X-Git-Url: https://asedeno.scripts.mit.edu/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=psftp.c;h=250a5fcc2f8e72c4b7afc9f4a139ed0182869d44;hb=382ffaf0262c8b552cf5bd32dbf922ceacbf921d;hp=137320b83d57e26989415f061bacd7709a29b0f2;hpb=7692bf350a03be7a50390bdddbdb7b3419d4eaa0;p=PuTTY.git

diff --git a/psftp.c b/psftp.c
index 137320b8..250a5fcc 100644
--- a/psftp.c
+++ b/psftp.c
@@ -130,6 +130,30 @@ char *canonify(char *name)
     }
 }
 
+/*
+ * Return a pointer to the portion of str that comes after the last
+ * slash (or backslash or colon, if `local' is TRUE).
+ */
+static char *stripslashes(char *str, int local)
+{
+    char *p;
+
+    if (local) {
+        p = strchr(str, ':');
+        if (p) str = p+1;
+    }
+
+    p = strrchr(str, '/');
+    if (p) str = p+1;
+
+    if (local) {
+	p = strrchr(str, '\\');
+	if (p) str = p+1;
+    }
+
+    return str;
+}
+
 /* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
  * Actual sftp commands.
  */
@@ -307,7 +331,8 @@ int sftp_general_get(struct sftp_command *cmd, int restart)
 	printf("%s: %s\n", cmd->words[1], fxp_error());
 	return 0;
     }
-    outfname = (cmd->nwords == 2 ? cmd->words[1] : cmd->words[2]);
+    outfname = (cmd->nwords == 2 ?
+		stripslashes(cmd->words[1], 0) : cmd->words[2]);
 
     fh = fxp_open(fname, SSH_FXF_READ);
     if (!fh) {
@@ -406,7 +431,8 @@ int sftp_general_put(struct sftp_command *cmd, int restart)
     }
 
     fname = cmd->words[1];
-    origoutfname = (cmd->nwords == 2 ? cmd->words[1] : cmd->words[2]);
+    origoutfname = (cmd->nwords == 2 ?
+		    stripslashes(cmd->words[1], 1) : cmd->words[2]);
     outfname = canonify(origoutfname);
     if (!outfname) {
 	printf("%s: %s\n", origoutfname, fxp_error());
@@ -1335,6 +1361,25 @@ void askcipher(char *ciphername, int cs)
     }
 }
 
+/*
+ * Warn about the obsolescent key file format.
+ */
+void old_keyfile_warning(void)
+{
+    static const char message[] =
+	"You are loading an SSH 2 private key which has an\n"
+	"old version of the file format. This means your key\n"
+	"file is not fully tamperproof. Future versions of\n"
+	"PuTTY may stop supporting this private key format,\n"
+	"so we recommend you convert your key to the new\n"
+	"format.\n"
+	"\n"
+	"Once the key is loaded into PuTTYgen, you can perform\n"
+	"this conversion simply by saving it again.\n";
+
+    fputs(message, stderr);
+}
+
 /*
  *  Print an error message and perform a fatal exit.
  */
@@ -1369,7 +1414,7 @@ void logevent(char *string)
 {
 }
 
-void ldisc_send(char *buf, int len)
+void ldisc_send(char *buf, int len, int interactive)
 {
     /*
      * This is only here because of the calls to ldisc_send(NULL,
@@ -1684,6 +1729,32 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	cfg.port = 22;
     }
 
+    /*
+     * Trim leading whitespace off the hostname if it's there.
+     */
+    {
+	int space = strspn(cfg.host, " \t");
+	memmove(cfg.host, cfg.host+space, 1+strlen(cfg.host)-space);
+    }
+
+    /* See if host is of the form user@host */
+    if (cfg.host[0] != '\0') {
+	char *atsign = strchr(cfg.host, '@');
+	/* Make sure we're not overflowing the user field */
+	if (atsign) {
+	    if (atsign - cfg.host < sizeof cfg.username) {
+		strncpy(cfg.username, cfg.host, atsign - cfg.host);
+		cfg.username[atsign - cfg.host] = '\0';
+	    }
+	    memmove(cfg.host, atsign + 1, 1 + strlen(atsign + 1));
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Trim a colon suffix off the hostname if it's there.
+     */
+    cfg.host[strcspn(cfg.host, ":")] = '\0';
+
     /* Set username */
     if (user != NULL && user[0] != '\0') {
 	strncpy(cfg.username, user, sizeof(cfg.username) - 1);
@@ -1749,7 +1820,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 
     back = &ssh_backend;
 
-    err = back->init(cfg.host, cfg.port, &realhost);
+    err = back->init(cfg.host, cfg.port, &realhost, 0);
     if (err != NULL) {
 	fprintf(stderr, "ssh_init: %s", err);
 	return 1;