lenbuf[0] = bignum_byte(b, len);
SHA512_Bytes(s, lenbuf, 1);
}
- memset(lenbuf, 0, sizeof(lenbuf));
+ smemclr(lenbuf, sizeof(lenbuf));
}
/*
- * This function is a wrapper on modpow(). It has the same effect
- * as modpow(), but employs RSA blinding to protect against timing
- * attacks.
+ * Compute (base ^ exp) % mod, provided mod == p * q, with p,q
+ * distinct primes, and iqmp is the multiplicative inverse of q mod p.
+ * Uses Chinese Remainder Theorem to speed computation up over the
+ * obvious implementation of a single big modpow.
+ */
+Bignum crt_modpow(Bignum base, Bignum exp, Bignum mod,
+ Bignum p, Bignum q, Bignum iqmp)
+{
+ Bignum pm1, qm1, pexp, qexp, presult, qresult, diff, multiplier, ret0, ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Reduce the exponent mod phi(p) and phi(q), to save time when
+ * exponentiating mod p and mod q respectively. Of course, since p
+ * and q are prime, phi(p) == p-1 and similarly for q.
+ */
+ pm1 = copybn(p);
+ decbn(pm1);
+ qm1 = copybn(q);
+ decbn(qm1);
+ pexp = bigmod(exp, pm1);
+ qexp = bigmod(exp, qm1);
+
+ /*
+ * Do the two modpows.
+ */
+ presult = modpow(base, pexp, p);
+ qresult = modpow(base, qexp, q);
+
+ /*
+ * Recombine the results. We want a value which is congruent to
+ * qresult mod q, and to presult mod p.
+ *
+ * We know that iqmp * q is congruent to 1 * mod p (by definition
+ * of iqmp) and to 0 mod q (obviously). So we start with qresult
+ * (which is congruent to qresult mod both primes), and add on
+ * (presult-qresult) * (iqmp * q) which adjusts it to be congruent
+ * to presult mod p without affecting its value mod q.
+ */
+ if (bignum_cmp(presult, qresult) < 0) {
+ /*
+ * Can't subtract presult from qresult without first adding on
+ * p.
+ */
+ Bignum tmp = presult;
+ presult = bigadd(presult, p);
+ freebn(tmp);
+ }
+ diff = bigsub(presult, qresult);
+ multiplier = bigmul(iqmp, q);
+ ret0 = bigmuladd(multiplier, diff, qresult);
+
+ /*
+ * Finally, reduce the result mod n.
+ */
+ ret = bigmod(ret0, mod);
+
+ /*
+ * Free all the intermediate results before returning.
+ */
+ freebn(pm1);
+ freebn(qm1);
+ freebn(pexp);
+ freebn(qexp);
+ freebn(presult);
+ freebn(qresult);
+ freebn(diff);
+ freebn(multiplier);
+ freebn(ret0);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is a wrapper on modpow(). It has the same effect as
+ * modpow(), but employs RSA blinding to protect against timing
+ * attacks and also uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem (implemented
+ * above, in crt_modpow()) to speed up the main operation.
*/
static Bignum rsa_privkey_op(Bignum input, struct RSAKey *key)
{
bitsleft--;
bignum_set_bit(random, bits, v);
}
+ bn_restore_invariant(random);
/*
* Now check that this number is strictly greater than
bignum_cmp(random, key->modulus) >= 0) {
freebn(random);
continue;
- } else {
- break;
}
+
+ /*
+ * Also, make sure it has an inverse mod modulus.
+ */
+ random_inverse = modinv(random, key->modulus);
+ if (!random_inverse) {
+ freebn(random);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ break;
}
/*
* _y^d_, and use the _public_ exponent to compute (y^d)^e = y
* from it, which is much faster to do.
*/
- random_encrypted = modpow(random, key->exponent, key->modulus);
- random_inverse = modinv(random, key->modulus);
+ random_encrypted = crt_modpow(random, key->exponent,
+ key->modulus, key->p, key->q, key->iqmp);
input_blinded = modmul(input, random_encrypted, key->modulus);
- ret_blinded = modpow(input_blinded, key->private_exponent, key->modulus);
+ ret_blinded = crt_modpow(input_blinded, key->private_exponent,
+ key->modulus, key->p, key->q, key->iqmp);
ret = modmul(ret_blinded, random_inverse, key->modulus);
freebn(ret_blinded);
pm1 = copybn(key->p);
decbn(pm1);
ed = modmul(key->exponent, key->private_exponent, pm1);
+ freebn(pm1);
cmp = bignum_cmp(ed, One);
- sfree(ed);
+ freebn(ed);
if (cmp != 0)
return 0;
qm1 = copybn(key->q);
decbn(qm1);
ed = modmul(key->exponent, key->private_exponent, qm1);
+ freebn(qm1);
cmp = bignum_cmp(ed, One);
- sfree(ed);
+ freebn(ed);
if (cmp != 0)
return 0;
freebn(key->iqmp);
key->iqmp = modinv(key->q, key->p);
+ if (!key->iqmp)
+ return 0;
}
/*
*/
n = modmul(key->iqmp, key->q, key->p);
cmp = bignum_cmp(n, One);
- sfree(n);
+ freebn(n);
if (cmp != 0)
return 0;
*p = NULL;
if (*datalen < 4)
return;
- *length = GET_32BIT(*data);
+ *length = toint(GET_32BIT(*data));
+ if (*length < 0)
+ return;
*datalen -= 4;
*data += 4;
if (*datalen < *length)
return b;
}
+static void rsa2_freekey(void *key); /* forward reference */
+
static void *rsa2_newkey(char *data, int len)
{
char *p;
struct RSAKey *rsa;
rsa = snew(struct RSAKey);
- if (!rsa)
- return NULL;
getstring(&data, &len, &p, &slen);
if (!p || slen != 7 || memcmp(p, "ssh-rsa", 7)) {
rsa->p = rsa->q = rsa->iqmp = NULL;
rsa->comment = NULL;
+ if (!rsa->exponent || !rsa->modulus) {
+ rsa2_freekey(rsa);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
return rsa;
}
struct RSAKey *rsa;
rsa = snew(struct RSAKey);
- if (!rsa)
- return NULL;
rsa->comment = NULL;
rsa->modulus = getmp(b, len);
if (!rsa->modulus || !rsa->exponent || !rsa->private_exponent ||
!rsa->iqmp || !rsa->p || !rsa->q) {
- sfree(rsa->modulus);
- sfree(rsa->exponent);
- sfree(rsa->private_exponent);
- sfree(rsa->iqmp);
- sfree(rsa->p);
- sfree(rsa->q);
- sfree(rsa);
+ rsa2_freekey(rsa);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!rsa_verify(rsa)) {
+ rsa2_freekey(rsa);
return NULL;
}
int ret;
rsa = rsa2_newkey((char *) blob, len);
+ if (!rsa)
+ return -1;
ret = bignum_bitcount(rsa->modulus);
rsa2_freekey(rsa);
return 0;
}
in = getmp(&sig, &siglen);
+ if (!in)
+ return 0;
out = modpow(in, rsa->exponent, rsa->modulus);
freebn(in);