struct Packet *pktin);
static void ssh2_channel_check_close(struct ssh_channel *c);
static void ssh_channel_destroy(struct ssh_channel *c);
+static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
/*
* Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
}
}
+ /*
+ * RFC 4253 doesn't explicitly say that completely empty packets
+ * with no type byte are forbidden, so treat them as deserving
+ * an SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
+ */
+ if (st->pktin->length <= 5) { /* == 5 we hope, but robustness */
+ ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(ssh, st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
/*
* pktin->body and pktin->length should identify the semantic
* content of the packet, excluding the initial type byte.
}
ssh_fix_verstring(verstring + strlen(protoname));
+#ifdef FUZZING
+ /* FUZZING make PuTTY insecure, so make live use difficult. */
+ verstring[0] = 'I';
+#endif
if (ssh->version == 2) {
size_t len;
"rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
sfree(keystr);
+#ifdef FUZZING
+ s->dlgret = 1;
+#endif
if (s->dlgret < 0) {
do {
crReturn(0);
/* List encryption algorithms (client->server then server->client). */
for (k = KEXLIST_CSCIPHER; k <= KEXLIST_SCCIPHER; k++) {
warn = FALSE;
+#ifdef FUZZING
+ alg = ssh2_kexinit_addalg(s->kexlists[k], "none");
+ alg->u.cipher.cipher = NULL;
+ alg->u.cipher.warn = warn;
+#endif /* FUZZING */
for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
if (!c) warn = TRUE;
}
/* List MAC algorithms (client->server then server->client). */
for (j = KEXLIST_CSMAC; j <= KEXLIST_SCMAC; j++) {
+#ifdef FUZZING
+ alg = ssh2_kexinit_addalg(s->kexlists[j], "none");
+ alg->u.mac.mac = NULL;
+ alg->u.mac.etm = FALSE;
+#endif /* FUZZING */
for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
alg = ssh2_kexinit_addalg(s->kexlists[j], s->maclist[i]->name);
alg->u.mac.mac = s->maclist[i];
{
int csbits, scbits;
- csbits = s->cscipher_tobe->real_keybits;
- scbits = s->sccipher_tobe->real_keybits;
+ csbits = s->cscipher_tobe ? s->cscipher_tobe->real_keybits : 0;
+ scbits = s->sccipher_tobe ? s->sccipher_tobe->real_keybits : 0;
s->nbits = (csbits > scbits ? csbits : scbits);
}
/* The keys only have hlen-bit entropy, since they're based on
dmemdump(s->exchange_hash, ssh->kex->hash->hlen);
#endif
- if (!s->hkey ||
- !ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
+ if (!s->hkey) {
+ bombout(("Server's host key is invalid"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
(char *)s->exchange_hash,
ssh->kex->hash->hlen)) {
+#ifndef FUZZING
bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
crStopV;
+#endif
}
s->keystr = ssh->hostkey->fmtkey(s->hkey);
ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
s->fingerprint,
ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+#ifdef FUZZING
+ s->dlgret = 1;
+#endif
if (s->dlgret < 0) {
do {
crReturnV;
* the one we saw before.
*/
if (strcmp(ssh->hostkey_str, s->keystr)) {
+#ifndef FUZZING
bombout(("Host key was different in repeat key exchange"));
crStopV;
+#endif
}
sfree(s->keystr);
}
if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe;
- ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
+ if (ssh->cscipher) ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
ssh->csmac_etm = s->csmac_etm_tobe;
- ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
+ if (ssh->csmac)
+ ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
* Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
* hash from the _first_ key exchange.
*/
- {
+ if (ssh->cscipher) {
unsigned char *key;
key = ssh2_mkkey(ssh, s->K, s->exchange_hash, 'C',
ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, key);
smemclr(key, ssh->cscipher->blksize);
sfree(key);
+ }
+ if (ssh->csmac) {
+ unsigned char *key;
key = ssh2_mkkey(ssh, s->K, s->exchange_hash, 'E',
ssh->csmac->keylen);
sfree(key);
}
- logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
- ssh->cscipher->text_name);
- logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm%s%s",
- ssh->csmac->text_name,
- ssh->csmac_etm ? " (in ETM mode)" : "",
- ssh->cscipher->required_mac ? " (required by cipher)" : "");
+ if (ssh->cscipher)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
+ ssh->cscipher->text_name);
+ if (ssh->csmac)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm%s%s",
+ ssh->csmac->text_name,
+ ssh->csmac_etm ? " (in ETM mode)" : "",
+ ssh->cscipher->required_mac ? " (required by cipher)" : "");
if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
ssh->cscomp->text_name);
*/
if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
- ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
- ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
+ if (ssh->sccipher) {
+ ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
+ ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
+ }
if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
- ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
- ssh->scmac_etm = s->scmac_etm_tobe;
- ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
+ if (ssh->scmac) {
+ ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
+ ssh->scmac_etm = s->scmac_etm_tobe;
+ ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
+ }
if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
* Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
* hash from the _first_ key exchange.
*/
- {
+ if (ssh->sccipher) {
unsigned char *key;
key = ssh2_mkkey(ssh, s->K, s->exchange_hash, 'D',
ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, key);
smemclr(key, ssh->sccipher->blksize);
sfree(key);
+ }
+ if (ssh->scmac) {
+ unsigned char *key;
key = ssh2_mkkey(ssh, s->K, s->exchange_hash, 'F',
ssh->scmac->keylen);
smemclr(key, ssh->scmac->keylen);
sfree(key);
}
- logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
- ssh->sccipher->text_name);
- logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm%s%s",
- ssh->scmac->text_name,
- ssh->scmac_etm ? " (in ETM mode)" : "",
- ssh->sccipher->required_mac ? " (required by cipher)" : "");
+ if (ssh->sccipher)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
+ ssh->sccipher->text_name);
+ if (ssh->scmac)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm%s%s",
+ ssh->scmac->text_name,
+ ssh->scmac_etm ? " (in ETM mode)" : "",
+ ssh->sccipher->required_mac ? " (required by cipher)" : "");
if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
ssh->sccomp->text_name);
projects / PuTTY.git / blobdiff