]> asedeno.scripts.mit.edu Git - linux.git/commitdiff
KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
authorKarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Thu, 1 Feb 2018 21:59:45 +0000 (22:59 +0100)
committerThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Sat, 3 Feb 2018 22:06:52 +0000 (23:06 +0100)
[ Based on a patch from Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> ]

Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for
guests that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not
be using a retpoline+IBPB based approach.

To avoid the overhead of saving and restoring the MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for
guests that do not actually use the MSR, only start saving and restoring
when a non-zero is written to it.

No attempt is made to handle STIBP here, intentionally. Filtering STIBP
may be added in a future patch, which may require trapping all writes
if we don't want to pass it through directly to the guest.

[dwmw2: Clean up CPUID bits, save/restore manually, handle reset]

Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-5-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c

index 1909635fe09c9f848d292fbbd138833c3c3da3b3..13f5d4217e4f1c0ee27f13935b04725949aa30d2 100644 (file)
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
 
        /* cpuid 0x80000008.ebx */
        const u32 kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features =
-               F(IBPB);
+               F(IBPB) | F(IBRS);
 
        /* cpuid 0xC0000001.edx */
        const u32 kvm_cpuid_C000_0001_edx_x86_features =
@@ -394,7 +394,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
 
        /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
        const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
-               F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
+               F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) |
+               F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
 
        /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
        get_cpu();
@@ -630,9 +631,11 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
                        g_phys_as = phys_as;
                entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8);
                entry->edx = 0;
-               /* IBPB isn't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */
+               /* IBRS and IBPB aren't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */
                if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
                        entry->ebx |= F(IBPB);
+               if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+                       entry->ebx |= F(IBRS);
                entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features;
                cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX);
                break;
index e5f75eb7c459c2d5971b17f9dec9e41df8e20271..bee4c49f6dd0849de280e00fac7ab6777e484bbb 100644 (file)
@@ -595,6 +595,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
 #endif
 
        u64                   arch_capabilities;
+       u64                   spec_ctrl;
 
        u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow;
        u32 vm_exit_controls_shadow;
@@ -1910,6 +1911,29 @@ static void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
        vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Check if MSR is intercepted for currently loaded MSR bitmap.
+ */
+static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+       unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
+       int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+       if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+               return true;
+
+       msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap;
+
+       if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
+               return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
+       } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) {
+               msr &= 0x1fff;
+               return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
+       }
+
+       return true;
+}
+
 /*
  * Check if MSR is intercepted for L01 MSR bitmap.
  */
@@ -3262,6 +3286,14 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
        case MSR_IA32_TSC:
                msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu);
                break;
+       case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+               if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+                   !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
+                   !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+                       return 1;
+
+               msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
+               break;
        case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
                if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
                    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
@@ -3375,6 +3407,37 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
        case MSR_IA32_TSC:
                kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info);
                break;
+       case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+               if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+                   !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
+                   !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+                       return 1;
+
+               /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
+               if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP))
+                       return 1;
+
+               vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
+
+               if (!data)
+                       break;
+
+               /*
+                * For non-nested:
+                * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
+                * it through.
+                *
+                * For nested:
+                * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
+                * nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the
+                * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten
+                * in the merging. We update the vmcs01 here for L1 as well
+                * since it will end up touching the MSR anyway now.
+                */
+               vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap,
+                                             MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+                                             MSR_TYPE_RW);
+               break;
        case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
                if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
                    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) &&
@@ -5700,6 +5763,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
        u64 cr0;
 
        vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
+       vmx->spec_ctrl = 0;
 
        vmx->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = get_rdx_init_val();
        kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, 0);
@@ -9371,6 +9435,15 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
        vmx_arm_hv_timer(vcpu);
 
+       /*
+        * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
+        * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
+        * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
+        * being speculatively taken.
+        */
+       if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
+               wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
+
        vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched;
        asm(
                /* Store host registers */
@@ -9489,6 +9562,27 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 #endif
              );
 
+       /*
+        * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
+        * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
+        * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding
+        * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former
+        * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM.
+        *
+        * For non-nested case:
+        * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+        * save it.
+        *
+        * For nested case:
+        * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+        * save it.
+        */
+       if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))
+               rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
+
+       if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
+               wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+
        /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
        vmexit_fill_RSB();
 
@@ -10113,7 +10207,7 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
        unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1;
        unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap;
        /*
-        * pred_cmd is trying to verify two things:
+        * pred_cmd & spec_ctrl are trying to verify two things:
         *
         * 1. L0 gave a permission to L1 to actually passthrough the MSR. This
         *    ensures that we do not accidentally generate an L02 MSR bitmap
@@ -10126,9 +10220,10 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
         *    the MSR.
         */
        bool pred_cmd = msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD);
+       bool spec_ctrl = msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
 
        if (!nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12) &&
-           !pred_cmd)
+           !pred_cmd && !spec_ctrl)
                return false;
 
        page = kvm_vcpu_gpa_to_page(vcpu, vmcs12->msr_bitmap);
@@ -10162,6 +10257,12 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                }
        }
 
+       if (spec_ctrl)
+               nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(
+                                       msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+                                       MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+                                       MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
+
        if (pred_cmd)
                nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(
                                        msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
index 4ec142e90a34eaec6b9a6669f1d7f258cfec86ee..ac381437c29113c8bf9f49a95f63af3424248d50 100644 (file)
@@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@ static u32 msrs_to_save[] = {
 #endif
        MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA,
        MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX,
-       MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+       MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
 };
 
 static unsigned num_msrs_to_save;