EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata

When EVM is enabled it forbids modification of metadata protected by
EVM unless there is already a valid EVM signature. If any modification
is made, the kernel will then generate a new EVM HMAC. However, this
does not map well on use cases which use only asymmetric EVM signatures,
as in this scenario the kernel is unable to generate new signatures.

This patch extends the /sys/kernel/security/evm interface to allow
userland to request that modification of these xattrs be permitted. This
is only permitted if no keys have already been loaded. In this
configuration, modifying the metadata will invalidate the EVM appraisal
on the file in question. This allows packaging systems to write out new
files, set the relevant extended attributes and then move them into
place.

There's also some refactoring of the use of evm_initialized in order to
avoid heading down codepaths that assume there's a key available.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
index 9578247e17929bf4fcd6bd50b185f955031dc96d..d12cb2eae9ee658e552c81c9009e2759a9142d58 100644 (file)
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
@@ -14,30 +14,46 @@ Description:
                generated either locally or remotely using an
                asymmetric key. These keys are loaded onto root's
                keyring using keyctl, and EVM is then enabled by
-               echoing a value to <securityfs>/evm:
+               echoing a value to <securityfs>/evm made up of the
+               following bits:
 
-               1: enable HMAC validation and creation
-               2: enable digital signature validation
-               3: enable HMAC and digital signature validation and HMAC
-                  creation
+               Bit       Effect
+               0         Enable HMAC validation and creation
+               1         Enable digital signature validation
+               2         Permit modification of EVM-protected metadata at
+                         runtime. Not supported if HMAC validation and
+                         creation is enabled.
+               31        Disable further runtime modification of EVM policy
 
-               Further writes will be blocked if HMAC support is enabled or
-               if bit 32 is set:
+               For example:
 
-               echo 0x80000002 ><securityfs>/evm
+               echo 1 ><securityfs>/evm
 
-               will enable digital signature validation and block
-               further writes to <securityfs>/evm.
+               will enable HMAC validation and creation
 
-               Until this is done, EVM can not create or validate the
-               'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.
-               Loading keys and signaling EVM should be done as early
-               as possible.  Normally this is done in the initramfs,
-               which has already been measured as part of the trusted
-               boot.  For more information on creating and loading
-               existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to:
+               echo 0x80000003 ><securityfs>/evm
 
-               Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst. Both dracut
-               (via 97masterkey and 98integrity) and systemd (via
+               will enable HMAC and digital signature validation and
+               HMAC creation and disable all further modification of policy.
+
+               echo 0x80000006 ><securityfs>/evm
+
+               will enable digital signature validation, permit
+               modification of EVM-protected metadata and
+               disable all further modification of policy
+
+               Note that once a key has been loaded, it will no longer be
+               possible to enable metadata modification.
+
+               Until key loading has been signaled EVM can not create
+               or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns
+               INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.  Loading keys and signaling EVM
+               should be done as early as possible.  Normally this is
+               done in the initramfs, which has already been measured
+               as part of the trusted boot.  For more information on
+               creating and loading existing trusted/encrypted keys,
+               refer to:
+               Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst. Both
+               dracut (via 97masterkey and 98integrity) and systemd (via
                core/ima-setup) have support for loading keys at boot
                time.

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 241aca315b0c351d6897e4e6d9ee2261cbbb3bcb..3d05250e831394a50242da89843e2db62aca8c6c 100644 (file)
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -23,9 +23,12 @@
 
 #define EVM_INIT_HMAC  0x0001
 #define EVM_INIT_X509  0x0002
-#define EVM_SETUP       0x80000000 /* userland has signaled key load */
+#define EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES      0x0004
+#define EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE 0x80000000 /* userland has signaled key load */
 
-#define EVM_INIT_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_SETUP)
+#define EVM_KEY_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509)
+#define EVM_INIT_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE | \
+                      EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
 
 extern int evm_initialized;
 extern char *evm_hmac;

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 9826c02e2db8f789eea2dc9d209db7e605839de0..ba89c246829837b00510d5244387db10d9172375 100644 (file)
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ static void __init evm_init_config(void)
        pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs);
 }
 
+static bool evm_key_loaded(void)
+{
+       return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK);
+}
+
 static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
        struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
@@ -241,7 +246,7 @@ enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
                                      void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
                                      struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 {
-       if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
+       if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
                return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 
        if (!iint) {
@@ -265,7 +270,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
        struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 
-       if (!evm_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
+       if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
                return 0;
        return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
 }
@@ -299,6 +304,7 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
                        return 0;
                goto out;
        }
+
        evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
        if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
                struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -345,6 +351,12 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 {
        const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
 
+       /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
+        * there's no HMAC key loaded
+        */
+       if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+               return 0;
+
        if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
                if (!xattr_value_len)
                        return -EINVAL;
@@ -365,6 +377,12 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
  */
 int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 {
+       /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
+        * there's no HMAC key loaded
+        */
+       if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+               return 0;
+
        return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 }
 
@@ -393,8 +411,8 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
 void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
                             const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
-       if (!evm_initialized || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)
-                                && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)))
+       if (!evm_key_loaded() || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)
+                                 && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)))
                return;
 
        evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
@@ -414,7 +432,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
  */
 void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 {
-       if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
+       if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
                return;
 
        evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
@@ -431,6 +449,12 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
        unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
        enum integrity_status evm_status;
 
+       /* Policy permits modification of the protected attrs even though
+        * there's no HMAC key loaded
+        */
+       if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+               return 0;
+
        if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
                return 0;
        evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
@@ -456,7 +480,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
  */
 void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
 {
-       if (!evm_initialized)
+       if (!evm_key_loaded())
                return;
 
        if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
@@ -473,7 +497,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
        struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data;
        int rc;
 
-       if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
+       if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
                return 0;
 
        xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index 319cf16d6603050f4ac6fef1f3e2aa31c7a941ce..feba03bbedae25f4a4e6b89cfda2990451c41391 100644 (file)
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
        if (*ppos != 0)
                return 0;
 
-       sprintf(temp, "%d", (evm_initialized & ~EVM_SETUP));
+       sprintf(temp, "%d", (evm_initialized & ~EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE));
        rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
 
        return rc;
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 {
        int i, ret;
 
-       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP))
+       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE))
                return -EPERM;
 
        ret = kstrtoint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i);
@@ -75,16 +75,30 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
        if (!i || (i & ~EVM_INIT_MASK) != 0)
                return -EINVAL;
 
+       /* Don't allow a request to freshly enable metadata writes if
+        * keys are loaded.
+        */
+       if ((i & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) &&
+           ((evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK) != 0) &&
+           !(evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES))
+               return -EPERM;
+
        if (i & EVM_INIT_HMAC) {
                ret = evm_init_key();
                if (ret != 0)
                        return ret;
                /* Forbid further writes after the symmetric key is loaded */
-               i |= EVM_SETUP;
+               i |= EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE;
        }
 
        evm_initialized |= i;
 
+       /* Don't allow protected metadata modification if a symmetric key
+        * is loaded
+        */
+       if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)
+               evm_initialized &= ~(EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES);
+
        return count;
 }