f2fs: remove f2fs_bug_on in terms of max_depth

There is no report on this bug_on case, but if malicious attacker changed this
field intentionally, we can just reset it as a MAX value.

Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/dir.c b/fs/f2fs/dir.c
index 3da58265c0d404fcc16484d6b8c6770d2b831c36..29bb8dd76a46e7a589e9a2c3f0d22a9867373863 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/f2fs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/dir.c
@@ -172,8 +172,6 @@ static struct f2fs_dir_entry *find_in_level(struct inode *dir,
 
        namehash = f2fs_dentry_hash(&name);
 
-       f2fs_bug_on(F2FS_I_SB(dir), level > MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH);
-
        nbucket = dir_buckets(level, F2FS_I(dir)->i_dir_level);
        nblock = bucket_blocks(level);
 
@@ -238,6 +236,14 @@ struct f2fs_dir_entry *f2fs_find_entry(struct inode *dir,
                goto out;
 
        max_depth = F2FS_I(dir)->i_current_depth;
+       if (unlikely(max_depth > MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH)) {
+               f2fs_msg(F2FS_I_SB(dir)->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+                               "Corrupted max_depth of %lu: %u",
+                               dir->i_ino, max_depth);
+               max_depth = MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH;
+               F2FS_I(dir)->i_current_depth = max_depth;
+               mark_inode_dirty(dir);
+       }
 
        for (level = 0; level < max_depth; level++) {
                de = find_in_level(dir, level, &fname, res_page);