rportfwd(rpf);
} else if (epf->local) {
- pfd_terminate(epf->local);
+ pfl_terminate(epf->local);
}
delpos234(ssh->portfwds, i);
}
if (epf->type == 'L') {
- const char *err = pfd_addforward(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
- epf->saddr, epf->sport,
- ssh, conf,
- &epf->local,
- epf->addressfamily);
+ char *err = pfl_listen(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
+ epf->saddr, epf->sport,
+ ssh, conf, &epf->local,
+ epf->addressfamily);
logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
sportdesc, dportdesc,
err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
+ if (err)
+ sfree(err);
} else if (epf->type == 'D') {
- const char *err = pfd_addforward(NULL, -1,
- epf->saddr, epf->sport,
- ssh, conf,
- &epf->local,
- epf->addressfamily);
+ char *err = pfl_listen(NULL, -1, epf->saddr, epf->sport,
+ ssh, conf, &epf->local,
+ epf->addressfamily);
logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
sportdesc,
err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
+
+ if (err)
+ sfree(err);
} else {
struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
}
pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
- strncpy(pf->dhost, epf->daddr, lenof(pf->dhost)-1);
- pf->dhost[lenof(pf->dhost)-1] = '\0';
+ pf->share_ctx = NULL;
+ pf->dhost = dupstr(epf->daddr);
pf->dport = epf->dport;
+ if (epf->saddr) {
+ pf->shost = dupstr(epf->saddr);
+ } else if (conf_get_int(conf, CONF_rport_acceptall)) {
+ pf->shost = dupstr("");
+ } else {
+ pf->shost = dupstr("localhost");
+ }
pf->sport = epf->sport;
if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
logeventf(ssh, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "tcpip-forward");
ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 1);/* want reply */
- if (epf->saddr) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
- } else if (conf_get_int(conf, CONF_rport_acceptall)) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "");
- } else {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "localhost");
- }
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, pf->shost);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, pf->sport);
ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS,
c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
c->ssh = ssh;
- if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
- NULL, -1, ssh->conf) != NULL) {
- logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
- sfree(c);
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
- PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
- } else {
- logevent
- ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
- c->remoteid = remoteid;
- c->halfopen = FALSE;
- c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
- c->closes = 0;
- c->pending_eof = FALSE;
- c->throttling_conn = 0;
- c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
- add234(ssh->channels, c);
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
- PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
- c->localid, PKT_END);
- logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
- }
+ c->u.x11.xconn = x11_init(ssh->x11authtree, c, NULL, -1);
+ c->remoteid = remoteid;
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
+ c->closes = 0;
+ c->pending_eof = FALSE;
+ c->throttling_conn = 0;
+ c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
+ c->localid, PKT_END);
+ logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
}
}
int remoteid;
int hostsize, port;
char *host;
- const char *e;
+ char *err;
remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &host, &hostsize);
port = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- if (hostsize >= lenof(pf.dhost))
- hostsize = lenof(pf.dhost)-1;
- memcpy(pf.dhost, host, hostsize);
- pf.dhost[hostsize] = '\0';
+ pf.dhost = dupprintf("%.*s", hostsize, host);
pf.dport = port;
pfp = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
pf.dhost, port);
- e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s, pf.dhost, port,
- c, ssh->conf, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
- if (e != NULL) {
- logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
+ err = pfd_connect(&c->u.pfd.pf, pf.dhost, port,
+ c, ssh->conf, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
+ if (err != NULL) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", err);
+ sfree(err);
sfree(c);
send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
}
}
+
+ sfree(pf.dhost);
}
static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
c->halfopen = FALSE;
c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
c->throttling_conn = 0;
- pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
+ pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.pf);
}
if (c && c->pending_eof) {
c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
- pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.pf);
del234(ssh->channels, c);
sfree(c);
}
switch (c->type) {
case CHAN_X11:
- if (c->u.x11.s)
- x11_send_eof(c->u.x11.s);
+ if (c->u.x11.xconn)
+ x11_send_eof(c->u.x11.xconn);
else
send_close = TRUE;
break;
case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- if (c->u.pfd.s)
- pfd_send_eof(c->u.pfd.s);
+ if (c->u.pfd.pf)
+ pfd_send_eof(c->u.pfd.pf);
else
send_close = TRUE;
break;
int bufsize = 0;
switch (c->type) {
case CHAN_X11:
- bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, p, len);
+ bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.xconn, p, len);
break;
case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, p, len);
+ bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.pf, p, len);
break;
case CHAN_AGENT:
/* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, arg);
}
+int ssh_agent_forwarding_permitted(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ return conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_agentfwd) && agent_exists();
+}
-static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
struct Packet *pktin)
{
crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate);
ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh1_msg_channel_data;
ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status;
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_agentfwd) && agent_exists()) {
+ if (ssh_agent_forwarding_permitted(ssh)) {
logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING, PKT_END);
do {
}
}
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_forward) &&
- (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_display),
- conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_auth), ssh->conf))) {
- logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
- /*
- * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
- * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
- * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
- * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
- * cookie into the log.
- */
- if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
- PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
- PKTT_PASSWORD,
- PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
- PKTT_OTHER,
- PKT_INT, ssh->x11disp->screennum,
- PKT_END);
- } else {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
- PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
- PKTT_PASSWORD,
- PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
- PKTT_OTHER,
- PKT_END);
- }
- do {
- crReturnV;
- } while (!pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
- && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
- crStopV;
- } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
- } else {
- logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
- ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
- }
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_forward)) {
+ ssh->x11disp =
+ x11_setup_display(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_display),
+ ssh->conf);
+ if (!ssh->x11disp) {
+ /* FIXME: return an error message from x11_setup_display */
+ logevent("X11 forwarding not enabled: unable to"
+ " initialise X display");
+ } else {
+ ssh->x11auth = x11_invent_fake_auth
+ (ssh->x11authtree, conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_auth));
+ ssh->x11auth->disp = ssh->x11disp;
+
+ logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
+ if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
+ PKT_STR, ssh->x11auth->protoname,
+ PKT_STR, ssh->x11auth->datastring,
+ PKT_INT, ssh->x11disp->screennum,
+ PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
+ PKT_STR, ssh->x11auth->protoname,
+ PKT_STR, ssh->x11auth->datastring,
+ PKT_END);
+ }
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ } while (!pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
+ && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
+ } else {
+ logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
+ ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
+ }
+ }
}
ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, ssh->conf);
ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
if (ssh->ldisc)
- ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
+ ldisc_echoedit_update(ssh->ldisc); /* cause ldisc to notice changes */
ssh->send_ok = 1;
ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
while (1) {
while (inlen > 0) {
int len = min(inlen, 512);
send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA,
- PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, in, len,
- PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, in, len,
+ PKT_END);
in += len;
inlen -= len;
}
ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh1_msg_debug;
}
-static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen,
struct Packet *pktin)
{
- unsigned char *in=(unsigned char*)vin;
+ const unsigned char *in = (const unsigned char *)vin;
if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
return;
/*
* Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
*/
-static int in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
+static int in_commasep_string(char const *needle, char const *haystack,
+ int haylen)
{
int needlen;
if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
/*
* Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
*/
-static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
+static int first_in_commasep_string(char const *needle, char const *haystack,
+ int haylen)
{
int needlen;
if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Add a value to the comma-separated string at the end of the packet.
+ * If the value is already in the string, don't bother adding it again.
+ */
+static void ssh2_pkt_addstring_commasep(struct Packet *pkt, const char *data)
+{
+ if (in_commasep_string(data, (char *)pkt->data + pkt->savedpos,
+ pkt->length - pkt->savedpos)) return;
+ if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos > 0)
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, ",");
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data);
+}
+
/*
* SSH-2 key creation method.
/*
* Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
*/
-static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen,
struct Packet *pktin)
{
- unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
+ const unsigned char *in = (const unsigned char *)vin;
struct do_ssh2_transport_state {
int crLine;
int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher;
const struct ssh2_cipher *sccipher_tobe;
const struct ssh_mac *csmac_tobe;
const struct ssh_mac *scmac_tobe;
+ int csmac_etm_tobe, scmac_etm_tobe;
const struct ssh_compress *cscomp_tobe;
const struct ssh_compress *sccomp_tobe;
char *hostkeydata, *sigdata, *rsakeydata, *keystr, *fingerprint;
int hostkeylen, siglen, rsakeylen;
void *hkey; /* actual host key */
void *rsakey; /* for RSA kex */
+ void *eckey; /* for ECDH kex */
unsigned char exchange_hash[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
int n_preferred_kex;
const struct ssh_kexes *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX];
};
crState(do_ssh2_transport_state);
+ assert(!ssh->bare_connection);
+
crBeginState;
s->cscipher_tobe = s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
begin_key_exchange:
ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
{
- int i, j, k, commalist_started;
+ int i, j, k;
/*
* Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
&ssh_rsa_kex;
break;
+ case KEX_ECDH:
+ s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
+ &ssh_ecdh_kex;
+ break;
case KEX_WARN:
/* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
* the list. */
ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) random_byte());
/* List key exchange algorithms. */
ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- commalist_started = 0;
for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
if (!k) continue; /* warning flag */
- for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
- if (commalist_started)
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, k->list[j]->name);
- commalist_started = 1;
- }
+ for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_commasep(s->pktout, k->list[j]->name);
}
/* List server host key algorithms. */
if (!s->got_session_id) {
* we're prepared to cope with.
*/
ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
- if (i < lenof(hostkey_algs) - 1)
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_commasep(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
} else {
/*
* In subsequent key exchanges, we list only the kex
/* List encryption algorithms (client->server then server->client). */
for (k = 0; k < 2; k++) {
ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- commalist_started = 0;
for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
- for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
- if (commalist_started)
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
- commalist_started = 1;
- }
+ for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_commasep(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
}
}
/* List MAC algorithms (client->server then server->client). */
for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
- if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- }
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_commasep(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
+ /* For each MAC, there may also be an ETM version,
+ * which we list second. */
+ if (s->maclist[i]->etm_name)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_commasep(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->etm_name);
+ }
}
/* List client->server compression algorithms,
* then server->client compression algorithms. (We use the
ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
/* Prefer non-delayed versions */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_commasep(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
/* We don't even list delayed versions of algorithms until
* they're allowed to be used, to avoid a race. See the end of
* this function. */
- if (s->userauth_succeeded && s->preferred_comp->delayed_name) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout,
- s->preferred_comp->delayed_name);
- }
+ if (s->userauth_succeeded && s->preferred_comp->delayed_name)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_commasep(s->pktout,
+ s->preferred_comp->delayed_name);
for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
- if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
- if (s->userauth_succeeded && c->delayed_name) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->delayed_name);
- }
- }
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_commasep(s->pktout, c->name);
+ if (s->userauth_succeeded && c->delayed_name)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_commasep(s->pktout, c->delayed_name);
}
}
/* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
* to.
*/
{
- char *str, *preferred;
+ char *str;
+ const char *preferred;
int i, j, len;
if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* key exchange algorithms */
+ if (!str) {
+ bombout(("KEXINIT packet was incomplete"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
preferred = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
break;
}
if (!ssh->kex) {
- bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
- str ? str : "(null)"));
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm"
+ " (available: %.*s)", len, str));
crStopV;
}
/*
*/
s->guessok = first_in_commasep_string(preferred, str, len);
ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* host key algorithms */
+ if (!str) {
+ bombout(("KEXINIT packet was incomplete"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[i]->name, str, len)) {
ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[i];
}
}
if (!ssh->hostkey) {
- bombout(("Couldn't agree a host key algorithm (available: %s)",
- str ? str : "(null)"));
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a host key algorithm"
+ " (available: %.*s)", len, str));
crStopV;
}
s->guessok = s->guessok &&
first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[0]->name, str, len);
ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server cipher */
+ if (!str) {
+ bombout(("KEXINIT packet was incomplete"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
if (!c) {
break;
}
if (!s->cscipher_tobe) {
- bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
- str ? str : "(null)"));
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher"
+ " (available: %.*s)", len, str));
crStopV;
}
ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client cipher */
+ if (!str) {
+ bombout(("KEXINIT packet was incomplete"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
if (!c) {
break;
}
if (!s->sccipher_tobe) {
- bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
- str ? str : "(null)"));
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher"
+ " (available: %.*s)", len, str));
crStopV;
}
ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server mac */
+ if (!str) {
+ bombout(("KEXINIT packet was incomplete"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
- break;
+ s->csmac_etm_tobe = FALSE;
+ break;
}
}
+ if (!s->csmac_tobe) {
+ for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
+ if (s->maclist[i]->etm_name &&
+ in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->etm_name, str, len)) {
+ s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
+ s->csmac_etm_tobe = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!s->csmac_tobe) {
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server MAC"
+ " (available: %.*s)", len, str));
+ crStopV;
+ }
ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client mac */
+ if (!str) {
+ bombout(("KEXINIT packet was incomplete"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
- break;
+ s->scmac_etm_tobe = FALSE;
+ break;
}
}
+ if (!s->scmac_tobe) {
+ for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
+ if (s->maclist[i]->etm_name &&
+ in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->etm_name, str, len)) {
+ s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
+ s->scmac_etm_tobe = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!s->scmac_tobe) {
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client MAC"
+ " (available: %.*s)", len, str));
+ crStopV;
+ }
ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server compression */
+ if (!str) {
+ bombout(("KEXINIT packet was incomplete"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
const struct ssh_compress *c =
i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
}
}
ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client compression */
+ if (!str) {
+ bombout(("KEXINIT packet was incomplete"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
const struct ssh_compress *c =
i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
s->our_kexinit, s->our_kexinitlen);
sfree(s->our_kexinit);
- if (pktin->length > 5)
- hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
- pktin->data + 5, pktin->length - 5);
+ /* Include the type byte in the hash of server's KEXINIT */
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
+ pktin->body - 1, pktin->length + 1);
if (s->warn_kex) {
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
* If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
* requesting a group.
*/
- if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
+ if (dh_is_gex(ssh->kex)) {
logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX;
/*
* much data.
*/
s->pbits = 512 << ((s->nbits - 1) / 64);
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
+ if (s->pbits < DH_MIN_SIZE)
+ s->pbits = DH_MIN_SIZE;
+ if (s->pbits > DH_MAX_SIZE)
+ s->pbits = DH_MAX_SIZE;
+ if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_OLDGEX)) {
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
+ } else {
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, DH_MIN_SIZE);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, DH_MAX_SIZE);
+ }
ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
crWaitUntilV(pktin);
}
set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* cogitate */
ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
- s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
+ s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(ssh->hostkey,
+ s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
s->f = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
if (!s->f) {
bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
crStopV;
}
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
-
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
+
+ {
+ const char *err = dh_validate_f(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
+ if (err) {
+ bombout(("key exchange reply failed validation: %s", err));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ }
s->K = dh_find_K(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
/* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_NOT);
hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
- if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
+ if (dh_is_gex(ssh->kex)) {
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_OLDGEX))
+ hash_uint32(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, DH_MIN_SIZE);
hash_uint32(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->pbits);
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_OLDGEX))
+ hash_uint32(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, DH_MAX_SIZE);
hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->p);
hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->g);
}
dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
freebn(s->f);
- if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
+ if (dh_is_gex(ssh->kex)) {
freebn(s->g);
freebn(s->p);
}
+ } else if (ssh->kex->main_type == KEXTYPE_ECDH) {
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Doing ECDH key exchange with hash %s",
+ ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
+ ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_ECDHKEX;
+
+ s->eckey = ssh_ecdhkex_newkey(ssh->kex);
+ if (!s->eckey) {
+ bombout(("Unable to generate key for ECDH"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+
+ {
+ char *publicPoint;
+ int publicPointLength;
+ publicPoint = ssh_ecdhkex_getpublic(s->eckey, &publicPointLength);
+ if (!publicPoint) {
+ ssh_ecdhkex_freekey(s->eckey);
+ bombout(("Unable to encode public key for ECDH"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, publicPoint, publicPointLength);
+ sfree(publicPoint);
+ }
+
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY) {
+ ssh_ecdhkex_freekey(s->eckey);
+ bombout(("expected ECDH reply packet from server"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
+ s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(ssh->hostkey,
+ s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
+
+ {
+ char *publicPoint;
+ int publicPointLength;
+ publicPoint = ssh_ecdhkex_getpublic(s->eckey, &publicPointLength);
+ if (!publicPoint) {
+ ssh_ecdhkex_freekey(s->eckey);
+ bombout(("Unable to encode public key for ECDH hash"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
+ publicPoint, publicPointLength);
+ sfree(publicPoint);
+ }
+
+ {
+ char *keydata;
+ int keylen;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &keydata, &keylen);
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, keydata, keylen);
+ s->K = ssh_ecdhkex_getkey(s->eckey, keydata, keylen);
+ if (!s->K) {
+ ssh_ecdhkex_freekey(s->eckey);
+ bombout(("point received in ECDH was not valid"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
+
+ ssh_ecdhkex_freekey(s->eckey);
} else {
logeventf(ssh, "Doing RSA key exchange with hash %s",
ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
- s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
+ s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(ssh->hostkey,
+ s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
{
char *keydata;
* Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
* checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
*/
- s->fingerprint = ssh->hostkey->fingerprint(s->hkey);
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
- s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
- ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
- ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
- s->fingerprint,
- ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
- if (s->dlgret < 0) {
- do {
- crReturnV;
- if (pktin) {
- bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
- " for user host key response"));
- crStopV;
- }
- } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
- s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
- }
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
- if (s->dlgret == 0) {
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL,
- 0, TRUE);
- crStopV;
- }
+ s->fingerprint = ssh2_fingerprint(ssh->hostkey, s->hkey);
logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
logevent(s->fingerprint);
+ /* First check against manually configured host keys. */
+ s->dlgret = verify_ssh_manual_host_key(ssh, s->fingerprint,
+ ssh->hostkey, s->hkey);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) { /* did not match */
+ bombout(("Host key did not appear in manually configured list"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (s->dlgret < 0) { /* none configured; use standard handling */
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
+ ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
+ ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
+ s->fingerprint,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
+ " for user host key response"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "Aborted at host key verification", NULL,
+ 0, TRUE);
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ }
sfree(s->fingerprint);
/*
* Save this host key, to check against the one presented in
if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
+ ssh->csmac_etm = s->csmac_etm_tobe;
ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context();
if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
ssh->cscipher->text_name);
- logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
- ssh->csmac->text_name);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm%s",
+ ssh->csmac->text_name,
+ ssh->csmac_etm ? " (in ETM mode)" : "");
if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
ssh->cscomp->text_name);
if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
+ ssh->scmac_etm = s->scmac_etm_tobe;
ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context();
if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
}
logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
ssh->sccipher->text_name);
- logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
- ssh->scmac->text_name);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm%s",
+ ssh->scmac->text_name,
+ ssh->scmac_etm ? " (in ETM mode)" : "");
if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
ssh->sccomp->text_name);
/*
* Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
*/
-static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf,
+static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, const char *buf,
int len)
{
bufchain_add(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, buf, len);
pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
- dont_log_data(ssh, pktout, PKTLOG_OMIT);
ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, data, len);
- end_log_omission(ssh, pktout);
ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
bufchain_consume(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, len);
c->v.v2.remwindow -= len;
* notification since it will be polled */
break;
case CHAN_X11:
- x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.s);
+ x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.xconn);
break;
case CHAN_AGENT:
/* agent sockets are request/response and need no
* buffer management */
break;
case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.s);
+ pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.pf);
break;
}
}
}
+static int ssh_is_simple(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ /*
+ * We use the 'simple' variant of the SSH protocol if we're asked
+ * to, except not if we're also doing connection-sharing (either
+ * tunnelling our packets over an upstream or expecting to be
+ * tunnelled over ourselves), since then the assumption that we
+ * have only one channel to worry about is not true after all.
+ */
+ return (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple) &&
+ !ssh->bare_connection && !ssh->connshare);
+}
+
/*
* Set up most of a new ssh_channel for SSH-2.
*/
c->pending_eof = FALSE;
c->throttling_conn = FALSE;
c->v.v2.locwindow = c->v.v2.locmaxwin = c->v.v2.remlocwin =
- conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple) ? OUR_V2_BIGWIN : OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
+ ssh_is_simple(ssh) ? OUR_V2_BIGWIN : OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
c->v.v2.chanreq_head = NULL;
c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
/*
* Construct the common parts of a CHANNEL_OPEN.
*/
-static struct Packet *ssh2_chanopen_init(struct ssh_channel *c, char *type)
+static struct Packet *ssh2_chanopen_init(struct ssh_channel *c,
+ const char *type)
{
struct Packet *pktout;
* request-specific data added and be sent. Note that if a handler is
* provided, it's essential that the request actually be sent.
*
- * The handler will usually be passed the response packet in pktin.
- * If pktin is NULL, this means that no reply will ever be forthcoming
- * (e.g. because the entire connection is being destroyed) and the
- * handler should free any storage it's holding.
+ * The handler will usually be passed the response packet in pktin. If
+ * pktin is NULL, this means that no reply will ever be forthcoming
+ * (e.g. because the entire connection is being destroyed, or because
+ * the server initiated channel closure before we saw the response)
+ * and the handler should free any storage it's holding.
*/
-static struct Packet *ssh2_chanreq_init(struct ssh_channel *c, char *type,
+static struct Packet *ssh2_chanreq_init(struct ssh_channel *c,
+ const char *type,
cchandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
{
struct Packet *pktout;
if (c->closes & (CLOSES_RCVD_EOF | CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE))
return;
+ /*
+ * Also, never widen the window for an X11 channel when we're
+ * still waiting to see its initial auth and may yet hand it off
+ * to a downstream.
+ */
+ if (c->type == CHAN_X11 && c->u.x11.initial)
+ return;
+
/*
* If the remote end has a habit of ignoring maxpkt, limit the
* window so that it has no choice (assuming it doesn't ignore the
c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
if (!c ||
- (c->halfopen && pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION &&
+ (c->type != CHAN_SHARING && c->halfopen &&
+ pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION &&
pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) {
char *buf = dupprintf("Received %s for %s channel %u",
ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
struct outstanding_channel_request *ocr;
if (!c) return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
ocr = c->v.v2.chanreq_head;
if (!ocr) {
ssh2_msg_unexpected(ssh, pktin);
c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
if (!c)
return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
c->v.v2.remwindow += ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(ssh, c);
c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
if (!c)
return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA &&
ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)
return; /* extended but not stderr */
data, length);
break;
case CHAN_X11:
- bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, data, length);
+ bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.xconn, data, length);
break;
case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, data, length);
+ bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.pf, data, length);
break;
case CHAN_AGENT:
while (length > 0) {
* buffering anything at all and we're in "simple" mode,
* throttle the whole channel.
*/
- if ((bufsize > c->v.v2.locmaxwin ||
- (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple) && bufsize > 0)) &&
- !c->throttling_conn) {
+ if ((bufsize > c->v.v2.locmaxwin || (ssh_is_simple(ssh) && bufsize>0))
+ && !c->throttling_conn) {
c->throttling_conn = 1;
ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
}
}
}
+static void ssh_check_termination(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ if (ssh->version == 2 &&
+ !conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_shell) &&
+ count234(ssh->channels) == 0 &&
+ !(ssh->connshare && share_ndownstreams(ssh->connshare) > 0)) {
+ /*
+ * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here, because I'd
+ * believed that _every_ conforming SSH-2 connection had to
+ * end with a disconnect being sent by at least one side;
+ * apparently I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
+ * unceremoniously slam the connection shut when you're done,
+ * and indeed OpenSSH feels this is more polite than sending a
+ * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
+ */
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "All channels closed", NULL, 0, TRUE);
+ }
+}
+
+void ssh_sharing_downstream_connected(Ssh ssh, unsigned id)
+{
+ logeventf(ssh, "Connection sharing downstream #%u connected", id);
+}
+
+void ssh_sharing_downstream_disconnected(Ssh ssh, unsigned id)
+{
+ logeventf(ssh, "Connection sharing downstream #%u disconnected", id);
+ ssh_check_termination(ssh);
+}
+
+void ssh_sharing_logf(Ssh ssh, unsigned id, const char *logfmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ char *buf;
+
+ va_start(ap, logfmt);
+ buf = dupvprintf(logfmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (id)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Connection sharing downstream #%u: %s", id, buf);
+ else
+ logeventf(ssh, "Connection sharing: %s", buf);
+ sfree(buf);
+}
+
static void ssh_channel_destroy(struct ssh_channel *c)
{
Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
break;
case CHAN_X11:
- if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
- x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
+ if (c->u.x11.xconn != NULL)
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.xconn);
logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
break;
case CHAN_AGENT:
sfree(c->u.a.message);
break;
case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
- pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ if (c->u.pfd.pf != NULL)
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.pf);
logevent("Forwarded port closed");
break;
}
sfree(c);
/*
- * See if that was the last channel left open.
- * (This is only our termination condition if we're
- * not running in -N mode.)
+ * If that was the last channel left open, we might need to
+ * terminate.
*/
- if (ssh->version == 2 &&
- !conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_shell) &&
- count234(ssh->channels) == 0) {
- /*
- * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
- * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
- * SSH-2 connection had to end with a disconnect
- * being sent by at least one side; apparently
- * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
- * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
- * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
- * this is more polite than sending a
- * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
- */
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, "All channels closed", NULL, 0, TRUE);
- }
+ ssh_check_termination(ssh);
}
static void ssh2_channel_check_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_EOF;
if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
- x11_send_eof(c->u.x11.s);
+ x11_send_eof(c->u.x11.xconn);
} else if (c->type == CHAN_AGENT) {
if (c->u.a.outstanding_requests == 0) {
/* Manufacture an outgoing EOF in response to the incoming one. */
sshfwd_write_eof(c);
}
} else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA) {
- pfd_send_eof(c->u.pfd.s);
+ pfd_send_eof(c->u.pfd.pf);
} else if (c->type == CHAN_MAINSESSION) {
Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
if (!c)
return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
ssh2_channel_got_eof(c);
}
c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
if (!c)
return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
/*
* When we receive CLOSE on a channel, we assume it comes with an
*/
ssh2_channel_got_eof(c);
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SENDS_LATE_REQUEST_REPLY)) {
+ /*
+ * It also means we stop expecting to see replies to any
+ * outstanding channel requests, so clean those up too.
+ * (ssh_chanreq_init will enforce by assertion that we don't
+ * subsequently put anything back on this list.)
+ */
+ while (c->v.v2.chanreq_head) {
+ struct outstanding_channel_request *ocr = c->v.v2.chanreq_head;
+ ocr->handler(c, NULL, ocr->ctx);
+ c->v.v2.chanreq_head = ocr->next;
+ sfree(ocr);
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* And we also send an outgoing EOF, if we haven't already, on the
* assumption that CLOSE is a pretty forceful announcement that
ssh->send_ok = 0; /* stop trying to read from stdin */
break;
case CHAN_X11:
- x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, 1);
+ x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.xconn, 1);
break;
case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, 1);
+ pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.pf, 1);
break;
}
c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
if (!c)
return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
assert(c->halfopen); /* ssh2_channel_msg will have enforced this */
c->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
c->halfopen = FALSE;
if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
- if (c->u.pfd.s)
- pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
+ if (c->u.pfd.pf)
+ pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.pf);
} else if (c->type == CHAN_ZOMBIE) {
/*
* This case can occur if a local socket error occurred
c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
if (!c)
return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
assert(c->halfopen); /* ssh2_channel_msg will have enforced this */
if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
reasons[reason_code], reason_length, reason_string);
- pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.pf);
} else if (c->type == CHAN_ZOMBIE) {
/*
* This case can occur if a local socket error occurred
c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
if (!c)
return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
+ if (c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE) {
+ /*
+ * We don't reply to channel requests after we've sent
+ * CHANNEL_CLOSE for the channel, because our reply might
+ * cross in the network with the other side's CHANNEL_CLOSE
+ * and arrive after they have wound the channel up completely.
+ */
+ want_reply = FALSE;
+ }
+
/*
* Having got the channel number, we now look at
* the request type string to see if it's something
!memcmp(type, "exit-signal", 11)) {
int is_plausible = TRUE, is_int = FALSE;
- char *fmt_sig = "", *fmt_msg = "";
+ char *fmt_sig = NULL, *fmt_msg = NULL;
char *msg;
int msglen = 0, core = FALSE;
/* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
/* ignore lang tag */
} /* else don't attempt to parse */
logeventf(ssh, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
- fmt_sig, core ? " (core dumped)" : "",
- fmt_msg);
- if (*fmt_sig) sfree(fmt_sig);
- if (*fmt_msg) sfree(fmt_msg);
+ fmt_sig ? fmt_sig : "",
+ core ? " (core dumped)" : "",
+ fmt_msg ? fmt_msg : "");
+ sfree(fmt_sig);
+ sfree(fmt_msg);
reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
}
}
}
+struct X11FakeAuth *ssh_sharing_add_x11_display(Ssh ssh, int authtype,
+ void *share_cs,
+ void *share_chan)
+{
+ struct X11FakeAuth *auth;
+
+ /*
+ * Make up a new set of fake X11 auth data, and add it to the tree
+ * of currently valid ones with an indication of the sharing
+ * context that it's relevant to.
+ */
+ auth = x11_invent_fake_auth(ssh->x11authtree, authtype);
+ auth->share_cs = share_cs;
+ auth->share_chan = share_chan;
+
+ return auth;
+}
+
+void ssh_sharing_remove_x11_display(Ssh ssh, struct X11FakeAuth *auth)
+{
+ del234(ssh->x11authtree, auth);
+ x11_free_fake_auth(auth);
+}
+
static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
{
char *type;
char *peeraddr;
int peeraddrlen;
int peerport;
- char *error = NULL;
+ const char *error = NULL;
struct ssh_channel *c;
unsigned remid, winsize, pktsize;
+ unsigned our_winsize_override = 0;
struct Packet *pktout;
ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
if (typelen == 3 && !memcmp(type, "x11", 3)) {
char *addrstr;
- const char *x11err;
ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
addrstr = snewn(peeraddrlen+1, char);
logeventf(ssh, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
addrstr, peerport);
- if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled)
+ if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled && !ssh->connshare)
error = "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
- else if ((x11err = x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
- addrstr, peerport, ssh->conf)) != NULL) {
- logeventf(ssh, "Local X11 connection failed: %s", x11err);
- error = "Unable to open an X11 connection";
- } else {
- logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
+ else {
+ c->u.x11.xconn = x11_init(ssh->x11authtree, c,
+ addrstr, peerport);
c->type = CHAN_X11;
+ c->u.x11.initial = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * If we are a connection-sharing upstream, then we should
+ * initially present a very small window, adequate to take
+ * the X11 initial authorisation packet but not much more.
+ * Downstream will then present us a larger window (by
+ * fiat of the connection-sharing protocol) and we can
+ * guarantee to send a positive-valued WINDOW_ADJUST.
+ */
+ if (ssh->connshare)
+ our_winsize_override = 128;
+
+ logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
}
sfree(addrstr);
} else if (typelen == 15 &&
!memcmp(type, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *realpf;
- char *dummy;
- int dummylen;
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &dummy, &dummylen);/* skip address */
+ char *shost;
+ int shostlen;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &shost, &shostlen);/* skip address */
+ pf.shost = dupprintf("%.*s", shostlen, shost);
pf.sport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
realpf = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
- logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port %d open request "
- "from %s:%d", pf.sport, peeraddr, peerport);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port %s:%d open request "
+ "from %s:%d", pf.shost, pf.sport, peeraddr, peerport);
+ sfree(pf.shost);
+
if (realpf == NULL) {
error = "Remote port is not recognised";
} else {
- const char *e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s,
- realpf->dhost,
- realpf->dport, c,
- ssh->conf,
- realpf->pfrec->addressfamily);
+ char *err;
+
+ if (realpf->share_ctx) {
+ /*
+ * This port forwarding is on behalf of a
+ * connection-sharing downstream, so abandon our own
+ * channel-open procedure and just pass the message on
+ * to sshshare.c.
+ */
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(realpf->share_ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ sfree(c);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ err = pfd_connect(&c->u.pfd.pf, realpf->dhost, realpf->dport,
+ c, ssh->conf, realpf->pfrec->addressfamily);
logeventf(ssh, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
"%s:%d", realpf->dhost, realpf->dport);
- if (e != NULL) {
- logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
+ if (err != NULL) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", err);
+ sfree(err);
error = "Port open failed";
} else {
logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
ssh2_channel_init(c);
c->v.v2.remwindow = winsize;
c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = pktsize;
+ if (our_winsize_override) {
+ c->v.v2.locwindow = c->v.v2.locmaxwin = c->v.v2.remlocwin =
+ our_winsize_override;
+ }
add234(ssh->channels, c);
pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
}
}
+void sshfwd_x11_sharing_handover(struct ssh_channel *c,
+ void *share_cs, void *share_chan,
+ const char *peer_addr, int peer_port,
+ int endian, int protomajor, int protominor,
+ const void *initial_data, int initial_len)
+{
+ /*
+ * This function is called when we've just discovered that an X
+ * forwarding channel on which we'd been handling the initial auth
+ * ourselves turns out to be destined for a connection-sharing
+ * downstream. So we turn the channel into a CHAN_SHARING, meaning
+ * that we completely stop tracking windows and buffering data and
+ * just pass more or less unmodified SSH messages back and forth.
+ */
+ c->type = CHAN_SHARING;
+ c->u.sharing.ctx = share_cs;
+ share_setup_x11_channel(share_cs, share_chan,
+ c->localid, c->remoteid, c->v.v2.remwindow,
+ c->v.v2.remmaxpkt, c->v.v2.locwindow,
+ peer_addr, peer_port, endian,
+ protomajor, protominor,
+ initial_data, initial_len);
+}
+
+void sshfwd_x11_is_local(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ /*
+ * This function is called when we've just discovered that an X
+ * forwarding channel is _not_ destined for a connection-sharing
+ * downstream but we're going to handle it ourselves. We stop
+ * presenting a cautiously small window and go into ordinary data
+ * exchange mode.
+ */
+ c->u.x11.initial = FALSE;
+ ssh2_set_window(c, ssh_is_simple(c->ssh) ? OUR_V2_BIGWIN : OUR_V2_WINSIZE);
+}
+
/*
* Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point,
* if we're going to display them.
pktout = ssh2_chanreq_init(ssh->mainchan, "x11-req",
ssh2_setup_x11, s);
ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0); /* many connections */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname);
- /*
- * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
- * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
- * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
- * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
- * cookie into the log.
- */
- dont_log_password(ssh, pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring);
- end_log_omission(ssh, pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, ssh->x11auth->protoname);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, ssh->x11auth->datastring);
ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->x11disp->screennum);
ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
static void ssh2_response_authconn(struct ssh_channel *c, struct Packet *pktin,
void *ctx)
{
- do_ssh2_authconn(c->ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
+ if (pktin)
+ do_ssh2_authconn(c->ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
}
-static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
struct Packet *pktin)
{
struct do_ssh2_authconn_state {
int got_username;
void *publickey_blob;
int publickey_bloblen;
- int publickey_encrypted;
+ int privatekey_available, privatekey_encrypted;
char *publickey_algorithm;
char *publickey_comment;
unsigned char agent_request[5], *agent_response, *agentp;
s->done_service_req = FALSE;
s->we_are_in = s->userauth_success = FALSE;
+ s->agent_response = NULL;
#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
s->tried_gssapi = FALSE;
#endif
- if (!conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_userauth)) {
- /*
- * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
- */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-userauth");
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
- if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
- s->done_service_req = TRUE;
- }
- if (!s->done_service_req) {
- /*
- * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
- */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
- if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
- s->we_are_in = TRUE; /* no auth required */
- } else {
- bombout(("Server refused service request"));
- crStopV;
- }
+ if (!ssh->bare_connection) {
+ if (!conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_userauth)) {
+ /*
+ * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-userauth");
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
+ s->done_service_req = TRUE;
+ }
+ if (!s->done_service_req) {
+ /*
+ * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
+ s->we_are_in = TRUE; /* no auth required */
+ } else {
+ bombout(("Server refused service request"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ s->we_are_in = TRUE;
}
/* Arrange to be able to deal with any BANNERs that come in.
s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
if (!filename_is_null(s->keyfile)) {
int keytype;
- logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
+ logeventf(ssh, "Reading key file \"%.150s\"",
filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
keytype = key_type(s->keyfile);
- if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2) {
+ if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2 ||
+ keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_RFC4716 ||
+ keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_OPENSSH) {
const char *error;
s->publickey_blob =
ssh2_userkey_loadpub(s->keyfile,
&s->publickey_bloblen,
&s->publickey_comment, &error);
if (s->publickey_blob) {
- s->publickey_encrypted =
+ s->privatekey_available = (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2);
+ if (!s->privatekey_available)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Key file contains public key only");
+ s->privatekey_encrypted =
ssh2_userkey_encrypted(s->keyfile, NULL);
} else {
char *msgbuf;
- logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)",
+ logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load key (%s)",
error);
- msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
+ msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load key file "
"\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
error);
}
} else if (s->can_pubkey && s->publickey_blob &&
- !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
+ s->privatekey_available && !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
struct ssh2_userkey *key; /* not live over crReturn */
char *passphrase; /* not live over crReturn */
key = NULL;
while (!key) {
const char *error; /* not live over crReturn */
- if (s->publickey_encrypted) {
+ if (s->privatekey_encrypted) {
/*
* Get a passphrase from the user.
*/
logevent("Sent public key signature");
s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
key->alg->freekey(key->data);
+ sfree(key->comment);
+ sfree(key);
}
#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->num_prompts);
for (i=0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
- dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
s->cur_prompt->prompts[i]->result);
- end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
}
ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
/* service requested */
ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
- dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
- end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
logevent("Sent password");
s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
int prompt_len; /* not live over crReturn */
{
- char *msg;
+ const char *msg;
if (changereq_first_time)
msg = "Server requested password change";
else
/* service requested */
ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
- dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result);
free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
- end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
logevent("Sent new password");
/* Clear up various bits and pieces from authentication. */
if (s->publickey_blob) {
+ sfree(s->publickey_algorithm);
sfree(s->publickey_blob);
sfree(s->publickey_comment);
}
if (s->agent_response)
sfree(s->agent_response);
- if (s->userauth_success) {
+ if (s->userauth_success && !ssh->bare_connection) {
/*
* We've just received USERAUTH_SUCCESS, and we haven't sent any
* packets since. Signal the transport layer to consider enacting
do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "enabling delayed compression", -2, NULL);
}
- /*
- * Now the connection protocol has started, one way or another.
- */
-
ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
/*
ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_channel_response;
ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_channel_response;
+ /*
+ * Now the connection protocol is properly up and running, with
+ * all those dispatch table entries, so it's safe to let
+ * downstreams start trying to open extra channels through us.
+ */
+ if (ssh->connshare)
+ share_activate(ssh->connshare, ssh->v_s);
- if (ssh->mainchan && conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple)) {
+ if (ssh->mainchan && ssh_is_simple(ssh)) {
/*
* This message indicates to the server that we promise
* not to try to run any other channel in parallel with
*/
/* Potentially enable X11 forwarding. */
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_forward) &&
- (ssh->x11disp =
- x11_setup_display(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_display),
- conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_auth),
- ssh->conf)))
- ssh2_setup_x11(ssh->mainchan, NULL, NULL);
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_forward)) {
+ ssh->x11disp =
+ x11_setup_display(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_display),
+ ssh->conf);
+ if (!ssh->x11disp) {
+ /* FIXME: return an error message from x11_setup_display */
+ logevent("X11 forwarding not enabled: unable to"
+ " initialise X display");
+ } else {
+ ssh->x11auth = x11_invent_fake_auth
+ (ssh->x11authtree, conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_auth));
+ ssh->x11auth->disp = ssh->x11disp;
+
+ ssh2_setup_x11(ssh->mainchan, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ }
/* Potentially enable agent forwarding. */
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_agentfwd) && agent_exists())
+ if (ssh_agent_forwarding_permitted(ssh))
ssh2_setup_agent(ssh->mainchan, NULL, NULL);
/* Now allocate a pty for the session. */
* Transfer data!
*/
if (ssh->ldisc)
- ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
+ ldisc_echoedit_update(ssh->ldisc); /* cause ldisc to notice changes */
if (ssh->mainchan)
ssh->send_ok = 1;
while (1) {
ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
}
+static void ssh2_bare_connection_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented;
+
+ /*
+ * Initially, we set all ssh-connection messages to 'unexpected';
+ * do_ssh2_authconn will fill things in properly. We also handle a
+ * couple of messages from the transport protocol which aren't
+ * related to key exchange (UNIMPLEMENTED, IGNORE, DEBUG,
+ * DISCONNECT).
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+
+ /*
+ * These messages have a special handler from the start.
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh2_msg_disconnect;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
+}
+
static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, unsigned long now)
{
Ssh ssh = (Ssh)ctx;
if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
return;
- if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != 0 &&
+ if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && !ssh->bare_connection &&
+ conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != 0 &&
now == ssh->next_rekey) {
do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "timeout", -1, NULL);
}
}
-static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen,
struct Packet *pktin)
{
- unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
+ const unsigned char *in = (const unsigned char *)vin;
if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
return;
do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
}
+static void ssh2_bare_connection_protocol(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ const unsigned char *in = (const unsigned char *)vin;
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (pktin)
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
+ else
+ do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
+}
+
static void ssh_cache_conf_values(Ssh ssh)
{
ssh->logomitdata = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitdata);
* Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
*/
static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
- Conf *conf, char *host, int port, char **realhost,
+ Conf *conf,
+ const char *host, int port, char **realhost,
int nodelay, int keepalive)
{
const char *p;
ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
ssh->x11disp = NULL;
+ ssh->x11auth = NULL;
+ ssh->x11authtree = newtree234(x11_authcmp);
ssh->v1_compressing = FALSE;
ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence = 0;
ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
+ ssh->ssh2_bare_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate = 0;
ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate = 0;
ssh->do_ssh_init_state = NULL;
+ ssh->do_ssh_connection_init_state = NULL;
ssh->do_ssh1_login_state = NULL;
ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state = NULL;
ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state = NULL;
ssh->username = NULL;
ssh->sent_console_eof = FALSE;
ssh->got_pty = FALSE;
+ ssh->bare_connection = FALSE;
+ ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = FALSE;
+ ssh->connshare = NULL;
+ ssh->attempting_connshare = FALSE;
*backend_handle = ssh;
ssh->gsslibs = NULL;
#endif
+ random_ref(); /* do this now - may be needed by sharing setup code */
+
p = connect_to_host(ssh, host, port, realhost, nodelay, keepalive);
- if (p != NULL)
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ random_unref();
return p;
-
- random_ref();
+ }
return NULL;
}
Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
struct ssh_channel *c;
struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
+ struct X11FakeAuth *auth;
if (ssh->v1_cipher_ctx)
ssh->cipher->free_context(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx);
while ((c = delpos234(ssh->channels, 0)) != NULL) {
switch (c->type) {
case CHAN_X11:
- if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
- x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
+ if (c->u.x11.xconn != NULL)
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.xconn);
break;
case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
- if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
- pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ if (c->u.pfd.pf != NULL)
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.pf);
break;
}
if (ssh->version == 2) {
ssh->channels = NULL;
}
+ if (ssh->connshare)
+ sharestate_free(ssh->connshare);
+
if (ssh->rportfwds) {
while ((pf = delpos234(ssh->rportfwds, 0)) != NULL)
free_rportfwd(pf);
sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
if (ssh->x11disp)
x11_free_display(ssh->x11disp);
+ while ((auth = delpos234(ssh->x11authtree, 0)) != NULL)
+ x11_free_fake_auth(auth);
+ freetree234(ssh->x11authtree);
sfree(ssh->do_ssh_init_state);
sfree(ssh->do_ssh1_login_state);
sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state);
static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle, Conf *conf)
{
Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- char *rekeying = NULL, rekey_mandatory = FALSE;
+ const char *rekeying = NULL;
+ int rekey_mandatory = FALSE;
unsigned long old_max_data_size;
int i, rekey_time;
ssh->conf = conf_copy(conf);
ssh_cache_conf_values(ssh);
- if (rekeying) {
+ if (!ssh->bare_connection && rekeying) {
if (!ssh->kex_in_progress) {
do_ssh2_transport(ssh, rekeying, -1, NULL);
} else if (rekey_mandatory) {
/*
* Called to send data down the SSH connection.
*/
-static int ssh_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
+static int ssh_send(void *handle, const char *buf, int len)
{
Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
return 0;
- ssh->protocol(ssh, (unsigned char *)buf, len, 0);
+ ssh->protocol(ssh, (const unsigned char *)buf, len, 0);
return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh);
}
} else if (ssh->version == 2) {
if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE))
ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_ignore_special);
- if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY))
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY) && !ssh->bare_connection)
ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_rekey_special);
if (ssh->mainchan)
ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials);
}
}
} else if (code == TS_REKEY) {
- if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->version == 2) {
+ if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && !ssh->bare_connection &&
+ ssh->version == 2) {
do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL);
}
} else if (code == TS_BRK) {
}
} else {
/* Is is a POSIX signal? */
- char *signame = NULL;
+ const char *signame = NULL;
if (code == TS_SIGABRT) signame = "ABRT";
if (code == TS_SIGALRM) signame = "ALRM";
if (code == TS_SIGFPE) signame = "FPE";
}
}
-void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, Socket s)
+void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, struct PortForwarding *pf)
{
Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
struct ssh_channel *c;
ssh2_channel_init(c);
c->halfopen = TRUE;
c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT;/* identify channel type */
- c->u.pfd.s = s;
+ c->u.pfd.pf = pf;
add234(ssh->channels, c);
return c;
}
+unsigned ssh_alloc_sharing_channel(Ssh ssh, void *sharing_ctx)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+
+ c->ssh = ssh;
+ ssh2_channel_init(c);
+ c->type = CHAN_SHARING;
+ c->u.sharing.ctx = sharing_ctx;
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ return c->localid;
+}
+
+void ssh_delete_sharing_channel(Ssh ssh, unsigned localid)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (c)
+ ssh_channel_destroy(c);
+}
+
+void ssh_send_packet_from_downstream(Ssh ssh, unsigned id, int type,
+ const void *data, int datalen,
+ const char *additional_log_text)
+{
+ struct Packet *pkt;
+
+ pkt = ssh2_pkt_init(type);
+ pkt->downstream_id = id;
+ pkt->additional_log_text = additional_log_text;
+ ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, datalen);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pkt);
+}
+
/*
* This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
* from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
ssh2_set_window(ssh->mainchan,
bufsize < ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple))
+ if (ssh_is_simple(ssh))
buflimit = 0;
else
buflimit = ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin;
ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
}
-void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, char *hostname, int port, char *org)
+void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, const char *hostname, int port,
+ const char *org)
{
struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)channel;
Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
PKT_END);
} else {
pktout = ssh2_chanopen_init(c, "direct-tcpip");
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, hostname);
+ {
+ char *trimmed_host = host_strduptrim(hostname);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, trimmed_host);
+ sfree(trimmed_host);
+ }
ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, port);
/*
* We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
}
/*
- * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
- * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
+ * cfg_info for SSH is the protocol running in this session.
+ * (1 or 2 for the full SSH-1 or SSH-2 protocol; -1 for the bare
+ * SSH-2 connection protocol, i.e. a downstream; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
*/
static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle)
{
Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- return ssh->version;
+ if (ssh->version == 0)
+ return 0; /* don't know yet */
+ else if (ssh->bare_connection)
+ return -1;
+ else
+ return ssh->version;
}
/*
projects / PuTTY.git / blobdiff