X-Git-Url: https://asedeno.scripts.mit.edu/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssh.c;h=d03f2967523ca40ccf0ffbecce4c0faa2dd6a961;hb=d06098622ce0d7dbbf29185dcdae8ed8a4c99823;hp=ee9798af5e6d6485440afc544a8dc9c25968c416;hpb=28f67586f568a3ec0388f58b5a87fa5cfed1a637;p=PuTTY.git diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c index ee9798af..d03f2967 100644 --- a/ssh.c +++ b/ssh.c @@ -408,10 +408,17 @@ static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin); #define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL #define OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT 0x9000UL -const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = { - &ssh_ecdsa_ed25519, - &ssh_ecdsa_nistp256, &ssh_ecdsa_nistp384, &ssh_ecdsa_nistp521, - &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss +struct ssh_signkey_with_user_pref_id { + const struct ssh_signkey *alg; + int id; +}; +const static struct ssh_signkey_with_user_pref_id hostkey_algs[] = { + { &ssh_ecdsa_ed25519, HK_ED25519 }, + { &ssh_ecdsa_nistp256, HK_ECDSA }, + { &ssh_ecdsa_nistp384, HK_ECDSA }, + { &ssh_ecdsa_nistp521, HK_ECDSA }, + { &ssh_dss, HK_DSA }, + { &ssh_rsa, HK_RSA }, }; const static struct ssh_mac *macs[] = { @@ -6242,7 +6249,10 @@ struct kexinit_algorithm { const struct ssh_kex *kex; int warn; } kex; - const struct ssh_signkey *hostkey; + struct { + const struct ssh_signkey *hostkey; + int warn; + } hk; struct { const struct ssh2_cipher *cipher; int warn; @@ -6297,7 +6307,7 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen, "server-to-client compression method" }; struct do_ssh2_transport_state { int crLine; - int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher; + int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_hk, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher; Bignum p, g, e, f, K; void *our_kexinit; int our_kexinitlen; @@ -6319,6 +6329,8 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen, unsigned char exchange_hash[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN]; int n_preferred_kex; const struct ssh_kexes *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX]; + int n_preferred_hk; + int preferred_hk[HK_MAX]; int n_preferred_ciphers; const struct ssh2_ciphers *preferred_ciphers[CIPHER_MAX]; const struct ssh_compress *preferred_comp; @@ -6395,6 +6407,20 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen, } } + /* + * Set up the preferred host key types. These are just the ids + * in the enum in putty.h, so 'warn below here' is indicated + * by HK_WARN. + */ + s->n_preferred_hk = 0; + for (i = 0; i < HK_MAX; i++) { + int id = conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_hklist, i); + /* As above, don't bother with HK_WARN if it's last in the + * list */ + if (id != HK_WARN || i < HK_MAX - 1) + s->preferred_hk[s->n_preferred_hk++] = id; + } + /* * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here) */ @@ -6471,20 +6497,43 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen, * In the first key exchange, we list all the algorithms * we're prepared to cope with, but prefer those algorithms * for which we have a host key for this host. + * + * If the host key algorithm is below the warning + * threshold, we warn even if we did already have a key + * for it, on the basis that if the user has just + * reconfigured that host key type to be warned about, + * they surely _do_ want to be alerted that a server + * they're actually connecting to is using it. */ - for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) { - if (have_ssh_host_key(ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport, - hostkey_algs[i]->keytype)) { - alg = ssh2_kexinit_addalg(s->kexlists[KEXLIST_HOSTKEY], - hostkey_algs[i]->name); - alg->u.hostkey = hostkey_algs[i]; - } - } - for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) { - alg = ssh2_kexinit_addalg(s->kexlists[KEXLIST_HOSTKEY], - hostkey_algs[i]->name); - alg->u.hostkey = hostkey_algs[i]; + warn = FALSE; + for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_hk; i++) { + if (s->preferred_hk[i] == HK_WARN) + warn = TRUE; + for (j = 0; j < lenof(hostkey_algs); j++) { + if (hostkey_algs[j].id != s->preferred_hk[i]) + continue; + if (have_ssh_host_key(ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport, + hostkey_algs[j].alg->keytype)) { + alg = ssh2_kexinit_addalg(s->kexlists[KEXLIST_HOSTKEY], + hostkey_algs[j].alg->name); + alg->u.hk.hostkey = hostkey_algs[j].alg; + alg->u.hk.warn = warn; + } + } } + warn = FALSE; + for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_hk; i++) { + if (s->preferred_hk[i] == HK_WARN) + warn = TRUE; + for (j = 0; j < lenof(hostkey_algs); j++) { + if (hostkey_algs[j].id != s->preferred_hk[i]) + continue; + alg = ssh2_kexinit_addalg(s->kexlists[KEXLIST_HOSTKEY], + hostkey_algs[j].alg->name); + alg->u.hk.hostkey = hostkey_algs[j].alg; + alg->u.hk.warn = warn; + } + } } else { /* * In subsequent key exchanges, we list only the kex @@ -6496,7 +6545,8 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen, assert(ssh->kex); alg = ssh2_kexinit_addalg(s->kexlists[KEXLIST_HOSTKEY], ssh->hostkey->name); - alg->u.hostkey = ssh->hostkey; + alg->u.hk.hostkey = ssh->hostkey; + alg->u.hk.warn = FALSE; } /* List encryption algorithms (client->server then server->client). */ for (k = KEXLIST_CSCIPHER; k <= KEXLIST_SCCIPHER; k++) { @@ -6617,7 +6667,8 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen, s->scmac_tobe = NULL; s->cscomp_tobe = NULL; s->sccomp_tobe = NULL; - s->warn_kex = s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE; + s->warn_kex = s->warn_hk = FALSE; + s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE; pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */ @@ -6661,7 +6712,8 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen, ssh->kex = alg->u.kex.kex; s->warn_kex = alg->u.kex.warn; } else if (i == KEXLIST_HOSTKEY) { - ssh->hostkey = alg->u.hostkey; + ssh->hostkey = alg->u.hk.hostkey; + s->warn_hk = alg->u.hk.warn; } else if (i == KEXLIST_CSCIPHER) { s->cscipher_tobe = alg->u.cipher.cipher; s->warn_cscipher = alg->u.cipher.warn; @@ -6707,10 +6759,11 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen, ssh->n_uncert_hostkeys = 0; for (j = 0; j < lenof(hostkey_algs); j++) { - if (hostkey_algs[j] != ssh->hostkey && - in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[j]->name, str, len) && + if (hostkey_algs[j].alg != ssh->hostkey && + in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[j].alg->name, + str, len) && !have_ssh_host_key(ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport, - hostkey_algs[j]->keytype)) { + hostkey_algs[j].alg->keytype)) { ssh->uncert_hostkeys[ssh->n_uncert_hostkeys++] = j; } } @@ -6759,6 +6812,30 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen, } } + if (s->warn_hk) { + ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1); + s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "host key type", + ssh->hostkey->name, + ssh_dialog_callback, ssh); + if (s->dlgret < 0) { + do { + crReturnV; + if (pktin) { + bombout(("Unexpected data from server while" + " waiting for user response")); + crStopV; + } + } while (pktin || inlen > 0); + s->dlgret = ssh->user_response; + } + ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0); + if (s->dlgret == 0) { + ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key warning", NULL, + 0, TRUE); + crStopV; + } + } + if (s->warn_cscipher) { ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1); s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, @@ -7183,16 +7260,16 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen, int i, j = 0; char *list = NULL; for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) { - if (hostkey_algs[i] == ssh->hostkey) + if (hostkey_algs[i].alg == ssh->hostkey) /* Not worth mentioning key types we wouldn't use */ break; else if (ssh->uncert_hostkeys[j] == i) { char *newlist; if (list) newlist = dupprintf("%s/%s", list, - hostkey_algs[i]->name); + hostkey_algs[i].alg->name); else - newlist = dupprintf("%s", hostkey_algs[i]->name); + newlist = dupprintf("%s", hostkey_algs[i].alg->name); sfree(list); list = newlist; j++; @@ -11518,7 +11595,7 @@ static const struct telnet_special *ssh_get_specials(void *handle) for (i = 0; i < ssh->n_uncert_hostkeys; i++) { struct telnet_special uncert[1]; const struct ssh_signkey *alg = - hostkey_algs[ssh->uncert_hostkeys[i]]; + hostkey_algs[ssh->uncert_hostkeys[i]].alg; uncert[0].name = alg->name; uncert[0].code = TS_LOCALSTART + ssh->uncert_hostkeys[i]; ADD_SPECIALS(uncert); @@ -11586,7 +11663,7 @@ static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code) do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL); } } else if (code >= TS_LOCALSTART) { - ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[code - TS_LOCALSTART]; + ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[code - TS_LOCALSTART].alg; ssh->cross_certifying = TRUE; if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && !ssh->bare_connection && ssh->version == 2) {